
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CONTENTS

PREFACE *RADHA BURNIER* *xi*

DR. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA — Bio-Data *ix*

DR. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA — Bibliography *xii*

J. GONDA

Translating the Veda .. *1*

K.A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

Bhartṛhari on the sentence .. *15*

G.M. BONGARD-LEVIN

Graeco-Roman Tradition and Religious-Philosophical Currents in Mauryan India .. *50*

ROSANE ROCHER

The Vivādārṇavasetu .. *63*

FRITS STAAL

Vedic Religion in Kerala .. *74*

T. VENKATACHARYA

Names of the Three Chapters of the Rasārṇavasudhākara and their significance .. *90*

M.A. MEHENDALE

Nirukta Note XXI

Once Again Ratharyati and Samtavitvāt .. *96*

H.G. NARAHARI

Some Atharvavedic Names of a Cow .. *104*

S. SANKARANARAYANAN

Threefold Inference of the Naiyāyika-s: A Historical Study .. *107*

V.K. CHARI

'Structure' and 'Rhythm' in Sanskrit Dramatic Theory .. *120*

LUDO ROCHER

Notes on mixed castes in classical India .. *132*

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S. MAYEDA
Śamkara and Sureśvara: Their Exegetical method to interpret the great sentence 'Tat Tvam Asi' .. 147

S. LIENHARD
On the textual structure of Kāvya .. 161

WILHELM RAU
A note on the Donkey and the Mule in early Vedic literature .. 179

LUDWIK STERNBACH
On the poetical part of Amarasūri's Ambaḍacaritra .. 190

S. VENKITASUBRAMONIA IYER
Metrical Eminence of Vedāntadeśika's Yādavābhyudaya .. 205

E.R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA
Sphoṭa and Śaṃkara .. 223

A.G. KRISHNA WARRIER
The Logic of Nivṛtti in Advaita .. 229

MADHAV M. DESHPANDE
Announcing a critical Edition of the Śaunakīyā Caturadhyāyikā (alias Whitney's Atharva-Veda Pratiśākhya) .. 241

J. MOUSSAIEFF MASSON
Are there universal criteria for Aesthetic Judgments? .. 253

V. BALAMBAL
Crime and Punishment in Saṅgam Age .. 261

ALEX WAYMAN
Notes on Metaphoric transfer .. 275

J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT
Privileged Lies .. 286

PATRICK OLIVELLE
Anandatirtha's Saṃnyāsapaddhati .. 293

G.B. PALSULE
Verbal Forms Peculiar to the Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala VI .. 304

SATYA VRAT SHASTRI
Taddhita Formations in the Yogavāsiṣṭha 320

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SADASHIV A. DANGE
The Gift of the Bed .. 333
BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL
Rāmā's Moral Decisions .. 344
HARTMUT SCHARFE
Overinterpretation Versus Redundancy .. 352
E.A. SOLOMON
Nyāya-sūtra, 5.2.2.—The Nigrahasthana Pratijñā-Hāni .. 358
S.D. JOSHI
Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa on the Meaning of Compounds .. 369
BISWANATH BHATTACHARYA
Yamaka in Ārya-śūra's Jātaka-Mālā .. 390
GEORGE CARDONA
On the Domain of Pānini's Metarule 1.3.10: Yathāsaṃkhyam Anudeśaḥ Samānām .. 394
SARVESWARA SHARMA PERI
Correctness of the Vocative Singular Form Subhru .. 410
SUSAN OLEKSIW
Dicing in the Mrcchakatika .. 415
T. BURROW
Five notes on Sanskrit Etymology .. 436
ARVIND SHARMA
A note on Franklin Edgerton's interpretation of Āhāra in Bhagavadgītā 2.59 .. 446
K. KRISHNAMOORTHY
Sidelights on the Theory of Dhvani .. 451
N.P. UNNI
Muṣikavaṃśa and the change-over to the matrilineal system in Kerala .. 463
HAJIME NAKAMURA
Śaṃkara's Vivaraṇa on the Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya .. 475
PARAMESWARA AITHAL
On the Cāturmāsya-prayoga of Anantadeva .. 486

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Digitized by Sarayu Trust Foundation and eGangotri

LOKESH CHANDRA
Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara as the Buddhist Apotheosis of Hari-Hara .. 506

KATSUHIKO KAMIMURA
Bhaṭṭa Narasimha's Sarasvatī Kaṇṭhābharana-Vyākhyā .. 528

M.D. BALASUBRAHMANYAM
Accent It-s in the kṛt suffixes .. 543

K.M. PRABHAKARA VARIAR
Syntax and Semantics of Interjections .. 556

N.V.P. UNITHIRI
Commentarial Literature in Sanskrit .. 572

ASHOK AKLUJKAR
Interpreting Vākyapadīya 2.486 Historically (Part 1) .. 581

M. SRIMANNARAYANA MURTI
Bhartṛhari on Svam Rūpam Śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā .. 602

A.K. WARDER
The origins of the technical senses of the word Rasa .. 614

ALAKA HEJIB & ARAVIND SHARMA
A note on Pāṇini 6.1.87 .. 635

MUSASHI TACHIKAWA
'Pratītyasamutpāda' in the dedication of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā .. 639

MARIA CHRISTOPHER BYRSKI
Is Manu's Varṇadharma an obsolete sociological concept? .. 654

ANANTALAL THAKUR
Nyāyadarśane sukhacarcā Ānandamokṣavādaś ca .. 662

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PREFACE

It is with much pleasure that I pen these words on behalf of the Adyar Library and Research Centre and the Theosophical Society to felicitate Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja who, like his uncle Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, has done notable work, in the field of Sanskrit learning. The Adyar Library and Research Centre has for many years had the advantage of his cooperation, advice and participation in its activities and it is only fitting that the present volume, honouring Dr. Raja, should be brought out by the Library.

Dr. Raja has had a distinguished career with a wide range of writings to his credit as evidenced by the bibliography of his publications included in this volume. The many contributions received from scholars in India and abroad are tributes not only to the notable nature of his literary productions and scholarship, but also to the amiability and culture which he embodies in his person. Many friends in the scholarly world would share with Dr. A.L. Basham, Professor Emeritus of the Australian National University, feelings which he has expressed in the following words:-

"I have known Professor Kunjunni Raja for many years and have great respect for him both as a man and as a scholar. He has already made very important contributions to Sanskrit and Indological studies and I trust that he will have many more years of fruitful life before him, in which he may add yet further to our knowledge of India's past."

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We look forward to many more years of further association between Dr. Kunjunni Raja and the Adyar Library in order to bring deeper knowledge of India's philosophy and culture to the world.

11 January 1982

Radha Burnier

International President of the Theosophical Society

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TRANSLATING THE VEDA

(with regard to *AiĀr.* 2. 6. 1)

ANY translation has to face the fact that languages are super-individual cultural products transmitted to the speakers and writers by their ancestors and predecessors and shaping their concepts and knowledge, their apprehension and interpretation of the world. There is, for example, no intrinsic reason for dividing up the continuous scale of colours in the way to which their speech-habits have accustomed English speaking people—various peoples analyse the spectrum in different ways and distinguish different colours or regard as a matter of intensity what others are accustomed to call 'colours'. Nor is there general uniformity in classifying the terms of family relationship, some languages distinguishing between paternal and maternal relations, others disregarding this difference. So we cannot expect that there is any necessity to distinguish the various functions and products of the human mind in the same way as, for instance, the Vedic Indians or the modern English did or do by means of their language. It is indeed a well-known fact that even between nearly related languages striking differences exist in this respect: while the English distinguish between

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learning, *science* and *scholarship*, the Dutch have only one word, namely *wetenschap*, which, moreover, is sometimes to be translated by *knowledge*. And if we wish to seek for the right equivalent of the Dutch *wetenschap* in Sanskrit we have to make a choice among several terms: *vidyā*, *śāstra*, *pāṇḍitya*, *jñāna*, etc., which, as is well known, are neither synonymous with nor equivalent to the above English words.

As to *jñāna*, in *GopBr.* **1**. 1. 20 it is co-ordinated with *manas* (another word for which 'modern' languages such as English have no counterpart) just as, in the preceding paragraphs, the nose is co-ordinated with breath (*prāṇa*), the eyes with light. That means that *jñāna* is considered to be one of the organs of sense and that its function presupposes, or depends on, the existence of *manas*. This is clearly not the meaning in *GobhGS.* **1**. 5. 12 where the author, stating that the time of full moon can be reckoned in three ways, says that 'on what day it becomes full, the knowledge of (information on, rather than, with Oldenberg, doctrine), that point is a separate chapter'. Neither translation applies to *BhārGS.* **1**. 11: here the author argues that it is of little avail if a girl whom one wishes to marry has *jñāna*, i.e. 'learning, erudition', in contrast to *prajñā* 'intelligence, sound judgment, cleverness' which is among the desirable qualities of a woman; *MānGS.* **1**. 7. 6. adds *vidyā* 'applicable knowledge'.

Those who make it a rule to translate terms belonging to the vocabulary of the intellectual or spiritual life of the Vedic Indians always by one and the same English

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or German word on the assumption that the Vedic and the English (etc.) words are equivalent are, therefore, generally speaking, grossly mistaken.[1] They seriously risk misinterpreting the original text or 'stretching out' the semantic possibilities of the word that is used as a translation making it more or less unintelligible. That is not to say that one should not try to translate the same Sanskrit term whenever it is used in exactly or virtually the same context by one and the same word. This sound principle was often disregarded by Geldner in his German translation of the *Ṛgveda*.[2] Thus in the phrase *matím prá bharati* the noun *mati* is in his work at **1**. 57. 1 translated by 'poem', in **1**. 114. 1 by 'pious thought', in **7**. 4. 1 by 'prayer'. Translators and authors of dictionaries often err also on the opposite side, namely in believing that two or even more than two Sanskrit words can be rendered into English, German, etc. by the same expressions. For instance, the first meaning of both *medhā* and *manīṣā* is said to be 'wisdom' (i.e. 'sound judgment').[3] However, real synonyms are extremely rare. As a rule the so-called synonyms are words whose ranges of usage are very close to each other. In that rather frequent case

[1] I refer to my article on the study of ancient-Indian religious terminology, in History of Religion 1 (Chicago 1961), p. 243 ff. (= J. Gonda, *Selected Studies*, Leiden 1975, II, p. 1 ff.).

[2] K. F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda . . .übersetzt*, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, 3 vol.

[3] H. Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*, Leipzig 1873, 996; 1063.

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a translator should try to reproduce their meaning by different words, however difficult it may often be to find them. It must indeed be admitted that the large number of important words that are, so to say, to some extent 'synonymous' is one of the main difficulties with which a translator of the Veda is confronted.

From the above facts and remarks it may be inferred that the apparent multitude of meanings of many important terms such as *brahman*, *dhī*, *vāja*, *māyā*, the many 'different senses' or 'different shades of meaning' which they seem to convey, are likely to be illusory, because our 'modern' languages do not furnish us with the means of rendering by one single word an 'idea' or 'concept' that is closely connected with lines of thought which are no longer ours, which at least are not characteristic of modern argumentation and scientific dialectics. In short, the apparent 'polysemy' of many Indian terms is often only a consequence of the impossibility of translating them. Since moreover the mental attitude of the large majority of linguists has long been predominantly historical and 'history was exclusively conceived in terms of units succeeding each other along a vertical line'[1] attempts were—and still are—made to account for the various 'shades of meaning' found in our dictionaries or for the different aspects or functions distinguished in studies of Vedic religion by considering them to represent different stages of development. In doing so scholars

[1] S. Ullmann, *The Principles of Semantics*, Glasgow 1951, p. 164.

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often forgot that in dictionaries words are usually arranged in an order that is a product of a time-honoured lexicographical procedure of a mainly 'logical' classification rather than a reflection of a historical development. One should neither start from the assumption that what seems in our eyes vague, complex and indefinite, pre-scientific termini of archaic languages are really analysable in different 'meanings' that are completely equivalent to modern terms, nor consider these 'meanings' to have developed from one another in such a way as would be in tune with more or less preconceived schemes of our devising.[1]

Instead of pursuing largely atomistic and often pseudo-historical methods we had better realize that in a given period and *milieu* words are used in synchronous systems as networks held together by differences, oppositions and distinctive values; that groups of words constitute 'lexical or semantic fields' intermediate between the individual words on the one hand and the whole vocabulary of a given period and *milieu* on the other; that within such a 'field' the semantic areas of the individual units reciprocally limit one another.[2] That is to say, we should first and foremost study the meaning of words synchronistically, regarding them as forming aggregations or associations of units between which there exist relations and connexions and attempt

[1] I also refer to my article 'Postscript on Mitra', in *ABORI*, Diamond Jub. Vol. (Poona 1977-78), p. 137 ff.

[2] See e.g. Ullmann, op. cit., p. 152 ff.

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to understand these connexions, that is, the differences in use and meaning of the separate units, as well as the extent to which they are semi-synonymous, that is interchangeable. One might say that the 'classification of various mental functions'[1] found in *AiĀr.* 2. 6. 1 and *AiUp.* **5**. 2 (**3**. 1. 2) not only helps us to form an idea of such a field but also shows that some ancient authorities themselves tried—for reasons that at the moment can be left out of consideration—to collect the terms that belonged, in the above way, together and to give the field, the aggregation, a characteristic name. The passage runs as follows: *yad etad dhṛdayaṃ manaś caitat saṃjñānam ājñānaṃ vijñānaṃ prajñānaṃ medhā dṛṣṭir dhṛtir matir manīṣā jūtiḥ smṛtiḥ saṃkalpaḥ kratur asuḥ kāmo vaśa iti. sarvāṇy evaitāni prajñānasya nāmadheyāni bhavanti.* We may have our doubts about the correctness of the opinion expressed by Keith[2]: 'that these terms . . . had ever any definite meanings is most improbable.'

Although some of these words are not often found in our Vedic texts a close examination of the contexts in which they occur shows that they are not synonymous and that the force of at least part of them can tolerably well be defined or paraphrased. Thus *vijñāna* is 'discriminative knowledge, discrimination' (e.g. *ŚatBr.* **3**. 3. 4. 11; **8**. 7. 2. 10; 11). In the early texts *saṃjñāna* means 'agreement, accord, accordance, harmony,

[1] S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, London 1953, p. 523.

[2] A. B. Keith, *The Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, Oxford 1909 (1969), p. 234.

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mutual understanding' and the verb *saṃ-jñā-* 'to agree, etc.': e.g. *ŚatBr.* **1**. 1. 4. 5; **1**. 2. 1. 17, where *saṃjñāna* is the name of that situation in which those find themselves who acknowledge and do not hurt each other; **2**. 3. 4. 16 'heaven and earth are in accord with each other': *saṃjānāne*; **13**. 1. 6. 1 'to get on amicably together' (Eggeling); **1**. 4. 5. 10 'what "mind" (*manas*) knows, speech (*vāc*) makes known so as to produce discrimination (disagreement, discord) or agreement (assent, concord)' rather than 'makes known, communicates' (Eggeling); **3**. 6. 4. 14 a tree that has been cut to be a sacrificial stake is addressed 'be joined (*saṃbhava*) with the earth', which is explained as 'agree, be in harmony (*saṃjānīṣva*) with the earth'; since saline soil (*ūṣā*) is said to mean cattle (**7**. 3. 1. 8) and scattering saline soil makes a man of equal amnion with the gods and hence agreeing with them (**7**. 1. 1. 7), places such as *TS.* **5**. 2. 3. 2 f. (cf. *TBr.* **1**. 1. 3. 1; **1**. 2. 1. 17) become clearer: salt ground is nourishment and propagation as well as the concord (complaisance, cf. *AVŚ.* **3**. 14. 4; *AVP.* **20**. 5. 5; *RV.* **10**. 19. 4) of cattle (no doubt, because it 'agrees with them'); for discord (*asaṃjñāna*) and concord with cattle and being without and possessing cattle—see *TS.* **5**. 3. 1. 4; notwithstanding the fact that a later author such as Śaunaka in the *Bṛhaddevatā* **8**. 93 says that the hymn of 'unanimity' (*saṃjñāna*; cf. *Ṛgvidhāna* **4**. 24. 5 f. 'for unanimity or reconciliation') *ṚV. khila* 5. 1 is in praise of knowledge or consciousness. (*jñānasaṃstavaḥ*) one should not adopt one of these words, with Griffith, in translating VājS. **12**. 46.

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Space forbids to examine the meaning of all the above words systematically.[1] However, a few remarks may be added on *medhā*. Among the translations proposed for this word are 'wisdom, spiritual or poetical mastery, enlightenment, knowledge, thought, poetic art, poem'.[2] As far as I am able to see it is a form of mental or spiritual power and its manifestations, a kind of cleverness—the state or quality of those who evince intelligence, ingenuity, ability—that in several places is explicitly said to be a means of influencing the gods. See e.g. *ṚV.* **1**. 165. 14 *á . . . kārúr asmāñ cakré mānyásya medhā́* 'the proclaimer, (more precisely) (the exertion of) the mental power of the descendant of Māna has called us (Indra) near'; **9**. 26. 3 'him (Soma) they have urged with their *medhā* ("inspiration" Geldner, "song" Bhawe[3])'; in **9**. 65. 16 Soma is purified *medhābhiḥ*, i.e. 'by (through) the exertions or

[1] Of *saṃkalpa*, something like 'willed mental realization' (and in ritual contexts 'declaration of intention or purpose' see L. Silburn, *Instant et Cause*, Paris 1955, p.202 f.; J. Gonda, *Loka*, Amsterdam 1966, p. 51 f.) seems a probable explanation; of *kratu*, in my opinion 'an internal psychical and intellectual power such as inventiveness or resourcefulness enabling a man to proceed to successful (creative) action' (J. Gonda, *Epithets in the Ṛgveda*, The Hague 1959 p. 36 ff.).

[2] See e.g. Grassmann, op. cit.; K. F. Geldner, *Der Rigveda in Auswahl*, I, Glossar, Stuttgart 1907, p. 139; L. Renou, *Études sur le vocabulaire du Ṛgveda*, Pondichéry 1958, p. 29.

[3] See the note in S. S. Bhave (Bhawe), *The Soma-hymns of the Ṛgveda*, II, Baroda 1960, p. 45.

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manifestations of the mental power of the eulogists'.[1] Their *medhā* enabled the Ṛbhu-s to fashion Indra's horses (**4**. 33. 10; here special translations, such as 'Erfindungsgabe' (Geldner) or 'sagesse inventive' (Renou) are not necessary). Elsewhere no explicit reference is made to this effect of a poet's *medhā* (**8**. 6. 10; **8**. 52. 9; **9**. 9. 9). As to the combination *sani medhā* (**1**. 18. 6; **2**. 34. 7; **9**. 32. 6) of disputed significance,[2] it is interesting because *sani* (from *san-* 'to secure, gain') is not, in the *Ṛgveda*, found in combination with *mati* or the other words enumerated in *AiĀr*. **2**. 6. 1; but does, on the other hand, occur together with *gāyatra* 'hymn' (**1**. 27. 4 *asmākaṃ saniṃ gāyatrāṃ návyāṃsam*, where Renou's 'acquisition,' is better than Geldner's 'gift') and with *dhī* (**7**. 79. 5) where Uṣas is implored to generate, on behalf of those speaking, visions (inspirations) 'with a view to acquisition'[3]: cf. **9**. 79. 1; **10**. 142. 2. Whereas Geldner took the word group *saním medhắm* in *ṚV*. **1**. 18. 6 and **9**. 32. 6 to constitute a case of asyndetic juxtaposition ('gain and inspiration')—in **9**. 32. 6 one should, however, punctuate 'honour to the liberal patrons and me (. . . *ca* . . . *ca*), gain, etc.', not 'to me gain . . .'; in **2**. 34. 7 a comma should in my opinion be placed before 'Lohn' (gain) because *saním* belongs, with

[1] Compare J. Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, The Hague 1963, p. 104.

[2] Compare, for instance, Geldner's translations and L. Renou, *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, VIII, Paris 1961, p. 76.

[3] cf. Gonda, *Vision*, p. 145.

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medhắm, here translated by 'Gabe des Geistes' (intellectual gift'), to *pāda* 4—, Renou preferred 'gain of wisdom', 'gain accompanied by wisdom' or 'gain, namely wisdom'.[1] It would appear to me that the last interpretation (explicative asyndeton) is the most satisfactory one: the *medhā* was felt to be an acquisition by which one was enabled to exert influence or to achieve something (see also *TS.* **1**. 2. 11 b; *VājS.* **5**. 7; **12**. 7[2]).[3]

Compare *ṚV.* **9**. 9. 9 where Soma is implored to win (for those speaking) *medhā* (*sánā medhắm*)[4] and the frequent compound *medhásāti* 'acquisition of *medhá*' (not, 'winning the prize', Geldner, *ṚV.* **1**. 129. 1 or 'winning the sacrifice (*médha*)', the same, **7**. 66. 8); the man who on the occasion of *medhāsāti* is urged on by Agni will gain cows (**8**. 71. 5; cf. **8**. 103. 3; **10**. 64. 6[5]; **7**. 94. 6; **10**. 147. 3). It should be noticed that sometimes *dhī* is regarded as a prerequisite to *medhāsāti*: in **8**. 3. 18 the inspired poets (*vipra-s*) are said to long for *medhasāti* by means of their *dhī* (inspiration); in **8**. 69. 1 it probably is the 'refreshment in the shape of *triṣṭubh* verses' (*pāda* a) which, assisted by Vision (Dhī) and Plenitude

[1] Renou, *E. V. P.* XV, p. 46 f.; VIII, p. 20; 76; X, p. 26.

[2] In most cases the adjective *medhira* qualifies, in the *Ṛgveda*, gods (Agni, Soma, Indra, Varuṇa) who are described as achieving or performing something. For presumed achievements of persons characterized as *medhāvin* see *BĀrUp.* **4**. 3. 33; *KaṭhaUp.* **1**. 3. 16.

[3] Bhave, op. cit., II, p. 62 interpreting the words *saním medhắm utá śrávaḥ* as 'fame gained due to the possession of poetic intelligence' seems to overlook the particle *utá*. See also *VājS.* **5**. 7 with *ŚB.* **3**. 4. 3. 18; *AiB.* **1**. 26. 4; *VājS.* **32**. 13.

[4] cf. also Gonda, *Vision*, ch. XI.

[5] Otherwise Renou, *E. V. P.* V, p. 55.

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(Puraṃdhi), guides the *ṛṣi* to the acquisition of *medhā*[1]; according to **4**. 37. 6 the one who has won the favour of the Ṛbhu-s and Indra 'shall acquire with his *dhī-s*; (*dhībhír astu sánitā*) on the occasion of *medhāsāti*. So the conclusion seems to be warranted that *medhā* is acquired in the course of a process that is initiated by vision or inspiration (*dhī*). It follows that when in *ṚV*. **7**. 66. 8 'this *mati*' is said to be 'for strength and safety' as well as 'acquisition of *medhā*' *mati* ('(materialized) inspired thought (that is supposed to be converted into actuality)') is no more synonymous with *dhī* (cf. e.g. also *AVŚ*. **6**. 133. 4) than *ṛc* in **5**. 27. 4 which I would propose to interpret as *dádad ṛcā saníṃ yaté dádan medhā́m <yaté> ṛtāyaté*[2] 'he should give to the one who with a hymn sets out to *sani*, . . . to the one who sets out to *medhā*, (if he is) true to Ṛta'. In **7**. 104. 6 it is the poet's *medhā* by which he sends (forwards) his *mati* to Indra and Śoma.

That *medhā* was on the one hand (to be) acquired by inspiration or through one of the gods who were instrumental in obtaining inspiration (cf. *ṚV*. **8**. 40. 2; *ṚVkh*. **4**. 8. 1; *VājS*. **32**. 13; *BĀUp*. **1**. 5. 1; *ĀśvG*.**1**. 15. 2; *HirGS*. **1**. 8. 4; *MahāNārUp*. 66) and during the ensuing process of composing verses and hymns[3] and on the other hand enabled its possessor to exert influence or

[1] cf. Gonda, *Vision*, p. 162; as to Puraṃdhi also Renou, *E. V. P.* III, p. 58.

[2] As to haplology see J. Gonda, *Vedic literature*, Wiesbaden 1975. p. 237. The difficult line was discussed by H. Lüders, *Varuṇa*, Göttingen 1951-1959, p. 479.

[3] I refer to my *Vedic literature*, p. 65 ff.

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to acquire or achieve something (cf. *ṚV.* **7**. 94. 6 *medhásātā saniṣyávaḥ*) appears clearly from *AVŚ.* **6**. 108 which deals with this 'concept'. In stanza 2 it is described as being filled with and quickened by *bráhman*, in 3 as being known by the Ṛbhu-s—who are renowned for their wondrous skill and the great feats of their dexterity—the *asura-s*—who have control over *māyā* (*ṚV.* **5**. 63. 3; 7)—and the *ṛṣi-s*; in 3 and 6 those speaking cause it to enter into themselves; in stanza 1 it is invited to come with cattle, horses (which it can enable its possessor to acquire) and the rays of the sun (the light of heaven, man's salvation). The explanation proposed by the commentator ('a goddess in the form of ability to remember what has been learned', *śrutadhāraṇasāmarthyarūpiṇī devī*) is inadequate. The poet of *AVŚ.* **5**. 11. 4 states that none else than Varuṇa is 'more wise by *medhā*', the adjective translated by wise (*dhīra*) meaning something like 'having insight into and knowledge of things, connections, and phenomena that are hidden from ordinary men'.[1] In *AVŚ.* **19**, 64. 1 Agni is implored to extend to the person speaking *śraddhā*, 'trustful faith or confident belief', i.e. 'a positive and affirmative attitude towards religious acts, moral precepts and the authority of Scripture', and *medhā* which in this connection is viewed as a complementary concept (. . . *ca* . . . *ca*); see also *MahāNārUp.* 433; 439 *śraddhāmedhe*[2] and the interesting passage 534 . . . *śraddhayā*

[1] cf. Gonda, *Vision*, p. 210, etc.

[2] Etymologically, these words are of the same formation (see below).

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medhā medhayā manīṣā (which may tentatively be defined as 'inspired emotional thought.'[1]) *manīṣayā manaḥ* (the essentially effective and fashioning psychical principle or 'organ' in which the processes of thought, will and feeling take place[2]).

Mention may also be made of another interesting combination contained in the ritual formulae *TS.* **1**. 2. 2a; 41. 9a; *VājS.* **4**. 7; **11**. 66, etc.: *ākūtim prayujam mano medhām*, the first two terms of which may correspond to ideas such as 'intention, purpose' and 'impulse, motive': as to *prayuj* (the verb meaning 'to yoke or harness, to prepare for, set in motion, direct, etc.'; for the noun compare also *ṚV.* **10**. 33. 1; **10**. 96. 12); this refers together with *ākūti*, to the sacrificer's *saṃkalpa* (Mahīdhara on *VājS.*); see also the explanation at *TS.* **6**. 12, 1 f. '. . . for with intention does a man "yoke", i.e. start, perform a sacrifice (with a view to a certain purpose: *abhi-pra-yuj-*),. . . by *medhā* and *manas* a man sets himself to undertake (*abhigacchati*) the sacrifice . . .' (cf. also *ŚB.* **3**. 1. 4. 6 f. and **6**. 6. 1. 15 f.). That *medhā* was felt to be a faculty for expediting matters may probably be inferred also from *VājS.* **30**. 6 enumerating the victims to be bound to the sacrificial stakes at the human sacrifice: the author has a noble person sacrificed to Royalty, a *vaiśya* to the Marut-s, etc. and a chariot-maker to the deity Medhā.

[1] ibid., p. 51 ff.

[2] ibid., p. 75. Remember that for archaic man 'the thinking function is much nearer to the centre of emotional functions and more apt to be influenced by emotional waves' (H. R. Zimmer, *Hindu Medicine*, Baltimore 1948, p. 163).

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Intelligibly enough, the man who wishes to become a preserver of the treasure of the Veda is at *MānGS.* **1**. 22. 17 said to be desirous of *medhā*. This reminds us of the *medhājanana* rite that is to be performed in order to evoke divine help in producing (in a new-born child, e.g. *PārGS.* **1**. 16. 3) or stimulating or re-activating (in a student, after a definite *vrata*) a person's mental power. Says Śaunaka, quoted in the *Vīramitrodayasaṃskāra-prakāśa*, I, p. 440: 'One who desires success in learning should worship her (Medhā) with a view to becoming accomplished in mental power (*medhāprasiddhaye*).'

The etymology proposed for *medhā* (from **mṇs-dhē* (*mṇs*, the weak stem beside *meneo-s* > Skt. *manas*)[1] 'fixing (one's) thought that may be converted into actuality (see above) on' is not incompatible with the above argument. One might also compare the noun *mandhātar*, of uncertain meaning, which in *RV.* **10**. 2. 2 is an epithet of Agni: according to the Naighaṇṭuka it is synonymous with *medhāvin*; translations such as 'a thoughtful or pious man' (Monier-Williams); 'Merker' (i.e. 'critic, judge'), or installateur des formules-pensées' ('introducer or establisher of formula-thoughts', Renou[2]) are unconvincing guesses. The 'etymological' meaning may be either 'who fixes his "mind" on' (cf. *ṚV.* **8**. 13. 20 *máno . . ví tád dadhuḥ*) or 'who places, lays in, helps to, "mind"' (remember Agni's functions).[3]

[1] I refer to M. Mayrhofer, *A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary*, II, Heidelberg 1963, p. 685 f.

[2] Renou, *E. V. P.* XIV, p. 2, but cf. p. 60 f.

[3] cf. also Gonda, *Vision*, p. 87 ff. on *dhiyaṃ dhā*.

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K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

BHARTṚHARI ON THE SENTENCE

1. To understand whatever Bhartṛhari says about language or speech, one has to remember the philosophical background in which he says it. To define a sentence is to say something about language or speech. While giving an account of his metaphysical background,[1] I pointed out that, according to Bhartṛhari, everything is a manifestation of the ultimate Reality, Brahman *śabdatattva*. The speaker, the words which he utters, the objects which the words denote and the listener are all emanations from this ultimate Word-Principle.

2. We are all born with Śabda or Vāc within us. It has been identified with our Self. We tried to understand what Bhartṛhari could have meant by this Vāc. We saw that it does not mean what we understand by language, though it is the source of all language. The new-born child also has it, though it knows no language yet. What it has to do as it grows older is to transform the *śabdabhāvanā* which it has already got into knowledge of the particular language of the speech-community to which it belongs. This inborn *śabdabhāvanā* can be transformed into any language. There

[1] See my *Bhartṛhari*, p. 181.

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is not much information on the process by which this transformation takes place. The Mīmāṃsakā-s speak about the way in which a child learns its language. For them, the chief method is the observation of the use of language by the grown-ups (*vyavahāradarśana*). They seem to conceive the process as consisting in learning the meaning of individual words by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Others, like the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s, also include this method among others in their list of the ways in which the power of words to convey their meanings is understood (*śaktigraha*). These philosophers do not speak of something being already within the child. For them, knowledge of a language comes entirely from society.

Bhartṛhari does not speak about *śaktigraha*. He observed that man does not speak in individual words. Knowledge of language is not merely knowledge of the meanings of individual words. For him, the chief reality in linguistic communication is the indivisible sentence and sentence-meaning. As pointed out in the previous section, though he speaks about the phoneme (*varṇa*) and the individual word (*pada*) as meaning-bearing-units (*sphoṭa*) the main form of the latter is the sentence. That is why a whole Kāṇḍa is devoted to the consideration of the sentence, though it says many interesting things about the individual word also. In the first Kāṇḍa the process of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is described in an atmosphere free from polemics. No attempt is made to present the arguments of those who believed that the phonemes themselves constitute

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connection with the meanings of the other words is part of the meaning of a word because, in worldly usage, we never experience unconnected word-meanings. We experience them as connected with the meaning of some word or other.

9. If the very first word can be looked upon as the sentence and its meaning as the sentence-meaning, the same thing can be said about the other words also. Each one of them can also be looked upon as the sentence. This is, therefore, another way of presenting the Mīmāṃsaka view and this will also come under *anvitābhidhāna*, because like the very first word, every other word is deemed to convey its meaning as connected with the meanings of the other words.

In all the five views of the sentence described so far, the basic assumption is that the individual words and their meanings exist before the sentence is formed. When it is formed, the individual words figure as parts of it and their meanings figure as parts of the sentence-meaning. All these views, therefore, look upon the sentence as a whole having parts (*sakhaṇḍa-pakṣa*). The parts are as real as the whole.

10. It is this view in all its different shades which is refuted in the *Vākyapadīya*. Against this *sakhaṇḍapakṣa*, Bhartṛhari puts forward the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*=the view that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible units and that they alone are real and fit for communication. Taking the stanzas and the commentary together, this view is put forward with the help of many analogies. The indivisible sentence is either internal

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or external. When it is fully manifested through utterance, it is external. Before that, when it is still in the speaker's mind, it is internal. In either case, it is an indivisible unity. It is essentially of the nature of light or knowledge because it illuminates, that is, it conveys an object. Because it is uttered it assumes the form of external sounds which only manifest it. Though indivisible, it appears to have parts, divisions. It has two aspects, the word aspect and the meaning aspect. Both are indivisible though both appear to have divisions. To explain this point the analogy of a complex cognition (*citrajñāna*) and that of the cognition of a picture are brought in. A cognition which embraces many objects at the same time is a complex cognition. As a cognition, it is one; but because of the many objects which figure in it, one sees plurality in it, though it is indivisible. Similarly, a picture is a unity and as such it has its colour. But in the different parts of a picture different colours like blue and red are also visible which, however, do not belong to the picture as a whole. Their plurality does not affect the unity of the colour of the picture. The commentator adds some more analogies. The flavour of a drink made up of many ingredients is one and unique but the flavours of the different ingredients may also be experienced. The man-lion (*narasiṃha*) of the legend is a unique Being though resemblance to a man and to a lion may be perceived in him. So is the animal gayal (*gavaya*) a unique breed, though one may see in it resemblance to a cow and a deer. The colour of the fluid in the pea-hen's egg is simple and

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therefore *abhihitānvayavāda* = the connecting together of meanings conveyed by individual words through their power called *abhidhā*.

6. Some Mīmāṃsaka-s are of the view that the verb (*ākhyātaśabda*) is the sentence. They do not mean that the verb by itself is the sentence. They are well aware that, ordinarily, a sentence consists of many words of which the verb is only one, though it may be the most important element. All that they mean is that sometimes from a mere verb a complete meaning is understood. If from a mere verb which denotes an action, a definite means to the accomplishment of that action is also understood and thus its meaning becomes completed, it should be looked upon as a sentence.

7. Whether the sentence consists entirely of the verb or whether there are other words also in it, in this view the meaning of the sentence is in the nature of an action. As soon as the verb is heard, a particular action associated with a particular agent and other accessories and therefore different from other actions is understood. When the other words of the sentence expressive of the accessories and their qualifications are heard, they do no more than confirm the understanding of a particular action which has already taken place.

8. Another view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s on the sentence is that it is the very first word of it. Their idea is that when one utters the very first word of a sentence, the meaning of the whole sentence is contained in it. The other words only make this meaning clear. The

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meaning of the whole sentence is in the very first word. Let us take the two sentences: *Devadatta*! *gām abhyāja*= 'O Devadatta! lead the cow away' and *Devadatta*! *gām badhāna*='O Devadatta! tie the cow'. Though the word 'Devadatta' seems to be the same in these two sentences, it is a mistake. They have been uttered to express two different meanings, namely, the meanings of the two sentences. The very first word of a sentence is uttered, not to convey the meaning of that word only, but that of the whole sentence. As the meanings of the above two sentences are different, the word 'Devadatta' at the beginning of one is not the same as the word 'Devadatta' at the other. They only look alike. Each of them conveys the meaning of the whole sentence in which it is found but only vaguely. The listener wants some more help to be able to understand it clearly and the other words of the sentence are meant to give this help. They say nothing new. They only bring out what is already in the very first word. This view of the sentence-meaning is *anvitābhidhāna*='the conveying of what is already connected', because the very first word conveys its meaning as connected with those of the others. In the other view, namely, *abhihitānvaya*, the first word like the other words conveys only an abstracted, unconnected universal. But as these universals are incomplete and require one another, they become connected, and the meaning which then emerges is the sentence-meaning. It does not come from the words, but from the word-meanings. In *anvitābhidhāna*, on the other hand,

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the view of the Mīmāṃsakā-s. Their view is briefly as follows: The sentence and the sentence-meaning are the result of joining together smaller units called words and word-meanings. Their view is put in five different ways.

4. One way of putting it says that the sentence is a collection (*saṃghāta*) of words depending upon one another and jointly conveying a connected meaning. The chief thing to note in this way of putting it is that the individual words themselves constitute the sentence which is not something apart from them. A particular view of the sentence naturally leads to a particular view of the sentence-meaning. Before a word enters into a sentence, it has a certain meaning. When it enters into a sentence it conveys that same meaning, neither more nor less. But when words stand together in a sentence, a new meaning over and above the meaning of the individual words results and it belongs to the collection of words. This extra meaning consists in connecting together the meanings of the individual words. That is why the sentence-meaning, according to this view, is called *saṃsarga* = mutual connection. Some people believe that this new meaning exists in the meanings of all the individual words taken together and not in any one of them or in each of them. It is like number. The number ten, for example, exists in all the ten objects counted, taken together and not in each of them. According to others, the sentence-meaning does not exist as distinct from the word-meaning. The word meaning is a universal. In the

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presence of another word, it becomes restricted to one single particular. In that state, it is called sentence-meaning. As this is the Mīmāṃsaka view of the sentence it is connected with a definition found in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s* of Jaimini. According to that, a set of words becomes a sentence if they convey a connected meaning, provided that, when they are in isolation, the meaning of each word is incomplete and requires to be completed.

5. Another way of putting the Mīmāṃsaka view is that the sentence is nothing more than the sequence of the individual words constituting it. It is not something verbal which can be heard because a sequence cannot be heard. Sequence is a property of time and it is super-imposed on the individual words. In this view of the sentence also, the sentence-meaning consists in connecting together the meanings of individual words, in particularizing the universal meanings of individual words. This is done by the sequence of individual words. If Śabda is what is expressive of the meaning, here that property must be ascribed to the sequence and not to the individual words which can be heard.

What is to be noted in the two views given above is that in both of them the sentence-meaning arises when the meanings of individual words which, by themselves consisting of universals, are particularized when they are connected with one another. In other words the sentence-meaning does not come from the words but from their meanings which require one another (*ākāṅkṣā*). This view of the sentence-meaning is

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the word and that there is no entity over and above them. Its existence over and above them is taken for granted. The only divergent view that is presented there is the one which looks upon the *sphoṭa* as a transitory thing of which the sounds constitute the reverberation. In contrast to all this, in the second Kāṇḍa, there is an atmosphere of polemics. The opponent of Bhartṛhari is anyone who accords reality to the individual word and its meaning. The arguments of those who hold this view and their objections to the orthodox view of the grammarians are presented again and again and rejected.

What Bhartṛhari tries to explain again and again is that the sentence and its meaning are indivisible units and that they alone are real (*satya*). Individual words and their meanings have neither definiteness nor reality. Communication is done with sentences and not with individual words. Communication (*lokavyavahāra*) is carried on through sentences and sentence-meanings. Communication means the transference of what the speaker has in his mind to the listener. What he has in his mind may be a fact or a fantasy but it exists as a unity and the expression through which he communicates it also exists as a unity. This unity is the sentence. When the hearer also grasps this unity, both of the word and the meaning, communication has taken place. These two unities exist in the mind of the speaker as distinct from each other, as the expressive word (*vācaka*) and the expressed meaning (*vācya*). It is only in that condition that communication is possible. There is

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a stage not available to the ordinary man where these two unities exist, not as distinct from each other, but as one. In that stage, communication is not possible. The knowledge of the Ṛṣi-s is in that stage. It is beyond the worldly level, and it cannot be communicated. When there is complete absence of differentiation, there cannot be any communication. Communication includes subsequent effective action and that is why error (*upaghātajaṃ jñānam*) due to some defect in the senses is said to be uncommunicable. Nor can there be any communication when there is extreme differentiation. The grammarian splits up the sentence into words and the words into root and suffix or into stem and suffix. With these completely differentiated elements, there cannot be any communication. That is, there cannot be *loka-vyavahāra*, worldly transaction. Of course, it is necessary for the grammarian to split the sentence in this manner to do his work, that is, for *śāstra-vyavahāra*. But extreme differentiation is not helpful in worldly transaction. The knowledge of the Ṛṣi-s, extremely undifferentiated, is not communicable, because it cannot be formulated in words. But the Ṛṣi-s do not always remain in that condition. They take part in everyday life also and then they are like everybody else. They cognize the phenomenal world and formulate their cognitions in sentences like ordinary people.

3. Sentence then being the unit of communication, Bhartṛhari enters into a detailed consideration of it. In order to establish his own view of it, he refutes chiefly

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existence of parts in the sentence and sentence-meaning. Arguing on the grammarian's own ground, the Mīmāṃsaka says that the distinction between *paryudāsa*= negation in which the negative particle is connected with the verb and *prasajyapratiṣedha*= a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the noun is possible only if the particle, the verb and the noun can be isolated from the sentence, that is, if they are real and expressive.

14. It is further pointed out that unless the words and word-meanings are real, the connection of a Dvandva compound with a plural verb would be inexplicable because its meaning being indivisible would involve no differentiation and plurality and there would be no occasion for the use of the plural number in the verb. Nor would it be possible to connect the action denoted by the verb separately with one of the objects denoted by the compound because, according to the doctrine of indivisibility, they have no separate existence. If, like a sentence, a compound word and its meaning are also indivisible, all discussion about the relative importance of the first or second term of a compound becomes futile and yet grammar does indulge seriously in such discussions and arrives at decisions. Equally futile would be discussions as to whether the different terms entering into a compound word give up their original meaning or not (*jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā vrttiḥ*). It is not merely the *śāstra-s* which proceed on the assumption that the individual words and their meanings are real. The average man in the world does the same.

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When the sentence *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is uttered and the listener understands *vanād ānīyatām*, but does not understand the word *pika* and enquires after the meaning of that word only. Obviously, in his consciousness and we must assume, in that of the speaker also, the word *pika* has a separate existence. It would become tedious to describe in detail all the arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka to prove the reality of the individual word. The few samples which have been given above are enough to show their way of reasoning.

15. All these arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka are met by Bhartṛhari by having recourse to his spirit of accommodation which has already been referred to in the section on Bhartṛhari and Darśana-s. While strongly upholding the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning, Bhartṛhari admits the need for splitting them into parts in order to serve practical purposes. The purpose which he has in mind is the fulfilment of the task of the grammarian, namely, the explanation of the word which is used for communication. The sentence is the unit of communication but it cannot be understood as it is by us ordinary mortals. It has to be artificially split up into parts as a means of explaining the sentence. Once this analysis is done, the result can be made use of by other *śāstra-s* also for their own purpose. The Mīmāṃsaka, for instance, can use the analysed parts in order to interpret Vedic injunctions and Vedic ritual. It does not matter whether the analysed divisions have the same degree of reality as the indivisible sentence.

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sūtra should be followed in preference to what is mentioned later. The principle behind this relative strength is that a clue which brings the idea to the mind quicker must be considered to be stronger and that which brings the idea to the mind with delay (*arthaviprakarṣa*) must be considered to be weaker.

13. Similarly there are certain other principles followed in the world and in the sciences and they would all become inexplicable if the individual word and its meaning are denied any existence. One such principle is *prasaṅga*, that is, the single performance of a subsidiary action accepted as helping a primary action other than the one to which it belongs. The principle is followed in the world also as when a teacher is giving instruction to one pupil and other pupils come and profit by it. It can be seen in Vyākaraṇa also. P. 1. 1. 27 not only gives the name *sarvanāma* to certain words but it also tells us incidentally that in the name *n* does not become *ṇ* as it normally should. This principle would not work if the individual word had no meaning. Another principle called *tantra* is dealt with in ch. **10** of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s*. An example from the world of the observance of this principle of *tantra* is that of several students using one lamp for their study. The use of the word *tapara* in P.I. 1. 70 in two meanings is an example of *tantra* from Vyākaraṇa. Another principle is *ūha*. It consists in the modification of a *mantra* prescribed for a *prakṛtiyāga* (model sacrifice) in order to suit the circumstances of a *vikṛtiyāga*. The modification usually consists in picking out one word of a *mantra* and

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substituting another word for it. Obviously this would not be possible if the individual words were not real. *Atideśa* is the subject of the seventh and eighth chapters of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s*. It means the transference of the details of the model sacrifice to those which are modelled on it. In Vyākaraṇa also some *sūtra-s* like P. I. 1. 83 are actually called *atideśa-sūtra-s*. Such transference involves the removal of a word from its original context and placing it in a new one and it presupposes the reality of the individual word. How to determine the order in which the different minor acts belonging to a sacrifice are to be performed is discussed in the fifth chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s*. Many guides are mentioned there. The order in which grammatical operations are done is important in grammar for arriving at the correct forms of words. The clues given in Mīmāṃsā for determining order all depend upon the reality of the individual words and their meaning. Much space is devoted in Mīmāṃsā to the question of what is primary and what is subsidiary. In the process of threshing the corn to be used for making the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) for instance, threshing is subsidiary to the corn to unhusk which it is done. Among the different actions constituting a Vedic sacrifice some are directly useful while others are so only indirectly. For instance, the threshing of the corn is directly useful for the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa, while the *prayāja* is so only indirectly. This distinction between primary and subsidiary, directly useful and indirectly useful, presupposes the

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to be performed with a particular material. If, for some reason, rice is not available, the ceremony must be performed with the nearest substitute, so that a Vedic injunction may not remain neglected. But it would be impossible to use a substitute if the sentence is indivisible, because then the whole sentence would just teach one thing, a particular ceremony of which rice is a part. If the ceremony is performed with something else, say, barley, the ceremony itself becomes different so that another ceremony is substituted for what is enjoined and that is not allowed. One can have a substitute for a material but not for the ritual itself. The sentence being indivisible, it does not teach two things. It does not say: (1) that one should perform the ritual, (2) that it should be done with rice. That would imply that the sentence has two parts, but we started with the assumption that the sentence is indivisible. So the sentence teaches only one thing: a ritual having a particular material. So when rice is not available and the ritual is done with some other material, it would not be a mere substitute of the material but of the ritual itself which is not allowed. When the Veda enjoins one ritual, it would be wrong to perform another.

12. This difficulty disappears in the view that words and word-meanings are real and that the sentence is not indivisible. The injunction in question must be interpreted accordingly as follows: There are two words in it—*vrīhibhiḥ* and *yajeta*. The latter says that one should perform a sacrifice. We also understand as

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an implication that it should be done with some material or other. But the verb *yajeta* does not indicate any particular material. But the word *vrīhibhiḥ* supplies the answer by saying that the sacrifice should be performed with rice. It should be looked upon as a positive injunction and not as a restriction. It specifies but does not exclude other things. It enjoins rice in the first instance but does not prevent the use of a substitute. The substitute can be used without interfering with the meaning of the verb *yajeta*. In other words, by substituting say barley for rice, one would only be using a substitute for a material and not for the ritual itself. Thus there would be no violation of the Vedic injunction. For interpreting Vedic injunctions, for arriving at an understanding of their correct meaning, the sage Jaimini has laid down six clues in his *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s* in their descending order of merit. All these clues or *pramāṇa-s* are found either in the sentence itself and their very existence, not to speak of their relative strength, depends upon the divisibility of the sentence and the reality of the divisions. To accept indivisibility of the sentence, says the Mīmāṃsaka, would go against this fundamental principle of interpretation of a sentence laid down by no less a person than Jaimini himself. Similarly, there are so many other minor and major principles laid down by him in this connection; they also presuppose the reality of the individual word and its meaning. Where there is conflict between any two of these clues, pointing to opposite conclusions, the clue mentioned earlier in the

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unique though the potentialities of the dazzling colours of the fully-grown peacock may be already in it. The doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence is also presented in three shades by the three expressions: *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*, *jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī* and *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*. These three shades of the doctrine have already been briefly described in the previous section in the course of the exposition of the doctrine of Sphoṭa. Whatever shade of the doctrine of the indivisible sentence one adopts, the sentence-meaning has been declared to be in the nature of Pratibhā = Intuition. I have already said something about Pratibhā in the section on 'Bhartṛhari and the Pramāṇā-s.' There I said that when the listener has understood the meaning of the words of a sentence, a flash of understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence takes place. It is quite different from the meanings of the individual words. It is sometimes understood even before the whole sentence has ben uttered. It is not easy to explain this flash of understanding to others. It relates to the sentence as a whole on which it rests. The meanings of the individual words manifest it. If they do not, their cognition in the middle will serve no useful purpose.

11. The doctrine of the reality and the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning was put forward in opposition to the Mīmāṃsaka-s who believe in the reality of the individual word and its meaning. The Mīmāṃsā developed in connection with the interpretation of Vedic injunctions. The principles of

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interpretation which evolved are applicable not only to Vedic texts but also to Dharmaśāstra texts and even to the language of everyday life. These principles are based on the view that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are the result of joining together smaller units called words and word-meanings. The latter are the source of the former. The authority of the Ṛk-prātiśākhya is invoked for this view. Allegedly it is stated there that the individual words are the source of the sentence. What is stated there is: *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā*.[1] If the word *padaprakṛtiḥ* is taken as a Bahuvrīhi compound, then the statement would mean that the connected text (*saṃhitā*), that is, the sentence, is that of which the individual words are the source. Of course, the compound can be taken as a Tatpuruṣa in which case we would get just the opposite meaning, namely, that the sentence is that which is the source of the individual words. However the Mīmāṃsaka-s take it in the first way and hold the view that the individual words exist before the sentence and have therefore a reality of their own. It is they which constitute the material out of which the sentence is made. This reality of the individual word and its meaning must be accepted, says the Mīmāṃsaka, if Vedic injunctions are to be carried out as prescribed. There is the injunction: *vrīhibhir yajeta* = 'One should perform the sacrifice with rice'. If it is taken as an indivisible sentence, expressing an indivisible meaning, the sentence would enjoin one thing, namely, a sacrifice

[1] *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* II. 1.

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They have not the same degree of reality as the sentence. We can infer that Patañjali also held the same view. The very fact that he says that the authors of the Padapāṭha of the Veda-s have to follow the *śāstra* in doing their work of analysing the Saṃhitā text of Veda-s shows that according to him the *padapāṭha* is man-made and not handed down from time immemorial as the Saṃhitā text is. It is the result of a grammatical analysis of the Saṃhitā. Puṇyarāja goes further and professes to quote a passage from the *Mahābhāṣya* in which Patañjali is presented as saying that the individual words are unreal and that the sentence is one and undifferentiated and that the division of a sentence into words is done only for the sake of instructing the ignorant. This passage is, however, not traceable in the *Mahābhāṣya* which we have.

16. While Bhartṛhari in a spirit of accommodation admits the need for practical purposes of analysing the sentence into words, he insists that words have no reality. He emphasizes the indefiniteness of the word. It appears in different forms in different sentences. The word *rājan*, for example, does not convey the idea of king through a particular form, but through one of its many inflectional forms. If the word had a reality, it would not be changing constantly. The compound *rāja-puruṣa* could be understood to mean: 'Shine! O man! (*puruṣa*)' and yet that is not its meaning. That shows that what looks like an individual word has no reality. How is one to determine the limits of an individual word, considering that its form changes from

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sentence to sentence? If the limits of a word cannot be determined, how can its meaning be fixed? Another reason why it is difficult to determine the form of a word is that different schools of grammar analyse words differently. *Vaira*, *Vāsiṣṭha*, *girīśa* and *ekāgārika* have been derived differently by different scholars. We divide a word into root and suffix or stem and suffix and assign a meaning to each of these divisions. Sometimes even if one of them is missing, we still understand the meaning. In *ahan*, we do not see any suffix after the root and yet it conveys the meaning assigned to the suffix. In *iyān*, there is no stem to see and yet its meaning is there. In *pacanti*, there are two suffixes: *śap* and *jhi*, but in *atti*, there is only one, namely *tip* and yet, apart from the meaning of the root, the meaning conveyed is the same. What is taught as the meaning of the suffix in one system is looked upon as the meaning of the stem in another.

17. Bhartṛhari's point in this context is not that before the sentence-meaning is understood, the listener does not understand anything else. He admits that he does understand in the middle certain partial meanings before understanding the meaning of the whole. What he emphasizes is that these partial meanings or word-meanings have no reality. They have no reality because they are unfit for communication (*vyavahāra*). Secondly, each subsequent word of a sentence conveys its meaning as mixed up with those of the preceding words and so the meanings conveyed by the preceding words are, in a way, abandoned in their original form.

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So the utterance of the previous words was really useless. Therefore when the sentence-meaning is ultimately understood, it would not be due to the useless preceding words. The understanding of the meanings of the preceding words was only temporary and therefore an unreal phase. The fact is that the understanding of these partial meanings in the middle is only a means to an end and once the end, namely, the understanding of the sentence-meaning is achieved, the intermediary meanings are abandoned. What is accepted first and later abandoned is just what is called the means (*upāya*). It is well known that there is no fixity in these means. They are obtained by analysis and the analysis is done differently by different scholars. To see word-meanings within the sentence-meaning is like seeing *naratva* and *siṃhatva* in a *narasiṃha*. They do not exist there, but the mind creates the fiction that they do exist. Similarly in the animal called *gavaya*, we see resemblance to a cow and to a deer. But the universals *gotva* and *mṛgatva* do not exist there. The animal has a totally different *jāti* in it.

As to the argument that sometimes we make an enquiry about just one word in a sentence when we have understood the meanings of the other words showing that both the speaker and the listener are conscious of the existence of individual words, it is pointed out that there is a fallacy here. When one thinks that one does not understand the meaning of one word only or that there is doubt about one word only, one is mistaken. It is the meaning of the whole sentence

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which is in doubt. The sentence *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is quite different from the sentence *vanād ṛkṣa ānīyatām*. To say that *vanād ānīyatām* is common to both is itself an error. The so-called common part itself does not exist. It is an artificially created part. Both the sentences are indivisible. There is no such thing as doubt about one word in a sentence. It is really the meaning of the whole sentence which is not understood. Just as one indivisible cognition appears to resemble another indivisible cognition in one part and to differ in another part, in the same way, even though the sentences are indivisible and differ from each other completely, one perceives resemblance and difference between them in parts. The cognition of blue resembles that of green in that both are cognitions but differs from it in as much as the contents of the two are different. Or the point might be illustrated by taking two pictures, the colour of one of which is green-and-blue while that of the other is green-and-yellow. The two would resemble each other partly and differ from each other partly, but in reality they are two different partless wholes. Similarly, two sentences which appear to resemble each other are really indivisible wholes.

18. The meanings which we seem to understand in the middle before the meaning of the whole sentence is understood are not real and cannot be taken seriously. As the words of the sentence are gradually grasped, one understands the meaning in a particular manner, but when the whole sentence is grasped the meaning appears to be quite different. Those sentences in which

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after the meanings of many words are understood, a negative follows, those meanings have to be discarded and cannot be taken seriously. From the sentence *dhava khadira palāśāś chedanīyā na*, the meaning understood until the last is heard is that the *dhava*, *khadira* and *palāśa* trees are to be cut. But as soon as the last word is heard, just the opposite meaning is understood which shows that the meanings of the individual words are unreal. It is better not to take it as real even before the negative particle is heard. Sometimes when the meanings of the individual words are considered they amount to condemnation, but when the meaning of the sentence as a whole is considered it is found to be praise. Sometimes it is just the opposite. One is compelled not to take the meanings of the individual words seriously, but to discard them. Just as the Mīmāṃaska holds that the meaningless phonemes when grouped according to meanings become the word and convey the word-meaning, in the same way the unreal and therefore meaningless individual words convey the sentence-meaning. It is the sentence and the sentence-meaning which are real and which come first. A sentence is not a putting together of previously existing elements. Words and word-meanings are what we get when we artificially analyse the sentence. The indivisible sentence and sentence-meaning are not understood at the beginning. They are understood only through the unreal words and their meanings. As already pointed out, the latter are only the means to the ultimate understanding of the sentence and the

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sentence-meaning. It is not possible to explain or to define the sentence except through the unreal words and word-meanings, obtained through analysis. When we analyse the sentence into words and assign meanings to them, it is as parts of sentences that the meanings are assigned to them and not as completely isolated elements. Here the analogy of the senses is brought in. The senses have each their function, but only as integral parts of the body and not in isolation. The words and the sentence stand in the same relation to each other.

It may appear strange that what is contrary to experience should be proclaimed as the truth. The individual word and its meaning are experienced by everybody, but they are not accepted as real. The sentence in its limitation as the individual words and the sentence-meaning, in its limitation as the word-meanings, are declared to be real. The fact is that only that which is validly cognised can become the object of verbal usage and worldly transaction. It is with the sentence and the sentence-meaning as with consciousness. Pure consciousness is the reality but it is never experienced in that form. It is always experienced as coloured by some object or other. It always appears as this or that. Philosophers have declared that in its pure form, it is beyond the mind and the words. Similarly, the sentence and sentence-meaning in their pure form are indivisible and devoid of any differentiation. But they appear to have differentiation in the form of words and word-meanings. But these differentiations are not real and are not fit for

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verbal usage and worldly transactions. It is because they are not fit for communication that they are said to be unreal.

In contrast to this, the sentence and the sentence-meaning are said to be real because they are fit for communication. In themselves, the word-meanings are isolated. It is the sentence which connects them together. The sentence-meaning it is which makes the meanings of individual words fit for communication. It is their very soul, so to speak, says Bhartṛhari.

19. The chief characteristic of the sentence is that there is a certain completeness about its meaning. This completeness does not depend upon any particular number of words which the sentence must have nor on any particular kind of word such as the verb which it must contain. A sentence is considered to be really complete when it contains a verb expressive of some action or process, its central idea, together with other words expressive of the accessories (*sādhana*) which help in the accomplishment of the action and of the qualifications of these accessories. Needless to say that all sentences are not equipped with a full set of such words. That does not mean that such deficient sentences are incomplete and, therefore, lose the claim to be called sentences. It is, however, essential that some action or process should be understood from the word or words uttered before there can be completeness. The action or process mentally supplied may be origination, existence or destruction, depending upon the words actually uttered and heard. This mental

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supplying of the required process is called *arthādhyāhāra* =insertion of an idea. Some scholars go further and say that it is not only the required idea which is mentally supplied but also the word which is expressive of it. That would be what is called *padādhyāhāra*=insertion of the word. It is only after this insertion is mentally made that what is uttered becomes fit for communication. This insertion is for the sake of making what is uttered a complete sentence which alone is fit to be used for communication. What is uttered may be a single word only and that too, a noun. Such a noun can express only an incomplete meaning. But it may be pregnant with some action or process which we then supply mentally and so the single noun becomes a sentence fit to be used for communication, ending in effective worldly transaction. Similarly, if the single word is a verb, it would directly bring some action or process to the mind. But even an action requires its accessories for its completion. The example usually given in the texts is the word *dvāram*='the door'. When uttered in a particular situation, it would necessarily bring to the mind the idea of closing, so that one would understand that the single word is a command or request to close the door. Similarly, if the single word is a verb, it would directly express some action or process. But even an action requires some accessory or other for its completion. As in the case of the isolated noun, an isolated verb also sometimes brings its accessory to the mind, either due to its very nature or due to some peculiarity in the situation.

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Thus completeness is achieved and the single word has become a sentence. Puṇyarāja gives the verb *varṣati* = 'it rains' as the example and suggests that it would be completed by bringing to the mind the god of rain as the agent and water as the object. As to how the gap in the idea conveyed by the single noun or verb is mentally filled up for the sake of completeness, there was difference of opinion. Do we mentally supply the missing word first and through that the meaning required or do we supply only the meaning or the idea which is needed for achieving completeness? The first view, already referred to as *padādhyāhāra* = 'insertion of the word' is also known as *śrutārthāpatti*. When the only word uttered is a noun, it would convey some accessory or other to an action. But action and accessory (*sādhya* and *sādhana*) always go together and so the word, expressive of the accessory, with the help of the context and the situation, would bring some suitable verb to the mind and thus the single word would be completed and turned into a sentence. If the required word is not supplied and yet the meaning is completed, it would mean that the uttered noun itself would in addition to expressing the accessory, also bring the main idea, namely, action to the mind. To make the same word bring both the action and the accessory to the mind is not right. It is against our common experience. This view is associated with the Mīmāṃsaka. Bhartṛhari does not subscribe to this view. The word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered to the mind because its function is

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to convey its own meaning. Nor can its meaning bring the unuttered word to the mind because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the uttered word bring the meaning of the unuttered word to the mind because there is no relation between a word and the meaning of some other word. A fourth possibility is that the meaning of the uttered word would bring the meaning of the unuttered word to the mind. But that would be a case of inference and not of verbal cognition. The conclusion is that when a single word, noun or verb, is uttered, it brings without the intermediary of any other word, but with the help of the context any other meaning which is required to complete it. This is Bhartṛhari's view.

20. Completeness of meaning is then the test of a sentence. That is why even a single word can be a sentence, if somehow completeness of meaning is achieved. For the same reason, even long phrases with incomplete meanings do not constitute sentences. A phrase consisting of many words is not a sentence if it still requires some other word or words for the completion of its meaning. That is the case with intermediary sentences, syntactically connected with the main sentence. Such intermediary sentences are no better than individual words. These intermediary sentences may all contain a verb, but that does not make any difference. We have already seen that even the meaning of a verb sometimes requires to be completed with the help of some accessory which would help in the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verb.

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That is why any definition of a sentence based on the presence of one or more verbs has to be understood in this light. The two Vārttika-s defining a sentence given by Kātyāyana under P. 2. 1. 1 in the context of the definition of syntactical connection (*sāmarthya*) have to be interpreted in accordance with this conception of the sentence. Both these definitions mentioned the presence of one single verb in a sentence. But they should not be understood to mean that where there is more than one verb, the words would not constitute a sentence. There can be more than one verb if one of them is the main one and the other subordinate to it. Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can be subordinate to one verb and be in the same sentence, in the same way, more than one verb can be subordinate to the main verb found in the same sentence. More than one verb can result in there being more than one sentence, if they are independent of one another. Not if one of them is the main one and the others subordinate to it. Here Bhartṛhari gives the sentence *mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti*='The deer goes, see!' Though there are two finite verbs here, they are connected with each other and so there is only one sentence. The opinion of those who interpret these three words as constituting either one sentence or two sentences is rejected. In the foregoing discussion, there has been talk about completeness and incompleteness of meaning. Bhartṛhari clarifies his conception of completeness. Unless the incompleteness is verbal, that is, it comes out of the words themselves, the meaning must be

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considered to be complete. Incompleteness is more in the way of saying a thing rather than in the thing itself. Nobody can say everything. Certain things are implied. They need not be openly expressed in words. They are left to be understood. What is actually expressed does not become incomplete unless there is incompleteness in the expression itself. When somebody says: 'Devadatta cooks', the sentence is complete though how and what he cooks is not mentioned. From the word 'cooks' an average listener would understand a complete meaning. What he understands would not be considered incomplete merely because all the details connected with Devadatta's cooking are not mentioned. The listener may have the desire to know the details but such desire is not aroused in him by any incompleteness in the words which he heard. It is aroused by the nature of the act of cooking. But that sort of desire to know more does not render the sentence incomplete.

The complete meaning expressed by a sentence is a complex thing in which some process or action occupies the central position and is closely associated with its accessories and their qualifications, all amalgamated into an indivisible whole. When one proceeds to analyse the sentence and the sentence-meaning, it is this central element, the process or action which is first analysed. The accessories and their qualifications are analysed later. The accessories are there for the accomplishment of the action. Of course, compared to the ultimate purpose to fulfil which the action is accomplished, the latter is secondary, but that is not

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always openly expressed in the sentence. Moreover there is no absolute fixity about what is a process and what is an accessory. It all depends very much upon how the speaker wants to present them. What is presented as a process by one speaker can be presented as an accessory by another. In the sentence *Devadattaḥ pacati*= 'Devadattah cooks', the action of cooking is presented as a process, because it is conveyed by a verb, but in the sentence *Devadattaḥ pacikriyāṃ karoti*='Devadatta does the action of cooking', the same thing is presented as a thing and not as a process. The fact is that all objects in the world are bundles of powers or capacities and it is open to a speaker to present an object in the light of any one of its capacities. The word does not touch the essence of an object. It stands far from it and does no more than bring it to the mind in some one of its many aspects, according to the intention of the speaker. It picks on some capacity or function of the object and presents it in that form. What the word presents has no fixity. It is not real.

As stated above, when we analyse the sentence-meaning, it is its central element, some action or process which is first analysed. It is the verb, the most important word of the sentence, which expresses it. The verb always presents the action or process in a very general way. But each one of these actions or processes comprises an infinite number of varieties on account of difference in the results arrived at or in their mode of performance. But the verb by itself cannot go into all these varieties. If the latter are also to be conveyed,

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many other words have to be used together with the verb for that purpose. Sometimes two different verbs may be used in two different sentences, but the action denoted by these two verbs may be the same. The fact is that every action is susceptible of infinite variation but there is no adequate variety of verbs to indicate all this infinite variety in the action. That has to be understood from the nature of the action itself or through context and situation. That is what actually happens. The verb itself denotes the action directly only in a general way, but the listener understands it in a particular form according to circumstances.

21. From all the foregoing discussions it is clear that according to Bhartṛhari, the indivisible sentence is the unit of communication and that its meaning is understood in a flash (*pratibhā*). This meaning is also something indivisible, a complex cognition in which the central element is an action or process with its accessories closely associated with it. This idea of indivisibility and reality of the sentence and unreality of the individual word is very old in India if we go by what Yāska says in his *Nirukta*. This *Nirukta* passage has been understood differently by different scholars. What is of interest to us is that Bhartṛhari refers to this *Nirukta* passage and gives us an idea of how he understood it. The context in which he makes the reference is as follows: As previously pointed out, the Mīmāṃsaka believes in *śrutārthāpatti*. When an utterance consists of a single word whether it be a noun or a verb, it does no more than convey its own meaning. This meaning brings to the mind any

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other meaning required to complete it, not directly but through the word to which the other meaning belongs. Thus the simple word is made up into a sentence.

Bhartṛhari does not accept this interpretation of what actually happens. We have already seen how he understands it. The main point in his interpretation is that we mentally complete the meaning of a sentence consisting of a single word by bringing in whatever other meaning is required without mentally adding any word to the word actually uttered. In other words, if the word actually uttered is a noun, it would not only convey its own meaning but also that of a verb for completing its own meaning and if it is a verb, it would not only convey its own meaning, but also that of a noun for completing its own meaning, without, in either case, any other word being brought to the mind. Only the required meaning, without its word would be understood with the help of the context and the situation. The consequence of this way of looking at it, says the Mīmāṃsaka, is that where the sentence consists of a noun only, it would bring to the mind its own meaning, namely, some object or other plus some action or other for the sake of completeness, whereas when the sentence consists of a noun and a verb, the noun would convey only some object or other. Thus the meaning of a word becomes undefined and that would go against the clear statement of Yāska regarding the meaning of a verb and a noun. His statement is: *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam* = 'An action or process is the meaning of a verb'; *sattvapradhānāni nāmāni* = things or objects form

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the main meaning of nouns. It is on the basis of a clear distinction in the meaning of words that they have been put under four categories: noun, verb, preposition and particle—*nāmākhyātopasarganipātāḥ*. Bhartṛhari's interpretation of the single-word sentence would go against the four parts of speech recognized by Yāska. If the individual word is unreal, as Bhartṛhari maintains, what is the use of speaking about four parts of speech and defining their meaning? It is when faced with this challenge of disloyalty to the ancients that Bhartṛhari tells us what the ancients really meant. Yāska mentions Audumbarāyaṇa with respect in the passage referred to under note 70, on p. 201, of my book entitled *Bhartṛhari*. Bhartṛhari also mentions him and couples him with another ancient name, namely, Vārttākṣa. These two scholars, says Bhartṛhari, seeing that the sentence exists always in the mind and it is that which is connected in the world with the meaning have declared that the fourfold classification of words and of word-meanings does not exist. Both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, the easy and very comprehensive treatment of sentences on the basis of individual words is resorted to by convention for the sake of convenience. In the world, transactions are not always based on reality. Therefore, apart from the sentence there is nothing which is not mere creation of the world.

22. Such, then, according to Bhartṛhari, is the nature of the sentence-meaning. Though both of them have an external aspect they are inner realities. They are not only in the mind but have deeper roots.

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They are derived from the Self which itself is a spark of the Brahman-śabdatattva, which represents total knowledge. Though inner realities are present in everybody, they have to be awakened before communication can take place. The process of awakening has been described in the chapter dealing with Sphoṭa in my *Bhartṛhari*, pp. 147 ff. The sentence is the chief form of the *sphoṭa*, though Bhartṛhari does speak about it as *pada* and *varṇa* also. It is not only referred to as *sphoṭa*, but also as *śabda*. It is manifested by the sounds which are uttered in a sequence. Whether it is the process of the sounds manifesting the *pada* or of the *pada-s* manifesting the *vākya* or the *padārtha-s* manifesting the *vākyārtha*, the process is the same and has the same features, which are: (1) the manifestation takes place in a progressively clear manner, (2) before the sentence and the sentence-meaning are fully manifested and grasped, we seem to cognize some other elements, the individual words and their meanings but they are not real, (3) they are only the means by which the final clear cognition takes place. It is not an accident that these main features of the process are brought out by Bhartṛhari both in the first Kāṇḍa where the process of manifestation is described and in the second Kāṇḍa where the reality of the sentence and the sentence-meaning only and the unreality and the character of being mere means to an end of the individual words and their meanings are emphasized. The *kārika-s* in which these features are mentioned in these two Kāṇḍa-s have a striking similarity of wording and ideas.

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G. M. BONGARD-LEVIN

GRAECO-ROMAN TRADITION AND RELIGIOUS-PHILOSOPHICAL CURRENTS IN MAURYAN INDIA

THE study of the ancient Indian cultural scene involves substantial difficulties, which are primarily due to the scarcity of relevant documentary data. Indian (mainly Buddhist) texts treat ideological processes of the period fairly one-sidedly and many of them with a bias—the reason why this major question has gained no appropriate coverage in modern works on Mauryan history: as a rule, their authors confine themselves to elaborate accounts of the situation in Buddhism.

This lends a special interest to statements left by Graeco-Roman (classical) authors, above all Megasthenes. Coincidental with the early Mauryan period, fragments from writings of Megasthenes offer a major source of information on the religious life of that epoch permitting to check and supplement evidences contained in local works.

Most important, Megasthenes and the classical authors who followed him correctly distinguished between the orthodox and unorthodox currents that divided the ancient Indian philosophers into Brāhmaṇa-s and Śramaṇa-s. The majority of the classical

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authors employed a form similar to that of the Indian sources which placed the Brāhmaṇa-s first. However, some of the authors put the Śramaṇa-s first thus repeating, so to speak, the form of Buddhist writings.[1]

In keeping with one of the later traditions (Porphyrius), the Brāhmaṇa-s and Śramaṇa-s constituted two particular currents, sects, teachings[2], offering a fairly interesting explanation for the Brāhmaṇa-Śramaṇa opposition: while the Brāhmaṇa-s have a common origin being hereditary preachers of one religious teaching, the Śramaṇa-s form another group (genos) including members of widely varying Indian tribes (categories, social groups—ethnos). This communication notes with sufficient clarity the organizational distinctions of the Orthodox and Śramaṇa sects having analogies in Indian sources. Close parallels with Indian writings are to be found in statements concerning the Śramaṇa-s (*Sarmanes*) left by Strabo (15. I. 60). Following Megasthenes, Strabo stressed their relationship with the kings, who turned to them for discovering the sources of contemporary events (compare Indian data on the Śramaṇa-s under the kings). A later tradition (*De Abstinentia*, 4. 17) says that the sacred places of the Śramaṇa-s had been built for them by a king and that the Śramaṇa-s devoted the whole day to

[1] *Stromateis* I. 305; see also R S. Majumdar, *The Classical Accounts of India*, Calcutta, 1960, p. 425.

[2] Porphirii *De Abstinentia* 4. 17.

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debates[1] (compare the data of Indian sources on the gifts of kings to various reform sects and acute controversies among the Śramaṇa-s). Strabo (**15**. I. 60) discusses a specific Śramaṇa group, Garmanes, known as Hylobioi (soothsayers and invocators), who wandered about villages and towns begging for alms (compare data on wandering ascetics, Ājīvika-s, who were most popular soothsayers).

Apparently, Strabo's (**15**. I. 70) observation on the Pramna-s= Pramnae—(in all probability, a variant of 'Śramaṇa-s') is also related to the Śramaṇa-s. 'Writers', said Strabo, 'oppose to the Brāhmaṇa-s the Pramna-s, a contentious and disputatious sect. These philosophers ridicule the Brāhmaṇa-s who study natural phenomena and astronomy, as conceited and fools'.[2] Strabo with amazing accuracy describes the situation that attended the emergence of Śramaṇa-s reform schools, which opposed the Brāhmaṇa-s and their doctrines and conducted various disputes on many problems posed by the existence of the world and man. The Śramaṇa-s, 'heretics', indeed opposed themselves to the Brāhmaṇa-s, derided them and fought their theory of the Brāhmaṇa-s' exclusiveness, divine merits and accomplishments.

The Śramaṇa-s defied the conceit of the Brāhmaṇa-s, who claimed the right to teach all society and put

[1] ibid.

[2] See Samaresh Bandyopadhyay, *Early Foreigners on Indian Caste System*, Calcutta, 1974, pp. 4-8.

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everyone spiritually wise. Many Buddhist texts described these claims as unfounded, delusive and false (*musa*) (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, **3**. 84). In *Tevija-sūtta* (**13**. 15) Buddha likens the Brāhmaṇa-s to blind people who preach what they neither know nor see themselves. 'The words of these Brāhmaṇa-s become absurd (*hassaka*), idle (*nāmaka*), empty, meaningless (*rittaka*) and futile (*tucchaka*).' These Buddhist statements coming from the Śramaṇa-s themselves convey with amazing accuracy the meaning of Strabo's words saying that the Śramaṇa-s make fun of the Brāhmaṇa-s' conceit and unreasonableness.

A statement contained in writings by classical authors which, apparently, goes back to Megasthenes, says that the Śramaṇa-s included a group of naked ascetics (compare data on the Jaina Digaṃbara-s, who walked naked).

Fragments which can safely be associated with Megasthenes do not contain direct statements concerning the Buddhists although followers of Buddhism must have been included among the Śramaṇa-s. True, Clemens Alexandrinus, in retelling data by Megasthenes on philosophers, wrote about the 'Indians who follow the precepts of Boutta whom they honour as a God on account of his extraordinary sanctity.' This report, in all likelihood, was a result of later contacts between the Graeco-Roman world and India.[1] But, possibly,

[1] See A. Dihle, 'Indische Philosophen bei Clemens Alexandrinus', *Mullus* (Festschrift T. Klauser), Münster 1964, pp. 60-70.

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it was a reflection of an ancient tradition going as far back as the Mauryan epoch.

During the Seleucid ambassador's stay in India, Brahmanism retained a major influence. The opposing Śramaṇa groups were still thought of as a whole and none of the reform currents had gained enough influence and power to warrant the particular attention of a foreigner. Data contained in Indian sources fit in very well with this conclusion.

In the pre-Ashokan period, Buddhism had not yet become widespread rivalling other reform currents, primarily Ājīvikism and Jainism. In the early Mauryan epoch the main watershed passed between the Orthodox tradition and the Śramaṇical (heretical) sects—a circumstance which was also noted by Megasthenes. The Brāhmaṇa-Śramaṇa opposition, registered by classical authors and in early Indian texts, survived in a later period. Patañjali (**2**. 4. 12), for instance, underlined that the Brāhmaṇa-s and Śramaṇa-s represented separate currents and stood in distinct opposition (*virodha*) to each other.

Substantial ground in the early Mauryan epoch was retained by the Orthodox teaching. Apparently, the position of the Brāhmaṇa-s was particularly strong in North-West India. This was fairly well known to Megasthenes and, before him, to writers who shared in the Alexander campaign. The influence of Brahmanical teachers and advisers in the Bindusāra period was known even from the Buddhist sources (for instance, *Samantapāsādikā*, **1**. 46).

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Graeco-Roman witnesses show the Brāhmaṇa-s to be the leading group among the Indian philosophers. According to Strabo (**15**. I. 59), compared to the Śramaṇa-s, the Brāhmaṇa-s commanded particular respect. Classical authors pointed out a distinct identity of views among the Brahmanical schools—something which ties in well with the data of Indian sources concerning Brahmanism.

According to Porphyrius (*De Abstinentia*, **4**. 17), who observed ancient tradition, the Brāhmaṇa-s comprised a sacerdotal category of one religious type. The same author indicates that the Brāhmaṇa-s came from one clan originating from one mother and one father—evidence similar to what we know about the claims of Orthodox Brāhmaṇa-s on particular origin from one ancestor. Graeco-Roman witnesses discuss Brahmanic ascetics who followed the norms prescribed for the Brahmacarya (Strabo says, for instance, that the Brāhmaṇa-s became ascetics for thirty-seven years dedicating themselves to the study of the sacred texts; according to the Laws of Manu (**3**. I), the longest term for Brahmacarya was also thirty-seven years).

Works by classical authors, primarily Megasthenes, contain extremely valuable information on the folk cults of the early Mauryan epoch. The ambassador mentioned the worship of Heracles in India. Undoubtedly, he implied a local deity but the text does not name him.[1] The question what exact

[1] See A. Dahlquist, *Megasthenes and Indian Religion*, Uppsala, 1962.

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mythological image was concealed here under the name of Heracles presents a substantial interest. Most of the researchers agree that it is a description of Kṛṣṇa.[1] It is essential, however, that in the Graeco-Roman writings the main feature of the deity was his supernatural physical power and unlimited bellicosity (Diodorus, 2. 39). This ties in poorly with the traditional Kṛṣṇa image, which is associated with the theme of love and pastoral games (only much later, already according to the Purāṇa-s, did Kṛṣṇa gain other features). Most probably, Megasthenes reflected here the stage of the formation of Vaiṣṇavism at which one of its central characters (at least, for the north-west of the country) was Vāsudeva, who retained features of a fearless warlike Kṣatriya. The legitimacy of an explanation like this is indicated by relevant data of Pāṇini and the epigraphic material which unambiguously reveal Vāsudeva worship in this part of India at least in the 2nd century B.C.[2] The subsequent fusion of the two mythological traditions led to a fusion of the images of Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa, which turned into a single deity, the Kṛṣṇa features gradually gaining prevalence. In this case the Heracles of Megasthenes was no other image than north-Indian Vāsudeva, who retained his independence of the Kṛṣṇa tradition proper.

[1] See W. Ruben, Krishna. Konkordanz und Kommentar der Motives seines Heldenlebens, Istanbul, 1943; Cambridge History of India, vol. I, L., 1924; on the comparison of Śiva and Heracles see A. Cunningham, Coins of Ancient India, Varanasi, 1963.

[2] See V. S. Agrawala, *India as known to Pāṇini*, Lucknow, 1953.

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Megasthenes (Arrian, *Indica*, **8**. 4) also made the major observation that Heracles was held in particularly great respect with the Indian tribe Sourasenoi (Śūrasena), whose principal cities were Methora (Mathurā) and Cleisobora (apparently, Kṛṣṇapura). Megasthenes' statement concerning Mathurā as the centre of worship of Heracles-Vāsudeva ties in well with data offered by ancient Indian sources.

The Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa cult had its home in north India. The duality of the deity's name is traceable to two different tribal traditions. The two currents merged much later but the spread of the Vāsudeva cult was registered already in the early period: it was mentioned by Pāṇini. Vāsudeva must have also been one of the legendary ancestors of the Vṛṣṇi-s, was first worshipped as a real hero of the past ages and had a superhuman power but was not a deity. Comparison with Heracles illustrates precisely this aspect of Vāsudevism. Clashing with Vaiṣṇavism geographically, this religious group found itself in the sphere of its syncretic activity. There is little information available about Vāsudeva proper in his initial meaning. Later he became one of the central elements of the set of legends about Kṛṣṇa, to whose image he had originally been unrelated. Otherwise, Vāsudeva appears as only a heroic Kṣatriya, all subsequent elements of his mythological biography going back to Vaiṣṇava tradition. There is no pinpointing the time of this identification. However, researchers possess extremely valuable and this time undeniable evidence referring to the

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2nd century B.C.—the famous Besnagar inscription of Heliodoros, the earliest known epigraphic evidence of Vaiṣṇavism.[1] The text discovered in Besnagar says: 'This Garuḍa column of Vāsudeva, the god of gods, was erected by Heliodoros the Bhāgavata, the son of Dion and an inhabitant of Takṣaśilā, who arrived as Greek ambassador from the court of great king Antialkidos to King Kausīputra Bhāgabhadra, the Saviour, who is prospering in the fourteenth year of his reign.'

This caption offers material for some interesting observations. First, it registers Garuḍa's relationship with the Bhāgavata tradition. The inclusion of Garuḍa in the Vaiṣṇava pantheon was eased by the fact that Viṣṇu, being a variant of a sunny deity in the *Ṛg Veda*, was sometimes depicted as a bird. Later, this relationship became inseparable and the epithet *garuḍa-dhvaja* became perhaps the most frequent definition of Nārāyaṇa-Viṣṇu.[2]

Second, Viṣṇu-Bhāgavata here is a synonym for Vāsudeva. The two traditions were already fused. Third, the text indicates the spread of Vāsudevism in Taxila. It was followed by the Indians as well as foreigners. The column erected in honour of Garuḍa must have been part of a temple and, presumably,

[1] See D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, vol. I, 2 ed., Calcutta, 1965, p. 96.

[2] See S. Chattopadhyaya, *Evolution of Hindu Sects*, New Delhi, 1970, p. 35.

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this period also saw the creation of sculptural portraits of Viṣṇu-Vāsudeva.

Śaivism was incorporated in the Brahmanized pantheon later—in the early centuries A.D. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for questioning the existence of the Śiva cult already in deep antiquity. It can be construed as some aboriginal Dravidian deity. In general, it is essential always to bear in mind that nearly all we know about the earliest stage of Indian religion comes from Brahmanical literature—a circumstance which accounts for a substantial aberration in the concepts of the evolution of Indian cults and religious systems. The moment of inclusion of some aboriginal faith in Brahmanism and its legalization by the ruling tradition in this case appear as the actual birth of the given phenomenon although in effect it may have crystallized long before and even go back to the pre-Vedic epoch. Naturally, utter lack of historical evidence makes it an exceedingly great problem to disclose the objective essence of the process. In some instances, however, indirect indications permit to fill the gaps due to one-sidedness of the sources. Invaluable aid again comes from writings by Greek authors, which is the only view of the evolution of ancient Indian religious currents from outside.

Megasthenes also originated the tradition saying that the Indian mountain dwellers worshipped Dionysos.[1] According to some scholars, this statement

[1] Diodorus, II. 39; Strabo, 15. 1. 58.

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indicates the presence of Śaiva cults. It will be remembered that Śiva was worshipped by many mountain tribes, this gaining him the epithet *girīśa*, 'ruler of mountains'. Ecstatic rituals of the Śaivaites can be interpreted as parallels to the Dionysos cult. The processions of Dionysians in north-west India described by Arrian (*Indica*, 5. 4) and Strabo (15. I. 8) could also be related to Śaivism. It is indicative that Graeco-Roman references to Indian Dionysos in many respects coincide with the local tradition of Śiva (Rudra-Śiva).[1] Dionysos is portrayed as long-haired and long-bearded and therefore named Katapōgōn (Diodorus, 3. 63). In the *Ṛg-Veda* and *Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā* Rudra bears the epithet *kapardin*, i.e. having tangled hair (curiously, the two terms reveal close phonetic similarity); the Dionysos cult is associated with incense (his followers rubbed themselves with incense, Strabo, 15. I. 58; Arrian, *Indica* 7. 9). A similar characteristic is given to Śiva in *Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā* (3. 61: 58). According to Strabo (15. I. 58), the followers of Dionysos wear a mitra. Rudra is described as wearing a specific turban-like headgear. During Dionysian festivities the Indians used drums and bells (Strabo, 15. I. 58). Indian tradition describes Śiva as a lover of music, including bells. Graeco-Roman authors stress Dionysos' connection with dances (they say that he taught Indians

[1] Sukumari Bhattacharji, *The Indian Theogony* (A Comparative Study of Indian Mythology from the Vedas to the Purāṇas) Cambridge, 1970.

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satyric dances; Arrian, *Indica* **7**. 8). The rites performed in honour of Śiva were accompanied by dances. Śiva sings and dances in his abode on Mt. Kailāsa (*Mbh.*, **13**. 14-15). In Indian tradition he is known as dancer-king, the dances being associated with the state of ecstasy (Śiva is even called chief of the mad—those who are in a state of inebriation-*unmattavināyaka*). Dionysos, coming to India, gave the Indians wine and taught them the art of grapevine cultivation (Strabo, **15**. I. 8; Arrian *Indica* **7**. 5) and was therefore named god of wine-making. Śiva is also associated with intoxicating drinks; Graeco-Roman tradition says that Dionysos acquainted the Indians with various plants—laurel, ivy, myrtle, beech, fig-tree (Diodorus, **3**. 63). In ancient Indian sources Rudra is referred to as ruler of trees (Vṛkṣapati, Pādapeśvara). He was given the names of various trees. He was particularly associated with the Aśvattha tree, Ficus religiosa (*Mbh.*, **13**. 85), the sacred fig-tree; iconographically, Śiva is sometimes presented in the shape of a banyan tree; Graeco-Roman writers attribute to Dionysos the merit of introducing agriculture to the Indians (Dionysos gave the Indians seeds: Arrian, *Indica*, **7**. 5). Indian tradition viewed Śiva and Rudra as gods of fertility. In some texts Rudra is named ruler of the fields and Śiva owner of the seeds; Dionysos, according to Graeco-Roman authors, first made bulls draw a plough (Arrian, *Indica*, **7**. 7). Śiva is frequently associated with a bull. He sits on a bull (*Mbh.*, **8**. 24) and wears an emblem depicting a bull

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(*Mbh.*, 2. 25) and is named 'ruler of cattle' (*paśupati*). Graeco-Roman writers speak of Dionysos as healer of an army which fell ill (Diodorus, 2. 38). Back in the *Ṛg-Veda* (1. 114. 5) Śiva is presented as a healer holding medicines in his hand. Rudra-Śiva is not infrequently described as protector from all diseases. Dionysos, says Arrian (*Indica*, 7. 7) gave the Indians arms. Śiva, according to the epic, gave arms to his followers and special arms to Arjuna teaching him to use these arms (*Mbh.*, 3. 40).

Thus, most of the Graeco-Roman sources of Dionysos tie in with the data of Indian sources of Śiva (remarkably, a large proportion of the Indian data refers to the Vedic and Epic periods).

Not accidentally, Megasthenes and the subsequent writers compared the Indian gods to the most popular deities of Graeco-Roman tradition—Heracles and Dionysos: they proceeded from customary concepts and images. However, there is a strikingly large proportion of coincidences of the two traditions—added evidence of the correctness of statements left by Megasthenes.

The evidence of Graeco-Roman writers cited here, compared with the data contained in Indian sources, thus enables us to form a fuller idea of the main and specific features in the cultural evolution of Mauryan India. Undeniably, researchers of ancient India should make a more thorough study of the Graeco-Roman tradition of India and fuller use of Graeco-Roman sources in analysing concrete phenomena of India's social, political and cultural life in that epoch.

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ROSANE ROCHER

THE *VIVĀDĀRṆAVASETU*

CHAPTERS 1 AND 2

AMONG Professor K. Kunjunni Raja's many scholarly activities, researchers particularly appreciate the editorial role he has played and continues to play for the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*. Not only is this monumental work an indispensable reference tool, its editor has been most generous in providing interested scholars with data available only in his files, prior to publication. As a recipient of Professor Kunjunni Raja's communications, I am happy to dedicate to him this preliminary report on a critical edition of the *Vivādārṇavasetu* which I have in preparation, and which he helped make possible.[1]

The *Vivādārṇavasetu*, also known as *Vivādārṇavabhañjana*, was the first legal treatise composed at the instance of the British.[2] In 1772, when the British government in Bengal assumed the administration of civil

[1] This research is supported by a grant from the Joint Committee on South Asia of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, and a sabbatical leave from the University of Pennsylvania.

[2] See 'The British as Patrons of the Śāstra', in J. Duncan M. Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India*, London, 1968, pp. 225-73.

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justice in their possessions, Governor Warren Hastings commissioned a group of ten pandits, to whom an eleventh was later added, to write a code of Hindu laws. Although its English version, made on a Persian abstract of a Bengali oral rendering, became famous as *A Code of Gentoo Laws*, published in London in 1776, the original Sanskrit text remained largely unknown. It was so little known that, when the Sri Venkatesvara Press in Bombay published in 1888 an edition of the *Vivādārṇavasetu*, the editors did not realize that it represented the original Sanskrit text of the famed *Code*, but believed it to have been composed at the instance of Ranjit Singh of the Punjab. Although the real identity of the treatise later became apparent, the edition did little to remedy the undeserved obscurity in which the Sanskrit text had fallen. Not only is it extremely rare,[1] it constitutes a simple printing, not a critical edition, of the text. It is based on a single Lahore manuscript and is incomplete. On some points, it may even have reinforced false notions on the tenor of the pandits' compilation, instead of correcting the distortions to which the string of successive translations led in the better known English *Code*.

The edition lacks the first two chapters of the Sanskrit treatise, precisely those which the English version treats as a 'preface'. It thus creates the impression that

[1] I was unable to find a copy in the United States or in London. I have used the copy in the Indian National Library in Calcutta.

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the two chapters on the creation and duties of castes, and the qualifications and duties of the king, which understandably struck the British as devoted to non-legal, extraneous matters, were also considered to be so by the pandits themselves. An examination of the complete Sanskrit text reveals a different situation. While the English *Code* has 19 legal chapters, preceded by two prefatory chapters, manuscripts show that the pandits organized their compilation in 21 successive chapters, called *ūrmi* or *taraṅga*. Though the edition lacks the first two chapters, it confirms this original division. Indeed, the editors had to resort to the expedient of dividing the third chapter into three to make up for the absence of the first two, and to reach the desired 'end of chapter 3' at the conclusion of the section on debt. Of twenty manuscripts of the text to which I had access, only one agrees with the edition in omitting the first two chapters. In one other the disappearance of these chapters and of the first few pages of the third results from the accidental loss of its first 25 folios. The pandits' introduction, in all sixteen manuscripts which have no missing pages at the beginning, includes these first two chapters in the enumeration of the titles under which the compilation is organized:

iha vācyāni varṇādeḥ sṛṣṭis tasya ca vṛttayaḥ (var. *taddharmanirṇayaḥ*)
rājapraśaṃsā tacchatramantridūtādilakṣaṇam
rājadharma ṛṇādānaṃ vṛddhyādividhilagnakāḥ . . .

The enumeration proceeds in the exact order of chapters, different from the *vivādapada-s* enumerated at the

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beginning of the chapter on debt, on the authority of Manu. Clearly, the pandits did not view the first two chapters as prefatory, as the English version would lead us to believe.

In the English *Code*, these chapters constitute but the last part of a long introduction. After a preface by the English translator, Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, the introduction includes

—a translation of a 'preliminary discourse' by the pandits on the circumstances under which they were called to produce their work,

—an enumeration of the 'names of the Bramins, who compiled this work',

—a 'glossary of such Shanscrit, Persian, and Bengal words, as occur in this work',

—a list of 'names of the Hindoo months with the corresponding dates in the English months',

—a list of 'names of authors, quoted in this compilation',

—'a list of the books from whence this pootee was compiled', and

—a table of 'contents of the chapters',

before the so-called 'preface' which corresponds to the first two chapters of the Sanskrit text. Two of these items, the glossary and the correspondence between Indian and English calendars, are immediately recognizable as reference tools provided by the translator, which cannot have been part of the pandits' compilation, but others might be expected to be featured in the Sanskrit text. The fact that the edition of 1888 lacks the pandits' introduction as well as the first two chapters,

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has made it impossible to verify whether these several items indeed had a place in the original compilation. A comparison with the introduction preserved in manuscripts of the *Vivādārṇavasetu* reveals that none of them is included, although there are some interesting parallels. The pandits' introduction is extremely brief. It consists of a blessing (in one *śārdūlavikrīḍita* stanza), an enumeration of their principal sources (in two *indravajrā* stanzas), and a list of topics to be treated, which has already been mentioned. The blessing disappeared in the translation. The pandits' enumeration of their sources and of the topics to be treated were not the basis for the lists of authors quoted and books used, nor for the table of contents in the English *Code*. Those were compiled by the English translator later on, and drawn from the translated text. Similarly, the list of the eleven authors of the *Code* fails to coincide with the way in which they are named in the statement which, in usual Indian fashion, concludes the Sanskrit text. Most interesting of all is the fact that no manuscript of the *Vivādārṇavasetu* contains the pandits' 'preliminary discourse'. There is no doubt that the pandits wrote that statement, which excited the admiration of contemporary Europe for its high-mindedness and spirit of tolerance. It appears, however, that it was not an integral part of their work, and that they handed it in separately, perhaps at the request of the English translator.

To a reader of the English version, the work thus appears as a compilation of laws in 19 chapters, with

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several introductory appendages, beginning with the pandits' preliminary discourse, and ending with accounts of the creation and of the qualities required of the magistrate. The original Sanskrit text is quite different. It is a compilation in 21 chapters, the first of which deals with the duties of castes, the second with the duties of the king, and which is devoid of any statement of time, place, and circumstances of the composition.[1]

Why, one may wonder, do I refer to the second chapter as spelling out the duties and qualifications of the king, when speaking of the Sanskrit text, and those of the magistrate, when speaking of the English *Code*? This is a point on which the English version is seriously flawed, and which the omission of the first two chapters in the edition failed to correct. The process of successive translations resulted in Sanskrit *rājā* being rendered as 'magistrate', via Persian *hākim*. Some of the king's duties, such as hearing parties with patience and restituting stolen property, corresponded to what an Englishman might expect of a magistrate, but other provisions, such as his having spies and ambassadors, building

[1] One point in the translated preliminary discourse is however echoed in the statement which concludes the Sanskrit text. In a final *śloka*, the pandits describe themselves as *anekaviṣayavāsividvadvṛnda* 'a group of scholars, residents of different places'. This confirms the remark, in the preliminary discourse, to the effect that 'Bramins, learned in the Shaster, . . . were invited from all parts of the kingdom', and contradicts other testimonies, according to which all pandits came from Nabadvip. The question of the origin and background of the authors requires a special study, which cannot be attempted here.

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fortresses, and waging war, must have been puzzling to the English translator Governor Hastings had appointed. The fact that the incongruity was allowed to stand reveals something of the conditions under which the translation was prepared. Direct consultation between the English translator and the pandits, which would have resolved the issue, was obviously impossible. At a time when no Englishman knew Sanskrit, and no pandit English, intermediaries were the only resource. Halhed knew Persian extremely well, but none of the pandits did, since it proved necessary for one of them to give the Persian munshi a Bengali oral rendering of the Sanskrit text. Halhed, who, a few years later, was to publish the first Bengali grammar in English, apparently did not yet control the language sufficiently well to seek the pandits' immediate guidance. For lack of a common language, discussion with the pandits was precluded. He was at the mercy of the Persian abstract of the text, with all its ambiguities.

Considering the obscurities of the English version, obscurities which the omission of the first two chapters in the edition of 1888 failed to remove, it may be worthwhile to give here, in anticipation of a complete and critical edition of the *Vivādārṇavasetu*, a survey of the contents and characteristics of these initial sections in the pandits' original compilation. It will be noted that in these as in later chapters of the text, the pandits made it a practice to quote authoritative Smṛti texts and commentaries—often with identification of their source—, to which they added comments of their own.

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These features, which represent the style of a traditional Nibandha, were totally obscured in the translating process.

Chapter 1 begins with a brief account of the creation (entitled *sṛṣṭiḥ*, var. *varṇādisṛṣṭiḥ*) taken from the *Mahābhārata* (**12**. 200. 8-13, and 31-33 with specific reference to castes).[1] Then follows a longer section on the respective functions, occupations, and duties of castes (entitled *eṣāṃ vṛttiḥ*, var. *dharmaḥ*). This begins with the relevant section in Manu (**10**. 75-99), with elucidating comments consistently based on Kullūkabhaṭṭa's commentary. The pandits obviously wished to provide their British patrons with a rationale and historical foundation for the assignment of separate duties and perquisites to different castes, for they proceeded to quote the *Mahābhārata's* relation of the times preceding the kingship of Veṇa (**12**. 59. 13-33 and 94-99). For the description of Veṇa's sins and mixing of castes, and the restoration under Pṛthu with the assignment to each of its place and duties, they turned to a text with a specifically Bengali identity, the *Bṛhaddharmapurāṇa* (*uttarakhaṇḍa* **13**. 13 - 14. 71),[2] with minimal inserts from Manu (**10**. 9) and the *Mahābhārata* (**12**. 59. 104-106). The chapter ends with a section on the duties of Caṇḍāla-s and Śvapaca-s from Manu (**10**. 51-56).

[1] References given for sequences of verses do not imply that each and every verse in the sequence is quoted in the *Vivādārṇavasetu*.

[2] See R. C. Hazra, *Studies in the Upapurāṇas*, vol. 2, Calcutta, 1963, p. 449.

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Chapter 2, of almost equal length with the first, is organized in seven sections. It opens on a glorification of the king (*rājapraśaṃsā*) based on Manu (**7**. 3-19 and **9**. 303-311), again with elucidations from Kullūka's commentary. Then follow brief paragraphs on the characteristics of the King's umbrella (*chattra*), ministers (*mantrin*), secretary (*lekhaka*), ambassadors (*dūta*), and fortified residence (*rājavāsa*). The description of the umbrella comes from the *Agnipurāṇa* (**224**. 1-2), that of the secretary from the *Garuḍapurāṇa* (**112**. 7), while scattered verses from Manu's chapter 7 are the basis for the qualification of ambassadors and ministers, and the fortification of the king's residence. Other provisions for the king's residence are drawn from the *Mahābhārata* (**12**. 69. 51-58). The last section is understandably longer than all others combined, since it deals with the king's duties (*rājadharmaḥ*). It is also the most varied in terms of sources quoted, though Manu, with Kullūka, and, to a lesser extent, the Rājadharma Parvan of the *Mahābhārata* constitute its primary foundations. Most striking is the fact that, while, in chapter 1, the duties of castes are described in long sequences of verses taken from their sources, for the duties of the king, the pandits picked isolated verses, often one by one. This section begins with the personal qualities a king must cultivate and the vices he must avoid (from Manu **7**. 44-48), then states some of his general duties (isolated verses from Manu and the *Mahābhārata*). The next subject is the king as warrior: his duty to fight enemies, restrictions on the weapons he may use and the people he may kill (Manu **7**. 87-93

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and *Mahābhārata* **12**. 86. 25), provisions for the distribution of booty (Manu **7**. 96), the precautions he must take to conceal his weaknesses while exploiting those of his enemies (Manu **7**. 105-108 and 170-175), how best to deploy his forces(Manu **7**. 189-190) and deal with conquered territories (Manu **7**.201-202 and Yājñavalkya **1**. 339), culminating in the philosophy of the king-conqueror set forth in Manu **7**. 99. Next comes the king's role in internal affairs: the royal audience (isolated verses from Manu), the administrative set-up of the kingdom (Mau **7**. 114-121), fire prevention (*Mahābhārata* **12**. 69. 45-47), the king as enforcer of the law promulgated by brahmins (Yājñavalkya 2. 185, Bṛhaspathi **17**, 4. and 9-10, Nārada **17**. 5-6 and a quote attributed to Gotama which corresponds to Vasiṣṭha **1**. 40-42), his duty to provide endowments for brahmins (Manu **7**. 134-135) and his role as protector of property (Manu **8**. 40 and *Mahābhārata* **12**. 76. 10-12). Then follow scattered provisions from many sources, primarily Manu and the *Mahābhārata*, which describe the relationship of the king with his subjects: how he must be patient, patronize lavish sacrifices, inspire confidence, be calm in times of emergency, refrain from excesses, see to it that justice prevails, and generally protect his people from harm. After considerations on the need for the king's council to be conducted in secrecy (Manu **7**. 147-151), the chapter ends on a quotation from the *Devīpurāṇa* on the king's responsibilities as guardian of morals.

The pandits appear to have been original. The text quoted in chapter 2 of the *Vivādārṇavasetu* is not taken

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from any of the better-known treatises on *rājanīti*. In some respects there are marked differences. Most noticeable is the absence of provisions for the king's chaplain (*purohita*), chief justice (*prāḍvivāka*), treasury (*kośa*), allies (*mitra*), and consecration (*abhiṣeka*). The motives which guided the pandits' choice are not immediately apparent, but a preliminary observation might be made that they seem to have approached their several topics with an open mind. If they felt that previous Nibandha-s covered the subject to their satisfaction, they used them almost slavishly, as was the case with the chapter on debt, which a close examination reveals to be little more than a weaving together of the texts and comments provided in the *Vivādaratnākara* and *Vivādacintāmaṇi*. If they did not find a treatise which fulfilled their expectations, they created one of their own, possibly with each or several of the eleven authors contributing quotes from Smṛti texts to the general effort. This may account for the jolty character of some sections of chapter 2, which contrasts with the smooth argumentative tone of chapter 3, and the long sequences of verses which form the backbone of chapter 1. Further research will be needed to confirm and refine these tentative and partial conclusions. Until such time as a critical edition of the entire Sanskrit text is completed and analysed, this article will have achieved its purpose if it alerts scholars to the dangers of judging the pandits' compilation on the evidence of its better-known English version and of its first and incomplete edition.

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FRITS STAAL

VEDIC RELIGION IN KERALA

It is difficult to deal with any aspect of Sanskrit culture in Kerala and not find that Professor K. Kunjunni Raja has already treated it authoritatively and exhaustively. In the following pages, the attempt is made with some temerity, chiefly in order to pay tribute to the author of these pioneering investigations, whose *ṣaṣṭyabdapūrti* we are celebrating.

The title 'Vedic Religion in Kerala' should come as a surprise to those who think that the religion of the Veda-s existed only in north-west India and became extinct more than 2000 years ago. However, Vedic culture is alive among the Nambudiri brahmins of Kerala, along with many other beliefs and practices which belong to the later Hindu religion. The purpose of this paper is to provide an outline of these Vedic survivals, and compare them briefly with the original Vedic religion and with similar survivals elsewhere in India.

If we adopt a historical point of view and accept labels which have been customary for some time among scholars of Indian religion, we should say that the Vedic religion flourished in northern India until it was replaced by Hinduism after 600 B.C. Sometimes another label is used, namely, Brahmanism, to denote

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the earliest phase of Hinduism. But this name only complicates matters further and is best avoided. The labels 'Vedic' and 'Hindu' themselves are to some extent misleading. The term *vaidika* applies to anything that is directly connected with the Veda-s, at whatever period. As for 'Hindu'—though the Greeks had already referred to the people they met as people of the Indus or 'Indians' (Ἰνδικοί), the term 'Hinduism' has been in use only since about 1830. The only Indian word which resembles it in function and extension is *dharma*. In the Veda-s, this term applied particularly to the world of the gods. Later it came to include 'not only religion, but all the ethical, social and legal principles associated with religion' (Renou 1953, 48).

If we drop the labels 'Vedic' and 'Hindu,' we perceive a continuous stream of development, starting at least with the *Ṛgveda*, and continuing until the present. Many non-Vedic and pre-Vedic elements have contributed to this development. In the early centuries before Christ the Veda-s lost much of their influence. They continued to be transmitted formally, as sound, complete with all phonetic and acoustic detail. But in the general area of religion, attention shifted to new concepts and structures, such as are illustrated in the epic and the Purāṇa-s. New developments were initiated by the Upaniṣad-s in the domain of thought, and by Pāṇini's grammar in the area of scientific development. Linguistically this is marked by Pāṇini's distinction between *bhāṣā*, the spoken language, and *chandas*, the Vedic language. While

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these were not yet entirely distinct around 500 B.C., they gradually began to diverge. And so we could maintain that at the time the Veda-s began to be looked upon as a sacred heritage, as *śruti* or 'revelation,' and the *smṛti* traditions of the epic and the *sūtra* literature arose, Hinduism was born. At that time, what happened to the Veda-s?

The incorporation of the Veda-s within Hinduism presents a paradox to which Renou has drawn attention in '*Le destin du Véda dans l'Inde*' (1960). On the one hand, the Veda-s were regarded as eternal, of non-human origin, and the source of all religion; on the other hand their contents were abandoned and forgotten and replaced by ideas of a different nature. The subdivision of the Veda-s into schools, for example, was mainly maintained only among brahmins; the larger society, including the brahmins, adopted new sects and deities, and new notions such as *bhakti*. The notion of *karman*, originally applicable to the Vedic ritual, was replaced by *jñāna* in the Upaniṣad-s and in a similar manner and roughly at the same time in Buddhism.

The formal transmission of the Veda-s continued while Hindu civilization spread over the subcontinent. It assumed two distinct forms: the transmission of the Veda-s themselves, called *adhyāya*, 'learning,' 'repetition' or 'recitation,' and the ritual application of the Veda-s, called *prayoga* or *viniyoga*. The latter term refers specifically to the recitation of a particular *mantra* to accompany a particular rite at a particular point

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in the ritual. I shall first deal with *adhyāya* and return to *prayoga* subsequently.

The *adhyāya* tradition is oral. And so we witness a development which is probably without parallel: for about 3,000 years, a class of people devoted themselves in relative isolation to the formal preservation of a large number of oral compositions, confining themselves almost entirely to sound. There is no corresponding tradition for preserving the meaning, which was accordingly modified. The formal transmission of the sounds of the language has been at least as faithful as have been manuscript traditions in other parts of the world. Sound, though perhaps not as durable as stone or clay, has proved much less susceptible to wear and tear than paper. As a result, we have access to one of the ancient literatures of mankind almost in its original form and in its entirety.

This extraordinary effort of memorization can largely be explained by a simple fact: when the Veda-s were composed, writing was unknown in the community to which the composers belonged. It is a matter of controversy whether at a much earlier period a regular system of writing was used in the Indus civilization which at one time had occupied the same areas which the Vedic nomads entered. But even if this is so, it is not open to doubt that the art of writing had disappeared with the advent of the Vedic culture. When writing was later introduced (or re-introduced) from elsewhere, it was considered alien to the Vedic heritage and therefore unfit as a receptacle for the Vedas-.

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In the beginning, this foreign invention was mostly confined to commercial use and to royal edicts. It was gradually adopted in all branches of learning, and finally the Veda-s themselves were committed to writing. But for a long time, writing continued to be considered impure and even offensive. A late Vedic text, the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (5. 5. 3), states that a pupil should not recite the Veda after he has eaten meat, seen blood or a dead body, had intercourse or engaged in writing. Unlike the ancient civilizations of the near east and of China, Vedic civilization flourished without literacy. In India, writing has always been held in lower esteem than memory or the sound of recitation. This explains, among other things, the importance attached to *mantra-s*, a term originally applied to the Vedic verse.

And now for the details of this oral tradition. Each brahmin belongs by birth to one of the Veda-s, and is initiated into the recitation of his particular Veda by his father or by a teacher, either at home or in a Vedic school. Elaborate mnemotechnic methods have been devised to safeguard the proper formal transmission of these compositions and to eliminate or decrease the danger of losing word, syllables or accents. The simplest of these methods is the memorization of the *pada-pāṭha* or 'word-for-word' recitation, along with the *saṃhitā*, or 'continuous' recitation. In addition there are several mnemotechnic modifications, called *vikṛti*, in which the words of the *pada-pāṭha* are recited in certain definite combinations and permutations.

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In a simple extension of the *pada-pāṭha*, called *krama* or *krama-pāṭha*, each word is repeated once. Even this is not as simple as it seems, for the *saṃdhi* combinations and the accents are also modified according to rules. The *krama* applied to such a Vedic sentence as:

agnír no yajñám úpa vetu 'Agni, may he come to the ritual', yields:

agnír naḥ / no yajñám / yajñám úpa / úpa vetu //.

If we were to subject the English translation to the same treatment, we would obtain: 'Agni may / may he / he come / come to / to the / the ritual.'

At the present time such mnemotechnic devices are still preserved in many parts of South India, and also in Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. The Nambudiri brahmins of Kerala teach this method of transmission, for example, at the Brahmasva Maṭham in Trichur. However, the Nambudiris also preserve *vikṛti* modifications which are unknown in other parts of India. The most famous of these is called *ratha*, 'chariot'. This name occurs in some texts, where its meaning, however, is different. The Nambudiri *ratha* or *ratha-pāṭha* consists in principle of a reiterated return to the first word of a verse, taking one more word each time, i.e.: / aba / abcba / abcdcba / abcdedcba / . . . The two occurrences of the initial word as initial and final word of a portion are made to overlap and are chanted by two different persons: both recite forward, one in the *saṃhita-pāṭha* and the other in the *pada-pāṭha* (i.e., with and without *saṃdhi*); and one recites backward (with *saṃdhi*). When the latter has arrived again at

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the first word, the former joins him and both go forward and include one more word.

This recitation, which is more fully described in my book *Nambudiri Veda Recitation* (1961, 47-48), is quite difficult. Here is a *ratha* of the English translation quoted before: 'Agni may Agni/Agni may he may Agni/ Agni may he come he may Agni/ Agni may he come to come he may Agni/ Agni may he come to the to come he may Agni/ Agni may he come to the ritual the to come he may Agni.' Evidently, this brief phrase becomes quite long in the process. A similar scanning from left to right and from right to left would be required if we were to construct certain kinds of computers that deal with language. So those who only believe in progress and modernization, need not brush this aside antiquated nonsense. A similarly precise and formal analysis of language is needed in linguistics and in computer science.

The Nambudiris had no machines in mind when they developed these modifications. Their origin, however, is in the realm of linguistics, for we find these methods explained in the *prātiśākhya* literature, phonetic treatises accessory to each of the Vedic schools. While these complicated recitations have developed into a form of art in their own right, their original function was purely mnemotechnic: devices to prevent the loss of a single word or accent. Those who are familiar with theories of probability, can compute how the chances of loss decrease. However, from a historical point of view, the structure of *ratha* is not its most interesting

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feature. Its accentuation is even more remarkable. In order to appreciate this we shall have to take a closer look at the Vedic accents.

In Vedic, as in some other Indo-European languages, most words were marked with an accent which Pāṇini called *udātta*, 'raised'. The meaning of this word is generally applied to pitch, though J. E. B. Gray (1959) has interpreted it as referring to volume or breath. Gray used Nambudiri recitations for his analysis. Whatever its original nature, the *udātta* accent is not recited at a raised pitch anywhere in India outside Kerala. In the most common manner of recitation adopted in South India, among the brahmins of Tamilnad, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore, the *udātta* syllable is marked not by itself but by the syllables which precede and follow it. The preceding syllable is recited at a lower pitch and the following syllable at a higher pitch. This must be a very old development, for there are passages in the *prātiśākhya* literature which point in such a direction. For example, in the word *yajñasya*, where the middle syllable carries the *udātta*, the recitation is as:

yajñasya.

It is not clear what has happened to cause this shift of the high accent to the next syllable. What is remarkable about the Nambudiri *ratha* recitation is that the originally high *udātta* syllable is still recited at the high pitch, which, in other words, has stayed put.

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The same can be heard in a few other Nambudiri recitations, transmitted only in a few families. In interpreting this we might assume that it is an artificial revivalistic development, an attempt, perhaps, to conform to the rules of Pāṇini's grammar. Or else it could be an authentic, ancient survival. I am inclined to believe that it is the latter, for the Nambudiri tradition has preserved many archaic features. Hence this high *udātta* in the Nambudiri recitation constitutes a unique survival of the high tone postulated by comparative Indo-European philology.

Before referring to other archaisms and survivals let me mention that the Nambudiri pronunciation of Vedic has been influenced by features of Malayalam. For example, many consonants are voiced: we hear *pañja* for *pañca*, *śāndi* for *śānti*, etc. According to Kunjunni Raja (1961, 466), these consonants 'tend to become softer, though they are not voiced'. Furthermore, final *t* is pronounced as *l* under similar conditions as prevail in Malayalam: *upaniṣal* for *upaniṣat*, *āsīl* for *āsīt*, *tal-sa* for *tat-sa*, etc. Some of these were observed around 1600 by the Jesuit Gonçalves. Last, there is a characteristic nasalization, which seems relatively ancient, as Kunjunni Raja has pointed out. In Sanskrit this was called *anunāsikādhiprasara*. It is worth noting that all these influences from *Malayalam* are relatively superficial, and do not detract from the generally archaic character of Nambudiri recitation.

Among the schools or branches (*śākhā*) of the Veda-s, the Nambudiri situation is different from, and

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in some respects more ancient than, the situation found elsewhere in India. Of the two schools of the *Ṛgveda*, Āśvalāyana or Aitareya and Śāṅkhyāyana or Kauṣītaki, the former is found all over India and the Nambudiris also have it. But many Nambudiris belong to the Kauṣītaki school which is not found anywhere else. They also recite the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa*. E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, who edited this text together with a Nambudiri commentary, made use of its traditional recitation which was rendered for him by Erkkara Raman Nambudiri.

In the domain of the *Yajurveda*, the Nambudiris belong to the Taittirīya school of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, like other South Indian Yajurvedin-s'. Most Nambudiri Yajurvedin-s belong to the *sūtra* of Baudhāyana, which is less common elsewhere, and a few belong to that of Vādhūla or Bādhūla, which is not found anywhere else. The Bādhūlaka-s live mostly in southern Kerala or in and around Iriñjālakuḍa. Baudhāyana and Bādhūla are among the earliest *sūtra-s* of the Taittirīya school.

In *Sāmaveda* the Nambudiri community is practically unique. The Kauthuma-Rāṇāyanīya, found all over India, does not exist in Kerala, but the twenty remaining Nambudiri *Sāmaveda* houses all belong to the rare Jaiminīya tradition. This has been found outside Kerala in a few villages in Tamilnadu, where the style of chanting is, however, quite different. The entire Jaiminīya literature has been recently surveyed by Parpola (1973). The Nambudiri Jaiminīya chant is characterized by a relatively small range of

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pitch. At the same time they follow rather closely the syllable notation found in Jaiminīya manuscripts from Tamilnadu and Kerala. The Nambudiri Sāmavedin-s also employ a system of hand-movements (*kai-kāṭṭuka*). These were demonstrated by Itti Ravi Nambudiri of Panjal to Wayne Howard, who has recently published a set of photographs in his monograph *Sāmavedic Chant* (1977, 234-48). The hand-gestures of the Ṛgvedin-s were photographed almost half a century ago by Arnold Bake. One was published by Beryl de Zoete in her beautiful book on South Indian dance (1953), and I hope to publish the others in the near future.

What about the *Atharvaveda*? Well, it is not transmitted by the Nambudiris. In fact it seems never to have existed in South India, though quite a few Atharvavedic *mantra-s* are used in the ritual. A few decades ago, an isolated community of Atharvavedin-s was discovered in Orissa. This serves to show that Vedic fieldwork can still lead to spectacular discoveries, also outside Kerala.

I now come to the domain of ritual, where the Vedic *mantra-s* find their proper application. The all-India situation is easily described. The most widespread survivals of Vedic custom are still the *gṛhya* or domestic rites, such as are performed on the occasion of birth, *upanayana*, marriage or death. These can be found all over the subcontinent, though often the rites have undergone considerable abridgment and simplification. There have also been accretions, like dowry at marriage, a pernicious custom which is not Vedic.

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Much more interesting than the *gṛhya* rites are the large and spectacular *śrauta* rituals, and these survive only in South India. There have been performances in the North in recent times, but many of these seem to have been revivalistic rather than traditional. By this I mean that they were brought about with the help of scholars who referred to texts, and also with the collaboration of brahmins imported from South India.

Authentic *śrauta* ritual performances which exhibit a living tradition are strong in Andhra Pradesh and can also be found in the Tanjavur District of Tamilnadu. In these regions all seven varieties of Soma ritual are traditionally performed. Early in 1977 a much more elaborate ritual, the Pauṇḍarīka, was carried out in Andhra. But this exhibited several artificial features and the *mantra-s* were partly read out from books.

Though the Nambudiri *Sāmaveda* is becoming very rare, the Nambudiri community is still, in Vedic terms, self-contained; i.e., they can perform a *śrauta* ritual without importing anybody from elsewhere. For the Soma of the Soma rituals, a substitute is used which grows in the Anamalai hills in the former territory of the Raja of Kollengode. This substitute is a creeper, identified as *Sarcostemma brevistigma*.

The Nambudiris have continued to perform two Soma rituals. The first is the Agniṣṭoma, the paradigm or prototype of the seven varieties of Soma ritual. Its performance lasts for five days, of which the fifth is the Soma pressing day. The second *śrauta* ritual that the

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Nambudiris perform is another variety of Soma ritual, called Atirātra or 'over-night'. The ceremonies last twelve days and continue throughout the last two nights. The Atirātra is always combined with an Agnicayana, a *śrauta* ritual characterized by the construction, from bricks, of a large sacrificial altar in the form of a bird. This Atirātra Agnicayana was performed in 1975. On this occasion the ceremonies were studied, filmed, photographed and recorded by an international group of scholars and technicians. The twenty hours of rough footage were cut into a short film, entitled 'Altar of Fire'. I am at the moment preparing a two-volume work on this ritual performance, in collaboration with several scholars and two leading Nambudiri ritualists, Cherumukku Vaidikan Vallabhan Somayajipad and Itti Ravi Nambudiri.

Soma rituals are characterized by sequences of *Sāmaveda* chant and *Ṛgveda* recitation, followed by Soma oblations and Soma drinking by the Yajamāna, or patron of the ritual, and his priests. In the Agniṣṭoma there are twelve such sequences: five for the morning pressing, five for the midday pressing, and two for the third pressing. In the Atirātra-Agnicayana there are twenty-nine such sequences, and the third pressing is extended overnight. These celebrations with recital and chant are perhaps the richest survivals of Vedic culture in Kerala, or for that matter, in the world.

I have used the word 'survival' deliberately, because it is the least inadequate of the terms that come to mind. The Vedic *śrauta* rituals which the Nambudiris

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have preserved through the centuries are not the same celebrations as took place in Vedic times. From the point of view of rites, recitations and chants, they are almost identical in form. But in the spirit and function they are not the same. In Vedic times, these rituals were performed by semi-nomadic tribes who were fighting their way into the subcontinent and who were engaged in constant raids and struggles with its original inhabitants. The recitations refer frequently to these adventures. During their expeditions, the Vedic nomads carried Agni and Soma, and when they stopped for the night or for longer periods, rituals for Agni and Soma were performed in temporary sheds, using perishable materials such as wood and clay. Before they moved on, the sacred enclosure with all its contents was destroyed. When they began to settle down these semi-nomadic people also began to absorb the culture of the original inhabitants, which was in many respects superior to their own. The brick altars of the Agnicayana reflect such indigenous influence, for nomads have no use for bricks.

The Nambudiri culture flourishes in the context of Hindu civilization which has long been sedentary. Though they continue to use for their Vedic rituals temporary sheds and perishable materials, the Nambudiris were until recently a settled and peaceful community of country gentry, connoisseurs of the arts such as Kathakali, scholars and men of letters. The Nambudiris have devoted themselves to *pūjā*, temple worship and other Hindu practices as much as to their

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Vedic heritage. In this respect they differ from their Vedic ancestors, and also from many performers of Vedic rituals in the intervening period, and indeed throughout the history of Hindusim, when Vedic rituals were patronized by influential members of the community and often by kings. In this sense Vedic religion has long been a survival, combined with and sometimes integrated into a different way of life which incorporated other traditions of different provenance.

In spite of differences and the long historical development, the Vedic religion has remained the same in at least one respect. Agni is the fire, reinforced by *mantra-s* and oblations, a name familiar from chants and recitations, but not a deity of which an image is installed in a temple, like Śiva, Viṣṇu, or Bhagavatī. What holds for Agni also holds for Soma, though in a different way. This amounts to saying that the Vedic religion of Agni and Soma is a completely non-anthropomorphic religion. This is just as much true of the Vedic religion of the Vedic Indians as it is of the Vedic religion of the Nambudiris. It explains at the same time that the Vedic Agni and Soma coexist with the deities of the Hindu pantheon. Men change and non-anthropomorphic deities, accordingly, have a longer life.

The 1975 performance of the Atirātra-Agnicayana was an event of historic importance. A tradition which had been jealously guarded for almost three thousand years became overnight manifest and public property. This event exhibited two sides of the brahmin tradition : on the one hand the exclusiveness of caste,

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which is rapidly becoming a thing of the past, and on the other hand, a concern with one of the most ancient heritages of mankind, which could have been preserved in pristine purity only because outside influences were always eschewed. What happens next is a question of the future. Perhaps the Nambudiris will be able to organize another Vedic celebration, freshly inspired by widespread and increasing awareness that their heritage is a national treasure. Or else, the Vedic culture will become extinct, and it remains the task of scholars to preserve for posterity as soon as possible whatever can still be studied, recorded, photographed, and filmed. Even in that case, public support will be required. For though some Vedic fieldwork has been done in recent decades, there are at present still many more treasures left that could be saved by the efforts of a single scholar.

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T. VENKATACHARYA

NAMES OF THE THREE CHAPTERS OF THE *RASĀRṆAVASUDHĀKARA* AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

THE three chapters of the *Rasārṇavasudhākara* are respectively known as the *Rañjakollāsa, Rasikollāsa* and *Bhāvakollāsa*.[1] In his *Contribution of Āndhras to Sanskrit Literature* (Andhra University Series 105), Dr. P. Sriramamurti mentions the name of the 3rd chapter as *Rūpakollāsa* (p. 82, line 8). But he does not provide any basis for this name. The name *Rūpakollāsa* is not found in any of the MSS. I have collated for my edition. The three names noted above are similar to the names of the *Nāyakaprakaraṇa*, the *Rasaprakaraṇa* and the *Nāṭakaprakaraṇa* of the *Pratāparudrīya*, though the arrangement of the topics adopted by Siṃhabhūpāla is different from that of Vidyānātha.

The first chapter of the *RAS* consists of a detailed treatment of the *nāyaka-s* (heroes) and the *nāyikā-s*

[1] The TSS ed. of the *RAS* (*RAS*-1) and the Mysore MS. (*RAS*-4) read the name as *Bhāvollāsa*. But the Venkatagiri ed. (*RAS*-2) and *two* Madras MSS. (*RAS*-5 and *RAS*-6) read clearly as *Bhāvakollāsa*. For the details of the MSS. see my edition of the *RAS* (ALS 110). This point of the footnote was to have appeared in my ed. on page 451 (for line 3); but through oversight it was left out. The omission is regretted.

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(heroines) and their companions and assistants (together with illustrations). In addition to the *nāyaka* and the *nāyikā* (who are the *ālambanavibhāva-s*, the fundamental elements, depending on which the *rasa*-realization takes place), the chapter deals with the *anubhāva-s*, the effects of the *sthāyibhāva*, which are broadly divided into four types (as *citta-gātra-vāg-buddhyārambha-saṃbhavāḥ* (p. 79), and these are shown further in detail and illustrated by the author. The *sāttvikabhāva-s*, which are in fact *gātraja-anubhāva-s* (see *Rasatarańgiṇī*: *śārīras tu sāttvikabhāvādiḥ*—, and the *RAS* 1. 311: *anubhāvāś ca kathyante bhāvasaṃsūcanād amī*) are also defined and illustrated, and with these the chapter comes to an end. According to his own method and view of importance, the definitions of *ālambanavibhāva*, *uddīpanavibhāva* and the *anubhāva*, and the various illustrations are included in this chapter by Siṃhabhūpāla, though Vidyānātha and some others would include these in the chapter dealing with *rasa*.

Coming to the point about the significance of the name *Rañjakollāsa*, the following deserves to be noted. In this chapter the discussion on *nāyaka* and *nāyikā* is the predominant feature. The chapter makes a striking contribution in the discussions, and in providing the definitions and various illustrations for *nāyaka-s* and *nāyikā-s* culled from different sources. The author could have named the chapter *Nāyakollāsa* (like the *Nāyakaprakaraṇa* of Vidyānātha). This is what seems to have been meant by the word *Rañjakollāsa* too. The word *rañjaka* is derived from the root *rañja=rāge*.

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If we take the derivation as *rañjayati iti rañjakaḥ* (or *rañjikā*), it would explain that *nāyaka* and *nāyikā* are the *rañjaka-s*, the causes of the mutual *rāga*, the *rati*, the love. With the analysis as *rañjakāś ca rañjikāś ca*, the resulting Ekaśeṣa form (by *pumān striyā*) would be *rañjakāḥ*. Then by Bahuvrīhi *rañjakānām ullāsaḥ = prakāśanaṃ yasmin saḥ* (*vilāsaḥ = bhāgaḥ*) we get *rañjakollāsaḥ*. In choosing the name thus, the intention of the author seems to be the following. In conformity with the names of the other chapters *Rasikollāsa* and *Bhāvakollāsa*, the expression *rañjaka* can also mean a *sahṛdaya* in addition to *nāyaka* and *nāyikā*. The word *upajīvaka* of the expression *upajīvyopajīvakabhāva* is derived as *upajīvati iti upajīvakaḥ* (meaning 'a dependent).' Similarly, by deriving it as *rajyati iti rañjakaḥ*, the word would mean one who has the *rāga*. In this explanation connected with the *sahṛdaya*, the word *rāga* may be taken in the sense of 'interest' and 'liking'. In the following *kārikā* of the *Daśarūpaka*, the use of *rāga* may be noted:

iṣṭasyārthasya racanā gopyaguptiḥ prakāśanam,
rāgaḥ prayogasyāścaryaṃ vṛttāntasyānupakṣayaḥ. (1. 55)

Here the expression: *rāgaḥ prayogasya* is explained by Dhanika as *abhinayarāgavṛddhiḥ*, and on this Bhaṭṭa-nṛsiṃha comments thus: *abhinayadarśanena sāmājikānāṃ kutūhalavṛddhir ityarthaḥ* (*DR*, ALS vol. 97, p. 64). Here the interpretation of the word *rāga* is noted, taking the expression *prayogasya viṣaye rāga*, as being associated with *sāmājika*, that is, *sahṛdaya*. Thus *rañjaka* can mean *sahṛdaya*. In this application the expression *rañjakollāsa* would mean: *ranjakānām = sahṛdayānām ullāsaḥ*

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=hṛdayollāsaḥ (see the expression: *bhāvakacittollāsa* used by Siṃhabhūpāla on page 298, line 15) *yasmāt saḥ* (*vilāsaḥ=bhāgaḥ*) *rañjakollāsaḥ*. In essence it seems to be intended by the author that the *sahṛdaya-s* would be delighted by reading this chapter (as by the others).

II. RASIKOLLĀSA

In the name of the 2nd chapter, the implied application to the *sahṛdaya-s* is not complicated, because of the word *rasika* in the expression, the analysis of which is similar to that of the *Rañjakollāsa*. In its primary application to the chapter, the word *rasika* can stand for *rasavān*, meaning that the chapter has discussion on *rasa* (*pratipādyapratipādakabhāvena rasavān*). Though *rasa* belongs to the *sāmājika*, the usages such as *rasavat kāvyam* are seen and possible, and these are similar to the expression *rasiko naṭaḥ*, which is discussed by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on 5. 2. 95. In this connection it may be noted that *rasiko naṭaḥ* probably meant 'an actor who was an expert exhibitor of *bhava-s* (feelings)'—. In the absence of the exact context a definite interpretation of this usage is difficult. Dhanika remarks thus:

> *rasikāḥ sāmājikāḥ. kāvyaṃ tu tathāvidhānandasaṃvidunmīlanahetubhāvena rasavat. āyur ghṛtam ityādi-vyapadeśavat.*

On this Bhaṭṭaṇṛsiṃha comments thus:

> *rasabhājo hi rasikāḥ te eva sāmājikāḥ . . . tarhi rasavat kāvyam iti kathaṃ kāvyasya rasavattāvyapadeśaḥ? tatrāha*

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—kāvyam tv iti. dṛṣṭaś ca taddhetāv api tattvena vyapadeśa ityāha—āyur iti.

(both: pp. 167 and 168 in *DR*, ALS, vol. 97)

In its primary application to the chapter, the full expression may be analysed as: *rasikaś cāsau ullāsaś ca*, just to convey that the chapter has discussion on *rasa*.

III. BHĀVAKOLLĀSA

Bhāvaka is a synonym of *rasika* and *sahṛdaya*, and Siṃhabhūpāla himself uses this word in this sense in several places. See for instance pages 135 (line 4), 206 (line 6), 250 (line 4), 251 (lines 8 & 10), 253 (*sahṛdaya*—line 6) (& *sāmājika*—line 1), and 298 (*bhāvakacittollāsa* — line 15). Thus *bhāvaka* being a synonym of *sahṛdaya*, in the implied application to *sahṛdaya*, the expression *bhāvakollāsa* and its analysis are similar to the other two, i.e. *Rañjakollāsa* and *Rasikollāsa*. In the primary application to the chapter, the word *bhāvaka* can be explained as *bhāvayati* (from the root *bhū*=*prāptau* of Curādi)=*prāpayati*=*pratipādayati nāṭakādibhedān saṃdhi-saṃdhyaṅgādi-saṃpannān iti bhāvakaḥ, bhāvakaś cāsau ullāsaś ca*=*bhāvakollāsaḥ*. Instead of using the common expressions like *Nāyakaprakaraṇa*, *Rasaprakaraṇa* and *Nāṭaka-prakaraṇa* or *Rūpakollāsa*, by choosing the expressions *Rañjakollāsa*, *Rasikollāsa* and *Bhāvakollāsa* the author seems to imply the applicability of these to the *sahṛdaya-s* also, to whose delight he attaches great importance as conveyed in the following verses:

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तस्मादस्मत्प्रयत्नोऽयं तत्प्रकाशनलक्षणः ।
सारैकग्राहिणां चित्तमानन्दयति धीमताम् ।।
नेदानींतनदीपिका किमु तमःसंघातमुन्मूलये-
ज्ज्योत्स्ना किं न चकोरपारणकृते तत्कालसंशोभिनी ।
बालः किं कमलाकरान् दिनमणिर्नोल्लासयेदञ्जसा
तत् संप्रत्यपि मादृशामपि वचः स्यादेव सत्प्रीतये ।।
(१. ५४, ५५)

The title of the whole text also seems intended to have the implied applicability to the *sahṛdaya-s*. In accordance with the mythological and poetical accounts, just as the moon (*sudhākara*) is said to bring delight to the ocean (*arṇava*), so also this work would bring delight to the *sahṛdaya-s*, the *rasika-s*. Hence the name of the work, *Rasārṇavasudhākara*, which is to be analysed as *Rasārṇavasya* = (*rasikajanasya, ullāsajanakaḥ*) *sudhākaraḥ*.

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M. A. MEHENDALE

Nirukta Note *XXI*

ONCE AGAIN *RATHARYATI* AND *SAṂTAVĪTVAT*

In the Proceedings of the Andhra Pradesh Oriental Conference,[1] First Session, appears a paper (pp. 10-17) entitled 'Some Objections to Mehendale on *Nirukta*' by Dr. (Mrs.) S. S. Pradhan. She has raised in this paper some objections to my interpretation of the *Nirukta* passages where Yāska comments on the words *ratharyati* (*Nir.* **6**. 28) and *saṃtavītvat* (*Nir.* **2**. 28).

First I shall state my position with regard to these two passages and then answer the objections raised by Dr. Pradhan.

(1) *ratharyati*. Yāska's explanation of this form runs as: *ratharyatīti siddhaḥ | tatprepsuḥ | rathaṃ kāmayata iti vā |* I have interpreted the word *siddhaḥ* in the Nirukta passage as a 'derived (formation)', i.e. one obtained from something else, in this particular case a denominative verbal form obtained from a noun (*siddhaḥ*= *nāmnaḥ siddhaḥ*). This denominative form, Yāska further tells us, has the sense 'desirous of that' (*tatprepsuḥ*),

[1] Published by the Andhra Saraswatha Parishat, Hyderabad, 1979.

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tat being substituted each time by the noun from which the denominative in question has been obtained. Since in the present case the form in question is derived from the noun *ratha*, *tat* is to be substituted by *ratha*, and *tatprepsuḥ* means *ratha-prepsuḥ* which Yāska has shown by paraphrasing *rathaprepsuḥ* as *rathaṃ kāmayate*.

Mrs. Pradhan's objections to the above interpretation are as follows:

(1) 'What proof is there to show that *siddha* means a derivative formation?'

The word *siddha* is available in the sense 'realized, obtained (from something else which forms its starting point).' The word (*pra*)*siddha* (and *siddhi*) is available, for example, in the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* **11**. 34 in this sense. There it is used in the context of the Kramapāṭha being realized from the Pada and the Saṃhitā-pāṭha which are called its *āśraya*. The verbal form *ratharyati* is realized from the noun *ratha* and since it is a form realized from something else I called it a 'derived (form)'. *ratharyati iti siddhaḥ* means, in my opinion, *ratharyati-śabdaḥ nāmnaḥ siddhaḥ* '(The word) *ratharyati* is derived or obtained (from the noun *ratha*)'.

(2) Her second objection is: 'His (Mehendale's) interpretation . . . does not tell us how this derivative with this particular meaning is formed from a noun. . .'

Frankly, I am unable to understand this objection. In my paper I have not gone beyond what Yāska tells us about the form and, as is well known, he leaves many things to be imagined. Yāska does not take care to account for every phonetic detail in his derivations.

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From what I have said it should be clear that according to Yāska *ratharyati* is a secondary or a derivative (denominative) verbal form from the noun *ratha* having, obviously, *-ya-* as the suffix of derivation, and this derivation, according to Yāska, has the meaning 'desirous of that' (i.e. desirous of the meaning conveyed by the noun from which it is derived).

(3) Dr. Pradhan's 'most important objection' is that in my interpretation I have not taken note of *vā* occurring in the *Nirukta* passage. This *vā*, according to her, means that Yāska had two explanations of *ratharyati* to offer, while I have assumed that he had only one.

It is true that the available editions of the *Nirukta* read *vā* at the end of the passage. But since neither Durga nor Skanda-Maheśvara took note of it, I concluded that the *Nirukta* text available to them did not have *vā*. It therefore seemed to me that the *vā* at the end of the passage was not genuine but was added by someone who mistook the *Nirukta* passage as giving two alternative explanations of *ratharyati*. My references to the *Nirukta* commentators are not meant as criticisms. They only point out what the facts are and what conclusion we might draw from the commentators' silence about *vā*. I do not know why Mrs. Pradhan considers my references to the commentators as 'comments' on them. I also do not know how she got the impression that I accept *siddhaḥ tatprepsuḥ* and *rathaṃ kāmayate* as alternative explanations of *ratharyati*.

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(4) Mrs. Pradhan's last objection is: 'I do not know how Mehendale construes *tatprepsuḥ*.'

I do not think I have left this point vague. The pronoun *tat* is meant to refer in general to anything for which one may entertain a longing (*prepsā*). This sort of wording is quite common in the formulations of the *sūtra-s*[1] and it is likely that Yāska borrowed the expression *tatprepsuḥ* from some grammar known to him. Although it is not necessary, I may try to make my interpretation clearer this way. Yāska's explanation of *ratharyati* would be analogous to someone explaining, let us say, the secondary derivative *karmaṇya* as *karmaṇya iti* (*śabdaḥ karmann iti nāmnaḥ*) *siddhaḥ*/ *tatra sādhuḥ*/ *karmaṇi pravīṇa* (paraphrasing *sādhuḥ* of the *sūtra* by *pravīṇaḥ*) *iti*/

(2) *saṃtavītvat*

Yāska's explanatory comment on this form runs as: *tanoteḥ pūrvayā prakṛtyā nigamaḥ*. This means that Yāska proposes to derive *tavītvat* from the root *tan*. Since the form contains the semivowel *v* twice it was suggested by me to derive it from the stem *tu* which, by reduplication, would yield *tavītu*. The only way to obtain the stem *tu* from *tan*, it seemed to me, was to consider it as made up of *ta*, an allomorph of *tan*, plus the vowel *u*, the sign of the eighth conjugation. I further suggested that if Yāska in this way obtained two stems from the root *tan*, a shorter *tu* and a fuller *tanu*, he

[1] Cf. *tasyāpatyam* (P. 4. 1. 92), etc.

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apparently called the former *pūrvā* and the latter, perhaps, *aparā prakṛti*.

Mrs. Pradhan does not approve of this suggestion. That is possible. But I am not able to follow her objection. She says: 'Mehendale's suggestion . . . is not acceptable in view of *Nir.* 2. 2.' I have myself drawn attention to *Nir.* 2. 2 and have, in fact, made that passage as my starting point. In 2. 2 Yāska refers to roots like *yaj* which yield two stems, *yaj* and *ij*, and which he calls *siddhā prakṛti* and, perhaps, *siddhetarā*[1] *prakṛti*. But a root like *tan* is different from *yaj* since it does not have in the body of the root, a semi-vowel immediately in the vicinity of a vowel. Hence, although the root *tan* offers to Yāska two bases he does not call them *siddhā* and **siddhetarā*, but calls them differently as *pūrvā* and **aparā*. So, pointing to *Nir.* 2. 2. cannot be an objection to my suggestion.

I already admitted in my note that 'it is somewhat difficult to arrive at one final solution of the problem presented by *tanoteḥ pūrvayā prakṛtyā nigamaḥ*. Hence I ventured to suggest an alternative solution. I said that since the *mantra* cited by Yāska is also available with the reading *saṃsaniṣyadat*, in place of *saṃtavītvat*, Yāska, perhaps, wanted to tell us by his remark *pūrvayā prakṛtyā nigamaḥ* that the *mantra* cited by him was in accordance with the *pūrvā prakṛti*, i.e. the older tradition. This *pūrvā prakṛti* could be, either, the *Ṛgveda*

[1] The words actually used by Yāska are *taditarayā* i.e. *siddhetarayā*.

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tradition, or, the proto-type of the Yajus schools, or, the Kāṇva recension.

With regard to this solution Mrs. Pradhan asks: 'What is the relevance of this remark to the derivation of the form (*anu*) *saṃtavītvat*?' But must Yāska always say only what is relevant to the derivations? Can we not permit him, occasionally, to say something besides derivation? As said by me, in this alternative interpretation, Yāska's remark regarding the derivation of *tavītvat* stops with *tanoteḥ*. We have to understand that he does not want to say anything further about the phonetic changes involved in deriving *tavītvat* from *tan*.

Let us now consider the suggestions made by Mrs. Pradhan to explain the two forms.

(1) *ratharyati*

As for *ratharyati* she admits *vā* in the text and therefore considers *siddhas tatprepsuḥ* and *rathaṃ kāmayate* as two different explanations proposed by Yāska of the form *ratharyati*. The first explanation, she thinks, declares that the form is (*a*) a denominative; and the second constitutes, in her opinion, (*b*) a paraphrase of the form indicative of its derivation.

(*a*) The 'denominative' explanation: According to Mrs. Pradhan *siddhaḥ* is a technical term and means a noun. What Yāska wants to tell us, according to her, is that in the denominative form *ratharyati* we have (1) a *siddha*, i.e. a noun, namely, *ratha*, and (2) the suffix *ya* in the sense 'desirous of that'. Hence she proposes the following translation: '*ratharyati* means one desirous of that, i.e. a noun, here *ratha*'. Actually her translation

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should have been: '*ratharyati* has a noun (and a suffix *-ya* which has the sense) "desirous of that" (noun, here *ratha*)'.

I for one do not know if anyone would be satisfied with Mrs. Pradhan's explanation and translation. Firstly, is there any point in saying that *ratharyati* has a noun, namely *ratha*? It seems so obvious. Secondly, if Yāska wanted to refer to the noun in *ratharyati*, could he not have used the general term *nāman* for this purpose? What was the necessity for using a technical term in this place? Thirdly, if Yāska wanted to refer to a *siddhāvastha-bhāva*, which, by the way, is out of the question in the case of *ratha*, he would have used the term *sattvanāma* already used by him before (*Nir.* 1. 1).[1] Finally, Mrs. Pradhan's translation appears very strained and requires many words to be supplied.

(b) The 'paraphrase' explanation: According to Mrs. Pradhan Yāska's remark *rathaṃ kāmayate* is intended to give another possible explanation of the form *ratharyati*. Yāska suggests, according to her, that *ratharyati* may be looked upon as a sort of haplological form coming from *rathaṃ haryati*[2] or **rathaharyati*. Mrs. Pradhan says that instead of directly stating the root *hary* for the derivation of *ratharyati*., Yāska suggests it by paraphrasing *haryati* by *kāmayate*. She says that Yāska on many occasions suggests the root for the derivation of a noun by means of a paraphrase. That

[1] See my note **16** *sattvanāman* and *karmanāman*, reprinted in the *Nirukta Notes*: Series II, pp. 31-34.

[2] This explanation has been already suggested by Durga.

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is true. But what Yāska paraphrases is the noun to be derived and not the root from which the noun is to be derived. And she ignores the very important fact that Yāska's paraphrase always contains the root from which the noun is sought to be derived. She might look up for this purpose the very examples she has chosen to justify the 'paraphrase' explanation. If her paraphrase explanation is to be accepted it would mean, in the light of Yāska's practice, that he wanted to explain the *-rya-* part of the form *ratharyati* from the root *kam*. And this, certainly, is not what Mrs. Pradhan thinks of.

(2) *saṃtavītvat*

According to Mrs. Pradhan the above form contains only *ta* of the root *tan* and hence by *pūrvayā prakṛtyā* Yāska refers to this initial syllable of the root. According to her *pūrvā prakṛti* 'the prior base' can also mean 'the prior portion of the base' and hence *saṃtavītvat* is to be derived from the prior portion of the root *tan*. Incidentally, according to her, *n* is the *aparā prakṛti* of *tan*.

When in the *Nirukta* **2**. 1 Yāska has an occasion to refer to the initial and the final sounds of a root, he has used expressions as *dhātvādi* and *(dhātv)anta*. Hence, in the present case, if Yāska wanted to suggest the derivation of *saṃtavītvat* from *ta* of *tan* he would most probably have said *saṃtavītvat tanoteḥ| dhātvāder nigamaḥ*, or *antalopena nigamaḥ*, or *atra dhātvādir evāvaśiṣyate*. The use of the word *pūrvā prakṛti* by him, however, clearly indicates, as in the case of his use of *siddhā prakṛti*, that he has in mind some variant base of the root *tan* for the derivation of *tavītvat*.

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H. G. NARAHARI

SOME ATHARVAVEDIC NAMES OF A COW*

THE *Atharvaveda* abounds in epithets for different types of bulls, cows and calves. Some of them are special to this Veda[1] and are not known in the rest of Vedic literature. The present paper discusses the etymology of *five* of these epithets culled from the *Kauśikasūtra* of this Veda.

1. *apavātā*

The word occurs in the following passage[2] in the *Kauśikasūtra*:

अस्थाद् द्यौरित्यपवातायाः स्वयं स्रस्तेन गोशृङ्गेण संपातवता जपन् ।

Dārila[3] explains the word thus: *apagatā gauḥ vatsavigalitasnehā*. The word therefore means 'a cow which has lost her love for her calf'. The *paddhati* of Keśava does not explain the word. The portion *-vātā* appears

* Paper read at the Vedic Section of XXIX All-India Oriental Conference, Poona, on 6 June 1979.

1 *Kauśikasūtra* of *Atharvaveda*, ed. by M. Bloomfield (Reprint 1977, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), pp. xliii ff.

2 *Kauśikasūtra*, **31.** 6.

3 ibid., p. 85n.

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to be related to the word *vanana* which occurs in another sūtra[1] of the same text which runs:

यथामांसमिति वननम् ।

Dārila[2] explains the word *vanana* as the affection a cow feels when she has her calf nearby (*goḥ savatsaṃ saṃbhajaphalaṃ karmety arthaḥ*). And a cow which is *apavātā* must therefore be one which has shed this affection (*saṃbhaja*).

The form *vanànā* is as old as the *Ṛgveda* (**9**. 86. 40). Sāyaṇa explains it as *vananīyā vācaḥ*, 'winning speech'. The word *vananīya* occurs in the *Nirukta* (**6**. 31) and means 'to be won'. The form *vanana* here (**5**. 5) appears to have a different meaning not suitable in this context.

2. *aṣṭakyā*

The word occurs in the *Kauśikasūtra* (**19**. 28) which runs:

प्रथमा ह व्युवास सेत्यष्टक्याया वपां सर्वेण सूक्तेन त्रिर्जुहोति ।

Dārila[3] explains the word *aṣṭakyā* here to mean 'a cow employed in the *aṣṭakā*-performance' (*aṣṭakāyām bhavā aṣṭakyā*; *tasyā gor vapāṃ juhoti*). The *paddhati*[4] of Keśava elaborates the ritual called *aṣṭakā karma*.

3. *puṃsī*

The word occurs in *Kauśikasūtra* (**35**. 8) which runs:

शमीमश्वत्थ इति मन्त्रोक्तेऽग्निं मथित्वा पुंस्याः सर्पिषि पैद्वमिव ।

[1] **41**. 18. [2] ibid., p. 114 n. [3] p. 54n. [4] p. 319.

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Dārila[1] explains the word *puṃsī* here as *puṃvatsāyāḥ goghṛtenāpi prakṣipya*. Keśava[2] explains that this rite in which the mixture is given to a woman is the *puṃsavana*. The word therefore means 'a cow which has brought forth a male-calf'.

4. *Karkī*

The word occurs in *Kauśikasūtra* (**56**. 13) which runs:

सूर्यस्य रश्मीनिति कर्कीं सानुवन्ध्यां ददाति ।

Dārila does not explain the word. Keśava's explanation[3] of the passage is not clear. The word seems to mean a 'white calf' to Bloomfield.[4] It may be a 'female calf' as the form of the word suggests, that is intended to be sacrificed.

5. *Sīrā*

Kauśikasūtra (**39**. 30) runs:

अधि सीरेभ्यो दश दक्षिणा ।

Dārila's explanation of the passage seems to suggest that the word *sīra* here means an 'ox at the plough or a draught-ox' (*halagobhyaḥ daśa gāvo'dhikā dakṣiṇā deyāḥ*). Keśava[5] does not explain the *sūtra* at all. Normally[6] the word would mean only a 'plough'.[7]

[1] p. 95n. [2] p. 336. [3] p. 364.
[4] p. xlviii. [5] p. 109 n. [6] p. 341.
[7] *TS.* **4**. 2. 5. 5 for instance.

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S. SANKARANARAYANAN.

THREEFOLD INFERENCE OF THE NAIYĀYIKA-S: A HISTORICAL STUDY

STUDENTS of Indian Logic know well that the Naiyāyika-s classify inference into three categories, namely, Affirmative-and-Negative, or *Anvaya-Vyatirekin* (AV); Exclusively Affirmative, or *Kevalānvayin* (KN); and Exclusively Negative, or *Kevalavyatirekin* (KV).[1] The Naiyāyika-s maintain that all the three are necessary for their scheme of inference. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s approve of only the first and regard the other two as unessential. In this paper an attempt is made to see how, why and when they came to be considered essential by the Naiyāyika-s and how far they succeeded in maintaining their position in this regard.

As far as AV is concerned, there is no problem, for it is the basic form of inference accepted by all schools of Indian philosophy, with the singular exception of the Cārvāka-s, who fall outside the purview of the present paper. In fact, even the animals behave, as Śrī Śaṃkara would say,[2] in a sort of rational way, which can be explained provided we accept that they too have some kind of AV inference. Hence this

[1] See the *Nyāyavārttika*, **1**. 1. 5, etc.

[2] cf. *paśvādibhiś ca aviśeṣāt*, etc.; Śaṃkara's introd. to the *Brahmasūtra*, **1**. 1. 1.

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inference may be as old as Man himself. Consequently, only the other two form the subject matter of our study.

Let us start with KV which came to the Nyāya school earlier than the KN as we shall see in the sequel. At the outset it may be pointed out that the KV is not a monopoly of the Naiyāyika-s. The Sāṃkhya-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s also accept it. In fact the concept of KV does not seem to have even originated in the Nyāya school. For, Gautama (*c.* 400 B.C.—A.D. 200) the author of the *Nyāyasūtra-s* and Vātsyāyana (*c.* A.D. 300), the author of the *Nyāyabhāsya* appear to be indifferent to or ignorant of the KV. The same also is the case with Praśastapāda (4th century A.D.), the author of the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. It seems to have been left to the genius of Uddyotakara (*c.* A.D. 650), the author of the *Nyāyavārttika*, to introduce it while elucidating the word *trividham* of the *Nyāyasūtra* on inference that reads:

> *Atha tat-pūrvakaṃ trividham anumānam pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca iti* (**1**. 1. 5).

He also introduces the same once again under the *sūtra* on the definition of the *udāharaṇa* (third member of the fivefold syllogism) based on difference. That *sūtra* runs:

> *Tathā vaidharmyāt* (**1**. 1. 35).

Wherefrom did Uddyotakara get it?

It may be suggested tentatively that Uddyotakara perhaps adopted the KV from the Sāṃkhya-s. This

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may be inferred from the fact that he employs, following the Sāṃkhya-s[1] the words *avīta* and *vīta* to denote respectively the KV *hetu* and AV *hetu*. Vācaspati Miśra explains the term *vīta* as a *hetu*, (the second member of the fivefold syllogism) that exists in the *pakṣa* (a given thing in which something is sought to be inferred) and is either found or is absent in the *sapakṣa* (similar instance) and *avīta* as a *hetu* entirely opposed to *vīta*. Further he says that these terms and these concepts belong to other systems of philosophy.

> *Tantrāntara-siddhena nāmnā tantrāntara-siddhāntaṃ darśayati—so'yam avīta iti.*

However, Miśra does not identify what that system is. Yet, the above statement of Miśra seems to suggest that the concept was foreign to the Nyāya school. It may be noted further that Miśra freely employs these expressions in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* as if they belong to the Sāṃkhya system.[2] Therefore it would appear that most probably the KV came from the Sāṃkhya-s to the Naiyāyika school.

Why should Uddyotakara adopt the KV? It is a difficult question to answer. However, it may be provisionally suggested as follows: The influence of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines came to be felt more and more

[1] See *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5 and 9 and *Sāṃkhyatattva-kaumudī* (*STK*) thereunder.

[2] ibid. Though *STK* is to be placed after *Tātparyaṭīkā* in chronological order, there is every reason to believe that in his *STK*, Vācaspati uses only those terminologies and concepts that have already been accepted by that school.

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on the Naiyāyika-s by A.D. 600; and whatever may be the original differences between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, both came to be regarded as being in complete agreement except on some minor points.[1] Therefore Uddyotakara might have felt the necessity to accommodate, at least to some extent, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of salvation, achieved by means of the correct knowledge of the *padārtha-s* (categories) on the basis of their common properties and their individual unique properties.[2]

The common property is *anvayidharma* and the most common properties, such as *jñeyatva* (knowability), *vācyatva* (speakability), etc., are KN-s. The individual property is *vyatirekidharma* and the most uncommon or exclusive property that distinguishes a category from all the rest in the universe is KV, like Desire, Knowledge, etc. of the Soul (*ātman*); the Smell of the Earth; and so on. So to gain the correct knowledge of the *ātman* on the basis of its common and exclusive properties, the KN and the KV inferences might have been felt to be necessary.

Thus it would appear that during the period of amalgamation of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, the Naiyāyika-s thought it necessary to bring in the concept of the KV and that in this context they had been influenced by the examples of Sāṃkyha-s, at least to

[1] S. N. Dasgupta, *A Hist.* of *Ind. Philosophy* (1975), vol. I, p. 310.

[2] *Padārthānāṃ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṃ niḥśreyasam—Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, **I.** 1. 4.

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a certain extent. If we could, from this angle, view the *vīta* and *avīta* inferences on the one hand and the AV, KN and KV inferences on the other and review the scanty information we have, regarding the *Daśapadārthī*, a Vaiśeṣika work (available only in the Chinese translation made possibly by Yuan Chwang in A.D. 648) which is stated to use the terms *vīta* and *avīta*,[1] perhaps in similar senses, then we may surmise that the Vaiśeṣika school also contributed its mite in inducting these ideas into the amalgamated *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school.

Here what we should not lose sight of is this: The early Naiyāyika-s who, swearing by the first *sūtra* of Gautama, hold that salvation is possible through the right knowledge of the sixteen categories like Pramāṇa, Prameya, etc., cannot digest the idea of attaining salvation through *sādharmya-vaidharmya-jñāna* or the correct knowledge of the categories on the basis of their common and unique properties. Hence Uddyotakara, the first known Naiyāyika to speak of the KV, illustrates the *anumāna* in question by using it as a weapon against the exponents of the No-Soul theory (*nairātmya-vādin-s*) like the Cārvāka-s, etc. His illustration runs as follows:

> *nedaṃ jīvac-charīraṃ nirātmakam, aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgāt; yad ubhaya-pakṣa-saṃpratipannam aprāṇādimat tat sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ dṛṣṭam / na cedaṃ śarīram aprāṇādimat bhavati; tasmād nedaṃ nirātmakam*
>
> (1. 1. 35).

[1] See the *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 2, p. 275.

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Uddyotakara specifies also the purpose of the *avīta* KV by saying that it is intended only to refute the opponent:

so'yam avītaḥ parapakṣa-niṣedhārtha eva bhavati.

It may be of interest to note that the purpose of the *avīta* seems more or less the same with the Sāṃkhya-s also. For, they too employ the *vīta-hetu-s* to establish the *satkārya* theory by saying:

asad akaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasaṃbhavābhāvāt/
śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam//

(*Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 9)

On the other hand, they use the *avīta-hetu-s* to refute their opponents, such as the Naiyāyika-s who hold to the duality of the material cause and its effect. Their *avīta* syllogism runs as follows:

paṭas tantubhyo na bhidyate, tad-dharmatvāt; yad yato bhidyate tat tasya na dharmaḥ, yathā gaur aśvasya; dharmaś ca paṭaḥ tantūnām; tasmān nārthāntaram.

(Vācaspati Miśra on the above)

However, slowly the idea of KV as a means to *vaidharmya-jñāna* asserted itself and hence we find Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (*c.* A.D. 1200) providing an example of KV:

pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate, gandhavattvāt.

Thus the KV *anumāna* came to play an important role in the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools. Perhaps it is necessary for the Yoga school also as it has much in common with the Sāṃkhya-s.

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On the other hand the KV has been summarily rejected by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s. They accept *arthāpatti* (inference by circumstances) as the fifth means-of- right-knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). This *arthāpatti* too seems to be a *pramāṇa* of high antiquity. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya give *arthāpayāmi* as the form of mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*) of the *arthāpatti*. To derive the form *arthāpayāmi* and the like Kātyāyana (*c.* 4th century B.C.) gives a special *vārttika*.[1] Patañjali seems to derive the word *arthāpayāmi* as *arthaṃ karomi*.[2] Śabarasvāmin (*c.* A.D. 200), the author of the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*, is perhaps the first known writer to define *arthāpatti* clearly:

arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā arthaḥ,
anyathā nopapadyate ityartha-kalpanā.

(on Jaimini, 1. 1. 5)

The Mīmāṃsaka-s say that they need *arthāpatti* for certain purposes like assuming a *śruti* on the basis of a given *smṛti*, as explained by Kumārilabhaṭṭa:

smṛtyā śrutir yā parikalpyate 'smin, etc.

(*Ślokavārttika*, on the above)

Similarly Advaitin-s swear that they require *arthāpatti* in order to establish the *prapañca-mithyātva* (illusoriness of the world of objects) and so on. Besides, both the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s make use of *arthāpatti* also wherever the Naiyāyika-s and others employ the

[1] *Artha-veda-satyānām āpug vaktavyaḥ* under Pāṇini, 3. 1. 25.
[2] cf. *satyaṃ karoti satyāpayati* under the above.

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KV. The different interpretations and definitions offered by these two opposed schools, their respective concepts and their arguments and counter-arguments, since the days of Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda—through the ages of Uddyotakara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayanācārya, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Śrīharṣa, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Dharmarājādhvarin, Viśvanātha Pañcānana and many others—are well known to scholars and they need not be touched upon here. Thus the KV divides the Vaidika-darśana-s into two conflicting camps—the Sāṃkhya-s, the Yoga-s, the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s, all upholding it on one side, and the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s, rejecting it on the other. Both go to the extent of swearing by their respective *anuvyavasāya-s* of the forms *anuminomi* and *arthāpayāmi* (or *kalpayāmi*). However, on the basis of what we have seen so far, an impartial student may observe this: Both these groups earnestly desire to establish the *itarabheda* (uniqueness) of the *pṛthivī* (Earth); the absence of soullessness of the living body; and both the groups are very much interested in assuming an unknown *śruti* (a Vedic injunction) on the basis of a *smṛti* of unknown origin. The thinkers of the first group try to achieve it through the *anumāna* alone obviously because the founders of their respective schools do not subscribe to the idea of *arthāpatti* as a means-of-knowledge. At the same time the later writers of these schools themselves have realized that an ordinary *anumāna* cannot deliver the goods. And hence they invented a special *anumāna* and gave it

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the name *avīta* or KV. Similarly the teachers of the other group cannot escape noticing the strong *anumāna* elements contained in what they call *arthāpatti*, in spite of its uniqueness. What they have in their mind is quite discernible when we read Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's concluding observation on the topic:

evaṃ-svabhāvo 'pyanumāna-śabdaṃ
labheta ced astu yathepsitaṃ naḥ /

A few *sūtra-s* of Jaimini also may support this suggestion of ours. For, we have already seen that according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s. etc., the assumption of *śruti* on the basis of a *smṛti* of unknown origin is possible only by *arthāpatti*, as Kumārila puts it. But atleast in two instances, the *sūtrakāra* Jaimini calls such an assumption *anumāna* only and not *arthāpatti*. cf.

api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt and *virodhe tvanapekṣaṃ syād asati hy anumānam.*

(1. 3. 2-3)

Kumārila's *Vārttika* also in the context runs:
virodhe tvanapekṣaṃ syād asati hy anumīyate.
However, in the same context he writes a bit earlier:
arthāpattyāpi yatkiṃcin mūlam ity avagamyate.
Further, it may also be noted that in the *Brahmasūtra*—
śabda iti cet, na; ataḥ prabhavāt, pratyakṣānumānābhyām

(1. 3. 28)

the word *anumāna* denotes a *smṛti* that leads to the inference of a *śruti*. And Śaṃkara too speaks of some subject matter of a *smṛti* leading to the inference of a *śruti*:

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tat smaryamāṇaṃ rūpaṃ mūlabhūtāṃ śrutim anumāpayat.
(Śaṃkara's *Bhāsya* on *Brahmasūtra*, 1. 2. 25)[1]

All these would show that even these opponents of KV find it difficult to think of *arthāpatti* unalloyed with the *anumāna* element.

Now it remains to see whether the Naiyāyika-s have succeeded in maintaining KV as an *anumāna*. It appears that they have not succeeded in their efforts. Uddyotakara's KV *anumāna*, quoted above, it is to be admitted, smacks of *arthāpatti*. And this seems to be indicated also by his own statement that it is meant not for establishing a new truth, but only for refuting opponents who raise objections against the conclusions of a system. The point may become further clear if we examine the question as follows: The form of the *Vyatireka-vyāpti* (universal pervasion of the negatives of two things) is given by the Naiyāyika-s as:

sādhyābhāva-vyāpakībhūtābhāva-pratiyogitvam.

If the knowledge of this *vyāpti* is taken to be the *karaṇa* or instrument of the KV inference, then how can the inference be avoided when one entertains the idea that the *hetu* is *vyabhicarita*, namely, it is *sādhyābhāvavadvṛtti*, meaning the *hetu* (the ground of inference) exists where there is no *sādhya* (that which is to be inferred)? That is to say that *anumiti* would be inevitable even when one entertains the above idea. For, the said knowledge of *vyāpti* cannot be obstructed by the above-mentioned knowledge of *vyabhicāra*. On this score, namely the

[1] i.e. *Smaryamāṇam anumānaṃ syāt.*

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lack of proper *bādhyabādhaka-bhāva* (the relationship of the hinderer and hindered), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has rejected the KV *vyāpti* and concludes that a *vyāpti* (concomitance) like *sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttiḥ* alone can be the cause of *anumiti* in all instances and hence the knowledge *pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate, gandhavattvāt* and the like are to be considered only as *arthāpatti* and not *anumiti*. Śiromaṇi argues in the KV section:

> *evaṃ sādhyābhāvavyāpakībhūtābhāva-pratiyogitvam api nānumityaupayikaṃ, gauravāt, vyabhicāra-jñānāvirodhitvācca . . . vyatirekavyāptigrahādhīnā ca dhīḥ na anumitiḥ, tattvena ananubhavāt . . . kiṃ tu vijātīyā; tatkaraṇam api pramāṇāntaram arthāpattir eva* (*Anumāna-Dīdhiti*, Chowkhambha ed., p. 1360).

Later writers like Jagadīśa and Gadādhara could not even think of meeting the above attack of Śiromaṇi.

The case appears to be more or less the same with the KN also. There seems to be no definite evidence to show that Gautama or Kaṇāda or Vātsyāyana or Praśastapāda had even thought it essential. Even Uddyotakara, who seems to be the first Naiyāyika to introduce it along with KV, illustrates the KN inference only in the form known to those thinkers who held that all is transient, i.e., the Buddhists.[1] But it is Vācaspati Miśra who is perhaps the first Naiyāyika to give the example of the KN as usually accepted by the Naiyāyika-s

[1] The Advaitin-s, excepting a few like Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita, the commentator on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, maintain that the supreme Brahman is devoid of any quality and hence they do not accept any quality to be KN and an inference of that.

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of the subsequent ages. The respective introductory words and examples given by these two authors run as:

anvayī vivakṣita-tajjātīya-vṛttitve sati vipakṣahīnaḥ, yathā sarvānityatva-vādinām 'anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt' iti; asya hi vipakṣo nāsti (*Nyāya-vārttika*, 1. 1. 5); and

udāharaṇam āha—yathā iti. 'svamate tu abhidheyo viśeṣaḥ, prameyatvāt, sāmānyavat', 'paramāṇvākāśādayaḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ, prameyatvāt, ghaṭavat' ity ādayo draṣṭavyāḥ (*Tātparyaṭīkā* on the above).

The fact that Uddyotakara went all the way to the Buddhist school in search of a KN inference may betray the fact that even during his time the KN had not yet been recognized by the Naiyāyika-s. For, had it been readily available in his own Naiyāyika camp, would he not have preferred it for the purpose?

arke cen madhu vindeta kimarthaṃ parvataṃ vrajet?

The above discussion would also show that after Uddyotakara, but before Vācaspati, the KN asserted its importance. This suggests that in adopting the KN the Naiyāyika-s were probably influenced by the Buddhists, just as they had been influenced a little earlier by the Sāṃkhya-s in embracing the KV. Whether the comparatively late recognition of KN by the Naiyāyika-s was due to their age-old proverbial animosity towards Buddhist ideas cannot be ascertained now.

Whatever may be the case, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has rejected the KN inference too on the ground that the knowledge of concomitance, namely

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hetu-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogisādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam that had been invented for maintaining the KN inference cannot be obstructed by the *vyabhicaritatva-jñānam* mentioned above. Śiromaṇi argues:

> *sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam eva vyāptiḥ, lāghavāt, prāyaśaḥ sādhana-bhēde 'pi abhedāc ca . . . syād evaṃ, yadi vyāpakatā-jñānaṃ vyabhicāra-buddhiṃ nirundhyāt, na caivam . . . vyāpakatā-jñānād eva anumitir iti nānubhāvikaṃ, na vā yauktikam . . . prameyatvādeś ca . . . na tu jñeyatvādi-hetukānumitir ānubhāvikī . . .* (*Anumāna-Dīdhiti*, op. cit., pp. 1361 ff.).

Thus it would appear that the teachers, who adopted the KV and KN for the sake of convenience, provided them with suitable *vyāpti-s*, but unfortunately failed to make necessary provision to maintain them from the point of the *hetvābhāsa* (fallacious middle term) of their own *anumāna* scheme. Hence it is of interest to observe that both these adopted children, namely KV and KN were to be rejected after a thousand years by Śiromaṇi (*c.* A.D. 1600) the greatest of the Navya-Naiyāyika-s. They stand rejected not because they are immigrants from the rival camps, but mainly because they do not stand the vigorous test of the *bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva* of the well-knit *hetāvabhāsa*-scheme of *anumāna*. It is better to treat the KV as *arthāpatti* and to have an additional means-of-right-knowledge, although the Sūtrakāra, etc. had not thought so, rather than to induct it into the sphere of the already available, most perfect *anumāna*, so sacred for the Naiyāyika-s. The intellectual giant, Śiromaṇi, was perhaps of this view.

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V. K. CHARI

'STRUCTURE' AND 'RHYTHM' IN SANSKRIT DRAMATIC THEORY

(Illustrated by the drama of *Śākuntala*)

'STRUCTURE' and 'Rhythm' are the twin concepts that govern the construction of a drama, according to Sanskrit theory. Drama is a mode of action, a structure of plotted events arranged according to causal and necessary connections. And Sanskrit treatises, from *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Daśarūpaka* to later manuals, lay down elaborate rules (*nāṭyadharma*) for the conduct of the plot (*itivṛtta*). But there is also a parallel concept, namely, of 'Rhythm' implied by the theory of Rasa, which provides a more comprehensive principle for the guidance of plot-construction. According to this, the plot of a drama is no more than the sequence of the material conditions (*vibhāva-s* and *anubhāva-s*) which manifest a given emotion. A play or poem is supposed to develop one principal emotion (*sthāyin*), while it may also attract other emotions and feeling tones (*vyabhicārin-s*) congruent with it, but necessarily subordinating them to the dominant mood. In this view, the plot of a drama is seen broadly as a curve describing the trajectory of the emotion, its rise, proliferation, and subsidence. All elements of structure, thus, become

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subservient to the total emotive tone of the composition.

I

Traditionally, in the Sanskrit treatises, the structure of a drama is described in terms of three parallel systems, each, in turn, having a fivefold division: Elements of the Subject Matter (*arthaprakṛti-s*), Stages of the Action (*avasthā-s*), and Junctures or Conjunctions (*saṃdhi-s*). The last of these are again subdivided into 64 limbs or members (*saṃdhyaṅga-s*). But on closer examination, we find that these systems are often inaccurate, and their minute divisions and subdivisions unnecessary and cumbersome, since they do not, except for the Junctures, bring out the defining property of drama, which consists in conflict and tension. A drama, by its very nature, cannot survive without some opposing force impeding the activity of the hero in the pursuit of his goal. The first division, *arthaprakṛti-s*, provides for three important stages in the development of the action, namely, *bīja* (the germ of the action), *bindu* (its expansion through subsidiary and allied issues), and *kārya* (denouement, marking the final fruition of the hero's purpose). But the two other elements of the plot: *patākā* (collateral action or sub-plot) and *prakarī* (episodical incident) are not indispensable for a drama, since a good plot can be conceived even without these.[1] For instance, Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala* has no sub-plot,

[1] Cf. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (Baroda, 1929), pp. 46, 47,48.

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though it has an episodical incident in the fisherman's scene in the Prelude to Act 6, and the Vidūṣaka-Mātali scene in Act 6. The *arthaprakṛti-s* are not, strictly speaking, divisions of plot; they are rather, as Bhoja points out, the material causes of the plot (*kathāśarīropādāna-kāraṇabhūtāḥ*).[1] The second parallel division of dramatic action into five stages in the realization of the hero's purpose: *ārambha*, *yatna*, *prāptyāśā*, *niyatāpti* and *phalāgama*, no doubt describes the course of all human efforts, based as it is on the well-recognized objectives of human life (*trivarga*). Dramatic action is an artistic representation, or imitation, if you will, of the whole universe of human action, and it must naturally follow these stages. But this system still does not pinpoint the elements of reversal, tension, and suspense so vital to a drama, although fear of failure is also implied in the hope of attainment (*prāptyāśā*) and effort might seem to suggest certain obstacles to be surmounted.

The system of Junctures (*saṃdhi-s*), however, offers a better description of the segments of a dramatic structure. A 'juncture' is defined as the connection of one thing with another thing, when there is a single sequence of events: *ekena prayojanena anvitānāṃ kathāṃśānām avāntaraikaprayojanasaṃbandhaḥ*.[2] As the unity of a dramatic plot consists in the development of a single action, composed of a series of incidents, causally and

[1] Quoted in Raghvan: *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (Madras), 1979, p. 578.
[2] *The Daśarūpaka* ed. T. Venkatacharya (Madras, 1969) p. 19.

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psychologically inter-related, the 'junctures' provide these links or intermediate connections, whereby the various incidents are unified into one developing situation. A juncture is the joining together of the various parts of the story: *saṃdhiḥ parasparaṃ kathāṃśānāṃ saṃghaṭanaṃ.*[1] A *saṃdhi* can also be understood as representing that part of an ongoing action, in which a whole series of happenings and motifs is gathered together and brought to a head so as to constitute a stage in its development. Thus, the first segment *mukha* (Protasis) is the first cause that gives rise to an initial purpose, motive, or sentiment, which is to be developed in various ways in the course of the drama, and it corresponds to the Beginning or *bīja.* The second, *pratimukha* (Epitasis or Metabasis) is the stage in which the initial purpose is promoted or impeded by another event, and it is parallel with *prayatna* and *bindu.* The third *garbha* (Catatasis) represents a further development of the germ, but there are introduced frequent hindrances to its growth; the initial purpose is seen and lost by turns, but its pursuit is continued. This segment is supposed to coincide with *prāptyāśā* and *patākā.* The fourth, *avamarśa* (Peripateia) introduces a definite change in the course of the story, by which the initial cause or germ is baffled and an unforeseen reversal ensues, caused by anger, passion, temptation, curse, etc.[2] This segment

[1] Sāgaranandin, *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa,* 59.

[2] '*nāśaḥ, kāraṇavaidhuryam, kiṃcit śreyaḥ, savighnatā,*' Sāgaranandin; *saṃdehātmakaḥ, Abhinavabhāratī, Nāṭyaśāstra* (G. O. S), 3. p. 26.

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is supposed to match the fourth *avasthā*, namely, *prāptyāśā*. The fifth, *nirvahaṇa* (Apodosis or the closing of the action) brings together the chain of happenings that were set in motion in the opening and developed through the intermediate stages, and causes them to end in the consummation of the initial object (*phalāgama*).

This system (of the *saṃdhi-s*), thus, seems to give a more objective analysis of the dramatic plot by dealing more directly with its structural principles. More particularly, it provides for the element of tension or conflict, which impels the onward movement of the plot. The second, third, and fourth segments admit, among other things, such elements as *nirodha* (obstruction), *toṭaka* (quarrel), *udvega* (dismay), *saṃbhrama* (consternation), *apavāda* (censure), *vidrava* (tumult), *chalana* (humiliation), etc. But it, too, suffers from certain defects: (i) The parallels with the *artha-prakṛti-s* and *avasthā-s* do not always work too neatly: for instance, *avamarśa* does not correspond with *niyatāpti*; on the other hand, it brings to a head all those factors that cause a set-back in the attainment of the object. Again, the parallel between *nirvahaṇa* and *phalāgama* does not take into account the possibility of a calamitous ending. But as the Sanskrit tradition does not recognize pure tragedies, this may be justified. In any case, a coordination between the three systems seems difficult to maintain, and diverse views exist in regard to this matter. (ii) *pratimukha* and *garbha* are not clearly distinguished, although *garbha* may seem to represent

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a further development of the elements found in *pratimukha*. Thus we may have four rather than five segments of plot: Exposition, Progression, Reversal, Conclusion or Catastrophe. (iii) Then again, the 64 *saṃdhyaṅga-s* often overlap, and their enumeration serves no purpose, inasmuch as they need not all be employed in one drama (a fact admitted by Bharata himself: *NS.* 21. 17. 105), and they can be introduced in some junctures irregularly or promiscuously. The critics themselves do not show decisively that any particular limb is essential for the juncture of which it is a part. In general, their procedure is to show that particular elements are present in the plays selected to illustrate them. Neither do they demonstrate clearly, by an analysis of a complete play, what elements, stages, or junctures, of a plot are its necessary conditions, without which drama as plotted action cannot exist. However, the theory of junctures, whether they are four or five, does furnish us with an instrument for analysing the basic structure of action in a tragedy, comedy, or tragicomedy.

In *Śākuntala*, in terms of the junctures, we find that the opening is represented by the first meeting of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, and their love at first sight (Act 1); the Progression by the deepening of their love, which is interrupted by a minor obstacle in the form of the queen-mother's call to the king requesting his presence at the court, which, however, is soon removed (Act 2); the Development by the second meeting between the lovers and the tantalizing prospect of a

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consummation, unfortunately interrupted by the arrival of Gautamī and the call to the king to protect the evening sacrifice from the raid of the demons, until, subsequently, the lovers do happily consummate their love—an event reported by Anasūyā in the Prelude to Act 4. This Prelude also sets in motion the seeds of a reversal, caused by Durvāsas' curse. From this point on until the climax of Act 5 (Duṣyanta's repudiation of Śakuntalā and the tragic separation of the lovers) we have the *avamarśa* or Peripateia. The Prelude to Act 6, the fisherman's scene, sows the seeds of a recognition. This is the beginning of the *nirvahaṇa*, which is carried on until the end of the last act, where the lovers are finally reunited.

II

While this is a bare outline of the gross structure of the drama, it does not fully explain its dynamis, its distinctive power as an artistic form, which, according to the Indian theorists, is *rasābhivyakti* or evocation of the emotions. Hence the Sanskrit critics, from Bharata down, talk about another over-arching principle, namely *rasaucitya* (propriety in regard to the presentation of the emotive situation), which, they insist, must guide the construction of the plot. The arrangement of incidents into a unified sequence is certainly important. But that alone is not sufficient to make the composition a *kāvya*. As Ānandavardhana declares: 'The poet will not be serving any useful purpose simply by the management of the plot, because this aim is fulfilled even in a

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historical chronicle.'[1] Ānandavardhana states further that the divisions and sub-divisions of plot should be constructed only with a view to the proper delineation of the sentiments and to the securing of unity of tone.[2] Abhinavagupta points out in the *Abhinavabhāratī* (*NS.* **1**. 107) that no aesthetic delight can result from a bare outline of the story merely: 'They did like this and this is what happened to them.' The mere relating of events is not *kāvya*; it would be *kāvya* only when events are presented with a view to exhibiting the feeling qualities latent in them. In devising the junctures of a dramatic plot, the poet should therefore aim at the presentation of *rasa* in accordance with its causes and concomitant factors, and its rhythm of excitement (*uddīpana*), efflorescence, and subsidence (*praśamana*). If rasa-evocation is thus the aim of all drama, it should also be remembered that no play, or any extended composition for that matter, can have one *rasa* only, but must, for the proper elaboration of its theme, be composed of a variety of emotions, out of whose interaction is produced the dominant mood of the piece. (*na hy ekarasajaṃ kāvyam*: *NS.* **7**. 119-23). Feelings, again, do not remain stable for any length of time, but have a rise and a fall, and often they do not occur alone in their purity, but mingle and interact with other

[1] *na hi kaver itivṛttamātranirvahaṇena kiṃcit prayojanam, itihāsādeva tatsiddheḥ, Dhvanyāloka*, **3**. 14; vṛtti.

[2] *saṃdhīnām . . . tadaṅgānām ca . . . ghaṭanaṃ rasābhivyaktyapekṣayā, Dhvanyāloka*, **3**. 14, vṛtti; see also *Dasarūpaka*, p. 20: *rasotpattihetor eva bījatvam iti, rasamātrasyaiva mukhasaṃdhi-prayojakatvakathanaparatayā vyākhyeyam;* also *Nāṭyaśāstra*, **19**, 104-5.

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feelings. Therefore, a drama, which is a complex structure of emotive tones, will follow the rhythm of Rise, Proliferation and Commixture, and Subsidence. This in the Rasa theory is called *bhāvodaya* (rise), *bhāvasaṃdhi* (co-existence of equal emotions), *bhāvaśabalatā* (variegation), and *bhāvaśānti* (subsidence). The only way of presenting an emotive situation in a drama is by following the rhythm of the various emotions treated, and by devising the sequence of events in accordance with that rhythm. But while each auxiliary feeling may have its rhythmic rise and fall, the overall movement of the dramatic action will follow the rhythm of its dominant emotion (*sthāyin*). Traditionally, no doubt, the terms *bhāvodaya*, etc. are applied to the *vyabhicārin-s* (transitory mental states) only. (The Dhvani theorists call these cases of *bhāvadhvani* as distinct from *rasadhvani*. Thus, Abhinavagupta says: 'Whenever a transitory feeling is developed to an acme of excitement and becomes exclusively important as the source of delight, it is called *bhāvadhvani*.')[1] In this view, it appears that only *vyabhicārin-s* have this property of rise and fall. But this line of reasoning is not sound, since *sthāyin-s*, too, exhibit this property when treated in an extended poem or play, and since no *bhāva* has any existence except insofar as it culminates in or gets connected to some *sthāyin*. There is, in fact, no *bhāvadhvani* as distinct from *rasadhvani*. And the fact that a *vyabhicārin* is necessarily subordinated to a *sthāyin* and

[1] *Dhvanyāloka*, 2. 3: *Locana*.

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helps the cause of a *sthāyin* is also, contrary to the view of Viśvanātha,[1] no reason for classifying *bhāvodaya*, etc. as *alaṃkāra-s*; nor does it serve to distinguish the mode of *bhāvābhivyakti* from *rasābhivyakti*.

In terms of its emotive rhythm, the drama of *Śākuntala* may be seen, in its sustained treatment of erotic love (*śṛṅgāra*)—which is its ruling motive and total emotive tone and in its complex orchestration of various subsidiary tones, motifs, and images—to move from *pūrvarāga* (courtship) to *saṃbhoga* (consummation), to *pravāsa-vipralambha* (separation due to the departure of the lover), to *karuṇa-vipralambha* (sorrow due to loss of hope of reunion), and finally to union after separation. These parts, in turn, correspond in the following manner to the *saṃdhi-s*:

Bhāvodaya	pūrvarāga	mukha		
		pratimukha	Acts	**1-2**
	saṃbhoga	garbha	Act	**3**
Bhāvaśabalatā & Bhāvasaṃdhi	pravāsa	avamarśa	Act	**4**
	karuṇa		Acts	**5-6**
Bhāvaśānti	reunion	nirvahaṇa	Act	**7**

In addition to the dominant emotion, several incidental conditions are also introduced, which have no direct bearing on the principal motive, but which harmonize well with it. Examples of these are: the Heroic and

[1] *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 10 (ed. P. V. Kane), p. 62: Viśvanātha argues that when *bhāvodaya*, etc. are subordinate to something else (to the main *rasa*, that is), they are called the figures *bhāvodaya*, etc. becaue they help the cause of that *rasa*.

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the Wonderful in several passages extolling the king's exploits, including the deer-hunt of the opening scene; the Serene (*Śānta*) in the descriptions of the hermitages; the Wrathful in Act 6 when the king is roused from his despondency by the despairing cries of the Vidūṣaka, the Comical in the Vidūṣaka scenes and in the fisherman's episode. The main theme is also supported by several images or symbolic motifs, appropriate to each stage of the emotion being depicted. Thus, the images of the jasmine creeper and the bee (Act 1) symbolize the female and the male lovers respectively. The throbbing of the king's arm heralds his exciting experience in the serene hermitage. Similarly, the twitching of Śakuntalā's eyelid (Act 5) is felt as a foreshadowing of her tragic repudiation. The image of the female Cakravāka bird (Act 4) symbolizes the heroine's own plight in *pravāsavipralambha*. The metaphor of the cloud in Act 5 suggests the mind of the king darkened by the sage's curse, and the simile of the surface of the mirror tarnished by dust and its restoration to its original lustre suggests the deliverance of his mind from darkness. The drama thus achieves its unity by subordinating all of its elements—structure, image, and motive—to the overriding consideration of emotive tone.

To conclude: the emotive rhythm is what guides dramatic construction and provides the artistic motive for the ordering of the individual actions into an integrated structure. The commanding form in any drama is always a feeling to be explored and exploited. The

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poet is, no doubt, initially presented with a story material, a sequence of human actions, which promises certain emotional possibilities. For feelings to be exhibited in the artistic medium, they must of course be contained in the situation. Hence the given situation always precedes its treatment in a poem or play. The trinity of *arthaprakṛti-s*, *avasthā-s*, and *saṃdhi-s* represents the total system of actions, moving by probable or necessary connections from beginning, through middle, to end. These constructive principles ensure the material continuity of the story. They constitute the framework or mechanism (*kathāśarīra*) of the drama. The emotive rhythm, on the other hand, describes the sequence of emotions or moods, the rise and fall of tension, generated by the events. But while both structure and rhythm must be at work simultaneously in dramatic construction, the Sanskrit theorists, especially of the Dhvani School, seem to give primacy to the latter as the chief regulative principle. Rasa is the final end which everything in the work must be made, directly or indirectly, to serve.

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LUDO ROCHER

NOTES ON MIXED CASTES IN CLASSICAL INDIA

§ 1. The so-called 'mixed castes' in classical India have been studied in the past. The most comprehensive collection of data appears in P. V. Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra* (vol. 2, pp. 69-104, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941).[1] In this paper I want to return to the original texts on which these data are based, schematize some of the materials, and try to draw certain conclusions. The texts are the dharmasūtra-s, the early dharmaśāstra-s, and Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, as follows:

—*Gautamadharmasūtra* **4**. 16-21 (Stenzler's edition, Bühler's translation) = **4**. 14-17 (Ānandāśrama edition);

—*Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* **1**. 16. 6-8 + **1**. 17. 3-8 (Hultzsch's edition, Bühler's translation) = **1**. 16. 7-8 + **1**. 17. 2-8 (Kashi edition);

—*Vāsiṣṭhadharmasūtra* **18**. 1-6, 8-9;

—*Viṣṇusmṛti* **16**. 2-6;

[1] The text of this article was written before the publication of Horst Brinkhaus: *Die altindischen Mischkastensysteme* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1978). Brinkhaus treats the texts in far greater detail, but pays less attention to general trends which are the prime concern of this paper.

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—*Mānavadharmaśāstra* **10**. 6, 8-9, 11-12, 16-17;
—*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* **1**. 91-95;
—*Kauṭilīyārthaśāstra* **3**. 7. 20-30.

It should be noted that one dharmasūtra, that of Āpastamba, does not discuss the matter of mixed castes.

§ 2. On the other hand, Gautama gives two sets. A first set is followed by a second one, introduced by: 'Some say . . .' The interesting point is that not only the content but also the way of presentation in both sets are totally different; I shall return to this point later (§ 29).

§ 3. Baudhāyana also introduces mixed castes twice, one after the other. The situation is far more confused in this treatise, and considerable text-critical research will be required to solve the problem. The first passage follows immediately after the rules on the number of wives members of the four varṇa-s are allowed to have: from four to one. After a few rules which are difficult to understand Baudhāyana exhibits a second set of sūtra-s on mixed castes. Although the presentation in both cases is quite different, the contents are nearly identical, with one exception (§ 19), one omission in the first set (§ 9), and one uncertainty (§§ 9, 24).

§ 4. Consequently the following analysis is based on nine different descriptions of mixed castes. Reference to them will be as follows:

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Gautama	G_1
	G_2
Baudhāyana	B_1
	B_2
Vasiṣṭha	Va
Viṣṇu	Vi
Manu	M
Yājñavalkya	Y
Kauṭilya	K

§ 5. There are, of course, two basically different types of mixed marriages, in both of which the husband is the point of reference. If he marries a woman of a lower varṇa than his own, the marriage is *anuloma*; if he marries a woman of a higher varṇa, the marriage is *pratiloma*.

The brāhmaṇa can conclude an *anuloma* marriage in three different degrees:

—with a kṣatriya woman: A^1b
—with a vaiśya woman: A^2b
—with a śūdra woman: A^3b

There are two degrees of *anuloma* for a kṣatriya:

—with a vaiśya woman: A^1k
—with a śūdra woman: A^2k

There is only one degree of *anuloma* for the vaiśya:

—with a śūdra woman: A^1v

Conversely, there is one possible degree of *pratiloma* marriage for a kṣatriya:

—with a brāhmaṇa woman: P^1k

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Two degrees of *pratiloma* are possible for a vaiśya:

—with a kṣatriya woman: P^1v

—with a brāhmaṇa woman: P^2v

And there are three degrees of *pratiloma* for a śūdra:

—with a vaiśya woman: P^1s

—with a kṣatriya woman: P^2s

—with a brāhmaṇa woman: P^3s

§ 6. All together there are, thus, twelve different cases of primary mixed castes, i.e. those that come into being as a result of marriages the parties to which belong to two of the four original varṇa-s. Some of the texts on which this study is based discuss a smaller or larger number of secondary mixed castes, i.e. those that come into being when one or both parties to the marriage belong(s) to one or two primary mixed castes. This article will not concern itself with secondary mixed castes; they will only be referred to occasionally in direct relation to one or the other of the primary mixed castes. Table 1 presents a complete picture of the twelve primary mixed castes as they appear in the nine versions of the texts mentioned earlier (§ 4).

§ 7. The most striking fact in table 1 is that there is absolute unanimity in all nine versions for one situation only:

$$P^3s = cāṇḍāla.$$

That means that all texts agree on the name of the worst case of primary mixed marriage: the single highest degree of *pratiloma*.

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§ 8. As might be expected, a nearly equally strong unanimity appears in the single highest degree of *anuloma*: A^3b. However, in this case there is one exception. Viṣṇu's general approach to *anuloma* (§ 23) apparently did not tolerate exceptions, not even for *anuloma*, in the third degree. Moreover, G_1 and G_2 call A^3b pāraśava, B_1 niṣāda, both terms evidently being interchangeable:

B_2 'niṣāda; some say: pāraśava,'
M 'niṣāda who is called pāraśava,'
Y 'niṣāda or also pāraśava,'
K 'niṣāda or pāraśava.'

A similar statement by Vasiṣṭha will be discussed later (§ 22).

§ 9. Besides P^3s and A^3b there is quasi unanimity in one other case:

P^1k = sūta.

B_1 is the only version in which sūta is absent. It lists eight *pratiloma-s*: āyogava, māgadha, vaiṇa, kṣattṛ, pulkasa, kukkuṭa, vaidehaka, and caṇḍāla. Three of these are explained immediately as secondary mixed castes:

vaiṇa = A^2k (ugra) x kṣatriya
pulkasa = A^3b (niṣāda) x vaiśya
kukkuṭa = vaiśya x A^3b (niṣāda).

This leaves only five primary *pratiloma-s*. Even though all manuscripts used so far by editors of Baudhāyana seem to confirm this situation, I cannot accept that a

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Table 1

	brāhmaṇa F	*kṣatriya F*	*vaiśya F*	*śūdra F*
brāhmaṇa M		brāhmaṇa B_1 B_2 K b-sadṛśa M kṣatriya Vi savarṇa G_1 mūrdhāvasikta G_2 Y ambaṣṭha Va A^1b	vaiśya Vi ambaṣṭha B_1 B_2 M Y K niṣāda G_1 bhṛjjakaṇṭha G_2 ugra Va A^2b	śūdra V pāraśava G_1 G_2 niṣāda B_1 pārāśava/niṣāda B_2 Va M Y K A^3b
kṣatriya M	sūta G_1 G_2 (B_1) B_2 Va Vi M Y K P^1k		kṣatriya B_1 B_2 K k-sadṛśa M vaiśya Vi māhiṣya G_2 Y ambaṣṭha G_1 Va A^1k	śūdra Vi ugra B_1 B_2 Va M Y K dauṣmanta G_1 yavana G_2 A^2k
vaiśya M	vaideha(ka) B_1 ? B_2 Vi M Y K kṛta G_1 māgadha G_2 rāmaka (romaka) Va P^2v	māgadha G_1 M Y K pulkasa Va Vi āyogava B_1 ? B_2 dhīvara G_2 P^1v		vaiśya B_1 v-sadṛśa M śūdra Vi K rathakāra B_2 karaṇa G_2 Y ugra G_1 ambaṣṭha Va A^1v
śūdra M	cāṇḍāla G_1 G_2 B_1 ? B_2 Va Vi M Y K P^3s	kṣattṛ B_1 ? B_2 M Y K vaidehaka G_1 pulkasa G_2 vaiṇa Va māgadha Vi P^2s	āyogava G_1 Vi M Y K māgadha B_1 ? B_2 vaideha G_2 antyavasāyin Va P^1s	

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sūtrakāra would have neglected to mention the sixth *pratiloma*: sūta. I therefore include it, in parentheses, in table 1.

§ 10. The reason why P^1k is unanimous has to be different from that of the unanimity in the two extreme cases: P^3s and A^3b. Even though Kauṭilya (3. 7. 29) states that the sūta as P^1k is different from the sūta who recites the Purāṇa-s, I suggest that the question be reconsidered. Together with some of the other terms exhibited in table 1—rathakāra, kṣattṛ, niṣāda, māgadha, ugra, āyogava—sūta appears already in Vedic texts (Kane pp. 43-44). It is at least surprising that of all these terms sūta alone has attained an unquestioned status among the mixed castes. I intend to come back to this problem in another publication.

§ 11. In all other cases than the three discussed so far terminology varies greatly from one version to the other. Ten terms occur only once:

G_1	kṛta	:	P^2v
	dauṣmanta	:	A^2k
	savarṇa	:	A^1b
G_2	dhīvara	:	P^1v
	bhṛjjakaṇṭha	:	A^2b
	yavana	:	A^2k
B_2	rathakāra	:	A^1v
Va	antyavasāyin	:	P^1s
	rāmaka (romaka)	:	P^2v
	vaiṇa	:	P^2s

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Four of these are used elsewhere for secondary mixed castes: antyavasāyin (Kane p. 71), yavana (Kane pp. 92-93), rathakāra (Kane p. 94), and vaiṇa (Kane p. 95).

§ 12. Six terms are far better represented, but with up to two, three, or even four different meanings:

āyogava	P^1s	:	G_1 Vi M Y K
	P^1v	:	B_1 ? B_2
pulkasa	P^2s	:	G_2
	P^1v	:	Va Vi
ambaṣṭha	A^1k	:	G_1
	A^1bkv	:	Va
	A^2b	:	B_1 B_2 M Y K
ugra	A^1v	:	G_1
	A^2bk	:	Va
	A^2k	:	B_1 B_2 M Y K
vaidehaka	P^1s	:	G_2
	P^2s	:	G_1
	P^2v	:	B_1 ? B_2 Vi M Y K
māgadha	P^1v	:	G_1 M Y K
	P^2v	:	G_2
	P^1s	:	B_1 ? B_2
	P^2s	:	Vi

§ 13. Terms occurring in more than one text and used with only one meaning are rare:

kṣattṛ	P^2s	:	B_1 ? B_2 M Y K
māhiṣya	A^1k	:	G_2 Y
mūrdhāvasikta	A^1b	:	G^2 Y

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§ 14. The only distinction which is strictly maintained throughout is that between *anuloma-s* and *pratiloma-s*: not a single term is used for any of the categories of A in one text and for any type of P in another. We shall now examine some characteristics which are proper to either basic category.

§ 15. First, *anuloma* as a generic type is considered superior to all species of *pratiloma*. Viṣṇu, who adopts a uniform and relatively lenient attitude toward all *anuloma-s* (§ 23), labels *pratiloma-s* as a whole: 'despised by the Ārya-s.' Manu (**10**. 10) has a general derogatory term for P: apasada. And Yājñavalkya concludes his brief passage on mixed castes by calling *pratiloma* and *anuloma* 'worse' and 'better', respectively.

§ 16. Second, table 2 clearly shows that the *anuloma-s* are normally given before the *pratiloma-s*. There is only one straight exception: Va, and one case—G_2—in which A and P—plus the regular marriages—are incorporated following the four vertical columns of table 1.

§ 17. Finally, one important feature sets all *anuloma-s* apart from all *pratiloma-s*: all six sub-categories are, at least in certain texts, considered not as mixed castes but as members or assimilated members of one of the four varṇa-s.

§ 18. There can be no doubt that of all types of primary mixed castes A^1, as a group, was considered least

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objectionable. As shown in table 2 they are listed first and together in three versions: G_1, B_2, and M.

§ 19. Both B_1 and B_2 display the most lenient approach to A^1, at least in two cases out of three. In both A^1b and A^1k the offspring retain their fathers' varṇa-s: brāhmaṇa and kṣatriya, respectively. This sequence is strangely interrupted by B_2 in the case of A^1v, where the offspring is called rathakāra. The term occurs nowhere else as the name of a primary mixed caste: (§ 11). It is used once more by Baudhāyana (1. 5. 9). 'The snātaka may accept uncooked food from brāhmaṇa-s, kṣatriya-s, vaiśya-s, and rathakāra-s,' which seems to indicate a lower status than that of a vaiśya. It is interesting to notice that Yājñavalkya mentions only one type of secondary mixed caste: rathakāra, corresponding to the offspring of A^1k and A^1v.

§ 20. Kauṭilya's treatment of A^1 bears a strange resemblance to that of B_2: A^1b = brāhmaṇa and A^1k = kṣatriya as in B_1 and B_2, but A^1v = śūdra as against B_2: A^1v = rathakāra.

§ 21. Manu, although less lenient, also has no special names for the three cases of A^1. He consistently considers them sadṛśa 'assimilated' to their fathers' varṇa-s.

§ 22. At this stage I should like to combine the special position of A^1 generally (§§ 18-21) with the equally special treatment of the single case of A^3 (§ 8) to propose

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Table 2

G_1	A^1b	A^1k	A^1v	A^2b	A^2k	A^3b	P^1k	P^1v	P^1s	P^2v	P^2s	P^3s
G_2	bb)P^1k	P^2v	P^3s	A^1b (kk)P^1v		P^2s	A^2b	A^1k(vv)P^1s		A^3b	A^2k	A^1v(ss
B_1	A^1b	A^1k	A^1v	A^2b	A^2k	A^3b	see §§ 9. 24					
B_2	A^1b	A^2b	A^3b	A^1k	A^2k	A^1v	P^1s	P^2s	P^3s	P^1v	P^2v	P^1k
Va	P^3s	P^2s	P^1s	P^2v	P^1v	P^1k	see § 22					
Vi	mother's varṇa, see § 23						P^1s	P^1v	P^2s	P^3s	P^2v	P^1k
M	A^1b	A^1k	A^1v	A^2b	A^3b	A^2k	P^1k	P^1v	P^2v	P^1s	P^2s	P^3s
Y	A^1b	A^2b	A^3b	A^1k	A^2k	A^1v	P^1k	P^2v	P^3s	P^1v	P^2s	P^1s
K	A^1b	A^1k	A^2b	A^3b	A^2k	A^1v	P^1s	P^2s	P^3s	P^1v	P^2v	P^1k

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an interpretation for Vasiṣṭha **18**. 8-9. The Sanskrit text reads:

> *ekāntarādvyantarātryantarāsu jātā brāhmaṇakṣatriya-vaiśyair ambaṣṭhograniṣādā bhavanti. śūdrāṇām pāraśavaḥ.*

Bühler's translation is equally ambiguous: '(Children) begotten by Brāhmaṇa-s, Kṣatriya-s, and Vaiśya-s on females of the next lower, second lower, and third lower castes become (respectively) Ambaṣṭha-s, Ugra-s, and Niṣāda-s. (The son of a Brāhmaṇa and) of a Śūdra woman (is) a Pāraśava.'

Since sūtra 8 includes a marriage of a brāhmaṇa with a woman of the 'third lower caste,' it already refers to A^3b. In this respect it coincides with sūtra 9, which is not a different case as Bühler's translation might make us believe. In reality, pāraśava in sūtra 9 and niṣāda in sūtra 8 refer to the same mixed caste. If so, ambaṣṭha and ugra refer to the three cases of A^1 and the two cases of A^2, respectively. My interpretation of sūtra 9 is radically different from Bühler's which also does not do justice to the genitive *śūdrāṇām*: 'For śūdra-s he—the niṣāda—is pāraśava.' Stated differently, śūdra-s call pāraśava the mixed caste that others label niṣāda. Thus interpreted Vasiṣṭha **18**. 9 is a welcome contribution to the problem discussed above (§ 8).

§ 23. Viṣṇu is lenient in a different way. For him all A^1 have the—lower—varṇa-s of their mothers; but, on the other hand, he extends his leniency to all *anuloma-s*:

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A^1b	kṣatriya
A^2b A^1k	vaiśya
A^3b A^2k A^1v	śūdra

The principle is applied so strictly that it even overrules the unanimity elsewhere for A^3b: pāraśava or niṣāda (§ 8).

§ 24. The treatment of *pratiloma-s* in the texts shows fewer general trends than we have been able to discern in the case of the *anuloma-s*. The only two special cases of caṇḍāla and sūta have been discussed earlier (§§ 7, 9). Unlike in the case of *anuloma-s*, nothing distinguishes the three less serious cases of P^1 from the two more serious instances of P^2. In one version—B_1—it is not even possible to assign with certainty the five (§ 9) terms mentioned for *pratiloma-s*. Since B_1 generally agrees with B_2 elsewhere, and because its *pratiloma* terminology corresponds to that of B_2, I have, in table 1 arranged the five terms for *pratiloma-s* in B_1 according to those of B_2, followed by question marks.

§ 25. Looking back at the sources on primary mixed castes one cannot help being struck by the fact that no two single versions are identical. Mixed castes is not one of those subjects which, once they had been laid down by one authority, was invariably adhered to by all others. There is, thus, a fundamental difference between the four basic varṇa-s and the mixed castes to which their combinations give rise.

§ 26. This does not mean that the system of mixed castes did not develop a number of invariables of its

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own. The most obvious one is the distinction between *anuloma* and *pratiloma*; also, the fact that caṇḍāla and niṣāda/pāraśava occupy the two extremes. Sūta as P[1]k is a very special and intriguing type of invariable. Finally, all nine versions make it a point to provide names for all twelve possible combinations of *anuloma* and *pratiloma*: this is no longer true when it comes to secondary mixed castes.

§ 27. The question that remains to be answered is that of the nine different versions of primary mixed castes. The obvious answer is that they reflect differing situations in real life, both in time and in space. Although this argument cannot be *a priori* discarded, there are a number of reasons which make it difficult to accept without qualifications.

§ 28. Here as elsewhere in Dharmaśāstra, Manu seems to have had a greater impact than any other text. Except for the three cases of A[1], Manu's distribution of caste names is followed invariably by Yājñavalkya and Kauṭilya. Therefore, the argument of differing local situations no longer applies for them. On the other hand, there is no pattern to Manu's agreement or disagreement with the—earlier—Dharmasūtra-s. Manu follows either Gautama or Baudhāyana or Viṣṇu or Vasiṣṭha or a combination of them. But no term appears in Manu for the first time. Hence it looks as if Manu's contribution primarily consisted in systematizing the varied data of earlier texts, using

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some of them for primary mixed castes, others for its own secondary mixed castes.

§ 29. Also, there is the problem of the two texts that exhibit not one but two passages on mixed castes. As indicated earlier, B_1 and B_2 seem to describe identical situations. Hence the question there is one of textual criticism rather than of content. Gautama, on the contrary, first gives his own sets of six *anuloma-s* and *pratiloma-s*, followed by the twelve primary mixed castes 'according to others.' G_1 and G_2 are so differently arranged (see table 2) that G_2 has to be more than Gautama's providing us information on 'another' system of mixed castes; it is a direct quotation from some unknown source. Yet, the author again does not assign G_2 to any specific part of the country different from his own. We are left, once more, with the impression that the names of specific primary mixed castes and their respective places in table 1 were less important to the classical authors than their desire to present complete and coherent systems.

It is possible that, for mixed castes as for other topics of Dharmaśāstra, we shall never know the exact roles played by real life at the time and in the part of India the treatises were written in on the one hand, and the systematizing influence of the authors on the other. This article wants to show that the latter too, is important, and that it should not be overlooked in our reconstruction of classical Indian society.

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S. MAYEDA

ŚAṂKARA AND SUREŚVARA: THEIR EXEGETICAL METHOD TO INTERPRET THE GREAT SENTENCE '*TAT TVAM ASI*'*

THE statement of Sarvajñātman (750-800), 'Nobody realizes the non-dual *Ātman* without the great sentences' (*vinā mahāvākyam ato na kaścit pumāṃsam advaitam avaiti jantuḥ, Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, **3**. 303) clearly shows how much importance the Advaitin-s attached to the well known great sentences (*mahāvākya-s*). It is said that there are about twelve *mahāvākya-s*.[1] In their eyes the most important of all is of course the sentence '*tat tvam asi*'[2].

* The substance of this paper is from my article in Japanese 'Sureśvara to seiku "Nanji wa sore nari"', *Journal of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, 1978, pp. 70-7. My gratitude is due to Mr. Edgar Cooke who has taken the trouble to correct and improve my English. The following abbreviations (and editions) have been used:

Naiṣ.=*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (*Naiṣkarmya-siddhi of Sureśvarācārya with the Candrikā of Jñānottama*, ed. by G. A. Jacob and rev. by M. Hiriyanna. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. 38, 1925).

Upad.=*Upadeśasāhasrī* (*Śaṃkara's Upadeśasāhasrī*, critically ed. by S. Mayeda. Tokyo, Hokuseido Press, 1973).

[1] cf. *The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, together with the Commentaries of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha*, ed. by G. A. Jacob (5th ed. Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1934), pp. 155-6.

[2] The sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is said to be the *Upadeśavākya* while another sentence '*ahaṃ brahmāsmi*', the *Anubhavavākya*.

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('Thou art That') which Uddālaka Āruṇi, the famous Upaniṣadic thinker, uttered repeatedly to his son, Śvetaketu (*Chāndogya Up.* **6**. 8. 7, etc.).

Today the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is generally regarded as plainly expressing the idea of Ātman's identity with Brahman, which Śaṃkara and his followers highly emphasized. Śaṃkara himself dedicated the 18th and longest chapter, named 'Tat Tvam Asi', of his *Upad.* to an interpretation of the sacred sentence as expressing Ātman-Brahman identity. Moreover, two further independent though small works, namely, *Vākyavṛtti* and *Laghuvākyavṛtti*, which aim at a similar interpretation of the same sentence are ascribed to him.[1]

However, judging from the fact that the philosophy of the *Brahmasūtra* is in line with the *bhedābhedavāda*, taking Ātman as portion (*aṃśa*) of Brahman, it is difficult for us to suppose that the Advaitic interpretation of the sentence was supported by all the Vedāntin-s either before or after the composition of the *Brahmasūtra*, although it was made very influential by Śaṃkara and his followers. Even after Śaṃkara, Bhāskara,

[1] The *Vākyavṛtti* consists of 53 stanzas according to the edition in *Minor Works of Shaṅkarācārya*, ed. by Hari Raghunath Bhagavat (Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1925, pp. 34-8) but G. A. Jacob suggests that there are manuscripts which contain 55 or 52 stanzas (see *The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda*, pp. 156-7). The *Laghuvākyavṛtti* comprises only 18 stanzas. The 18th chapter of the *Upad.*, the *Vākyavṛtti*, and *Laghuvākyavṛtti* are almost the same in their contents, but the 18th chapter is different from the latter two in its exegetical method. The 18th chapter applies the *anvaya-vyatireka* method

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Rāmānuja, Madhva[1] and others tried to interpret the same sentence in opposition to Śaṃkara from the respective standpoints of the *bhedābhedavāda*, *viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*, *dvaitavāda*, and the like. Therefore, it was quite necessary for Śaṃkara and his followers to establish a firm exegetical method for the purpose of justifying their Advaitic interpretation of the sentence.

I have already traced elsewhere[2] the historical development of the Advaitic exegetical method of the

while the latter two depend upon the method of *bhāgalakṣaṇa*, which is synonymous with *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇa* and *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, and which is also used in Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* 23, p. 34. This fact is one of the negative evidences regarding Śaṃkara's authorship of the latter two from which I infer that they are not Śaṃkara's genuine works, although Dasgupta (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 80) and S. K. Belvalkar (*Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta Philosophy*, Poona, 1929, p. 226; 228) regard both of them as genuine. For a detailed discussion on the authorship problems of these works, see my article (in Japanese), 'Vākyavṛtti-kō', *Dr. Hajime Nakamura's Felicitation Volume* (Tokyo, Shunjūsha, 1973), pp. 57-69.

[1] Madhva attaches importance to the sentences which state the difference of the individual self from Brahman and arbitrarily interprets those which set forth their oneness. For example, he interprets '*tat tvam asi*' as '*tvaṃ tadīyaḥ asi*' or '*tvaṃ tasya asi*' ('Thou belong to That'). cf. V. S. Ghate, *The Vedānta* [Government Oriental Series—Class C, No. 1] 2nd ed. Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1960), pp. 31-2. For Rāmānuja's interpretation, see note 1, p. 153 of this paper.

[2] 'Funiichigenronha no seitenkaishaku no hōnō ni tsuite: Anvaya to vyatireka' (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, 19-2, 1969), pp. 74-8; *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara*, tr. with Introduction and Notes by Sengaku Mayeda (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1979), pp. 46-58.

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sentence, chiefly aiming at the clarification of Śaṃkara's exegetical method. Here in the following pages the focus will be placed on Sureśvara's methodological characteristics.

As far as the extant materials show, it was probably Śaṃkara who first tried to apply an exegetical method to an interpretation of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*'. His was the *anvaya-vyatireka* method which Sureśvara inherited, saying as follows:

> 'You must tell us, then, by what method one knows the sentence meaning.
> We reply: [One knows it] by the *anvaya-vyatireka* method'.
>
> *ucyatāṃ tarhi kayā tu paripāṭyā vākyārthaṃ vettīti / ucyate / anvaya-vyatirekābhyām /* (*Naiṣ.* 4. 9 prose).

Śaṃkara did not give a clear-cut explanation of this method, which he seems to assume is well known. His fragmentary explanation of, or references to, it here and there in his *Upad.* may lead us to the conclusion that it is 'the logical means (*yukti*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 96) by which, when hearing the words in a sentence, one can recollect (*saṃsmṛti*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 176; *smaraṇa*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 178; *smaryate*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 189), discriminate (*viveka*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 180), or ascertain (*avadhāraṇa*, *Upad.* 1. 18. 96) their meanings'.[1]

In his *Naiṣ.* Sureśvara also characterizes the *anvaya-vyatireka* method as logical means (*anvayavyatirekanyāya*,

[1] See Sengaku Mayeda, 'Funiichigenronha no seitenkaishaku no hōhō ni tsuite', p. 75; do, *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 51.

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Naiṣ. **3**. 54. cf. *yukti*, *Naiṣ.* **2**. 21).[1] And he stresses its importance, saying:

> 'Without the *anvaya-vyatireka* method, there would be no understanding of the sentence meaning, and without this, nescience cannot be destroyed.'
> *anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vinā vākyārthabodhanam|*
> *na syāt tena vinājñānaprahāṇaṃ nopapadyate||* (*Naiṣ.***2**. 9).

In Śaṃkara's view, the meanings of the two words '*tat*' (That) and '*asi*' (art) in the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' are already known (*Upad.* **1**. 18. 193). For him, the word '*tat*' means Brahman or Being (*sat*, *Upad.* **1**. 18. 196), or the Painless One (*nirduḥkha*, *Upad.* **1**. 18. 169). The word '*asi*' means that the words '*tat*' and '*tvam*' have one and the same referent (*tulyanīḍatva*, *Upad.* **1**. 18. 169; 194). Therefore, the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is taken to be an identity judgement and not a universal positive judgement. Although the meanings of these two words are known, the sentence meaning is still not understood since the meaning of the word '*tvam*' has not been analysed (*Upad.* **1**. 18. 179). Śaṃkara asserts that the *anvaya-vyatireka* method is applied to recollect and ascertain the meaning of the word '*tvam*' (*Upad.* **1**. 18. 180). Sureśvara also applies the *anvaya-vyatireka* method, repeating the same idea in his *Naiṣ.*:

> 'If the man who has heard the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' does not understand the sentence meaning,

[1] cf. P. Hacker, *Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaita-vāda*, 1. *Die Schüler Śaṅkaras* (Mainz, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literature, 1950), p. 1999.

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then it is because he does not understand the meaning of '*tvam*'. Therefore its meaning will be explained.'

śrāvito vetti vākyārthaṃ na cet tattvamasīty ataḥ|
tvaṃpadārthānabhijñatvād atas tatprakriyocyate||

(*Naiṣ.* 2.1)

Śaṃkara's examination of the exegetical method does not seem to go much further.[1] However, Sureśvara, relying on his *guru's* opinion, made efforts to strengthen it further theoretically as will be seen in the following.

As mentioned above, the *anvaya-vyatireka* method is used to recollect the meaning of the word '*tvam*', more exactly to recollect the word (*pada*) and the word meaning (*padārtha*). In Sureśvara's case he analyses the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' syntactically and semantically, and examines the true sentence meaning on the basis of a threefold relation between words and word meanings therein.

The first part of the threefold relation is the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* or appositional relation between the two words '*tvam*' and '*tat*'. The second is the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā* or the qualified-qualifier (or subject-predicate) relation between the two word meanings. The third is the *lakṣyalakṣaṇasaṃbandha* or the relation of indirectly indicated-indirect indicator between the Inner Ātman and the two word meanings (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 3).[2]

[1] For a more detailed discussion of Śaṃkara's *anvaya-vyatireka* method, see S. Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 50-3.

[2] *sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā |*
lakṣyalakṣaṇasaṃbandhaḥ padārthapratyagātmanām || (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 3)

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The *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relation probably means not only the syntactically appositional relation between the two words '*tvam*' and '*tat*' but also the identity of the referents of the two words. In other words, like Śaṃkara, Sureśvara also seems to take the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' to be an identity judgement. If so, the word *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is possibly synonymous with Śaṃkara's term *tulyanīḍatva* mentioned above. Although Sureśvara uses a different term, he seems to have inherited his *guru's* idea in this respect.[1]

This stanza again appears in Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* 185, p. 1271 (Ānandāśrama S. S. 15, 1891). cf. *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka* 1, 196-7; *Vedāntasāra* 23; H. Nakamura, *The Vedāntasāra* (Kyoto, Heirakujishoten, 1962), pp. 157-9; P. Hacker, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 1983-5. The *Svātmanirūpaṇa* (st. 29) ascribed to Śaṃkara also refers to this threefold relation. But this may be a spurious work by a later author since it contains such non-Śaṃkaran terms as *saccidānanda* (st. 71) and *jaḍa* (st. 87).

[1] Rāmānuja also applies the concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* to an interpretation of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*'. He defines it as: 'the reference of two words to one and the same thing through its twofold aspect' (*sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ hi dvayoḥ padayoḥ prakāradvayamukhenaikārthaniṣṭhatvam*, *Vedārthasaṃgraha* [ed. by J. A. B. van Buitenen] 65, p. 109). Furthermore, on the ground of this Viśiṣṭādvaita concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, he asserts in opposition to Sureśvara that the words retain the primary meanings (*mukhyārtha*). According to him, '*tat*' refers to the perfect Brahman who is the universal cause and the possessor of all auspicious qualities (*jagatkāraṇaṃ sarvakalyāṇaguṇākaraṃ niravadyaṃ brahma*), while the word '*tvam*' refers to Brahman who exists as the internal Controller of the individual self, who has the individual self as His body, who abides as the nature of the individual self, and who has the individual self as His aspect (*jīvāntaryāmirūpi taccharīraṃ tadātmatayāvasthitaṃ tatprakāraṃ brahma*, *Vedārthasaṃgraha* 65, p. 109). The Advaitin-s maintain that the individual self is in essence entirely identical with Brahman. In Rāmānuja's view, however, the individual self is only the body (*śarīra*) or the aspect (*prakāra*) of Brahman (cf. V. S. Ghate, *The Vedānta*, p. 25).

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With regard to the second relation *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*, he says that the word '*tvam*' has for its meaning the qualified (*viśeṣya*, subject) while the word '*tat*' has for its meaning the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*, predicate) (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 26). Probably relying upon the Mīmāṃsaka theory, he further explains its efficacy (*sāmarthya*):

> 'The meaning of [the word] '*tvam*' is the 'Painless One' (*nirduḥkhin*) as it is qualified by the meaning of [the word] '*tat*'. The meaning of [the word] '*tat*' is the 'Inner One' (*pratyañc*) because of its proximity[1] to the word '*tvam*'.'
>
> *nirduḥkhitvaṃ tvamarthasya tadarthena viśeṣaṇāt |*
> *pratyaktā ca tadarthasya tvaṃpadenāsya saṃnidheḥ ||*
>
> (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 10)

Thus he asserts that there is the qualified (subject)-qualifier (predicate) relation between the two words, '*tvam*' and '*tat*'.

Then Sureśvara explains the *lakṣyalakṣaṇasaṃbandha* between the Inner Ātman and the two word meanings with reference to *aham* (I) in the sentence '*ahaṃ brahmāsmi*' ('I am Brahman'):

> 'It is not due to any cause that Ātman as Being is the changeless Consciousness and Inner One. [Ātman is] the cause of [the intellect's] being the

[1] Sureśvara does not explain the concept of 'proximity' (*saṃnidhi*) at all, but it is likely that he borrowed it from the Mīmāṃsā school according to which there are proximity (*saṃnidhi*), suitability (*yogyatā*), and expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) among the constituents of a sentence (Cf. K. K. Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning* [The Adyar Library Series vol. 91, 1963], pp. 151-69).

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knower and bearer of 'I'-consciousness. Therefore, [the Ātman] is indirectly indicated by the two.'

kūṭasthabodhapratyaktvam animittaṃ sadātmanaḥ |
boddhṛtāhaṃtayor hetus tābhyāṃ tenopalakṣyate ||

(*Naiṣ.* **3.** 11).

'*Boddhṛ*' (knower), '*aham*' (I) and other words directly indicate the intellect (*buddhi*) which is the knower and bearer of 'I'-consciousness. However, it is the Inner Ātman that makes the intellect the knower and bearer of 'I'-consciousness. Therefore, the words '*boddhṛ*' and '*aham*' which directly indicate the effects of the Inner Ātman indirectly indicate their cause, i.e. the Inner Ātman.[1] Hence just as there is a *lakṣyalakṣaṇa* relation between the Inner Ātman and the meaning of the word '*aham*', there is the same relation between the Inner Ātman and the word '*tvam*'.

Now when people hear the sentence '*tat tvam asi*', they do not always understand it correctly. The word '*tat*' has many meanings in ordinary worldly usage, but it brings with it and never loses the meaning of '*pārokṣya*' (mediatedness) derived from its direct significative power (*abhidhāna*). On the other hand, the word '*tvam*' refers directly to, and never parts from, the meaning of '*saṃsārin*' (transmigrator) arising

[1] cf. S. Mayeda, 'The Advaita Theory of Perception', *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitchrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens*, Bd. 12-13, 1968-69, p. 236; do, *A Thousand Teachings* pp. 39-40.

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from its direct significative power (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 23-4). For this reason people fail to understand the sentence properly.

However, a Vedic text does not intend to explain to people the sentence meaning derived from the direct significative power of the two words '*tat*' and '*tvam*' since such sentence meaning is assumed to be known even before the Vedic text is heard (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 23), and the Vedic text only teaches what is not knowable through any other means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*, *Naiṣ.* 2. 35).

Furthermore, according to the theory that the sentence meaning is *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the word meanings in a sentence,[1] the meaning of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is the *saṃsarga* of the subject '*tvam*' and the predicate '*tat*'. But, as mentioned before, the direct meanings of '*tvam*' and '*tat*', which are incompatible with each other, cannot be mutually associated (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 25). Similarly, the theory that the sentence meaning is *bheda* or the mutual exclusion of the word meanings in a sentence is not applicable to an interpretation of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' either, since the two word meanings are mutually incompatible. Therefore, neither the *saṃsarga* nor the *bheda* theory enables us to interpret the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' reasonably. Here Sureśvara introduces, in addition to the subject-predicate relation, the Mīmāṃsaka view that the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the subject which is modified by the predicate is not what the sentence intends to

[1] cf. K. K. Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 191-3.

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say.[1] For example, in the case of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*', '*tvam*' and '*tat*' are in the subject-predicate relation. And attributes such as 'being the sufferer' (*duḥkhitva*) which belong to the subject of the sentence '*tvam*' are not the meaning it is intended to convey. The intended meaning is found in the predicate '*tat*'. Therefore, the direct meanings of the subject which are incompatible with the predicate are to be discarded. Thus when the two words are in the subject-predicate relation, they do not retain their direct meanings. Giving up their mutually contradictory meanings, they are able to coalesce in an identity statement (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 75).

Moreover, in this case, the common referent (*niṣṭhā*) of '*tvam*' and '*tat*' is Ātman free from duality and unmediated (*dvayapārokṣyavarjita*, *Naiṣ.* **3**. 76).[2] Therefore, of the two meanings of the word '*tvam*', 'sufferer' and 'Inner Ātman', the first one is discarded (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 77). On the other hand, of the two meanings of the word '*tat*' 'Ātman' and 'mediatedness' (*pārokṣya*), the second one is given up (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 77). The attributes of 'being the transmigrator' (*saṃsāritā*) and 'mediatedness' are only accidentally associated

[1] *uddiśyamānasya ca viśeṣaṇam avivakṣitam iti sthitam eva*, *Ṭupṭīkā* **3**. 4. 22. cf. K. K. Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 184-5.

[2] Sureśvara rejects the assertion that, although the meanings that have to be given up cannot be mutually associated into a sentence meaning, the purified meanings of '*tvam*' and '*tat*' whose mutually contradictory meanings have been discarded can be mutually associated into a sentence meaning as in the case of the sentence 'The (blue) lotus is blue' (*nīlotpala-*) (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 76). This sentence example 'The (blue) lotus is blue' is also used in the mutual exclusion theory (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 2).

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with the non-dual Inner Ātman and Ātman respectively. Since they are in mutual contradiction, they are therefore both negated: the first by '*tat*' and the second by '*tvam*' (*Naiṣ.* **2**. 79).

Thus, when the two words '*tvam*' and '*tat*', with mutually contradictory direct meanings, have one and the same referent and are in the subject-predicate relation, they indirectly indicate the 'non-sentence meaning' (*avākyārtha*) which stands beyond either the mutual association or the mutual exclusion of the words '*tvam*' and '*tat*'. In other words, the relation of these two word meanings to the Inner Ātman is that of *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa* or indirect indicator to the indirectly indicated (*Naiṣ.* **3**. 26-8).

Sureśvara summarizes as follows:

'In our view, the 'non-sentence meaning' (*avākyārtha*) is directly apprehended through the exclusion of [mutually incompatible meanings] from the meanings of [the two words] '*tat*' and '*tvam*' which arise from the threefold relation of apposition, subject-predicate, and indirectly indicated-indirect indicator. . .'.

sāmānādhikaraṇyāder ghaṭetarakhayor iva /
vyāvṛtteḥ syād avākyārthaḥ sākṣān nas tattvamarthayoḥ //
(*Naiṣ.* **3**. 9)[1]

When the compatible (*anvaya*) meanings are retained from the meanings of the two words '*tvam*' and '*tat*'

[1] This stanza also appears in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣyavārttika* (186, p. 1271) and *Taittiriyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (**2**. 658).

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by the *anvaya* method, with the incompatible (*vyatireka*) meanings being excluded by the *vyatireka* method[1] on the ground of the threefold relation, the 'non-sentence meaning' which is not realized through the general way of understanding a sentence is directly brought out.

> 'The very moment he understands the meaning of '*tat*' in the meaning of '*tvam*', he attains the state of the "non-sentence meaning" (*avākyārthatā*) and goes beyond the sphere of words and the mind.' *yadaiva tadartham tvamarthe 'vaiti tadaivāvākyārthatām pratipadyate gīrmanasoḥ sṛtim na pratipadyata iti*/(*Naiṣ.* **3**. 2, prose) cf. *Nais.* **3**. 64.

In this way 'the man, free from nescience and possessed of knowledge, himself abides as 'One Apart' (*kevala*)[2] and is himself of the nature of the 'non-sentence meaning' (... *niravidyo vidvān avākyārtharūpa eva kevalo 'vaśiṣyate* ... *Naiṣ.* **3**. 29, prose). In this case the 'non-sentence meaning' is nothing but Ātman or final release.[3] The discussion of the 'non-sentence meaning' goes beyond that of exegetical method and reaches the topic of final release (*mokṣa*).

The above is an outline of Sureśvara's arguments concerning the exegetical method for interpreting the sentence '*tat tvam asi*'. In his discussion, there is

[1] See S. Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings*, pp. 52-3. Śaṃkara does not know the term 'non-sentence meaning' (*avākyārtha*) nor any other technical terms for it, but says that the meaning of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is 'One Apart' (*kevala*, *Upad.* **1**. 18. 181) or 'Not thus! Not so!' (*neti neti*, *Upad.* **1**. 18. 195).

[2] See note 1 above.

[3] cf. P. Hacker, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 2007-8.

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no reference to the *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* (partial transfer) which the later Advaitin-s proposed.[1] Nor is the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' compared with the sentence '*so 'yam*' or '*so 'yaṃ devadattaḥ*' as in the case of the *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.[2]

It is certain that Sureśvara, faithfully following Śaṃkara's opinion, intended to give a theoretical foundation to his *guru's anvaya-vyatireka* method, depending upon Mīmāṃsaka exegetical theories. Sureśvara's merits in this respect lie in the two points: (1) he gave specific technical terms to, and clearly formulated, the threefold relation among words, word meanings, and the Inner Ātman which is already recognizable in Śaṃkara to some extent; and (2) he asserted that the meaning of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is the 'non-sentence meaning' (*avākyārtha*).

Sureśvara's theory of the threefold relation was later adopted by Sarvajñātman (750-800), Sadānanda (1500) and other Advaitin's, and exerted a significant influence upon the later Advaita Vedānta school. Even the later Advaita theory of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* may be regarded as a development of his view of the *lakṣyalakṣaṇa* relation. Further, another later Advaita theory, the *akhaṇḍārthakavākya* or 'sentence with an indivisible meaning' which is referred to in relation to the *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, may have its origin in Sureśvara's theory of the 'non-sentence meaning'.

[1] cf. D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing* (University of Calcutta, 1960), pp. 289-94; R. V. de Smet, 'Langage et connaissance de l'Absolu chez Śaṃkara', *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, tome 52 (1954), pp. 36-9; K. K. Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 249-56; S. Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings*, pp. 53-4.

[2] See S. Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings*, pp. 54-7.

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S. LIENHARD

ON THE TEXTUAL STRUCTURE OF KĀVYA

THE particular nature of classical poetry is shown most clearly if we compare *kāvya* texts with other, non-literary texts. This comparison is possible between any two works, but the contrast between literary and non-literary is demonstrated with the greatest clarity in texts having a high degree of lexical similarity. We observe that poems lose their attraction as soon as we paraphrase them or attempt to render in ordinary language what the poet has expressed in another and better manner. We frequently come across simplified renderings of a text in commentaries in Sanskrit and other Indian languages where paraphrase has the function of explaining to the reader the connection (*anvaya*) in a verse or, in complex prose, in a complete sentence.[1] We will take the following example:

> *daivād dūravartī te priyaḥ tanunā taptena sāsreṇa utkaṇṭhitena socchvāsena ca svāṅgena tādṛśam eva te 'ṅgaṃ manorathair viśati |*

'By [means of] desires your lover, far away because of [the irony of] fate, with his lean, tortured, weeping,

[1] As a simplified version of the text enables a given work to be understood at first sight, it has become a valuable aid in modern literary criticism.

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longing and sighing body penetrates your body, [which is] of the same nature.'
And then this stanza:

aṅgenāṅgaṃ pratanu tanunā gāḍhataptena taptaṃ
sāsreṇāśrudrutam aviratotkaṇṭham utkaṇṭhitena /
uṣṇocchvāsaṃ samadhikataroccchvāsinā dūravartī
saṃkalpais tair viśati vidhinā vairiṇā ruddhamārgaḥ//

'By such dreams [of love] the absent one, whose way [home] is blocked by hostile fate, penetrates your body with his: [his is] lean, [hers is] slim; [hers is] unusually hot, [his is] glowing hot; [hers is] full of tears, [his is] bathed in tears; [his is] full of longing, [hers is] endlessly longing; [his is shaken by] the heaviest sighs, [hers is] sighing hotly.'

The sentence in prose is taken from the modern commentary *Bhāvaprabodhinī* by Nārāyaṇaśāstrī Khiste,[1] while the stanza comes from Kālidāsa's poem *Meghadūta*,[2] which is the subject of the commentary. These two extracts show clearly the difference between non-literary and literary texts. The first example lacks artistry. It is obvious that its object is merely to impart information, and the facts it gives are not of an artistic nature. Although the long row of appositions agreeing in case with the instrumental of the noun *aṅga* (body) is somewhat unusual, the paraphrase, which keeps very close to the original, is written in more or less ordinary

[1] *Meghadūta*, KSS 88, Benares 1931.
[2] *Meghadūta*, 2. 39.

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language. The sentence does not appear to have been written with painstaking care; indeed, it creates a loose, rather spontaneous effect insofar as some words could easily be omitted entirely, moved to another position or replaced by others without affecting the sense of the passage. The commentator might equally well have begun the sentence with the words: *priyas te daivād dūravartī*, etc., *priyas te dūravartī tanunāsrasahitena*, etc. Kālidāsa's stanza, on the other hand, surprises us by its density of expression, by the strictness with which it is constructed. All the elements in the sentence are welded together into a complex and unalterable whole. The stanza is composed with the care that is characteristic of literary texts, and yet the lines are elegant and accomplished although the poet has conformed to a number of rules. In addition to the ordinary rules governing the use of language, which of course also apply to poetry, there are new restrictions which, although artistic, nevertheless leave the poet considerably less freedom than is available to the author of ordinary texts. The first limitation is imposed by the choice of a difficult metre, the *mandākrāntā*, others arise from the poet's endeavour to create a maximum of euphony and also to establish exact congruence between the stanza and the sentence. Like other poets, Kālidāsa aims at achieving consonance and assonance by repeating words in forms that resemble each other or are derived from the same root or stem (*aṅgena aṅgam*, *pratanu tanunā*, °*taptena taptam*, °*utkaṇṭham utkaṇṭhitena*, °*ucchvāsam* °*ucchvāsinā*). Furthermore, he

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may employ alliteration, as he does towards the end of the stanza (*viśati vidhinā vairiṇā*).

The symmetry and balance of the stanza reveal the hand of the true master. Whereas the first three lines contain pairs of words (*pratanu: tanu*, etc.) which describe the bodies of the separated lovers with increasing intensity, the fourth line does not continue the series but allows the emotion to ebb out in a kind of diminuendo: *saṃkalpais tair viśati vidhinā vairiṇā ruddha-mārgaḥ*. One word in each pair refers to the body of the Yakṣa, the other to that of his beloved; yet this does not mean that the distribution of the words is done in a mechanical manner, as I shall show. The poet does not consistently place each accusative after its corresponding instrumental or *vice versa*; neither does he put every instrumental[1] before the accusative,[2] as Khiste's paraphrase does. Kālidāsa avoids any arrangement of this sort. He constructs a complex pattern which, although making it more difficult to comprehend the sense of the text, engages the reader or the listener more actively and gives the stanza a certain heightening of effect and liveliness. Each of the five pairs consists of one short and one long word. However, one soon notices that the length of each word in a pair slowly increases as one approaches the end of the series. Kālidāsa's arrangement is done on an alternating

[1] *tanunā* 1. *taptena* 2. *sāsreṇa* 3. *utkaṇṭhitena* 4. *socchvāsena* 5. *ca svāṅgena.*

[2] The *tādṛśam . . . aṅgam* of the paraphrase replaces the original's *tanuṃ* 1. *taptaṃ* 2. *sāsram* 3. *utkaṇṭhitaṃ* 4. *socchvāsaṃ* 5. *cāṅgam.*

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system. In the first pair he uses the short word for the instrumental, in the second for the accusative, but he interrupts this order when he comes to the fourth pair of modifiers (*aviratotkaṇṭham*, etc.): here he stops, begins the pattern again and thus, by doing the opposite of what the reader is expecting, heightens the density and tension of the text. This interruption of the system is also to be found in the order in which the accusative and instrumental cases are arranged in the five different pairs. The following table will illustrate the system:

	Distribution of the words in apposition to:		*Length*		*Case Sequence in the Stanza*	
	aṅgena	*aṅgam*				
1.	*tanunā*	*pratanu*	s[1]	l[2]	a[3]	i[4]
2.	*gāḍhatap-tena*	*taptam*	l	s	i	a
3.	*sāsreṇa*	*aśrudrutam*	s	l	i	a
4.	*utkaṇṭhi-tena*	*aviratotkaṇ-ṭham*	s	l	a	i
5.	*samadhi-kataro-cchvāsinā*	*uṣṇocchvāsam*	l	s	a	i

[1] The short apposition.
[2] The long apposition.
[3] The accusative.
[4] The instrumental.

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We could imagine a much more detailed and exact paraphrase of the stanza than that given in the *Bhāva-prabodhinī*; the wording might also have been different, for instance: *aṅgena tanunā taptena sāsreṇotkaṇṭhitena socchvāsena ca svāṅgena tanu taptaṃ sāsram utkaṇṭhitaṃ socchvāsaṃ cāṅgaṃ (viśati)*; ' [He], by [means of] desires, penetrates with his lean, hot, weeping, longing and sighing body your body [which is likewise] lean, hot, weeping, longing and sighing.' The poet, however, organizes his text, as we have shown: he puts the considerable number of nominal modifiers in pairs, which he makes longer and longer as the stanza proceeds, and, following an important rule in the poetic canon, he replaces the second modifier from time to time with an alternative expression having a similar sound, *pratanu tanunā* instead of *tanu tanunā*, *sāsreṇāśrudrutam* instead of *sāsreṇa sāsram*, etc. This substitution of variants for words that have already been used is a special characteristic of poetic style. The direct repetition of lexemes is carefully avoided in literary works; in poetry for a minimum of one stanza, but often for a number of stanzas in succession,[1]

[1] In *Saund.* **7**. 36-42, the god Kāma is called by three different names, in *Kirāt.* **9**. 1-8, the sun by eight different names, in *Kirāt.* **9**. 17-30, the moon by twelve different names, in *Kirāt.* **16**. 50-61, fire by ten different names, in *Śiśup.* **3**. 35-40, the sea by six different names. The descriptions of nature in *Kumāras.* **8**, are put into the mouth of the god Śiva who, whenever he speaks to the newly-married Umā, uses a quite different appellative: (*he*) *mitakathe* (34), *pīvaroru* (36), *adrirājatanaye* (47), *valguvādini* (48), *sutanu* (52), *śailarājatanaye* (53), *dīrghanayane* (55), *puṇḍarīkamukhi* (58), *pārvati* (64), etc.

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in prose, in the neighbourhood of the expression replaced.

The analysis we have just made shows clearly that no single element in this stanza is haphazard. Any tampering with a single part, a word or even a syllable would not only upset the structure, the delicate balance of the various components, but would also damage the fine poetic character of the verse. This is not true of the paraphrase, however well it is done. The prefix *pra* itself, one single syllable, as in the word *pratanu*, is pregnant with poetic meaning: for one thing, the poet needs the variant form *pratanu* as a substitute for *tanu*, for another, it gives him the contrast *pratanu*: *tanu*, which from the artistic point of view is—like the following *gāḍhatapta*: *tapta*—an integral part of the pattern the poet has been building up from the beginning of the stanza: the increasing length, the variation and the same sort of construction.

In order to allow his text not only to convey information but to convey it in an artistic manner, the poet uses a complex structure, as the stanza from the *Meghadūta* shows. Natural language is the foundation on which poetry is built. It is, however, in the nature of poetry to create for itself a language that to some extent has a character of its own, that departs from ordinary linguistic usage; it wears alien clothing, so to speak. The poet arranges his bricks in a manner quite different from that employed by the writer of non-literary texts. He assembles his material in a non-standard fashion, and, as the theorist Vāmana

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correctly realized, his creative processes involve using a word-order (*padaracanā*) which, as it is formed in a particular way (*viśiṣṭa*), possesses particular characteristics.[1] With considerable acumen Vāmana advanced the view that the special characteristics (*viśeṣa*) of *kāvya* are mainly due to the fact that the poet aims at quite definite stylistic effects on the phonetic and semantic plane. The theories held by Vāmana and other critics with similar opinions are only partly correct, however, when they regard style (*rīti*, *mārga*) as being the most essential thing and consider the total number of *guṇa-s* to be the traditional ten. The omnipresent characteristics of accomplished *kāvya* are rather its structure, the accompanying textual density and its above-mentioned alienation in expression and content from the norms of non-literary writing. In order to achieve these aims, the poet employs certain processes which give every word such significance and meaning that they render the understanding of the text more difficult and frequently lead to the poetic message being polysemic. If these processes are not present, we cannot properly call the text *kāvya*.

This point of view may profitably be tested on epigrammatic literature, on so-called didactic and gnomic 'poetry'. Didactic poems and epigrams are seldom presented in the form of *kāvya*; generally they are little more than versified maxims but, as the boundary between literary and non-literary is easily

1 *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* 1. 2. 7 and 8.

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eradicated by the devices employed by the author, they may well prove to be genuine poetry. A verse like the following, for instance, cannot claim to be regarded as *kāvya*:

yena yatra ca bhoktavyaṃ sukhaṃ vā duḥkham eva vā |
sa tatra rajjvā baddhvaiva balād daivena nīyate ||

'He who is somewhere to taste sorrow or joy [to the full], him Fate carries off by violence there as though [he were] tied to the end of a rope.' It is difficult to see any characteristics whatever in these two lines that would justify calling them poetic. The dictum lacks density and the language is in no wise heightened; nor do the possibly chance alliterations (*y—y* in *yena yatra*, *ba°—ba°* in *baddhvaiva balād*), the interior rhyme (*sukham—duḥkham*) or the repeated *vā* suffice to give this sentence, a typical gnomic statement, the character of a genuine poem. Furthermore, the simile of a man carried off by fate as though he were tied to the end of a rope is banal.[1] On the other hand another stanza of a diadactic and gnomic nature (*Nītiśataka* 60) is of high poetic quality; its attribution to the lyrical poet Bhartṛhari is probably correct:

namratvenonnamantaḥ paraguṇakathanaiḥ svān guṇān
khyāpayantaḥ svārthān saṃpādayanto vitataprthutarā-
rambhayatnāḥ parārthe |

[1] The stanza is included in the Adyar version of Bhartṛhari's *Nītiśataka* (**9**. 14) as well as in the well-known anthology *Subhāṣita-ratnabhāṇḍāgāra* (pp. 91, 33), but is almost certainly not by the

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kṣāntyaivākṣeparūkṣākṣaramukharamukhān durjanān
duḥkhayantaḥ
santaḥ sāścaryacaryā jagati bahumatāḥ kasya nābhyarca-
nīyāḥ ||

'To whom do not the highly regarded of the world seem worthy of respect, wondrously progressing noble ones who, sublime in humility, proclaim their excellence by speaking of the excellence of others; who reach their goal by working far and wide for the good of others; and who, only, by forgiveness, cause pain to the evil ones from whose mouths harsh words of reproach issue?' We meet here a broad, flowing utterance which, eschewing brevity, strives to attain richness of words and expression. The stream of words is, however, controlled and the ordering of the intentionally rather long, impressive-sounding words, mostly compounds, is carefully articulated. While each of the first three *pāda-s* contains a complete thought of its own, the last one sums up these various ideas and ends in true praise of these genuinely noble beings who are above fraud and deceit. We also find here, as we found in the example from Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* and can find again in countless other poems, a very close correspondence between the length of the sentence and the stanza; in this case it is complete. Bhartṛhari takes pleasure in repeating words and elements of words which, we feel, lends emphasis to his maxim. Their

hand of Bhratṛhari; see D. D. Kosambi, *Śataka-trayam of Bhartṛhari (The Southern Archetype of the Three Centuries of Epigrams, etc.)*, Bombay 1946 (=Bharatiya Vidya Series IX), p. 54 f.

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constant repetition is also intended to drive home to the reader the truth of the message the poet is proclaiming:

1. *-antaḥ, -guṇa-, guṇān, -antaḥ*
2. *-anto, -tata-, -atnāḥ,*
3. *-āntyai-, -mukhara-, -mukhān, dur-, duḥ-, -antaḥ*
4. *-antaḥ, -atāḥ, -āḥ.*

We obtain an equally compact pattern if we consider the stanza from the purely phonetic point of view and just look at the dentals (*t, th, d, n*):

1. *n- -t- -n- -nn- -nt- -n- -n -n -nt-*
2. *-th- -n -d- -nt- -t- -t- -th- -t- -tn- -th-*
3. *-nt- -n d- -n -n d- -nt-*
4. *-nt- -t- -t- n- -n-.*

Characteristics such as these are certainly not the work of pure chance; they put the lines on a plane far above that of ordinary everyday writing. We could extend our analysis to include other traits, but consideration of the obvious features we have just mentioned will be sufficient to convince us that, in contrast to the first, merely didactic verse, the second stanza quoted is a genuine, accomplished work of verbal art.

We have come to a very important feature of classical Indian poetry: Sanskrit and Middle Indian languages offer writers a rich opportunity of varying linguistic elements and of putting them in any order they choose so as to obtain the maximum effect. The great majority of authors concentrate on the sonic

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qualities of their sentences and verses and do not hesitate to make full use of the possibilities their language offers them. From the point of view of euphony the most important factors to consider when selecting a word were the multiple meanings often carried by a word[1] and the vast wealth of synonyms in Skt. and Pkt.[2] The language of *kāvya* went even further in that poets were constantly enlarging the existing number and scope of synonyms and were able to create new designations almost at will by forming compounds or adding suffixes. We must regard this aim as being a traditional one in Old Indian poetic language, which in certain fields has built up a real synthetic vocabulary that is peculiar to itself. Many new names are formed by replacing at will the prior or the final member of a certain semantic model, generally a determinative (*tatpuruṣa*) or possessive compound (*bahuvrīhi*), with some word of the same or of a similar meaning. Thus a possessive compound whose prior member always means 'cold' (adj.), 'cold' (noun), or 'snow' and whose final member always means 'lustre' or 'ray(s)' serves as a semantic model to signify the moon. The poet now has complete freedom to use quite different

[1] Some of the meanings of Skt. *go* are: cow, head of cattle, bull, herd of cattle, milk (of cow), hide, beef, (pl.) stars, rays of light, sky, heaven, sun, moon, water, sense-organ. The word *bhū* can mean: originate, originating, origin, universe, earth, land (property), place, material.

[2] M. Leumann, *Merkmale des Sanskrit als Brahmanensprache und als Kunstsprache*, Asiatische Studien 18/19 (1965), pp. 207 ff.

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lexemes with the same or approximately the same meaning anywhere he wishes. The word he chooses may be different each time he returns to the concept; it may be an old choice, it may be abstruse; the only important thing is that both members retain the sense of ' cold-radiating ', ' cool-gleaming ', ' snow-radiant ', etc. Any synonym may be employed for the prior member, for example *hima-dīdhiti*, *śiśira-dīdhiti*, *śīta-dīdhiti*, *tuhina-dīdhiti*, etc., and the final member may also be varied *ad libitum*: *hima-dīdhiti*, *himâṃśu*, *hima-bhās*, *hima-dhāman*, *hima-dyuti*, *hima-raśmi*, *hima-ruci*, etc.[1] This extreme flexibility often enables a poet to put together names so as to create the tone-colour he desires and to suit the length and sound of the vowels and consonants in an expression to the demands of the context. If we keep to the example of the moon, he can easily produce names in which the vowel *i* is dominant (e.g. *śiśiradīdhiti*,) or those containing only *ă* (e.g. *agharmadhāman*) or compounds with members containing *u* sounds, which may convey a somewhat darker impression to the reader (e.g. *tuhinadyuti*).

Sound and word play of this nature is used by most poets, as we have said. They call euphony to their aid, sometimes to the extent that it seems to us exaggerated and uninhibited, but they do so with the object of achieving agreement between content (*artha*) and expression (*śabda*). In the following stanza from

[1] Insted of *hima*, one could of course choose *śiśira-*, *śita-* or *tuhina-*.

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the *Kumārasaṃbhava* (1. 18), which describes the young maiden Menā, the succession of soft consonants in the second line, particularly *m*, *n*, *v* and *p*, evokes a feeling of gentleness and charm:

sa mānasīm merusakhaḥ pitṛṇāṃ kanyāṃ kulasya sthitaye sthitijñaḥ |
menāṃ munīnam api mānanīyām ātmānurūpāṃ vidhinopayeme ||

'In order to ensure the continuance of the family, knowing the custom, he, a friend of Meru's, married Menā in accordance with the ritual: (she) was the spiritual daughter of her ancestors, resembled him in nature, and seemed worthy of respect even to the ascetics.' In contrast, let us look at the following harsh consonants, above all the aspirated palatals, and *r* and *kṣ*, which reproduce the spraying and splashing of water:

ucchalacchīkarācchācchanirjharāmbhaḥkaṇokṣitaḥ ||

'(The wind), sprinkled with drops from a very pure cascade whose spume sprays up . . .'[1] One cannot fail to recognize that endeavour to achieve such aims is one of the basic demands of Indian poetry and poetics.

[1] *Kāvyādarśa* **1**. 48. Cf. the first quarter of the stanza in *Kāvyaprakāśa* **1**. 5. 4. which gives a similar depiction in sound of the swift currents of the Gaṅgā: *svacchandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbucchaṭā* and the first half of *Śiśup.* **3**.37, which describes the rolling waves of the ocean: °*vāridhivārivīcicchaṭocchalacchaṅkhakulākulena| (vapreṇa . . .)*.

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The idea of *kāvya* as a close association of sound and meaning, an intimate interweaving (*saṃparka*) of *śabda* and *artha*,[1] runs like a red thread though practically all poetry.[2] The concept of poetic art, of literary composition, is caught very well by the term *sāhitya*, which stresses precisely this close relationship, this unity of expression and content.[2]

[1] Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa* **1.** 1:

vāgarthāv iva saṃpṛktav vāgarthapratipattaye|
jagataḥ pitarau vande pārvatīparameśvarau||

'So that [I] may be granted (insight into) words and meaning, I greet you, Pārvatī and the Highest [i.e., Śiva], parents of the world, twined togther like word and meaning.'

[2] The following definitions of *kāvya*, given, by various poets are illuminating: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam* 'poetry is word and meaning together' (Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* **1.** 16); *nanu śabdārthau kāvyam*, 'poetry is word and meaning', (Rudraṭa, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* **2.** 1); *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi*, 'this (i.e., poetry) is word and meaning: without faults, furnished with excellencies, sometimes without (decorative) figures' (Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa* **1.** 4); *adoṣau-saguṇau sālaṃkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam*, 'poetry is word and meaning: without faults, furnished with excellencies and figures' (Hemacandra, *Kāvyānuśāsana* 1T, KM, p. 19); *sādhūśabdārthas aṃdarbhaṃ guṇālaṃkārabhūṣitam | sphuṭarītirasopetam kāvyaṃ kurvīta kīrtaye*, 'let (the poet) compose poetry with the object (of gaining) fame: an intertwining of word and meaning decorated with excellencies and figures and furnished with a clear style and (a clear) poetic sentiment' (Vāgbhaṭa I, *Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra* **1.** 2); *śabdārthau nirdoṣau saguṇau prāyaḥ sālaṃkārau kāvyam*, 'poetry is word and meaning: without faults, furnished with excellencies and —often—with figures' (Vāgbhaṭa II, *Kāvyānuśāsana* I); Cf. also Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvita* **1.** 7.

[2] Skt. *sahita*, 'together' 'joined' 'put together', from which comes *sāhitya*. Cf. Rājaśekhara, *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* II (GOS, p. 5): *śabdārthayor yathāvat sahabhāvena vidyā sāhityavidyā*, The science of literary composition is a science consisting in the correct matching of word and content.'

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This is not the place to mention in detail the numerous devices which give literary works their particular character. What is valid for the small number of examples given above is also valid, on the whole, for others. Time and again the common aim proves to be the endeavour to make the language of literary texts different from that of ordinary speech; it should have a quality of freshness about it and it should be relatively difficult. The earliest means of marking this divorce between poetry and everyday language were of course metre, enlivening the text with decorative figures (*alaṃkāra*) and detailed descriptions. Of far greater significance to the development of a poetic language possessing striking characteristics of its own, however, were metaphor, the repetition of certain conventional patterns and images and the use of long, unusual expressions. Moreover it is worth noting that a literary text frequently does not yield up its meaning at first sight; it does so only slowly and by degrees, the meaning must be deciphered. The technique of poetry makes use of these different devices in various ways, but to ensure that distance is kept from ordinary language the general rule is that banal words are to be avoided whenever possible. To replace words that have already been used, poets employ substitutes. They have a decided preference for compounds and striking or polysemic words, which are often archaic.

Hand in hand with the divorce of the two styles on the linguistic plane goes a parallel phenomenon which affects the conception of what a work of literary

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art is, since a sort of transformational process also influences content, the message. In actual fact the basic mechanisms which govern the poet in his choice of words are also active where content is concerned. Here, too, the three principles of rearrangement, added difficulty and selection are valid. As it cannot be the task of a *kāvya* faithfully to mirror reality to the reader, the poet generally selects only some aspects of reality, transforms them and presents them as whatever he wishes from a new, poetically rendered point of view. Among other things the very lavish use of polysemic words and, above all of various forms of simile, leads to a broadening of perspective and produces a sort of multiple vision of the phenomena presented; it is unique and conveys the message in an artistic manner. Not only do poets show us familiar objects in a new light, as Ānandavardhana's criticism correctly recognizes;[1] they also reveal truths, relationships and beauties that are either not present in ordinary life or else remain unrecognized.

It is obvious that Indian tradition could not have remained unaware of the distinguishing characteristics of poetic speech. Sanskrit poetics is fond of referring to the difference that is clearly appreciable between *śāstra* and *kāvya*, i.e. between didactic writing and poetry. The two sorts of writing show fundamental differences.

[1] It is true that he regards the effect as being achieved only through *rasa*, poetic sentiment:

dṛṣṭapūrvā api hy arthāḥ kāvye rasaparigrahāt|
sarve navā ivābhānti madhumāsa iva drumāḥ||

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The former is purely informative and monosemic in style; the latter is a linguistically complex, organic whole which, although built up on the same linguistic foundations, is loaded with meaning down to the last detail and is frequently polysemic. Indian tradition might equally well have created other categories for other forms of text, but the division into *kāvya* and *śāstra* is motivated by more than one reason. For one thing, poetry could hardly have employed the language of common speech, firstly because the everyday language of poets was not identical with the language of poetry and, secondly, because Sanskrit, even at the time when it was used by the greatest poets as a vehicle for their works, had long ceased to be a living language; furthermore, *kāvya* and *śāstra* were by far the most important contemporary forms of literature.

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WILHELM RAU

A NOTE ON THE DONKEY AND THE MULE IN EARLY VEDIC LITERATURE

THERE can be no doubt that an accurate dating of the Veda is a major problem of early Indian history and that, therefore, no line of investigation possibly conducive to it should be neglected. Research—literary and archaeological—with regard to the material culture of the Vedic Aryans is one of them and still capable of no slight improvement: to this day, the majority of scholars evidently use A. A. Macdonell/A. B. Keith's *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects* (London 1912, reprinted Varanasi 1958) as their most recent source of information; really, it is out-of-date in many respects. The live-stock known in Vedic times may serve as an example to show that after nearly seventy years more numerous and more detailed facts can be culled from the Vedic literature accessible now. For this purpose I have selected two genera of animals which may have been introduced to India from the ancient Middle East and are moreover noteworthy on account of their association with several Vedic gods.

The Indian donkey may derive either from the Asiatic Wild Ass (*Equus hemionus* Pallas) still surviving

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in 'the deserts of the Rann of Cutch and parts of the desert zone of north-west India and Baluchistan',[1] or from *Equus asinus*, descendant of *Asinus taeniopus* Heuglin, a native of Ethiopia and the Soudan. In the latter case, it would have been brought to north-western India probably via Egypt, the Middle East and Iran.

The mule was, according to ancient Greek tradition, first bred in several parts of Asia Minor.[2] We are therefore here too, faced with an alternative: either cross-breeding of a donkey and a mare was invented independently by the Vedic Aryans or they derived such knowledge—indirectly of course—somehow from westernmost Asia.

What follows is an attempt to report briefly and to record precisely all references in early Vedic literature to (I) the donkey and (II) the mule with the intention to facilitate further research, mainly to be conducted by zoologists, prehistorians and archaeologists.

The abbreviations used to designate Vedic texts are the following:

AA Aitareya-Āraṇyaka
AB Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa

[1] Prater, S. H.: *The Book of Indian Animals.* Second (Revised) Edition, Bombay Natural History Society, Bombay 1965, p. 227.

[2] Hehn, V.: *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere in ihrem Übergang aus Asien nach Griechenland und Italien sowie in das übrige Europa. Historisch-linguistische Studien.* Herausgegeben von Otto Schrader, [8]Berlin 1911 (Nachdruck: Darmstadt 1963), pp. 132-5.

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AV	Atharvavedasaṃhitā (Śaunaka recension)
AV(P)	Atharvavedasaṃhitā (Paippalāda recension)
DhS	Dharma-Sūtra
DhŚ	Dharma-Śāstra
GB	Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa
GS	Gṛhya-Sūtra
JB	Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa
JUB	Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa
KB	Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa
KpS	Kapiṣṭhala-Kaṭha-Saṃhitā
KS	Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā
MS	Maitrāyaṇīya-Saṃhitā
PVB	Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa
ṚV	Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā
ṚV(kh)	Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā-khilāni
ŚB	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa
ŚB(K)	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (Kāṇva recension)
ŚB(M)	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (Mādhyandina recension)
ŚS	Śrauta-Sūtra
ṢVB	Ṣaḍviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa
TA	Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka
TB	Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa
TS	Taittirīya-Saṃhitā
VS	Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā

Figures in square brackets [ ] refer to pages and lines of the standard edition of the text quoted.

Want of space prevents me from adding translations to the passages quoted, but their language hardly

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presents difficulties and I have proposed emendations in a few cases where the printed texts are presumably faulty.

I

In our sources we meet with three names for the donkey: *rā́sabha, gardabhá* (fem. *gardabhī*) and *khára*. Of these, *rāsabha* is an archaic[1] and *khara* a recent word.[2] Since the *Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa* mentions *khara* and *gardabha* side by side[3] there must have been a difference between the two. The donkey figures regularly in the lists of domestic[4] or more appropriately, of whole-hoofed domestic animals.[5] In value, it was deemed less than a horse[6] or a mule.[7] Its colour resembles that of ashes[8] or dust,[9] while there were three varieties

[1] *TS* **5**. 1. 5. 7 says of the *gardabha: rā́sabha ity hy ètám ṛ́ṣayó 'vadan.*

[2] First occurrence, as far as I can see, *AV(P)* **20**. 39. 2.

[3] *Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa* **71**. 7. 5-6.

[4] *MS* **1**. 5. 10 [78. 6]: *gaúś cā́śvāś cāśvatarā́ś ca gardabhò 'jā́ cāviś ca púruṣaḥ. KS* **7**. 7 [69. 14]: *gauś cāśvaś cāviś cājā cāśvataraś ca gardabhaś ca puruṣaḥ. PVB* **16**. 1. 10: *gauś cāśvaś cāśvataraś ca gardabhaś cājāś cāvayaś ca.*

[5] *AV(P)* **20**. 39. 2: *aśvaḥ . . . kharaḥ . . . aśvataraḥ. ŚB* **12**. 7. 1. 5: *tád ékaśapham abhavad: áśvo 'śvataró gardabhā́ḥ.*

[6] *MS* **3**. 1. 3 [3. 17]; *KS* **19**. 2 [2. 1]=*KpS* **29**. 8 [157. 9]; *TS* **5**. 1. 2. 1-3; *ŚB* **6**. 3. 1. 28; **6**. 4. 4. 12-13.

[7] *JUB* **1**. 4. 4: *tasmād asya* [scil. *gardabhasya*] *pāpīyasaś śreyo jāyate 'śvataro vāśvatarī vā.*

[8] *bhasman: AB* **3**. 34. 2; *JB* **3**. 264 [464. 12]: text see below, note 6, p. 184.

[9] *ásа, pāṃsú ŚB(M)* **4**. 5. 1. 9 and *ŚB(K)* **5**. 5. 4. 4.

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of the *khara*: black, dun and white.[1] Mention is made of the donkey's long ears and if the reading *akarṇa* in three Śrautasūtra-s is more than an inadvertence of Rudradatta's, or does not merely mean the blemish of an individual animal, we must assume that there was a short-eared variety, too. *Equus hemionus* does possess shorter ears than *Equus asinus*, indeed.[2] The size of its penis is noted[3] and it is referred to as 'possessing twofold sexual power'[4], since it mates not only with the she-ass but with the mare as well. Its shrieking bray is described by a number of verbal roots: *krand*

[1] *kṛṣṇa-, gaura-, śvetakhara: VāsDhS* **21**. 1-3.

[2] The *gardabhá* is *karṇá: MS* **2**. 2. 4 [18. 16]: *kūṭaṃ dákṣiṇā karṇó vā gardabháḥ.* **3**. 14. 21 [177. 4]: *tarákṣuḥ śvá kṛṣṇáḥ karṇó gardabhás té rákṣasām.—VS* **24**. 40: *śvá kṛṣṇáḥ karṇó gardabhás tarákṣus té rákṣasām.—akarṇa: BhārŚS* **9**. 16. 18: *kṛṣṇājinaṃ vā kūṭaṃ vākarṇo vā gardabho hariṇo vā hariṇapṛṇākā vā śaphakaśyāmākapātrau vā dve vā kambuśūrpe dakṣiṇeti vijñāyate* [. . . an ass with short ears . . . C. G. Kashikar]. *ĀpŚS* **9**. 14. 14: *kṛṣṇājinaṃ dakṣiṇā kūṭaṃ vākarṇo vā gardabho hariṇo vā hariṇapṛṇākā vā śyāmākapātrau vāśaphako veti vijñāyate* [. . . ein stutzohriger Esel . . . W. Caland]. *SatyŚS* **15**. 4. 21: *kṛṣṇājinaṃ vā kūṭaṃ vākarṇo vā gardabho dakṣiṇā/hariṇo vā hariṇapṛṇākā vā śyāmākapātro*(sic!) *vā / dve vākyāmbū śūrpe* (sic!) *śayyāṃ* (sic!) *vā/ sā hi tasyeṣṭiḥ /* – Rudradatta ad *ĀpŚS* **9**. 14. 14: *akarṇaḥ karṇavikalaḥ*, repeated by Mahādeva Śāstrī ad *SatyŚS* **15**. 4. 21.

[3] *AV* **6**. 72. 3=*AV(P)* **19**. 27. 15.

[4] *dvirétas: TS* **5**. 1. 5. 5: text see below, note 6, p. 184; *TS* **7**. 1. 1. 2: *agniṣṭoména vai prajāpatiḥ prajā asṛjata tā agniṣṭoménaivá páry agṛhṇāt tāsāṃ párigṛhītānām aśvataró 'ty apravata tásyānuhāya réta ādatta tád gardabhé ny àmārṭ tásmād gardabhó dvirétāḥ. AB* **4**. 9. 4: text see below, note 5, p. 185. *JB* **1**. 67 [30, 24]: text see below, note 1, p. 187. *ŚB* **6**. 3. 1. 23.

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(intensive: *kanikrad-*),[1] *nad* (intensive: *nānad-*),[2] *nu*,[3] *ras*[4] and *vāś*.[5] Satisfied with meagre feed[6] and no care the donkey normally reaches its full span of life, and it is considered a bad omen when it dies prematurely.[7] It is praised for its strength[8] and sturdiness to carry

[1] *MS* **2**. 7. 4 [79. 5]=*KS* **16**. 4 [224. 15]=**19**. 5[6. 4]=*KpS* **30**. 3 [162. 23]=*TS* **4**. 1. 4. 3=**5**. 1. 5. **6**=*VS* **11**. 46=*ŚB* **6**. 4. 4. 7.

[2] *AV* **8**. 6. 10=*AV(P)* **16**. 79. 10; *AV* **10**. 1. 14=*AV(P)* **16**. 36. 4: *gardabhī; AV(P)* **6**. 14. 2; **20**. 39. 2; *MS* **2**. 7. 4 [79. 5]=*KS* **16**. 4 [224. 15]=*KpS* **30**. 3 [162. 23]=*TS* **4**. 1. 4. 3=**5**. 1. 5. 6=*VS* **11**. 46 =*ŚB* **6**. 4. 4. 7; *JB* **3**. 37 [370. 4].

[3] *ṚV* **1**. 29. 5.

[4] *ŚB* **6**. 1. 1. 11: *átha yád árasad iva sá rásabho 'bhavat. ŚB* **6**. 3. 1. 28: *átha yát tád árasad ivaiṣá rásabhaḥ. Pāṇinīyadhātupāṭha* I. 745: *rásá śabde.*

[5] *PVB* **21**. 3. 5.

[6] *TS* **5**. 1. 5. 4-5: *sthiró bhava vīḍvàṅga iti gardabhá á sādayati //4// sáṃ nahyaty evainam etáyā sthemné gardabhéna sám bharati tásmād gardabháḥ paśūnám bhārabhāritamo gardabhéna sám bharati tásmād gardabhó 'py anāleśé 'ty anyắn paśắn medyaty ánnaṃ hy ènenārkáṃ saṃbháranti gardabhéna sáṃ bharati tásmād gardabhó dvirétāḥ sán kániṣṭham paśūnám prá jāyate 'gnír hy àsya yóniṃ nirdáhati. JB* **3**. 264 [464. 12]: *bhasmana eva gardabho 'sṛjyata | tasmāt sa bhasmanaḥ pratirūpaḥ* [°*rūpaṃ* MS. *ga*] *| tasmāt sa* [*sa* missing in MS. *ga*] *babhriyamāṇo* [*babhryamāṇo* MS. *ka mriyamāṇo* MS. *ga; read: tasmāt so 'bhriyamāṇo*] *jīvati.*

—The following two passages may have the same purport, but I confess that I fail to understand them:

MS **3**. 1. 3 [3. 15]: *gardabhéna sáṃbharaty eṣá hí paśūnám anupajīvanīyátamaḥ.*

KS **19**. 2 [2. 3]=*KpS* **29**. 8 [157. 11]: *gardabhena saṃbharati| tasmād eṣa samāvat paśūnāṃ reto dadhānānāṃ kaniṣṭho 'gnir hy asya reto niradahad yad etenāsyām ūrjam arkaṃ saṃbharati tasmād eṣo 'syāṃ jīvitatamaḥ* [*KpS: jīvitṛtamaḥ*].

[7] *KS* **19**. 5 [6. 5]=*KpS* **30**. 3 [162. 25]; *TS* **5**. 1. 5. 7.

[8] *vīryà*: *MS* **3**. 1. 6 [7. 16]; *sthemán*: see the passages listed under the next note 1, p. 185.

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loads better than any other beast of burden.[1] At the same time it often appears as a draught-animal,[2] although it is the slowest of them.[3] To account for this, a curious myth is related, namely that the Aśvins who (despite their name) are frequently pictured as driving a donkey-ekkā,[4] once won a race of the gods with this vehicle but thereby ruined the donkey's nimbleness.[5] Once even Indra uses a donkey-chariot.[6]

[1] *bhārabhāritama: KS* **19**. 5 [6. 1]=*KpS* **30**. 3 [162. 20]; *TS* **5**. 1. 5. 5: text see note 6, p. 184 above.

[2] *ṚV* **1**. 162. 21=*KS* V. **6**. 5 [179. 1]=*TS* **4**. 6. 9. 4=*VS* **25**. 44; *JB* **3**. 328 [488. 29]: *tad yathā vijite nayanti saindhavān ajanti hastinam vahanti dhūrgṛhītaṃ rathaṃ yāti hulubhyāṃ yāti vicchidvahābhyām evaṃ gardabharathena / evam etaṃ dvitīyaṃ tryahaṃ devā atyāyan. AA* **3**. 2. 4 [137. 3]: *kharair varāhair yuktair yāti* [scil. in a dream].

[3] *KB* **18**. 1. 11-17: *tā* [scil. *devatāḥ*] *abruvann ājim āyāmāsmint sahasra iti* /11/ *tā ājim āyan* /12/ *tad aśvinā udajayatāṃ rāsabhena* /13/ *tasmād bahvyo devatāḥ śasyante* /14/ *athāśvinam ity ākhyāyate* /15/ *tata u haitad uta rāsabho na sarvam iva javaṃ dhāvati* /16/ *sṛtaṃ mayeti hataṃ* [read: *ha taṃ* scil *javam* [?]] *manyamānaḥ* /17/. See also *AB* **4**. 9. 1-4, quoted below, note 5.

[4] *ṚV* **1**. 34. 9; **1**. 116. 2; **8**. 85 [694]. 7; *ṚV* (*kh*) **1**. 3. 4; *TS* **4**. 1. 4. 3; *AB* **4**. 9. 4: text see below, note 5. *KB* **18**. 1. 13; text see above, note 3. The Aśvins are called *rásabhāśva: ṚV* (*kh*) **1**. 2. 5 =*AV*(*P*) **12**. 6. 2=*TA* **1**. 10. 2 [46. 1]. Only *Nighaṇṭu* **1**. 15 speaks of two donkeys: *rāsabhāv aśvinoḥ*.

[5] *AB* **4**. 9. 1-4: *aśvatarīrathenāgnir ājim adhāvat tāsām prājamāno yonim akūḷayat tasmāt tā na vijāyante* (1) *gobhir aruṇair uṣā ājim adhāvat tasmād uṣasy āgatāyām aruṇam ivaiva prabhāty uṣaso rūpam* (2) *aśvarathenendra ājim adhāvat tasmāt sa uccairghoṣa upabdimān kṣatrasya rūpam aindro hi sa* (3) *gardabharathenāśvinā udajayatām aśvināv aśnuvātāṃ yad aśvinā udajayatām aśvināv āśnuvātāṃ tasmāt sa sṛtajavo dugdhadohaḥ sarveṣām etarhi vāhanānām anāśiṣṭho retasas tv asya vīryaṃ nāharatāṃ tasmāt sa dviretā vājī* (4).

[6] *ṚV* **3**. 53 [287]. 5.

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This story proves that in early times the donkey was considered sacrificially pure: together with a horse and a he-goat it plays an important role in the *agnicayana*-ritual,[1] and serves occasionally as a *dakṣiṇā*.[2] It must, however, be noted that during the *aśvamedha* it is as a sacrificial animal offered solely to the *itarajanāḥ* —which here means 'to the fiends'[3], to the *rakṣas*,[4] to *nirṛti*,[5] and still later serves as an expiation for a *brahmacārin* who has broken his vow of chastity.[6] From middle-Vedic times onward it is associated more and more with things inauspicious.[7]

II

The mule, *aśvatará* (fem. *aśvatarī*), i.e. the offspring of a donkey and a mare,[8] was known to be

[1] See e. g. the passages referred to under note 6, p. 182, above.

[2] *ṚV* **8**. 56 [1025]. 3=*ṚV*(*kh*) **3**. 8. 3; *MānŚS* **6**. 1. 1. 41 and the passages quoted above, in note 2, p. 183, except the second and the the third.

[3] *KS* V. 7. 9. [181. 2]; *TS* **5**. 5. 19. 1.

[4] *MS* **3**. 14. 21 [177. 4]; *VS* **24**. 40. Text see above, note 2, p. 183.

[5] *TA* **3**. 10. 3 [179. 14]: *nirṛtyā aśvataragardabhaú* = *ĀpŚS* **14**. 11. 3=*SatyŚS* **10**. 6. 20 [1097. 23].

[6] *BhārŚS* **9**. 17. 1; *ĀpŚS* **9**. 15. 1; *BaudhDhS* **2**. 1. 1. 30-31; *ĀpDhS* **1**. 9. 26. 8; *HirDhS* **1**. 7. 19=*SatyŚS* **26**. 7. 19[106. 23]; *KātyŚS* **1**. 1. 13 [17. 9]; *PārGS* **3**. 12. 1 sqq.; *GautDhS* **23**. 17 = **3**. 5. 17; *VāsDhŚ* **23**. 1; *Manusmṛti* **11**. 118; *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* **3**. 280.

[7] *PVB* **21**. 3.5; *BaudhDhS* **2**. 1. 1.2 sqq.; *ĀpDhS* **1**. 10. 28. 19; *HirDhS* **1**. 7. 54, 57=*SatyŚS* **26**. 7. 54, 57 [112-3]; *Viṣnusmṛti* **28**. 49; *ŚaṅkhalikhitaDhS* 379; *Manusmṛti* **11**. 122. *VāsDhŚ* **21**. 1-3; *ŚaṅkhalikhitaDhS* 313 and 325.

[8] *PVB* **24**. 11. 5; *TB* **1**. 8. 6. 4; *ŚB* **12**. 7. 2. 21; Rudradatta on *ĀpŚS* **13**. 5. 3: *gardabhād vaḍavāyāṃ jāto 'śvataraḥ*.

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barren[1] and is enumerated regularly among the different kinds of cattle.[2] Considered more valuable than a donkey,[3] it was of fallow[4] or white[5] colour, and

[1] *TS* **7**. 1. 1. 2: text see above, note 4, p. 183; *TS* **7**. 1. 1. 3: . . *tásmād aśvataró ná prá jāyata āttaretā hi tásmād barhíṣy ánavakḷptaḥ, sarvavedasé vā sahásre vāvakḷptó 'ti hy ápravata.* *JB* **1**. 67 [30, 18]: *prajāpatir yat prajā asṛjata tā agniṣṭomenāsṛjata | daśamena ca vai sa tā agniṣṭomasya stotreṇāsṛjata daśamena ca māsā saṃvatsarasya | tā dvādaśena caivāgniṣṭomasya stotreṇa paryagṛhṇād dvādaśena ca māsā saṃvatsarasya | tasmāt paśavo daśa māso garbhān bibhrati | ta ekādaśam anu prajāyante | na kā cana dvādaśam atiharati | parigṛhītā hi tena || tāsāṃ parigṛhītānām aśvataro 'tyaplavata | tasyānuhāya reta ādatta | tad gardabhe nyamārṭ tad baḍabāyāṃ | tat paśuṣu tad oṣadhīṣu | tasmād gardabho dviretās tasmād baḍabā dviretāḥ | tasmāt paśavo dvau-dvau janayanti | tasmād oṣadhayo 'nabhyaktā rebhanti | tasmād aśvataro barhiṣi na deyaḥ | ati hy aplavatāpa hy akrāmat | āttaretā hy aprajā hi | ṣoḍaśinas stotre deyaḥ | atirikto vai ṣoḍaśi stotrāṇām atirikto 'śvataraḥ paśūnām | atirikta eva tad atiriktam dadhati yajñasya salomatāyai.* See also Oertel, H.: *Contributions from the Jāiminīya-Brāhmaṇa* [Seventh Series]. III. *Why the mule is barren (JB.* **1**. 67) = *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. **15**, July, 1909, pp. 175-80.

[2] See the passages quoted in notes 4, p. 182 and 5, p. 182 above, and also *AV* **4**. 4. 8: *áśvasyāśvatarásyājásya pétvasya ca |*
átharṣabhásya yé vājās tán asmín dhehi tanūvaśín ||

JB **2**. 323 [299. 5] = **2**. 342 [307. 17]:

na ha vai gaur nāśvo nāśvataro virājam adhitiṣṭhati | puruṣo ha vāva virājam adhitiṣṭhati | tasmāt puruṣaḥ paśūnām attā |

[3] See note 7, p. 182 above.

[4] *hari AV(P)* **20**. 39. 2; *haritmat JB* **2**. 420 [341. 32]: text see below, note 7, p. 188.

[5] Cp. *Śvetāśvatara*, nom. pr.- *AB* **7**. 18. 16 = *ĀśvŚS* **2**. 3. 11. 23 [399. 13]: . . . *śvetaś cāśvatarīratho hotuḥ* [scil. *dakṣiṇā*]. I suspect that the original reading has been *śvetāśvatarīrathaś ca hotuḥ*, in spite of Sāyaṇācārya who remarks:. . . *aśvatarīrathaḥ | sa ca rajatenālaṃkṛtatvāc chvetaḥ.* The sentence is missing in *ŚāṅkhŚS* **15**. 27.

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mainly used as a draught animal.[1] As a costly item of property[2] it could be accepted as a sacrificial fee,[3] but later on it was less appreciated.[4]

Higher prized than the male was the she-mule, erroneously believed by the Vedic Aryans to be barren,[5] too. A chariot drawn by she-mules was considered the swiftest and the most fashionable means of transportation,[6] especially when more than two were yoked to it.[7] While Indra uses he-mules,[8] Agni[9] and other gods[10] prefer she-mules. An *aśvatarīratha* represented,

[1] *AV(P)* **2**. 87. 4; *AB* **3**. 47. 1; *JB* **1**. 38 [16. 8]: *tad vai tad agnihotraṃ dvādaśāham eva pūrve manuṣyā juhuvāṃ* [read: *juhavāṃ*] *cakruḥ | tasmāt teṣāṃ duhe dhenur vahaty anaḍvān ādadhānaḥ* [*ādhānaḥ* all MSS. except *ṣa*] *prahito* [*pratihito* MSS. *ya ra la*$_2$ *va śa*; read: *ādhānapratihito*] *'śvo 'śvatara upatiṣṭhaty adhikakṣyo hastī vahati*. *JB* **1**. 59 [25. 27]; 333 [139. 4]; **3**. 279 [471. 2]; *ŚB* **12**. 4. 1. 10: very similar to *JB* **1**. 59 [25. 27]; *GB* **1**. 3. 1 [64. 14].

[2] *AV(P)* **12**. 7. 13: *niṣkaḥ kaṃso 'śvataro* [*ha*]*stī*. *JB* **1**. 274 [114. 15]: *balīvardo 'śvataro hastī niṣkaḥ puruṣaḥ*.

[3] *PVB* **1**. 8. 16.-*aśvatarī*: *MānŚS* **2**. 5. 3. 9 *BhārŚS* **14**. 16. 12; *ĀpŚS* **14**. 3. 7.

[4] See above, note 5, p. 186.

[5] *AB* **4**. 9. 1: text see above, note 5, p. 185; *PVB* **6**. 1. 1-4: *prajāpatir akāmayata bahu*[*ṣ*] *syāṃ prajāyeyeti sa etam agniṣṭomam apaśyat tam āharat tenemāḥ prajā asṛjata // 1 // . . . tāsāṃ parigṛhītānām aśvatary atyakrāmat tasyā anuhāya reta ādatta tad vaḍavāyāṃ nyamārṭ tasmād vaḍavā dviretās tasmād aśvatary aprajā āttaretā hi*. *ṢVB* V. (VI.) 7. 2: . . . *aśvatarīgarbho jāyate*: a bad omen.

[6] *TS* **7**. 3. 1. 4; *JB* **2**. 121 [211. 31].

[7] *JB* **2**. 286 [283. 1]; *AV* **8**. 8. 22=*AV(P)* **16**. 31. 1: four; *JB* **2**. 420 [341. 32]: *sa yathā ṣaḍ dharitmatīr aśvatarīs saṃyujya yatra jigamiṣet tad gacched evam evaitābhir iḷāvibhaktibhi*[*ṣ*] *svargaṃ lokam abhyaśnuvate*.

[8] *AV(P)* **9**. 6. 4.

[9] *AB* **4**. 9. 1: text see above, note 5, p. 185.

[10] *AV* **8**. 8. 22=*AV(P)* **16**. 31. 1.

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therefore, a much coveted *dakṣiṇā*[1] and is never omitted in the enumeration of luxuries.[2]

It thus appears that both animals were part of the Vedic live-stock from the very beginning: the first reference to the donkey occurs in the *Ṛgveda*, to the mule in the *Atharva-*[3] and in the *Black Yajurveda*. The regard for them was highest during the earliest period of the Vedic age and gradually declined. At first *vāhana-s* of Indra, the Aśvins and Agni they were at the end transformed into symbols of barrenness (the mule) or lewdness (the donkey) and the latter especially associated with *nirṛti*, with the *rākṣasa* and with the *śaudra varṇa*. The cause for this development may have been either the fact that both animals proved to be less useful in the plains than in the hills, or that their masters grew more pretentious as they moved eastwards into the Gaṅgā-Yamunā doab.

[1] *AB* **7**. 18. 16: text see above, note 5, p. 187; *PVB*. **1**. 8. 16; *KātyŚS* **22**. 2. 25 [997. 23].

[2] *AB* **6**. 27. 2 = *GB* **2**. 6. 7 [253. 11]: *hastī kaṃso vāso hiraṇyam aśvatarīrathaḥ śilpam*. *JB* 1. 263 [109. 32]: *etāni vai kṣatre śilpāni hastiniṣko* [read: *hastī niṣko*] *'śvatarīratho 'śvaratho rukmaḥ kaṃsaḥ*. *JB* **1**. 341 [141. 32]: *rājñaḥ pariṣkāraś śārdūlājinaṃ maṇihiraṇyaṃ hastī niṣko 'śvatarīratho 'śvaratho rukmaḥ kaṃsaḥ*. *JB* **3**. 113 [401. 35]: *alaṃkurvanto 'syāsate gṛheṣv aṃśuṃ rukmaṃ niṣkaṃ hastinam aśvatarīratham aśvaratham*.

[3] The passages *AV(P)* **10**. 1. 8; **17**. 14. 4; **19**. 38. 10; **19**. 51. 11; **20**. 19. 7; **20**. 24. 10; **20**. 38. 3 and **20**. 52. 13 cannot be utilized for our purpose as long as a really reliable edition of the *Paippalāda-Atharvaveda* is lacking. It is a pity that Durgamohan and Dipak Bhattacharyya with their recently discovered Orissan manuscripts have since 1959 edited only book 1 (Calcutta 1964) and books 2-4 (Calcutta 1970).

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LUDWIK STERNBACH

ON THE POETICAL PART OF AMARASŪRI'S AMBAḌACARITRA[1]

1. To the least known *kathā*-literature belongs a work of Amara-sūri entitled Ambaḍacaritra (*AA*), or 'Adventures of Ambaḍa'; this fairy-tale belongs to the cycle of legends of king Vikramāditya. It narrates the story of Ambaḍa, a great magician who could fly in the air and change men into animals and then back again into men, and who himself could assume any form he liked. In the fairy-tale Ambaḍa, using his magical skill, carried out seven complicated tasks and won thirty-two[2] beautiful wives, wealth and kingdom.

2. Ambaḍa was a Śaiva but, in the last tale he was converted into the Jaina faith; the whole work is Śaiva rather than Jainistic in nature, but the ideals of Jainism were built up at the expense of Śaivism. The language is Sanskrit, but with many Old Gujarati words and with Prakrit infusions.

[1] This is a continuation of the author's study on '*The Kāvya Portions in the Kathā Literature—an analysis* (Meharchand Lachhmandas, Delhi, vol. 3, 1976). For details regarding references to quotation in *subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s*, etc. and variant readings, refer to those volumes as well as the volumes of *Mahāsubhāṣitasaṃgraha* vols. 1-4 published from VVRI, Hoshiarpur.

[2] In the *Vikramacarita* also 32 stories are told.

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3. The text was published once only, in MS. form by Hiralal Hamsaraja, Jamnagar 1919 (1910); it was translated into German by Charlotte Krause and published in *Indische Novellen* I; *Indische Erzaehler, Band 4, H. Haessel Verlag*, Leipzig, 1922. Ch. Krause in Annex I (pp. 152-71) to this translation included a concise but very useful study of the work as a whole.

4. The narrative of *AA*, like most narratives of *kathā*-works written in prose and verse[1], contains in the prose part the story itself and in the poetic part (also called *kāvya*-portions) either wise-sayings—maxims or *subhāṣita-s* of general nature of no moral and ethical value. This poetical part of *AA*, never analysed before, is the subject of this study.

5. There are 44 verses in *AA*; some of them are introductory verses, being prayers or devotional verses, some are closing verses and narrative verses belonging to the story itself and some are descriptive verses; the majority of verses in *AA* are, however, wise sayings —maxims. Some of these maxims are well-known sayings; some of them were quoted extensively in the Sanskrit literature, including primary sources; some were less known and were quoted only in *subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s*, since they belonged to the floating mass of oral tradition. Some are not quoted elsewhere and must be considered as new maxims.

6. Many of the verses of *AA* occur also in other Jainistic primary sources: the Jainistic version of

[1] *Pañcatantra, Hitopadeśa, Vikramacarita, Śukasaptati, Mādhavānalakāmakandalā*, etc.

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Vikramacarita (*VC*), Śivadāsa's version of *Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā* (*Vet*) and the *Mādhavānalakāmakandalākathā* (*MK*). The close relationship of these four works seems to prove that these works were all composed, or were prevalent, at approximately the same period and belong to the same region. That would mean that *AA* belongs to the fifteenth century A.D. and was popular in Western India where Old Gujarati was spoken.

7. Among the well-known maxims and *subhāṣita-s* in *AA* six occur in primary sources and *subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s*(21, 22, 33, 34, 35, 39); seven occur in primary sources only (2, 6, 12, 16, 18, 26, 28) and six occur in *subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s* only (4, 9, 25, 29, 31, 40). The Jainistic sources (*VC*, *Vet* and *MK*) contain 11 of the *subhāṣita* verses and maxims found in *AA* (2, 6, 12, 18, 21, 22, 29, 33, 34, 35, 39).

8. Some of the maxims and *subhāṣita-s* are 'new' and are not found elsewhere in anthologies or *kathā* literature; some are based on old maxims, but their wording is new. These two types are the most interesting as they bring us something new (3, 7, (10), 14, 17, 19, 27, 41, 44 and 11, 13, 23 and 24). Some are well-known maxims or *subhāṣita-s*, but contain new and interesting readings (6, 9, 12, 18, 26, 29, 33, 34, 39, and 40). The remaining verses show their popularity.

9. Verses which are devotional (and not quoted in other sources), or narrative and are neither maxims nor *subhāṣita-s*, as well as Prakrit verses (not quoted in other sources) and corrupt verses are not quoted here in extenso.

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10. The verses are in different metres:

Anuṣṭubh 1-4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 23-25, 31, 33-35, 39, 41, 44.
Āryā 9, 16, 26, 28, 40. *Upagīti Āryā* 10, *Gīti Āryā* 22.
Śārdūlavikrīḍita 6, 9, 36.
Sragdharā 32, 42.
Vasantatilakā 27, 29.
Bhujaṅgaprayāta 37, 38.
Svāgatā 18.
Viyoginī 21.
Drutavilambita 43.
Mālinī 12.
Mandākrāntā 14.
Śikhariṇī 17.
Irregular Prakrit metres 5, 20, 30.

11. The verses are analysed below: they are given in the order in which they occur in the text.

Tale I—verses 1-9; Tale II—verses 10-11; Tale III—verses 12-15; Tale IV verses 16-22; Tale V—verses 23-32; Tale VI—verses 33-34; Tale VII—verses 35-43.

Analysis of the Poetical Part

1. Introductory devotional verse dedicated to Mahāvīra.

2. Also introductory and devotional, dedicated to Sarasvatī. It occurs also in *MK* and *Vet* almost without variants (without changing even the fourth *pāda*) which proves that these three works are closely connected.

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प्रणम्य परया भक्त्या हंसयानां सरस्वतीम् ।
तस्याः प्रसादमासाद्य करिष्यामि कथामिमाम् ।।
[हंसारूढां, करिष्येऽहं *MK* (D).]

3. Also introductory, but didactic; it is a 'new' maxim.

धर्मात् संपद्यते लक्ष्मीर् धर्माद् रूपमनिन्दितम् ।
धर्मात् सौभाग्यभाग्ये च धर्मात् सर्वं समीहितम् ।।

4. A well-known maxim, quoted in secondary sources only.

अभ्यासकारणी विद्या बुद्धिः कर्मानुसारिणी ।
दानानुसारिणी कीर्तिर् लक्ष्मीः पुण्यानुसारिणी ।।
[अभ्यासकारिणी *AA*]

Learning is the result of constant practice, the intellectual faculty depends on past *karman*; fame results from liberal donations and prosperity results from virtuous deeds.

5. A Prakrit maxim in irregular metre.

6. A *subhāṣita* describing the beauty of a woman; *Śārdūla-vikrīḍita* metre. It occurs in *MK*, *VC* and in *Kathāratnākara*.

श्यामा यौवनशालिनी मधुरवाक् सौभाग्यभाग्योदया
कर्णान्तायतलोचनातिचतुरा प्रागल्भ्यगर्वान्विता ।
रम्या बालमरालमन्थरगतिर् मत्तेभकुम्भस्तनी
बिम्बोष्ठी परिपूर्णचन्द्रवदना भृङ्गालिनीलालका ।।
[आकर्ण मृगलोचना *AA*] (corrected on the basis of *MK*.)

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7. A new maxim; in *anuṣṭubh*.

महातीर्थमहौषध्यौ महानाथो मुनीश्वरः ।
अल्पभाग्यवतां तेषां प्रायो दुर्लभदर्शनम् ।।
(महौषध्यो *AA*).

It is difficult for the less fortunate to see a great holyman, a great medicinal plant, a great lord or a great ascetic.

8. A narrative verse.

9. A well-known maxim, known only from secondary sources, (*Kathāratnākara*, *Indische Spruche* (*IS*) 1018, etc.); in Āryā metre.

आरोहत गिरिशिखरं समुद्रमुल्लङ्घ्य यातु पातालम् ।
विधिनिखिताक्षरमालं फलति कपालं हि भूपाल ।।

[आरोहति *AA* corrected on the basis of *IS*.]

One might climb to the top of a mountain, or diving into the sea, go to the nether regions; but the letters inscribed on one's forehead by fate will certainly fructify, O king!

10. A Prakrit maxim in Upagīti Āryā metre: corrupt text.

It says that there is no heat like that of the sun, no dishonour like poverty, no pain like hunger and no evil like death.

11. Well-known maxim, in *anuṣṭubh*; but the verse is new.

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बलिभ्यो बलिनः सन्ति वादिभ्यः सन्ति वादिनः ।
गुणिभ्यो गुणिनः सन्ति तस्मान्मानं परित्यजेत् ।।

Strong men will find stronger men; pleaders will find better pleaders; virtuous people will find people more virtuous; therefore one should always put aside pride.

12. A *subhāṣita* in Mālinī metre; also occurs in *MK*. It is an eulogy of music.

सुखिनि सुखनिदानं दुःखितानां विनोदः
श्रवणहृदयहारी मन्मथस्याग्रदूतः ।
चतुरनरसुगम्यो वल्लभः कामिनीनां
जयति जयति नादः पञ्चमः सैष वेदः ।
(पञ्चमश्चोपवेदः *MK*.)

13. A well-known maxim in new form; in Anuṣṭubh metre.

निष्कामस्य तृणं नारी निरीहस्य तृणं नृपः ।
तृणं राजसुता पुंसां तृणं शूरस्य जीवितम् ।।
[निःकामस्य *AA*]

To a man not in love a woman is a mere nothing; to one who has no ambition a king is a mere nothing; to a (common) man the daughter of the king is nothing and to a hero life is a mere nothing.

14. A new maxim in Mandākrāntā metre; the text is corrupt.

15. A *śloka* dealing with ascetics; a narrative verse.

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16. A *subhāṣita* in Āryā metre; also occurs in *VC* (southern recension).

विकलयति कलाकुशलं
हसति शुचिं पण्डितं विडम्बयति ।
अधरयति धीरपुरुषं
क्षणेन मकरध्वजो देवः ।।
[b. शुचि पण्डितं *AA*]

The god of love, Kāma, torments, in a moment a man skilled in arts, laughs at a pure man, mocks at a scholar, and lays low a brave man.

17. A well-known proverb illustrated by the story of Hariścandra. A new verse in Śikhariṇī metre.

रमाराज्यभ्रंशः स्वजनविरहः पुत्रमरणं
प्रियाणां च त्यागो रिपुबहुलदेशे च गमनम् ।
हरिश्चन्द्रो राजा वहति सलिलं प्रेतसदने
अवस्था तस्यैषा अहह विषमाः कर्मगतयः ।।

18. A maxim in Svāgatā metre; occurs also in the Jain version of *VC* and *Subhāṣitāvalī* (3316).

संपदो जलतरङ्गविलोला
यौवनं त्रिचतुराणि दिनानि ।
शारदाभ्रमिव चञ्चलमायुस्
तज्जनाः कुरुत धर्ममनिन्द्यम् ।।
(d. किं धनैः परहितानि कुरुध्वम् v.l.)

Fortune is unsteady like billows of the sea, youth is short and life is uncertain like an autumn cloud; only *dharma* counts.

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19. A *subhāṣita* in Śārdūlavikrīḍita, describing a woman.

श्यामेयं स्तनभारमन्थरगतिः कण्ठे च रुद्रावलीं
बिभ्राणा हरिणीविलोलनयना रम्भोरुयुग्मान्विता ।
चन्द्राभा गजगामिनी सुललिता सल्लीलया गच्छति
दृष्ट्वा रूपमिदं तदीयमनिशं वृद्धोऽपि कामायते ।।

20. A *subhāṣita* in old Gujarati in irregular metre. It compares a lover with a sick person.

21. A well-known verse in Viyoginī metre from *Kirātārjunīya* (2. 30). Oft-quoted in collections, *MK*, etc.

सहसा विदधीत न क्रियामविवेकः परमापदां पदम् ।
वृणते हि विमृश्यकारिणं गुणलुब्धाः स्वयमेव संपदः ।।

[wrong reading *vṛṇute* found in some texts]

No act should be performed in haste, ill-conceived judgement is the cause of misfortunes; fortune itself, desiring good qualities, chooses of its own accord, him who acts with deliberation.

22. A well-known maxim, but in Prakrit form; also occurs in *MK*, *VC* (Jain version), etc. In Āryā metre.

विरला जाणन्ति गुणा
विरला पालन्ति निद्धणे णेहम्[1] ।
विरला परकज्जकरा
परदुक्खे दुक्खिआ[2] विरला ।।

[[1] नेहा *AA* [2] दरिकअ *AA*.].

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Few people recognize good qualities; few show affection towards the poor; few give service to others and few grieve at the grief of others.

A parallel Sanskrit verse in *mukhacapalā* metre is found in *subhāṣita-s* (*IS.* 6175):

विरला जानन्ति गुणान्
विरलाः कुर्वन्ति निर्धने स्नेहम् ।
विरलाः परकार्यरताः
परदुःखेनापि दुःखिता विरलाः ।।

23. A maxim in Anuṣṭubh; it is well known in Subhāṣitasaṃgraha-s; here the first line is different and corrupt.

विनयेन विद्या ग्राह्या पुष्कलेन धनेन वा ।
अथवा विद्यया विद्या चतुर्थो नैव विद्यते ।।

[Well-known first line is: guru-śuśrūṣayā vidyā]

Knowledge can be acquired through humility (towards the teacher), or by paying plenty of money or by exchanging some other knowledge.

24. A well-known maxim: but the form is new; in anuṣṭubh.

ग्रामो नास्ति कुतः सीमा पत्नी नास्ति कुतः सुतः ।।
प्रज्ञा नास्ति कुतो विद्या धर्मो नास्ति कुतः सुखम् ।।

If there is no village, there is no boundary; if there is no wife, there is no son; if there is no intelligence, there is no knowledge, and if there is no *dharma*, there is no happiness.

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25. A maxim in Śloka, quoted in Subhāsita-saṃgraha-s also.

पूर्वदत्तेषु या विद्या पूर्वदत्तेषु यद् धनम् ।
पूर्वदत्तेषु या कन्या अग्रे तिष्ठति तिष्ठति ।।

Knowledge, a sum of money, or a girl given away in previous existence will later become the property of the giver.

26. Popular maxim, in Āryā metre; occurs also in *MK.* in this form; it is in Prakrit.

हंसा रज्जन्ति सरे भमरा रज्जन्ति केतकीकुसुमे ।
चंदनवने भुअंआ सरसा सरसेण रज्जन्ति ।।

Haṃsa-s are happy in ponds, bees in the Ketakī flower, snakes in the sandalwood forest and men of taste in the company of people of the same type.

27. A beautiful 'new' maxim in Vasantatilakā metre; it says that without good deeds, the desired object will never be fulfilled.

रम्येषु वस्तुषु मनोहरतां गतेषु
रे चित्त खेदमुपयासि कथं वृथैव ।
पुण्यं कुरुष्व यदि तेषु तवास्ति वाञ्छा
पुण्यैर्विना न हि भवन्ति समीहितार्थाः ।।

28. A Prakrit maxim found in *MK* also, with a variant second *pāda.*

बालस्स माइमरणं भज्जा मरणं च जूवणारम्भे ।
बुड्ढस्स पुत्तमरणं तिन्नि वि दुक्खाइ गुरुआइं ।।

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(बालस्य मातृमरणं भार्यामरणं च यौवनारम्भे ।
वृद्धस्य पुत्रमरणं त्रीण्यपि दुःखानि गुरुकाणि ।।)

The death of the mother for a child, the death of the wife when young, the death of the son for an old man—these three are heavy blows.

The *MK* (A) reading is:

बालत्ते माइमरणं तारुण्णे मरणं णिजभज्जाइ ।
बुड्ढत्ते सपुत्तमरणं तिन्नि वि गरुआइं दुक्खाइं ।।

29. A well-known maxim in Vasantatilakā metre; occurs also in *MK* and various secondary sources (*IS*, 6443) etc. Many variant readings are found.

शास्त्रं सुनिश्चितधिया परिचिन्तनीयम्
आराधितोऽपि नृपतिः परिशङ्कनीयः ।
आत्मीकृतापि युवतिः परिरक्षणीया
शास्त्रे नृपे च युवतौ च कुतः स्थिरत्वम् ।।

[a. सुचिन्तितमपि प्रति° b. स्वाराधितो, संसेवितो . . . परिसेवनीयः c. अङ्के स्थितापि . . . परिशङ्कनीया]

One must reflect upon learning though well studied, must be suspicious of the king even while in his favour, must always be watchful of a young woman even if she belongs to him; how can learning, a king or a young woman be steady (faithful)?

30. A Prakrit maxim in irregular metre.

(स्त्री) पीयर नर सासरें संजभिया सह वास ।
पग पग होय अलघ मिणां जो माण्डे थिरवास ।।

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A woman in the father's house (i.e. an unmarried daughter), a man in the house of his father-in-law, and the residing together with an ascetic woman become more and more unpleasant the longer they last.

31. A maxim in Anuṣṭubh; it occurs also in Subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s, *IS.* 3042, etc. There are many minor variants.

धनधान्यप्रयोगेषु विद्यासंग्रहणेषु च ।
आहारे व्यवहारे च त्यक्तलज्जः सुखी भवेत् ।।

In the case of money or grain, in acquiring knowledge, in eating and in business the man who is not timid will be successful.

32. A verse on a religious topic, in Sragdharā metre.

33-34. Maxims which go together; in Anuṣṭubh. They occur in *Vet. MK*, etc. with variant readings.

अमृतस्य तु कुण्डानि मुधैवामरिकाणि हि ।
रतेरेव प्रधानेयं प्रमदा केन निर्मिता ।।
सर्वेषामत्र रत्नानां स्त्रीरत्नं हि मनोरमम् ।
तदर्थं धनमिच्छन्ति तत्त्यागेन धनेन किम् ।।

(a. अमृतस्येव b. रत्नानामिव राशयः d. योषित . . . निर्मिताः f. स्त्रियो रत्नमनुत्तमम् h. तस्मिन् त्यक्ते)

The pots of nectar in heaven are of no use; who created woman, the best for enjoyment? Of all jewels

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woman is the most attractive. One desires money for her sake. If one gives her up, what for is money then?

35. Well-known maxim in Anuṣṭubh; also occurs in *VC* and many Subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s.

अपुत्रस्य गतिर्नास्ति स्वर्गो नैव च नैव च ।
तस्मात् पुत्रमुखं दृष्ट्वा गृही धर्मं समाचरेत् ।।
(d. पश्चाद् भवति तापसः, स्वर्गं वाञ्छन्ति मानवाः)

There is no help for a man who has no son; heaven is not for him; therefore, only after seeing his son's face, a man should become an ascetic.

36-38. Neither maxims nor *subhāṣita-s*. 36 deals with *karman*, 37 a Jainistic devotional verse and 38 a Śaivite devotional verse.

39. A well-known maxim in Anuṣṭubh; occurs in *VC.*, *MK.* and Subhāṣitasaṃgraha-s . There are many variant readings.

आज्ञाभङ्गो नरेन्द्राणां महतां मानखण्डनम् ।
मर्मवाक्यं च लोकानाम् अशस्त्रो वध उच्यते ।।
(b. ब्राह्मणानामनादरः, वृत्तिच्छेदोऽनुजीविनाम्, अवज्ञा विदुषां तथा c. पृथक् शय्या च नारीणाम्)

For kings, defiance of their command; for the great disrespect; and for the common man, wounding words—form killing without the use of weapons.

40. A maxim in Āryā; occurs in many Subhāṣita-saṃgraha-s *IS.* 681.

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अविदितपरमानन्दो नदति जनो ह्येतदेव रमणीयम् ।
तिलतैलमेव मिष्टं येन न दृष्टं घृतं क्वापि ।।

One who does not know the highest bliss will say 'This is the most attractive;' he who has not seen clarified butter considers sesamum-oil a delicacy.

41. A new maxim in Anuṣṭubh.

पिधानं दुर्गतिद्वारे निधानं सर्वसंपदाम् ।
निदानं मोक्षसौख्यानां पुण्यैः सम्यक्त्वमाप्यते ।।

Through good deeds only one can achieve that which shuts the door towards the evil path, which is the seat of all prosperity and which is the cause of the bliss of liberation.

42-43. Narrative.

44. The last verse is in Anuṣṭubh; a new maxim on *dharma*.

धर्मात् संपद्यते भोगो धर्माच्च सुखसंपदः ।
धर्मात् स्वर्गापवर्गौ च धर्मः कल्पद्रुमोपमः ।।

Dharma brings happiness and wealth, and bliss of heaven and finally liberation; it is similar to the wish-fulfilling tree.

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S. VENKITASUBRAMONIA IYER

METRICAL EMINENCE OF VEDĀNTADEŚIKA'S YĀDAVĀBHYUDAYA

VEDĀNTADEŚIKA in his *Yādavābhyudaya*[1] has closely followed all the prosodiacal rules and conventions relating to Mahākāvya-s. A careful study of the work from the prosodiacal point of view reveals that he has observed the principles laid down by Kṣemendra in his *Suvṛttatilaka*, namely that in poetry metres should be chosen in keeping with the sentiment to be portrayed and the objects be described and framed in appropriate expressions.[2]

1. *General features*

An examination of the metres in the work shows the following facts:

[1] Pub. Vedanta Desika Research Society, Madras.

[2] काव्ये रसानुसारेण वर्णनानुगुणेन च ।
कुर्वीत सर्ववृत्तानां विनियोगं विभागवित् ।।
नानावृत्तविशेषास्तु कवेः शास्त्रस्य शासनात् ।
यान्ति प्रभोरिवात्यन्तमयोग्या अपि योग्यताम् ।।
तथाप्यवस्थासदृशैः साधुशब्दपदस्थिताः ।
सुवृत्तैरेव शोभन्ते प्रबन्धाः सज्जना इव ।।
(*Suvṛttatilaka*, 3. 7, 10, 12)

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1. Thirty-one metres are used, and if the different varieties of Upajāti are separately taken, the number rises to forty-four.

2. The *sargavṛtta-s* or the main metres for the cantos are ten in number, namely Anuṣṭubh for four cantos, Upajāti for eleven, and Drutavilambita, Puṣpitāgrā, Mālabhāriṇī, Rathoddhatā, Vaṃśastha, Vasantatilakā, Viyoginī and Svāgatā for one each.

3. In Upajāti, all the different combinations are represented.

4. Among *mātrāvṛtta-s* only one, namely Āryāgīti is seen.

5. Among the *akṣaravṛtta-s*, Viṣama is not represented, Ardhasama is represented by three, (Puṣpitāgrā, Mālabhāriṇī and Vīyoginī) and sama by all the rest.

6. Metres at the close of the cantos are comparatively longer. Mālinī occurs in the closing portions of 16 cantos.

7. Examples of rare metres are, Narkuṭa, Pramāṇī, Mattebha, Taralanayanā, Vidyunmālā, Samānī and Siṃhavikrīḍita.

Desika's sources

We are not in a position to say for certain what works on prosody Deśika has followed. But we may not be wrong in presuming that he was well-versed in this Śāstra and utilized all the major works in the field that had gained popularity in his time, like the *Chandaśśāstra* of Piṅgala, *Chandonuśāsana* of Hemacandra and *Vṛttaratnākara* of Kedārabhaṭṭa.

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Deśika on metrical propriety

There are veiled references in the work to the effect that metrical propriety is a factor that contributes to make a poem commendable. For instance the statement

स च वृत्तविहीनस्य न विद्यां बह्वमन्यत । **1**. 22

that Yadu did not respect learning (*vidyā*), in a person if he was not of good conduct (*vṛtta*) may be taken to indicate, by the force of the words *vidyā* and *vṛtta*, that poetic ability (*vidyā*) without proficiency in metres (*vṛtta*) does not command appreciation. This may be compared with Kṣemendra's statement

सुवृत्तैरेव शोभन्ते प्रबन्धाः सज्जना इव । (*Suvṛtta*. **3**. 12)

that poetry shines through good metres (*suvṛtta*) as good people do by right conduct (*suvṛtta*). A similar indication can be read into the verse

सत्ये! समीक्षस्व विपारिजातां
वृत्तेन हीनामिव वेदविद्याम् ।
निशामिव प्रोषितशीतभानुं
नारीमनाथामिव नाकलक्ष्मीम् ।। (**18**. 2)

Herein, the reference to Vedic knowledge devoid of proper conduct, using the words *vṛtta* and *vidyā* seems to pertain covertly to metre and poetry. Again, the verse

अवाप्य देव्यः पतिमग्र्यनायकं
महौजसं मन्मथसूत्रसंयताः ।

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उदग्रसद्वंशभवो मिथःसमाः
सुवृत्तमुक्तावलिसौम्यतां ययुः ।। (14. 77)

which speaks of the eight noble wives of Lord Kṛṣṇa being attached to him by a common bond of love, and who, living in great harmony and equality, shine like a string of pearls. This may be taken as indirectly indicating by the power of expression in it (*śabdaśakti*) like *nāyaka*, *manmathasūtra*, *sadvaṃśa* and *suvṛtta* that a composition having a noble person as hero, love as the sentiment and appropriate metres arising from the sacred *chanda-s* attains great beauty; thus as emphasizing the value of properly chosen metres. It may also be noted that the Vedic *chanda-s* like Gāyatrī (to which belongs the first classical metre Anuṣṭubh) has eight varieties, Ārṣī, Daivī, Āsurī, Prājāpatyā, Yājuṣī, Sāmnī, Ārcī and Brāhmī, and this suggests a correspondence with the number of Kṛṣṇa's wives. The last *pāda* in this verse seems to echo the last *pāda* in Kṣemendra's verse:

प्रबन्धः सुतरां भाति यथास्थानं निवेशितैः ।
निर्दोषगुणसंयुक्तैः सुवृत्तैर्मौक्तिकैरिव ।।

in *Suvṛttatilaka* (**3**. 1) and this deserves attention.

Rare metres

Let us now have a glance at the rare metres handled by Deśika.

1. *Pramāṇī-Samānī*. First there is the Pramāṇī-Samānī pair, also known as Pramāṇikā-Samānikā. This belongs to the Gāyatrī group with eight syllables

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in each *pāda*. In the first, long and short syllables alternate (∪—×4) and in the second it is in the reverse order (—∪×4). In **6**. 98 both these are illustrated.

नयानयानयानयानयानयानया ।
नयानयानयानयानयानयानयानया ।।
यानयानयानयानयानयानयान ।
यानयानयानयानयानयानयान ।।

Pramāṇī is used in four other verses also, **6**. 71-74.

2. *Taralanayanā*. In verse **6**. 36, all the 12 syllables in each foot are short.

प्रणमतमिममचलममर-
महितमहितमहितमहित ! ।
भजनमलघु विफलमिह न
सदयसदय ! सदय ! सदय ! ।।

This is not mentioned in the common works on Prosody but *Prākṛtapaiṅgala* calls it Taralanayanā. If, by the general rule that the final syllable in a *pāda* can be optionally considered long, we take the final short syllables to be long, then it can be 'Hrī' following the nomenclature of Hemacandra in the *Chando'nuśāsana*.

3. *Vidyunmālā*. In **6**. 96, in each *pāda*, there are 8 long syllables.

नानानानानानानाना

This is repeated in the other *pāda-s* and the stanza illustrates *ekākṣarabandha*. This *vṛtta* is Vidyunmālā when considered from the Akṣaravṛtta point of view,

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and Anaṅgakrīḍā when considered from the Mātrāvṛtta point of view, respectively defined as

मो मो गो गो विद्युन्माला ।

and

अष्टावर्धे गाद्यभ्यस्ता यस्याः सानङ्गक्रीडोक्ता ।

This is used in two other verses, one illustrating Sarvatobhadrabandha and the other Aṣṭadalapadmabandha (**6**. 99, 105).

4. *Narkuṭa*. The next rare metre is Narkuṭa, also called Narkuṭaka and Nardaṭaka. As in the case of Vidyunmālā this also is first used in the Citrasarga (**6**) where we get three instances (42, 43, 45) and later on in three more places (**20**. 99; **24**. 88, 89). To take one example,

इह मरुतो वहन्ति सुरसिन्धुसुगन्धसरिद्-
विकसितहेमकोकनदसौरभसारभृतः ।
मधुकरमौलिदघ्नमददन्तुरदन्तिघटा-
करटकटाहवाहिघनशीकरशीभरिताः ।। (**6**. 43)

we find the *gaṇā-s na ja bha ja ja la ga* (**6**. 43) constituting 17 syllables with pause after the eighth.

5. *Siṃhavikrīḍita*. In the verse

अथ पदविनिकीर्णमन्दारवन्दारुवृन्दारक-
स्तुतिगतबहुमानसत्यापितेहः स सत्यापतिः ।
अमरसमरवेगविख्यातदाक्ष्येण तार्क्ष्येण गां
प्रतिजिगमिषितां पुरीं त्रातुमन्वक् समन्वग्रहीत् ।।
(**17**. 134)

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We get the grouping of 18 syllables as 2 *na* + 4 *ra*. This rare metre has various names. *Vṛttaratnākara* calls it Siṃhavikrīdita. Hemacandra gives it the names Nīśā and Tāraka. Appaya Dīkṣita in his commentary on the *Yādavābhyudaya* gives an alternative name *Sudhā*. According to Piṅgala it is Nārācaka.

6. *Mattamayūra*: Mattamayūra with the gaṇa scheme *ma ta ya sa ga* is used in **10**. 119.

क्षिप्तावद्यं क्षत्रियवृत्त्या बहुशाखं
मग्नं शापोदन्वति मान्यं यदुवंशम् ।
इच्छाधीनस्वेतरधर्मः स्वमहिम्ना
रक्षागोपो रामयवीयानुदहार्षीत् ।।

7. *Mattebha*: This is another very rare metre used in **6**. 124

लोलापतच्चरणलीलाहतिक्षरितहालाहले निजफणे
नृत्यन्तमप्रतिघकृत्यं तमप्रतिममत्यन्तचारुवपुषम् ।
देवादिभिः समयसेवादरत्वरितहेवाकघोषमुखरै-
र्दृष्टावधानमथ तुष्टाव शौरिमहिरिष्टावरोधसहितः ।।

where we get the gaṇa-s *ta bha ya ja sa ra na ja*. More simply stated, its scheme is — — u — uuu × 3 plus a long syllable. We don't come across this in common treatises on Prosody. It is named Mattebha and is illustrated in the *Mandāramarandacampū*.

Metrical propriety

We may now examine the propriety observed by Vedāntadeśika in the employment of metres. As

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observed before, he has carefully followed the observations and injunctions in the *Suvṛttatilaka* in general, but has also exercised freedom in the judicious selection of metres. We may consider some examples.

1. *Anuṣṭubh.* Anuṣṭubh is the main metre in cantos **1**, **10**, **16** and **22**. Kṣemendra states about the use of this metre as follows:

पुराणप्रतिबिम्बेषु प्रसन्नोपायवर्त्मसु ।
उपदेशप्रधानेषु कुर्यात् सर्वेष्वनुष्टुभम् ।।
आरम्भे सर्गबन्धस्य कथाविस्तरसंग्रहे ।
समोपदेशवृत्तान्ते सन्तः शंसन्त्यनुष्टुभम् ।।

(*Suvṛttatilaka*, **3**. 9, 16)

that is, in works which are of the nature of Purāṇa-s, in clear exposition of policy, in didactic works, in the beginning of a Mahākāvya divided into cantos, in summarizing long stories and in imparting advice. All the above four cantos are of the nature of summaries of events, the first giving the incidents up to the Lord entering Devakī's womb, the tenth narrating the deeds of Kṛṣṇa at Mathurā, the sixteenth giving accounts of Airāvata, Garuḍa and the slaying of Narakāsura and the twenty-second narrating the Lord's Digvijaya. Each of the first three contains a *stuti* also. The whole Kāvya has as its theme the story of Kṛṣṇa as narrated in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and so it is a *kathā-vistarasaṃgraha* and *upadeśapradhāna*, and it is appropriate that the starting canto is in Anuṣṭubh. We may also remember that Anuṣṭubh is the very first classical

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metre, being the metre revealed to Ādikavi Vālmīki, and the one in which the great poet Kālidāsa begins his famous *Raghuvaṃśa*.

2. *Vaṃśastha*. Vaṃśastha is the *sargavṛtta* of **14**. Kṣemendra's remark on this metre is that it is most suitable in the depiction of the sixfold policy of state—

षाड्गुण्यप्रगुणा नीतिर्वंशस्थेन विराजते । (**3**. 18)

The canto deals with the Symantaka episode and Kṛṣṇa's marriage with Jāmbavatī and Satyabhāmā, and state policy is somewhat involved in it. There is explicit mention of *ṣaḍguṇa* and *naya* in verse 74,

स वल्लभाभिस्तिसृभिः प्रकाशयन्
परत्वमाद्यं प्रतिपन्नषड्गुणः ।
नयो महीयानिव शक्तिभिः समं
समेतसिद्धिः प्रचिकाय सम्पदम् ।।

indicating the author's awareness of the rule.

3. *Rathoddhatā*. Rathoddhatā is the principal metre in canto **17**. This is stated to be appropriate for descriptions of love-excitants such as moonrise.

रथोद्धता विभावेषु भव्या चन्द्रोदयादिषु । (**3**. 18)

A good portion of canto **17** is devoted to Kṛṣṇa's description of the beautiful Nandana garden and the attractive Pārijāta flower. The exciting nature of this garden is particularly referred to in the line

पुष्पधन्वन इवोपकारिकां प्रैक्षतोपवनसम्पदं पुरः ।

in Śloka 9, and Kṛṣṇa's deep love for Bhāmā in Śloka 11.

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दर्शयंस्तदनु रामणीयकं नन्दनस्य वसुदेवनन्दनः ।
इत्युवाच मधुरस्मितेक्षणां प्रेयसीं प्रणयपेशलाक्षरम् ।।

The charm of Bhāmā is shown by the numerous forms of address like *taralākṣi*, *snigdhakanṭhi*, *sumadhyame*, *dīrgha-locane*, *priye*, etc., and in the description of her in verse 13:

अञ्चितस्मितमकेवलेक्षणं भङ्गुरभ्रुपरिवर्तिताननम् ।

Every verse in this canto is indicative of *uddīpanatva* in general, but some are particularly so. Verse 17,

अर्दितान् मकरकेतुसायकै-
रत्र देवि ! दयितान् पदश्रितान् ।
मुद्रयन्ति चकितान् सुरस्त्रियः
पत्रभङ्गमकरैः स्तनार्पितैः ।।

describes the celestial damsels embracing their husbands, who are tormented by Cupid, and imprinting on them the fish painted on their breasts as token of having been won by him (who has the fish as his banner). Appaya Dīkṣita observes in his commentary:

अत्र मलयानिलकोकिलालापाद्युद्दीपनविभावयुक्ते ।
नम्रतामुपगतः फलैरसौ वल्गुभृङ्गविरुतैरभिष्टुवन् ।
आर्द्रभावसुभगो विभाव्यते कामकिंकर इवोचितक्रियः ।।
(verse 32)

Here the Pārijāta tree bending with fruits and humming with bees is fancied as the servant of Cupid bending with humility and speaking sweet words. Here too Appaya Dīkṣita observes:

उद्दीपनविभावत्वात् कामकिंकरत्वोत्प्रेक्षा.

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It may be noted that this description of the Nandana and the Pārijāta (12-43), is one of the best portions in the poem and the author himself calls it fine and charming poetry (*saukumārya-subhagā sarasvatī*) and claims that because of this he is the foremost among poets (verse 44).

इत्थमादिकविना समीरिता
सान्वभावि किल सत्यभामया ।
सामरस्यमिव तेन जग्मुषी
सौकुमार्यसुभगा सरस्वती ।।

although in the expressed sense here *ādikavi* refers to Lord Kṛṣṇa and *saukumāryasubhagā sarasvatī* relates to what he spoke.

4. *Vasantatilaka* is the main metre in canto 19 and is prescribed when there is an admixture of heroism and anger.

वसन्ततिलकं भाति संकरे वीररौद्रयोः । (**3**. 19)

But here Deśika does not follow Kṣemendra, but masters like Kālidāsa. The whole canto describes the waking of Lord Kṛṣṇa from sleep, and describes the dawn at great length. Kālidāsa has used this metre in the famous *prabhātavarṇana* in the fifth canto of *Raghuvaṃśa* where the bards woke up Aja by describing the dawn and its beauty. Vasantatilaka is the metre for the popular *Veṅkaṭeśasuprabhāta.*

5. *Mālinī*. Mālinī is prscribed for the close of *sarga-s*, like the *tāla* in fast tempo at the close of a musical presentation—

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कुर्यात् सर्गस्य पर्यन्ते मालिनीं द्रुततालवत् । (3. 19)

It is also pointed out that this metre becomes more beautiful with compounds in the latter half—

द्वितीयार्धे समस्ताभ्यां पादाभ्यां मालिनी वरा । (3. 22)

The ending of the śloka in visarga is also commended—

विसर्गहीनपर्यन्ता मालिनी न विराजते । (3. 23)

Deśika has used this metre in the closing part of 16 out of the 24 Sarga-s, with compound expressions in the latter half.

अथ सितरुचिलग्ने सिद्धपञ्चग्रहोच्चे
व्यजनयदनघानां वैजयन्त्यां जयन्त्याम् ।
निखिलभुवनपद्मक्लेशनिद्रापनुत्त्यै
दिनकरमनपायं देवकीपूर्वसंध्या ।। (2. 96)

The culmination in visarga is found in

अनुचरितविधिज्ञैरादृतां पूर्वपूर्वै-
र्महदिदमनपायं मङ्गलं मन्यमानाः ।
प्रचितविविधभोग्यां प्रारभन्त प्रतीतां
वलमथनसपर्यां वल्लवा नन्दमुख्याः ।। (5. 96)

and elsewhere too.

6. *Mandākrāntā.* Mandākrāntā is most suitable for the description of the pangs of separation during the rainy season—

प्रावृट्प्रवासव्यसने मन्दाक्रान्ता विराजते । (3. 21)

Our author has adopted it in 5. 95,

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अव्यासङ्गं जलधिशयनादुत्थितस्यात्मधाम्नः
पत्युः पुण्यं प्रथमनयनस्पन्दितं प्राप्तुकामा ।
नित्यापूर्वश्रुतिपरिमलं न्यस्तलीलारविन्दा
पादाम्भोजं सह वसुधया धारयामास पद्मा ।।

where Lakṣmī and Bhūmi are spoken of as eagerly awaiting the awakening of the Lord from the *yoganidrā* into which he falls in the rainy season.

7. *Śārdūlavikrīḍita.* Śārdūlavikrīḍita is particularly appropriate to praise kings and nobles—

शौर्यस्तवे नृपादीनां शार्दूलक्रीडितं मतम् । (**3**. 22)

This is used in **6**. 104.

सद्देवोऽङ्कुरयातवैभवलताशोभ्युच्चनानागमे
भव्यं कर्म सदार्चितोद्भव! नदीयादः सनाथीकृते ।
चित्राटव्यनुवाहिवातवलनश्रेयःप्रचेयोत्सवे
वेदोक्त्या समये भजेः शुचि गिरौ मेरून्नतेऽस्मिन्ध्रुवे।।

which is in praise of the mountain Govardhana, which is declared by Kṛṣṇa to be even more important than Indra, the king of gods. The grandeur of this stanza is increased by its being a *cakrabandha* with six spokes and ten concentric circular rims, the third of which from the outermost in the clockwise order gives the word *veṅkaṭanāthīyo* and the sixth similarly taken gives the word *yādavābhyudaya*, thereby incorporating in a dexterous manner the name of the poem and the name of its author.

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Moods

Some metres are used in this work for the depiction of the moods indicated by their names. Such are Praharṣiṇī, Viyoginī and Pṛthvī.

The name 'Praharṣiṇī' shows the sprightly mood. It is used in **1**. 100,

साधूनां स्वपदसरोजषट्पदानां
धर्मस्य स्थितिमनघां विधातुकामः ।
यद्गर्भो जगदखिलं स एव गर्भो
देवक्याः समजनि देवदेववन्द्यः ।।

which speaks of Lord Viṣṇu, who holds the entire universe in his belly, entering into Devakī in order to fulfil the desire of the deva-s to rid them of the oppression of Kaṃsa. The grouping of the syllables in this vṛtta is such as to create the impression of walking, running and leaping with joy successively. In **8**. 121 again

अन्यैरप्यसुरमरिम्लुचैरनेकै-
रातङ्कान् स्थिरचरसूतिभिः प्रसूतान् ।
गोपानां प्रतिविदधे गवां च काले
रामेण स्तुतचरितो रथाङ्गपाणिः ।।

the delight of the Gopa-s at Kṛṣṇa's destruction of the demons in various forms is indicated.

Viyoginī, which name signifies separation, is appropriately used in canto **9**, where the theme is the *virahāvasthā* of the Gopi-s when Kṛṣṇa was taken away by

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Akrūra to Mathurā. The metre provides ample scope for delineating the delicate feelings of the cowherdesses tormented by love.

Pṛthvī employed in the description of *pṛthvīdhara* (the Govardhana mountain) is apt. Its beauty is remarkable in

मरुद्गणसमाश्रितो मघवरत्ननीलद्युति-
विभाति वनमालया विततनित्यतुङ्गाकृतिः ।
कनत्यभिगतः श्रिया कनकरश्मिपीताम्बरः
करोति विधृतिं भुवः कथमसौ न विश्वंभरः ।।
(**6**. 41)

where it is compared to Lord Viṣṇu, and in

मनःप्रियमिह प्रभो ! मधुरसादरं सादरं
विधत्स्व हविरर्पयन् व्रतशुभावनां भावनाम् ।
कुरुष्व च गुरुष्वघक्षपणदक्षिणां दक्षिणां
प्रयच्छति तवेप्सितं प्रणयपर्वतः पर्वतः ।। (**6**. 44)

where it is extolled as worthy of worship.

In addition to these are the metres like Mattebha. It is very appropriately adopted for Kṛṣṇa's dance on Kāliya's head. Appaya Dīkṣita observes:

नृत्तानुगुणं वृत्तमवलम्ब्य वर्णयति ।

Such onomatopoeic stanzas stand out as glowing monuments of Deṣika's admirable skill.

Upajāti speciality

In the handling of all the above mentioned metres, and in many others too, Vedāntadeśika has displayed

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commendable skill in adjusting form to theme. But by far the metre in which he excels, and excels in an astounding manner, is Upajāti which combines Indravajrā and Upendravajrā. Kṣemendra prescribes it for the description of a heroine in love and in the description of the spring and other seasons—

शृङ्गारालम्बनोदारनायिकारूपवर्णनम् ।
वसन्तादि तदङ्गं च तच्छायमुपजातिभिः ।। (3. 17)

Among the cantos composed in this metre, the 12th devotes a major part to the description of Rukmiṇī with a detailed *aṅgapratyaṅga-varṇana* in a *keśādipāda*, the 5th is mainly a description of the summer, rainy and autumn seasons, and the 8th portrays the spring season and Kṛṣṇa's Rāsakrīḍā. This is in keeping with the above prescription. In Canto 18 Kṛṣṇa, while returning from Indraloka to Dvārakā riding on Garuḍa, describes to Satyabhāmā vividly all the places and things they see on the way, mountains, rivers, countries, etc. This is reminiscent of the thirteenth canto in *Raghuvaṃśa* in which Rāma makes a similar description to Sītā of all that they saw on the way from Laṅkā to Ayodhyā, seated in the aerial car, and which is couched in the same metre. The rest of the cantos can be seen to be either fine descriptions as of the sunset and moonrise in **2**, the construction and appearance of Dvārakā in **11** and the marriage of Rukmiṇī in **12**, or of succinct but attractive narrations as of the Kāliya episode in **4**, the Govardhana episode in **7** and the encounter with Bāṇāsura in **20**. In these, obviously, the author has

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used his own discretion and we find it used in an agreeable way.

With regard to Upajāti, Piṅgala gives sixteen varieties each with a distinct name like Ārdrā, Ṛddhi, Kīrti, etc., based on the possible types of combination between Indravajrā and Upendravajrā. Our author has handled all these types, and most of them in abundant measure. But the lion's share among them is for the type Haṃsī in which Upendravajrā and Indravajrā alternate and thus present the symmetry of an Ardhasamavṛtta. The commencement of this type in short syllable is in keeping with Kṣemendra's observation—

उपजातिविकल्पानां सिद्धो यद्यपि संकरः ।
तथापि प्रथमं कुर्यात् पूर्वपादाक्षरं लघु ।। (2. 6)

The Bhadrā type, with the reverse order, although equally symmetrical, has very few representatives. In fact, in this poem the verses belonging to the types beginning with long syllables are comparatively much less in number.

Deśika has handled Upajāti with great dexterity and unfailing effect. This metre seems to be his forte. Many great poets are associated with particular metres, as for instance, Kālidāsa with Mandākrāntā, Bhāravi with Vaṃśastha, Ratnākara with Vasantatilaka, Bhavabhūti with Śikhariṇī and Vidyādhara with Anuṣṭubh, as pointed out by Kṣemendra, in view of the unique charm of the verses of these poets in the respective metres. To this category we may add our

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author for his unparalleled proficiency in delightful compositions in Upajāti, and call him 'Upajāti-Vedāntadeśika', or 'Haṃsī-deśika' in view of his predilection for this particular variety and the wonderful skill he has displayed in its handling.

In conclusion, we may state that Vedāntadeśika follows the prescriptions of renowned prosodists, but also respects tradition and follows the great masters on the practical side. He exercises enough freedom in the choice of metres and selects what commends itself to him as most suitable for the particular situation in the poem. Consonance with context, evenness of rhythms, charm of cadence and richness of variety are the factors that seem to have weighed with him in adopting the metres in this magnificent work.

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E. R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA

SPHOṬA AND ŚAṂKARA

A few years ago during a session of the Sequence Seminar on Advaita and Nyāya held under the auspices of the Philosophy Department, University of Poona, a question was raised as to why Śaṃkara refuted the Sphoṭa theory. I thought Śaṃkara never refuted the Sphoṭa and expressed my view. But most of the scholars and Professors of Philosophy present there did not agree with me and thought that Śaṃkara refuted the sphoṭa which was against his Sat-cid-ānanda Brahman. I was not convinced. Subsequently I examined the statements made by Śaṃkara as well as his commentators and also the views of the modern scholars on the problem. I do not find it necessary to hold a view different from what I expressed in the Seminar. Why? That is the subject of this paper.

Śaṃkara refers to the Sphoṭa theory only once in his entire writings. It is when he comments on the Devatādhikaraṇa (Chapter I, Pāda 3, Sūtra 28) of the *Brahmasūtra-s*. The topic discussed in this context is that since the deities are born out of Vedic Śabda, they are eternal (*nitya*). Here Śaṃkara raises the question what is the nature of this *śabda* which is eternal and gives birth to the deities who are eternal. First he

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refers to the view that it is Sphoṭa (*sphoṭam ityāha*). He elucidates the concept of Sphoṭa and the necessity for recognizing such an entity apart from the syllables which are perceived by the auditory sense. The arguments are similar to those implied in the *Śabarabhāṣya* on the *Jaiminīyasūtra-s* and discussed in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana. After elucidating the Sphoṭa theory and concluding that since *śabda* which is Sphoṭa is eternal, the deities merging out of it are also eternal, Śaṃkara states that the Venerable Upavarṣa holds that the syllables alone are *śabda* (*varṇā eva tu śabda iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ*). There is no need for assuming something apart from the audible syllables in order to explain reasonably the experience of communication through language. Here he gives the counter arguments to the Sphoṭa theory which are similar to those found again in the *Śabarabhāṣya*. Then he concludes that there is nothing unreasonable (*aviruddha*) in maintaining the syllables which are eternal as the Śabda from which the deities are originated.

It is to be noted here that Śaṃkara does not speak anything against Sphoṭa or Varṇa theories of Śabda. He only shows that there are two theories on Śabda, the *Sphoṭa* theory and the *Varṇa* theory, both holding *Śabda* eternal. There is no necessity for Śaṃkara here to refute the Sphoṭa theory; and those who have studied Śaṃkara carefully will admit that Śaṃkara is not a thinker who would refute or approve a theory for its own sake, unless it goes against or supports his own position.

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Now we shall see what the commentators on Śaṃkara thought about the position of Śaṃkara. Vācaspatimiśra maintains the Sphoṭa theory as *Pūrva-pakṣa* and *Varṇa* theory as Siddhānta. Vācaspati's opposition to Sphoṭa is well explained in his *Nyāya-bindu*. But commenting on the so-called *Vyāsabhāsya* on the *Yogasūtra-s*, Vācaspati Miśra argues for accepting the theory of *vācakaśabda* as against the *Varṇaśabda* of the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Although the *Vyāsabhāsya* does not mention the word *sphoṭa*, Vācaspati specifically states that it is nothing but the Sphoṭa theory. Citsukha in his *Bhāsya-bhāva-prakāśikā* qualifies the Sphoṭa theory as *ācāryadeśīya-mata*, but introducing the Varṇa theory he states: *tad etat svamatam upapādayannapākaroti* (This is refuted hereunder advancing reasonable arguments in favour of his own theory). The *Vārttikakāra*, Nārāyaṇendra Sarasvatī, makes it clear that the Sphoṭa theory is according to Patañjali and is not the view of the Vedāntin.

पतञ्जलिमतानुसारी समाधत्ते–स्फोटमित्याहेति। आहेति परोक्तिकथनार्थम्, नास्माभिरुच्यत इत्यभिप्रायः।

Here he reads the non-acceptance of this theory by Śaṃkara by the force of the word *āha*. Further he discovers a suggestion that the Varṇa theory is acceptable to the Siddhāntin because it is held by the Venerable (Bhagavān) Upavarṣa. *Ratna-prabhā* supports the view that *Varṇa* theory is the *siddhānta*. The *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* states that the Sphoṭa theory is of the Grammarian and the Varṇa theory which is the *siddhānta* is according to the tradition of the ācārya-s:

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(वैयाकरण आह–स्फोटमिति। आचार्यसंप्रदायमुपादाय सिद्धान्तमाह–वर्णा एव त्विति)

Amalānanda, the author of the *Kalpataru*, however, cautions the readers that they should not mistake the Sphoṭa theory as Pūrvapakṣa and the *Varṇa* theory as *Siddhānta*, since taking such a view has no relevance to the context. What is challenged here is that the deities cannot be born out of either *Sphoṭa* or *Varṇa*. Appaya Dīkṣita explains this saying that the problem posed here is not connected with the nature of *śabda*, as otherwise the Sphoṭa theorist has to explain how the deities are born out of Sphoṭa and the Varṇa theorist the same out of *Varṇa*. However, the same Appaya Dīkṣita has used a considerable amount of his energy in refuting the *Sphoṭa* theory and upholding the *Varṇa* theory in the same context in his *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi*.

Coming to the modern scholars, Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri's remarks deserve our attention. He says in his introduction to the *Brahmasiddhi* (p. xxvi) 'But Śaṃkara completely differs from Maṇḍana in this respect and criticizes and entirely discards the Sphoṭa doctrine of Bhartṛhari'.

In *A B O R I* (Vol. LVI, 1975, pp. 67-76) there is an article entitled 'Śaṃkara's objection to the Sphoṭavāda' written by Kenneth H. Post. Here the author elucidates how Śaṃkara refutes Sphoṭa in the *Devatādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya*. He obviously takes for granted that there is a refutation of Sphoṭa and explains the

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arguments. There is no reason to accept his fundamental point that Śaṃkara refutes Sphoṭa in the context. But his statement, 'Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Sphoṭa-siddhi* defends sphoṭavāda from Kumārila and Śaṃkara' has to be substantiated by proving that Maṇḍana came after Śaṃkara. So far no scholar has shown convincing arguments to fix the relative chronology of Śaṃkara and Maṇḍana.

Among the traditional scholars, I have found atleast one pandit, Peri Suryanarayana Sastri, a great exponent of Vyākaraṇa and an erudite scholar of Advaita Vedānta holding the view that refutation of *Sphoṭa* is not the intention of Śaṃkara in the context of *Devatādhikaraṇa*.

Why do the commentators, excepting a few like Amalānanda, hold that Śaṃkara refutes the Sphoṭa theory as a Pūrvapakṣa in the Devatādhikaraṇa? I can imagine only one answer. They are obsessed by the stand of the later Advaitin-s that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā theories hold good for explaining all phenomena in the empirical sphere (व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः). But Śaṃkara never says so. He is not at all concerned with what others say on a topic in order to find support for himself. He relies on the Upaniṣadic passages, reasoning and experience. Modern scholars are led by later Advaitin-s and make such statements without considering how a refutation of Sphoṭa helps Śaṃkara to explain his view, in the context, and what Śaṃkara has to do with a linguistic concept in propounding the Advaita Vedānta.

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Therefore we come to the conclusion that:

(1) In the Devatādhikaraṇabhāṣya, Śaṃkara is stating two theories regarding Śabda, both holding Śabda as eternal.

(2) In either theory, the deities who are born out of eternal Śabda can be held as eternal.

(3) Sphoṭa is a linguistic theory; it has nothing to do with *mokṣa* or the deities.

(4) Śaṃkara will be the last man to enter into an argument which is not concerned with his views on truth and reality.

(5) There is no warrant to hold that Śaṃkara totally discards the Sphoṭa theory in the context.

(6) The views of the commentators and modern scholars are vitiated by the later dictum *Vyavahāre Bhāṭṭanayaḥ* which they take for granted whenever they write on Advaita Vedānta.

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A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER

THE LOGIC OF NIVṚTTI IN ADVAITA

THE aim of this paper is to examine briefly how far the concept of *nivṛtti* or cessation from activity, culminating in the celebrated repudiation of *jñānakarmasamuccaya* by Śaṃkara, is integral to Advaitic metaphysics. It is suggested that it is not due to any kink of Śaṃkara's mind that he has fought against and rejected the arguments in favour of *samuccaya*, establishing, in its stead, the doctrine that perfection in spiritual life is the fruit of exclusive Self-knowledge.[1] The logic of facts, as Advaita perceives them, left him with no option.

That the term *nivṛtti* had acquired a halo is clear from the reference Manu has made to it in the last chapter of his *Smṛti*.[2] In contrast to *pravṛttaṃ karma* whose spring is desire for fruit, either in this world or the worlds to come, and which is aimed at prosperity, *sukhamābhyudayikam*, *nivṛttaṃ karma* is rooted in an attitude of aversion to the empirical world, characterized by desirelessness and inspired by knowledge or *jñāna*. The term *nivṛttaṃ* draws attention to the fact that this type of activity leads the agent away from the empirical

[1] *BGB*, **18.** 66 *ātmajñānasya tu kevalasya niḥśreyasahetutvam.*
[2] *MS*, **12.** 88, 89.

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state that includes life in heaven, whereas the *pravṛttaṃ karma* only maintains or prolongs the empirical state.[1] It is well known that this ideal of action constitutes one of the main strands of the rich texture of thought enshrined in the *Gītā;* but then it marks only one, and by no means the final, step on the long[2] path leading to perfection in spiritual life. Śaṃkara's firm position is that man being essentially Self, *ātman*, which is identical with Brahman, the seat of all values,[3] perfection is only a matter of insight, recovery, and conscious possession rather than an effectuation, construction, or gift from on High. On the Upaniṣadic principle *nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena*,[4] Karma can have, at best, a preparatory role in a necessary process of purification of the mind, the instrument of insight; by itself it cannot deliver the goods. The decisive step which makes the all-important difference between the darkness of bondage and the light of freedom is Self-knowledge or *ātma-sākṣātkāra*. Let us briefly examine how the Advaitin establishes this position in the light of the Upaniṣad-s and the *Gītā*.

[1] Kullūka on **12.** 89, *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaphalakāmanārahitaṃ brahmajñānābhyāsapūrvakaṃ saṃsāranivṛttihetutvānnivṛttam ity ucyate*. Hiriyanna in a paper entitled 'A neglected ideal of life', reproduced in *The Quest after Perfection*, Mysore, 1950, draws attention to a different passage, *MS.* **5**. 56, which is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the problem dealt with in this paper.

[2] *BG*, **7.** 19, *bahūnāṃ janmanām ante jñānavān māṃ prapadyate.*

[3] Vide 'Brahman as Value', A. G. K. Warrier, ALB Jubilee Volume, 1961.

[4] *MU*, **1.** 2. 12: The eternal is not (won) through action.

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Being an objective idealist, Śaṃkara recognizes that *adhikārin-s* or eligible candidates for perfection are few and far between.[1] What is the attitude, the psychological make-up, characterizing the *mumukṣu* or the seeker after perfection? In the language of the *BU* his mind is seized by an unquenchable thirst after Truth, Light and Immortality.[2] On the basis of this yearning and the qualities listed, later, in the same text,[3] has been fashioned the concept of the *sādhana-catuṣṭayasaṃpatti*,[4] the *sine qua non* of meaningful spiritual life. In contrast to the many who, 'abiding in the gloom of nescience, self-wise but deluded, are like the blind led by the blind',[5] stands out the rare candidate for total freedom[6] who, with introverted gaze, looks within to glimpse his inner Self, the *pratyagātmā*. He looks within, for unlike the many who are carried away by the bewitchments of the senses, he is convinced that while the world is fleeting, a vision of its eternal Maker, the Creator, is best had in his own depths where He abides as his 'inner Ruler, immortal'.[7] Far from seeking an idle excuse in the plea that no man has seen God at any time,[8] he feels emboldened by the hope voiced in the resounding phrase *viśve amṛtasya putrāḥ*,[9] and the claim *vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam*.[10] There is no question of its ideal being any lower than

[1] *KU*, 4. 1; *BG*, 7. 3.
[2] *BU*, 1. 3. 27.
[3] ibid., 4. 4. 23.
[4] *BSB*, 1. 1. 1.
[5] *MU*, 1. 2. 8.
[6] *KU*, 4. 1.
[7] *BU*, 3. 7. 3.
[8] St. John, 1. 18.
[9] *ŚU*, 2. 5.
[10] ibid., 3. 8.

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the very highest; he must become perfect while still living in the body; he must realize the ideal of *jīvanmukti*.

The living hope of immortality, which all spiritually sensitive souls must entertain, finds practical expression in the ideal of Karmayoga that the *BG* teaches. Its heart is desireless action or *niṣkāmakarma*.[1] Karmayoga is the discipline that takes advantage of man's inherent need to act, disciplining the active impulses by directing them to his higher Self or Spirit and curing them of their craving for immediate reward. Not only is this latter, or fruits of actions, ephemeral and unworthy of solicitude; also, strengthening the case for their rejection, is the Karmayogin's perception that, being the *ātman* or seat of all values, he does not, in truth, need them at all.[2] That Reality, instrumentality to which makes things dear, must itself be the quintessence of all values is eloquently set forth in the phrase, *saccidānanda* denoting, at once, Self and God. Karmayoga argues that if the agent's Self is value, is the infinite God Himself, desire for the ephemeral fruits of actions is easily eschewed.

'You have been called upon to act and not to enjoy the fruits of your actions'[3]—for it is you, your Self, that is the source of all values; why should the infinite crave for the finite? Besides, in truth, man is not even the free agent of actions, but just the instrument of God who, as the Master of Prakṛti or Māyā, gets

[1] *MS*, **12**. 89 and Kullūka's comment on it.
[2] cf. *BU*, **2**. 4. 5, *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyaṃ bhavati*.
[3] *BG*, **2**. 47, *karmaṇy evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana*.

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them all executed through her constituents.[1] This vital point is too often woefully missed. Radhakrishnan, for instance, writes as though the ego-soul may, in certain circumstances, act freely.[2] Aurobindo Ghose clearly recognizes[3] that man is never a free agent, while Śaṃkara radically traces the whole tragedy of life to the superimposition of agency on the Self by egoistic man.[4] Only in the light of Śaṃkara's analysis of *adhyāsa*[5] can one make any sense of the paradox formulated by the *Gītā* in **4**. 18: He alone is integrated, wise, and the performer of all works who sees inaction in action and action in inaction. How can liberation from evil follow except in the way elucidated by Śaṃkara?[6]

That Śaṃkara's elucidation conforms to the *Gītā's* philosophy of action according to which the Self of man is no agent and ascription of agency to the Self is the root of all evil may be seen from its exhortations such as *naiva kiṃcit karomīti . . . manyeta tattvavit;*

[1] *BG*, **3**. 27; **11**. 33.

[2] *The Bhagavad Gītā*, Introductory Essay, p. 56, 4th Reprint, Blackie & Son (India) Ltd., 1976.

[3] *Essays on the Gītā*, p. 166, New York, 1950.

[4] *BSB*, **2**. 3. 40, *yathā ca takṣobhayathā;* cf. *The Gospel*, p. 328, 'Those who have realized God are aware that free will is a mere appearance. In reality man is the machine and God its Operator.'

[5] *BSB*, **1**. 1. 1.

[6] Rāmānuja arbitrarily equates *akarma* with knowledge of the self and takes this verse to refer to one 'who sees self-knowledge in action and semblance of action in self-knowledge'. This exercise has no relevance to freedom from evil referred to in *BG*, **4**. 16; yet Zaehner warmly applauds Rāmānuja!

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nistraiguṇyo bhava . . .; *naiva kurvan na kārayan*; *tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate*,[1] etc.; and, above all, from **18**. 66 where *dharma* includes *adharma*, as Śaṃkara has pointed out. Neither Radhakrishnan nor Das Gupta has cared to examine his arguments in their organic relation to the verses referred to above.

Once it is seen that *nivṛtti*, cessation from the activities falsely ascribed to the *ātman*, is what logic demands as first step towards Self-recovery, the Upaniṣadic exhortations[2] to renounce desire for children, wealth and fame and embrace the life of mendicancy fall into their proper place; Karmayoga is seen, then, as signifying the performance of *svadharma* without desire for fruits or with the dedication of fruits to God. Thus is affirmed, in practice, Self's status as the abode of all values. Far more, however, is necessary to reach the final goal affirmed in the *TU* in the words, *brahmavid āpnoti param*.[3] This next step *BG* indicates as the Bhaktiyoga of which the Dhyānayoga or quiet meditation is the heart. This, too, is an integral part of Advaita as Śaṃkara has clarified in *BSB*, especially in his comments on the *BS*, **2**. 3. 41 and **3**. 2. 5—*sūtra-s*[4] and comments virtually ignored by writers on Advaita.

[1] *BG*, **5**. 8; **2**. 45; **5**. 13; **3**. 17.
[2] *BU*, **3**. 5. 1.
[3] *TU*, **2**. 1.
[4] 'But from the highest (Lord) there result *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa*. . .'; 'But by the meditation on the highest Lord that which is hidden (identity with the Lord becomes manifest); for from Him are the soul's bondage and release.'

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Despite his metaphysical status as Brahman, man feels himself to be a finite being in his empirical life, emancipation from which is sought through *nivṛtti* whose positive side is the reaffirmation of this very metaphysical status which Śaṃkara describes as *vāṅmanasātītam aviṣayāntaḥpāti pratyagātmabhūtaṃ nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaṃ brahma*.[1] Formal renunciation of acts is an indispensable preparation for an intensive pursuit of the spiritual vocation consisting of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, when the seeker is a *vividiṣu*; it implies exclusive dedication to such pursuit when the candidate is a *vidvān* like Yājñavalkya in the *BU*.[2] Significant in this context are the Upaniṣadic observations: *tam eva dhīro vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*; *ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād . . . kiṃicchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusaṃjvaret*?[3] To the exclusion of all other interests and pursuits, the *mumukṣu* is bidden to apply himself, with the integrated powers of feelings, thoughts and actions, to the conquest of the realm of the Spirit which is at once the Absolute and God, the Transcendent and the Immanent. The logic implicit in this demand is of course based on the perception that the unaided efforts of the seeker cannot ensure success. While he has to make an all-out effort through the purification of his desire-ridden mind to become worthy of the vision of God, the actual

[1] *BSB*, **3**. 2. 22, Brahman beyond words and thoughts; non-objective, (one's own) Self whose nature is eternally pure, awake and free.

[2] Vide *JMV*, pp. 3, 4; ALB, vol. 41, 1977.

[3] *BU*, **4**. 4. 12, 21.

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consummation is felt to be a gift from on High, a matter of grace.[1] It is this view of the matter that has found its final formulation in the crowning counsel of the *Gītā*,[2] whence later theorists and devotees evolved the theory of the *mārjārakiśoranyāya* and that of the *markaṭa-kiśoranyāya*.[3]

In contrast to this typical approach of the devout temperament to the problem of securing integral experience is the *jñānayogin's* method of eradicating from his heart all desires contrary to and other than those relating to the non-dual Spirit. His main inspiration is drawn from the *BU*, **4**. 4. 7; **4**. 4. 12:

> *yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye 'sya hṛdi sthitāḥ,*
> *atha martyo 'mṛto bhavati atra brahma samaśnute.*

This process of stern repudiation of all that is irrelevant to spiritual illumination is what is enjoined in the celebrated words *neti, neti*; nothing alien, merely objective, shall impede the search for the truth of the Self. This process resembles the ascent on a ladder of values involving the rejection of all lesser ones in order to reach 'the root and crown of the world'.[4]

[1] cf. *KU*, **2**. 23; *MU*, **3**. 2. 3.

[2] *BG*, **18**. 66.

[3] The two *nyāya-s* or approaches are based, respectively, on the kitten's total dependence on the mother cat which carries it from place to place, and the baby-monkey's clinging to its mother while being transported by her. The first symbolizes the devotee who trusts and surrenders to God absolutely; the second, the devotee who must strive a little, himself.

[4] *KU*, **6**. 12; *BG*, **15**. 1.

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Jñānayoga is apt to view the countless non-selves, items of the objective sphere, as veritable zeros when divorced from the One that precedes, supports, and fills them all with whatever values they are felt to own, and gladly rejects them whenever a choice has to be made.[1]

The crucial act of repudiation of the world of objects demands an explanation, especially in view of the Upaniṣadic affirmation, *sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahma*,[2] where *idam*, of course, points to the objective sphere. Extremely relevant is Ānanda Giri's note that here is a case of *bādhāyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*,[3] apposition in the light of repudiation. What was mistaken for the real stands annulled, sublated, when its ground, on which it was superimposed, is directly perceived, just as the rope-snake is sublated when the rope, its real ground, is directly experienced, as such.

Here again the Advaitin clearly sees that the function of the grace of God is decisive; he insists that God is fully represented by the Teacher or the *ācārya* who is *śrotriya*, and *brahmaniṣṭha*, whose example and guidance dramatize the mysterious operation of that grace.[4] The *sādhaka* is inspired by the direction that he should set aside the vanity of knowledge, and become child-like,[5] guileless, to become a fit recipient of grace

[1] *BG*, **9**. 22. [2] *CU*, **3**. 14. 1.

[3] *GKB* with Ānanda Giri's gloss, p. 10, Anandasrama ed. 1936.

[4] *CU*, **6**. 14. 1; *MU*, **1**. 2. 12.

[5] *BU*, **3**. 5. 1 *pāṇḍityaṃ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset.*

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so that, like a light lit in the darkness of ages, the fulness of *brahmasākṣātkāra* may dispel his nescience for ever, and he may find himself in conscious possession of infinitude.[1]

Śaṃkara has explained in a passage seldom noticed just what happens when the qualified Teacher imparts 'the liberating' knowledge of *tat tvam asi*[2] to the integrated recipient.[2] 'What is the content of this perfection or *niṣṭhā* like? It is like *ātmajñāna*. What is this latter like? It is like the Self or *ātman*. The nature of the Self has already been set out in the *Gītā* and the Upaniṣad-s in the light of reason. Now, knowledge conforms to its object, but the *ātman* is formless. How then can there be a knowledge of the *ātman*? The import of the passages describing the Self as "sun-bright" (*ŚU*, 3. 8), "luminous" (*CU*, 3. 14. 1), etc. is only that it is not a mere negation like darkness. It is formless or extremely subtle, *aṇor aṇīyān*—subtler than the intellect, mind, senses and body. These latter live and operate due to pervasion by the Self. Therefore there is no need to engender knowledge of the Self, the very source of the light of Intelligence. Self-knowledge is not the knowledge of the Self; it is the eternal knowledge that *is* the Self.[3] All that Self-knowledge or *Brahmajñāna* calls for is the repudiation of the objective world, superimposed on It.'[4] It is freely

[1] *MU*, 3. 2. 9.

[2] *CU*, 6. 8; *BGB*, 18. 17.

[3] *BUB*, 3. 4. 2.

[4] *BV*, 1. 183: *tattvamasyādivākyotthasamyagdhījanmamātrataḥ /*
avidyā sahakāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati //

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admitted—indeed it is the recognized doctrine—that the repudiation becomes effective through the grace of God.[1]

The proof of the pudding is, of course, in the eating. The final court of appeal in the matter of *nivṛtti*, too, is furnished by the facts of spiritual experience authentically realized. Under the headings of the *sthitaprajña*, *guṇātīta*, and *akṣaropāsaka*, *BG* supplies the classical record of such experiences. They may be taken as word-pictures of *jīvanmukta-s*, ' God in the guise of men ', who are liberated in embodiment, triumphant examples of *nivṛtti*. Their state has been styled *brāhmī sthiti*.[2] Undisturbed by the slightest breath of worldly desire,[3] or intellectual doubts,[4] free from pains and pleasures,[5] they are the living Witnesses to the sole reality of the Spirit. The sphere of eternal awareness in which the liberated man lives and moves and has his being is of course a kind of night to the worldlings.[6] Having no private will of his own, no egoism, it would be an error to ascribe any sort of activities to the liberated man. Śaṃkara rightly declares: The actions of the *mukta-s* and of those who, like Śrī Kṛṣṇa, are born with full enlightenment, are not egoistic and so are not, properly, actions at all.[7] Of the two kinds of *dharma-s* laid down by the

[1] *BSB*, **2**. 3. 40; **3**. 2. 5—vide note 4. p. 234 above. Above all *BG*, **18**. 66, *ahaṃ tvā sarvapāpebhyo mokṣayiṣyāmi mā śucaḥ*.

[2] *BG*, **2**. 71. [3] *BG*, **6**. 18, 19.

[4] *MU*, **2**. 2. 8. [5] *BG*, **6**. 21-23. [6] *BG*, **2**. 69.

[7] *BGB*, **2**. 11: *yasya jñānam utpannaṃ paramārthaviṣayaṃ . . . tasya karmaṇi pravṛttasya yadpravṛttirūpaṃ dṛśyate na tat karma . . . ahaṃkārābhāvasya tulyatvād viduṣaḥ*.

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Veda-s, *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*, pointing to the entangling and liberating processes of life, the latter entails renunciation of egoistic actions, systematic cultivation of *sattva*, and the ultimate achievement of Self-abidance to which Patañjali refers in the aphorism *tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe-'vasthānam*.[1] In the words of *ŚU*, it may be concluded, *nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya*.[2]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALB	—	Adyar Library Bulletin
BG	—	The Bhagavad Gītā
BGB	—	Śaṃkara's Commentary on *BG*
BS	—	Brahmasūtra-s
BSB	—	Śaṃkara's Commentary on *BS*
BU	—	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
BUB	—	Śaṃkara's Commentary on *BU*
BV	—	Sureśvara's Vārttika-s on *BUB*
CU	—	Chāndogyopaniṣad
GKB	—	Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya by Śaṃkara
The Gospel	—	The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, Mylapore, Madras, 1976
JMV	—	Jīvanmuktiviveka
KU	—	Kaṭhopaniṣad
MS	—	Manusmṛti
MU	—	Muṇḍakopaniṣad
ŚU	—	Śvetāśvataropaniṣad
TU	—	Taittirīyopaniṣad
YS	—	Yogasūtra-s

[1] *YS*, **1**. 3.

[2] *ŚU*, **3**. 8; **6**. 16.

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*MADHAV M. DESHPANDE**

ANNOUNCING A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE *ŚAUNAKĪYĀ CATURĀDHYĀYIKĀ* [alias WHITNEY'S *ATHARVA-VEDA PRĀTIŚĀKHYA*]

1. Whitney published the first edition of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā* in the Journal of the American Oriental Society in 1862. His edition is based exclusively on a single manuscript of this text which he found in Berlin. Whitney fully realized that this manuscript (Chambers 143) was in bad shape, and attempted to find more manuscripts in the libraries in Europe and in India. Having failed in his search, and having realized the importance of this text for the study of the *Atharvaveda*, which he and Roth had edited and published from Berlin in 1856, Whitney decided to edit and publish this text. He himself admits in the introduction to his edition:[1]

* I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies of the University of Michigan, and to the Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan for supporting my research which has led to this paper. I am also deeply grateful to all the manuscript libraries and to numerous individuals who helped me acquire this manuscript material.

[1] Whitney (1862: iv).

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> Most unfortunately, considering the extreme rarity of the work, the manuscript is a very poor one. Not only is it everywhere excessively incorrect, often beyond the possibility of successful emendation; it is also defective, exhibiting lacunae at several points. Some may be of opinion, then, that the publication of the Prātiśākhya upon its authority alone is premature, and should not have been undertaken.

Emphasizing the 'faintness of the hope that additional manuscripts would later be obtainable'[1] and 'the peculiar interest of this class of works',[2] Whitney published his edition in 1862, with a translation and notes based on the commentary in the Berlin manuscript. From this poor manuscript, Whitney could only salvage the text of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*. He used the commentary therein, but was not able to publish it. Considering the odds against Whitney, one must admit that he did a masterly edition which has been widely used by scholars since its publication.

2. The Berlin manuscript did not call the text by the title of *Atharvaveda Prātiśākhya*, but Whitney argued:[3]

> The treatise was first brought to light, and its character determined, by Roth. It was recognized by him as being what is indicated by our title, a Prātiśākhya to a text of the *Atharvaveda*. That it has any inherent right to be called *the* Prātiśākhya

[1] ibid. [2] ibid. [3] ibid., p. iii.

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to *the Atharvaveda* is not, of course, claimed for it; but, considering the extreme improbability that any other like phonetic treatise, belonging to any of the other schools of that Veda, will ever be brought to light, the title of *Atharvaveda Prātiśākhya* finds a sufficient justification in its convenience, and in its analogy with the names given to the other kindred treatises by their respective editors.

Whitney's text has been widely used under the name of the *Atharvaveda-Prātiśākhya*.

3. In 1923, Vishva Bandhu Shastri published a different treatise from Lahore under the name *Atharva-Prātiśākhya*.[1] This edition is based on six different manuscripts. Referring to Whitney's earlier statements, Vishva Bandhu Shastri pointed out that many new manuscripts of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā* had also been found and preserved and that " a new and revised edition of the *Caturādhyāyikā* has thus become a matter of necessity ".[2]

In 1937, Surya Kanta Shastri prepared a critical edition of this other *Atharvaveda-Prātiśākhya* for his Ph.D. at Oxford, and this text was published from Lahore in 1939.[3] This text includes Vishva Bandhu's text as one of the versions, and is most obviously different from the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*. In fact, several manuscripts which contain this *Atharvaveda-Prātiśākhya* also contain the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*.

[1] V. B. Shastri (1923). [2] ibid., p. 12.
[3] S. K. Shastri (1939).

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The existence of these other manuscripts of the *Caturādhyāyikā* was thus known to the world of scholarship from the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1937, the curator of the Scindia Oriental Institute, Ujjain, Sadashiv L. Katre discovered a manuscript titled *Kautsa-Vyākaraṇa*, which is identical with the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*, and he published a detailed notice of this manuscript and its comparison with Whitney's text.[1] However, Katre does not show any awareness of the existence of other manuscripts of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā* which were noticed by Vishva Bandhu Shastri and Surya Kanta Shastri.

I myself located four more manuscripts of this text. The library of the Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, Poona, has three manuscripts of this text, two of which bear the title *Kautsa-Vyākaraṇa*. These two manuscripts also contain commentaries on this text by Bhārgava Bhāskara and Kṛṣṇadāsa, and in an article published in 1976, I have discussed some points connected with these manuscripts.[2] In the course of my personal search for more manuscripts of this text at Banaras in December, 1979, I located a manuscript of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā* with a Maharashtrian Atharvaveda pundit, Narayan Shastri Ratate, and with his kind permission was able to obtain a xerox copy of the same. Another very significant discovery is that of a manuscript at the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, which contains the same commentary as in the Berlin manuscript used by

[1] S. L. Katre (1938-39). [2] Madhav Deshpande (1976).

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Whitney, and, though incomplete, is in a much better shape. This will allow me in the course of time to publish the text of this commentary also.

4. During my research visits to India in the summer of 1974 (supported by an Office of Education Grant through the Centre of South and South East Asian Studies at the University of Michigan) and in the summer of 1976 and the fall of 1979 (supported by the Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan), I was able to put together and analyze all the available manuscripts of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*, and I am happy to report that a critical edition of this very important text will finally be published within the next few years, along with the text of three commentaries. Below I will briefly describe the available manuscripts:

A *Caturādhyāyikā*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, No. 1/1873-74. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 12-21, 10″ × 5 1/2″. From Bikaner. ± 1700 A.D.

B *Caturādhyāyikā*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, No. 179/1880-81. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 57-66, 9 1/2″ × 4″. From Anahilapurapattana. A.D. 1659

C *Caturādhyāyikā*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, No. 2/1884-86. Devanagari. Incomplete. Folios: 1-8, 9 3/8″ × 4 1/4″. From Anahilapurapattana. ± A.D. 1700

D *Caturādhyāyikā*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, Nos: 178 (vii)/1880-81 and 87/1880-81. Devanagari. Incomplete. Folios: 58-69, Folio 63b missing, 10 1/2″ × 4 3/4″. From Anahilapurapattana. A.D. 1695

E *Caturādhyāyikā*. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, No. 11/1870-71. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 1-13, 8 1/2″ × 4 1/2″. From Kaṇvālaya. A.D. 1660

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F *Caturadhyāyī-Vyākaraṇa.* Gore Collection, Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍaḷa, Poona, No. 4177. Devanagari. Complete. Folios 1-12, 9 1/2″ × 4 1/2″. From Mahuli near Satara. A.D. 1819

G *Kautsa-Vyākaraṇasya Caturādhyāyātmakasya Bhārgava-Bhāskarīya-Vṛttiḥ.* Gore Collection, Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, Poona, No. 4178. Devanagari. Incomplete. Folios: 1-24, 7.9″ × 4.2″. From Sangli, Maharashtra. ± A.D. 1700

H *Caturadhyāyībhāṣya.* Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. Chambers 143. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 1-77, 8 1/4″ × 3 3/4″. Origin: Unknown. A.D. 1656

I *Kautsa-Vyākaraṇa.* Oriental Institute, Ujjain, No. 3576. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 1-12, 11 1/4″ × 6″. From the Garde family in Gwalior. ± A.D. 1700

J *Caturādhyāyikā.* Personal property of Pt. Narayan Shastri Ratate, Durga Ghat, Banaras. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 1-5, 11″ × 5″. From Banaras. ± A.D. 1700

K *Kautsa-Vyākaraṇe Pañcasandhiḥ.* With a commentary by Kṛṣṇadāsa. Gore Collection, Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, Poona, No. 4179. Devanagari. Incomplete. Folios: 1-36, 7 4/5″ × 4 1/5″. Somewhere in North India. 1862 A.D.

L *Caturādhyāyikā.* Tübingen University Library, Germany. An incomplete transcript of a Bikaner manuscript made by Roth. The original has not yet been located.

M *Caturādhyāyī.* Asiatic Society, Calcutta, No. 7852. Devanagari. Complete. Folios: 35b-43b, 4 1/4″ × 9 1/2″. Origin: Unknown. A.D. 1613


N *Caturādhyāyī-bhāṣya.* Asiatic Society, Calcutta, No. 1272. Devanagari. Incomplete. Folios: 1-61a, 63b-64a, 101, 8 3/4″ × 4 1/4″. Origin: Unknown. A.D. 1624

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5. Based on the collation of all these manuscripts, I have come up with the following geneology:

RECONSTRUCTED ORIGINAL



The final version of this geneology will be presented in the critical edition with the required textual justification. However, even at this preliminary stage, it is clear that we have far richer textual evidence in our hands than what was available to Whitney represented by the manuscript H in the above geneology. Below I will indicate briefly some of the important gains which are already apparent from the available material.

6. Whitney divided his text only into four Adhyāya-s. He knew that each Adhyāya had four Pāda-s, but his manuscript was not very clear on these divisions. Hence he could not subdivide each Adhyāya into Pāda-s. The manuscript material now available settles this issue once for all. Below I have given colophons at the end of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya as found in the various manuscripts:

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ABM *prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

C *iti caturādhyāyikāyāṃ prathamādhyāyasya prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

D *iti prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

EF *prathamasya prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

G *ity atharvavedāṅga-kautsa-vyākaraṇe prathamādhyāyasya prathamapādasya bhārgava-bhāskarīya-vṛttiḥ paripūrṇā |*

HN *caturādhyāyikāyām prathamasyādhyāyasya prathamaḥ pādaḥ | sūtra 41 | ekacatvāriṃśat |*

I *41 ity atharvavede kautsa-vyākaraṇe prathamādhyāyasya prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

J *iti prathamādhyāyasya prathamaḥ pādaḥ |*

All of these colophons occur at the same juncture. This shows where the Pāda-s end and helps us subdivide the text properly.

7. Several prose and metrical passages found in the Berlin manuscript were relegated by Whitney to the commentary. Several of these passages are found in almost all the manuscripts which only give the text of the SCA, and this helps us to settle conclusively as to which of the passages omitted by Whitney belong to the text proper and which belong to the commentary. For example, Wh. (**1**. 105) reads as follows:

khaṇvakhā 3 i khaimakhā 3 i madhye taduri | idaṃ bhūyā 3 idā 3 miti | ūrdhwo nu sṛṣṭā 3 stiryaṅ nu sṛṣṭā 3ḥ sarvā diśaḥ puruṣa ā babhūvā 3 | parāñcam odanam prāśiḥ pratyañcām iti | tvam odanam prāśīs tvām odanā 3 iti | vaśeyā 3 m avaśe 3 ti | yat tadāsī 3 didaṃ nu tā 3 d iti | iti plutāni |

Whitney includes this long prose passage in the Berlin manuscript in the text of the of SCA, but stops abruptly, while the passage actually continues in that manuscript:

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kimarthaḥ paripāṭhaḥ | ita uttaram adhikam | etāvat svārtho'pi | bahuvidhās trividhāḥ plutayo bhavanti | svaraparā abhiniṣṭhānaparā vyañjanaparās tāsāṃ yāḥ samānākṣaraparās tā itāv aplutavad bhavanti | itāv aplutavad bhavanti |

The entire passage (with some minor variations) is now supported by the manuscripts A, B, D, E, F, H, I, J, M, and N, and obviously forms part of the text of the SCA. There are many such passages. On the other hand, many passages which are ascribed to the commentary by Whitney are not found in any of the manuscripts, and hence they do not form part of the text of the SCA.

8. The new manuscripts help us supply rules which are missing in Whitney's edition and in the Berlin manuscript. For instance:

1) After Wh. 3. 28: (Found in ABDEFIJMN)
chakāraś ca, or *chakarasya*
pippalyādiṣu pūrvāt

2) After Wh. 3. 80: (Found in ABCDEFIJM)
nasaś ca
dhātusthādayakārāt
uru
brahmaṇvatyādīnām
nipātaś ca (or *nipātasya*) *svaḥ*

3) After Wh. 3. 86: (Found in ABCDEFIJM)
nabheḥ

4) After Wh. 4. 93: (Found in ABCDEFIJM)
iṅgyavac ca

5) After Wh. 4. 107: (Found in ABCDEFIJM)
saṃhitādārḍhyārtham

In his detailed notice of the manuscript at Ujjain (i.e. I), S. L. Katre for the first time noted these missing

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rules[1], and now they stand supported by a large number of manuscripts.

9. The manuscripts occasionally offer a different splitting of rules from what has been offered by Whitney. For instance, consider the three rules given by Whitney:

Wh. **1**. 14: *samānayame' kṣaram uccair udāttam*
Wh. **1**. 15: *nīcair anudāttam*
Wh. **1**. 16: *ākṣiptaṃ svaritam*

All the manuscripts give just one contiguous rule as:

samānayamekṣaramuccairudāttaṃ nīcairanudāttamākṣiptaṃ svaritaṃ |

The manuscript G in fact gives a single number (i.e. **1**. 1. 16) for this single rule.

10. In some cases the manuscripts help us to discard some of Whitney's emendations. Consider the following cases.

1. Wh. **1**. 19: *kaṇṭhyānām adharakaṇṭhaḥ*
   This reading goes against the Berlin reading . . . *kaṇṭhyaḥ*. Now the Berlin reading stands supported by all the manuscripts, except 'I' which supports Whitney's reading.
2. Wh. **1**. 25: *oṣṭhyānām adharauṣṭham*
   This goes against the Berlin reading *auṣṭhyam*. Now the Berlin reading stands supported by all the manuscripts, except 'I' which supports Whitney's reading.

[1] S. L. Katre (1938-39: 384).

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3. Wh. **1**. 82: *ārtnī ivādiṣv ivāditiḥ paraḥ*
Berlin reads . . . *ditiparaḥ*. This is supported by all the available manuscripts.

11. In several cases, the now available manuscripts support Whitney's expectations. Consider the following cases.

1. Wh. **1**. 66: *lakārasya rephaḥ pādamaṃgulim ity evamādīnām*
Whitney says on this rule: 'We should have expected here *pādamaṃgurim* . . .'. Whitney's expectation is supported by all the available manuscripts, including a reading found in the Berlin manuscript (i.e. H).
2. Wh. **2**. 92: *sthāsahisicīnām akāravyavāye'pi*
The Berlin text is severely mutilated, and the above is Whitney's conjecture. It now stands supported by the manuscripts CDEFIJM and N.
3. Wh. **3**. 29: [*na*] *visarjanīyaḥ*
There is no support for *na* in the Berlin manuscript, and it is Whitney's conjecture. It now stands supported by the manuscripts ABDEFIJM and N.

12. I hope I have sufficiently demonstrated the new features of the forthcoming critical edition of the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*, and the extent to which it will replace Whitney's celebrated edition. It is hoped that this critical edition of the SCA, with three commentaries, will open up many new dimensions for the study of the *Atharvaveda* and its ancillary literature.

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J. MOUSSAIEFF MASSON

ARE THERE UNIVERSAL CRITERIA FOR AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS?

There is a discussion in the ninth century *Dhvanyāloka*, a Sanskrit text on poetic theory (pp. 372-74 of the Banaras text) that is of interest to the student of comparative literature. It involves a crucial distinction between Eastern and Western ideas of poetry and leads to the complex question of whether there are universal criteria for aesthetic judgments. The problem centres around a verse found in the second Uddyota of the text (p. 195) which reads, in Sanskrit:

> *kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ prasabham abhihato 'py ādadāno 'ṃśukāntam*
> *gṛhṇan keśeṣv apāstaś caraṇanipatito nekṣitaḥ saṃbhrameṇa,*
> *āliṅgan yo 'vadhūtas tripurayuvatibhiḥ sāśrunetrotpalābhiḥ*
> *kāmīvārdrāparādhaḥ sa dahatu duritaṃ śāmbhavo vaḥ śarāgniḥ.*

The verse has been translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls in his *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 21:

> The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes as Śambhu's arrow-flame embraced them; but still, though shaken off, the fire caught their

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hands, though struck, did pluck their garments' hem, denied, it seized their hair, and scorned like lover who has lately loved another, lay before their feet. May this same fire burn away your sins.

The primary situation is that Śiva has shot an arrow (the arrow is actually Viṣṇu himself) into the city of Tripura, the citadel of his great enemy. This arrow is burning alive the women of the city. The poet is describing the course of the arrow's flames as it catches the body and clothes of the women. The situation is therefore a 'pitiful' one, for the women are being burned. However the course of the arrow reminds the poet of the behaviour of a lover (the lover has been caught being unfaithful, and he is trying to placate his love through physical contact which she repulses) for the actions of grabbing and being rejected are similar. There are three distinct aesthetic situations in this verse:

(1) *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra*, (love-in-separation) for the women are jealous and not to be placated by their guilty lovers.

(2) *karuṇa-rasa*, (an aesthetic emotion involving pathos) for we know they are being burned alive by the fire.

(3) *bhāva-dhvani*, (the suggestion of an emotion), here the suggestion of admiration for Śiva who has created this situation and who is therefore demonstrating his concern for the welfare of the world.

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Now ordinarily, to Indians as well as to Westerners, the juxtaposition of both love and compassion (or sorrow) seems strange. Indian theoriticians, in fact, call this a breach of good taste (*anaucitya*) or even worse, a *rasa-bhaṅga-hetu*, a factor destroying aesthetic experience (*anaucitya* is the major factor in *rasa-bhaṅga*). However the verse is very famous (probably, according to Ingalls, op. cit. p. 21, by Bāṇa) and by no means an isloated example. Such verses are very common. Therefore a reason must be given why these two elements do not really contradict each other. The Indian answer is that they are not contradictory because they are both subordinate to a third and major point of the poem, namely the description of the greatness of Śiva. And this major point of the poem is not stated directly (as are none of the elements) but only suggested (perhaps through the inclusion of a fourth rasa, mentioned by Abhinava though not by Ānanda, namely *vīra-rasa*). It is at this point that the Western critic might find himself disagreeing with the Indian critic. He could argue that the major part of the poem is concerned not with Śiva, but with the situation he creates. Our sympathies, in fact all our imaginative faculties, are concentrated on the description of the women. If the poem is a self-contained unit, why should we bother to bring to bear on it our knowledge of what the burning of Tripura implies for mankind, etc.? To this, of course, there are equally strong arguments on the other side, in the West as well, namely that no poem is a self-contained unit in reality; that try

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as we might, we always bring extraneous considerations to bear, etc. It involves the long and perhaps insoluble argument between the romantics and the academics in literary criticism, i.e., between those who demand knowledge of the social and cultural background and those that argue that each poem should be seen as if it were unique, existing alone and forming its own universe of discourse, with its own rules ('A poem should not mean but be'). But now the Western critic will bring up another point where the Indian will disagree even more strongly, and it is here that truly universal principles are involved. Śiva, he would object, is being described as great for an act that inspires only disgust: the burning alive of the women of the city. Why should this burning give us any pleasure? At the most we might understand that the killing of the demon himself could create such an impression on us, but surely the women are innocent and do not deserve to suffer? Now, it has often been held that the Indians simply do not accept this, and have different aesthetic (or ethical) standards, whereby to describe the suffering of an enemy only heightens our admiration for the hero that has created such suffering. Moreover, they emphasize guilt by association: '*strīṇāṃ hi sāhacaryād bhavanti cetāṃsi bhartṛsadṛśāni*' says Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa in the *Veṇīsaṃhāra*. (The minds of women, through association, become similar to those of their husbands). The sufferings of the women of Tripura need not evoke any pity in us—quite the contrary, we should be delighted by their sorrows. If this is true, then we must be

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content with saying that the Indians simply apply different standards to the appreciation of literature than do Westerners, i.e. there are no universal standards. I think most people who deal with Indian poetry would be inclined to accept this as necessarily true. And the passage we are dealing with here, where Ānanda explicitly states that the fall of an enemy brings pleasure, would bear this out. If my reading of this passage in the vṛtti is correct, Ānanda must have been aware of just such criticisms as I have called 'Western'. The very fact that the verse is said to contain *karuṇa-rasa*, regardless of its being subordinated, shows that this situation is pathetic (unless, of course, we claim that the situation is *karuṇa-rasa* only because it contains the *vibhāva-s*, *anubhāva-s*, etc., of *karuṇa*, i.e., only formally, but that really it arouses no sense of compassion in the *sahṛdaya*; but if we do argue in this vein, then the very notion of *rasa* is robbed of its true essence). Now if there is *karuṇa*, there is most definitely sympathy with the suffering women. Ānanda knows this, and he finds himself in a difficult position, for tradition demands that such verses be seen as praise of the conqueror, but as a literary critic he was not sure this was justifiable. The background for this, I believe, is a complex one, but at least two elements are outstanding: already in the Veda-s, the behaviour of the gods is often extremely suspect, and many of these stories never were removed from the Indian tradition.

Somehow such behaviour had to be justified, in fact praised. That is one element. The other is the

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praśasti-s, from which, after all, a great deal of poetry arose. A poet was often forced to praise a king no matter what he did. Should he engage in some particularly reprehensible battle, and slaughter all the wives of his enemies, this had to be praised. Obviously, to kill his enemies is a fit subject for description. But when a similar situation is described where the poet dwells on the sufferings of the enemies, I think the Indian tradition found itself in a quandary as to how to deal with such situations aesthetically. Tradition forbids him from sympathising with the enemy, and yet the poet constantly finds himself doing so. (Abhinavagupta says that when such scenes are being described, we forget our knowledge of the past and the future and are carried away emotionally by the description itself. Thus we say 'sādhu' to a fighter engaged in an improper battle). Many of the famous incidents in Rāma's life are morally or aesthetically reprehensible: disfiguring Śūrpaṇakhā, killing Vālin by trickery, abandoning Sītā, cutting off the head of a Śūdra who was reading the Veda-s, etc. And the later tradition has found it difficult to deal with such incidents. In fact, certain great poets implicitly criticize Vālmīki (not Rāma) by changing the situation in their own works; thus Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti. These seem to me to be situations in which universal principles (sympathy with misery whatever its locus or source) conflict with specific literary conventions (rejoicing in an enemy's misfortune). One thing however is clear: in the *praśasti* context, though the poet may have had to praise the king, his

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sympathies need not always have been with him, and we may regard instances where the description dwells pathetically on the plight of the enemy as instances of unconscious rebellion on the part of the poet to a tradition which confines his poetic sensibility.

We must not be misled by the greatness of Ānandavardhana into assuming that he has said the last word on this stanza. There is no reason why it should not be critically reviewed again. Ingalls (op. cit., p. 22) has done precisely this, and the interpretation he provides can satisfy both traditions of literary criticism:

'The imagery of all but the last line of the verse conduces to the erotic mood. In erotic verse the woman who trembles and refuses a glance to the lover at her feet is never truly averse to his attentions but jealous at their being shared. Modal convention leads one to attribute to her not so much pain as passion, in which both pain and joy are mixed. Notice how the suggestion of pain in the verse is succeeded by suggestions of pleasure; weeping is followed by embraces and caresses. Thus the suggestion of the initial images of the poem is that Śiva's act of destruction is an act of love, of his love of the demon women or, by suggestion, since God brings us all to death, of all mankind, and of their passionate response to his love. But the greatness of the verse lies in its conclusion. The benediction shifts the mood to peace. To ask that God 'burn away your sins' by that same fire is to ask what? If the fire is the fire of man's joy and grief, the prayer would seem to ask that our joys and griefs so burn at our karma that

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we may return purified and in peace to the source from which the flame arose. In four lines of verse the poet moves by means of suggestion from the specific to the universal and from a mood of excitement to a mood of rest. The reader may feel that he has dived from a high springboard into a calm, cool pool.'

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V. BALAMBAL

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN SAṄGAM AGE

An attempt is made in this paper to give an account of crime and punishment during the Saṅgam age. *Pattuppāṭṭu*, *Eṭṭuttokai*, *Maṇimekalai*, *Śilappadikāram* and the Eighteen Minor works form the main source material. As far as the judicial part is concerned, there is scarcity of source material and a comprehensive account is not possible.

King's Power:

Monarchy was the normal form of government. The king was the head of the government and society. He enjoyed enormous powers and was the supreme administrator of law.[1] He took lead in every event of social importance as the head of the society. The sceptre he had was the symbol of royal justice. 'It is the beautiful rod on which sleeps justice for all'.[2] The white umbrella was to protect the people from suffering. Though *Muraśu* or drum was considered as the symbol of war, there were three drums (i.e.) the drum of victory,

[1] *Śilappadikāram*, **26**, 160 ff.
[2] *Puṟanānūṟu* 20.

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the drum of justice and the drum of charity. The king's orders were proclaimed throughout his country with beat of drums by officers riding on elephants.[1] The chastity of women, the penance of the sages and the regularity of the monsoons depended on the king's justice. In the capital, the king himself presided over the court, heard the cases and imparted justice. The fact that the kings were easily approachable and readily available is known from the practice of fixing bells at the entrance of the king's fort. It was believed that the king should not be partial and there should be no discrimination between the rich and the poor.[2] Tiruvaḷḷuvar deals with righteous government in his *Kuṟaḷ*.[3] Still there were instances which show that the king was often thoughtless, harsh and cruel. When Pāṇḍyan Neḍuñjeḻiaṉ was told that his queen's anklet was in the possession of Kōvalaṉ, he ordered the immediate execution of Kōvalaṉ without even hearing the case.[4]

A chieftain called Naṉṉaṉ ordered the death of a young girl who ate a mango from his garden.[5] Such examples are few in number and on the whole the kings of the Saṅgam age proved to be upholders of justice.

[1] *Śilappadikāram*, **23**, lines 130-31.
[2] *Paḻamoḻi*, 206.
[3] Chapter 55.
[4] *Śilappadikāram*, **16**, lines 150-54.
[5] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 151.

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OTHER INSTITUTIONS:

Though the king was the final court of appeal, and he tried cases in the capital, there were other agencies in towns and villages to administer justice. *Maduraikkāñji* describes the assembly of five consisting of men who knew the law well and whose sense of justice was so well known that people who approached them with their cases had no fear of miscarriage of justice.[1] *Śilappadikāram* and *Maṇimēkalai* mention about the assembly of five (Aimperumkuḷu) and assembly of Eight (*Eṇpērāyam*) which assisted the king in administration. The principal officers were the high priests, the chief astrologer, the ministers and commanders of the army. There were special officers appointed to perform the duties of judges and magistrates but the king was the supreme and final arbiter in all civil and criminal cases. That the king used to hear cases in the presence of high officials is known from *Śilappadikāram*. When Pāṇḍya Neḍunjeḻiaṉ was accused by Kaṇṇagi for having punished Kōvalaṉ wrongly, he was shocked and fell from his throne and died. Then the *purohita* of the court of justice, revenue officers and others in the royal household present in the Court were astonished.[2] *Madurai Kāñji* says that the presiding judge in each court wore a peculiar headgear by which he was distinguished from the officers of the Court.[3] Justice was administered free of charge to the suitors. But the punishments were severe.

[1] Lines 489-92. [2] 22, lines 8-11. [3] Line 494.

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QUALIFICATIONS OF THE JUDGES:

The members who discharged justice were expected to be learned, straightforward, experienced and aged.[1] Even when Karikālacōḷa himself was prepared to hear a case, they were not willing to state their case as they thought that the king was very young and inexperienced. Understanding their mind, Karikāla came in the disguise of an old man with grey hair and they accepted his judgment. In the villages, when a case was tried, all men and women except the widows were present.[2]

MEETING PLACE:

Though in the capital and big cities cases were tried in the court halls, we hear from Saṅgam works that the people assembled under the trees and the *Avai* (assembly) conducted the trial and pronounced judgements. The *Avai* met under the jack fruit tree[3] or the neem tree.[4]

PRISON:

Those found guilty were kept in prisons. We hear of separate prisons to keep the royal captives who were treated very cruelly. There were warders to watch them. The captives were chained like dogs and humiliated by the warders. Cēra Kaṇaikkāl Irumpoṟai

[1] *Ahanānūṟu*, 90.
[2] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 373, lines 11-12.
[3] ibid., 128, line 1.
[4] ibid., 76, line 4; 371, line 7.

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was defeated and imprisoned by the Cōla Kōccaṅgaṉaṉ in Kuḍavāyirkkoṭṭam. He was chained and when he asked for water, it was denied by the warder.[1] The Cēra ruler Yānaikkañcei was imprisoned by the Pāṇḍya king Neḍuñjeḻian.[2] The Cēra was clever enough to escape from the Pāṇḍya prison. The release of prisoners on ceremonial days was a common feature. Cēra Śeṅguṭṭuvan ordered the release of prisoners when he consecreted the Kaṇṇagi temple.[3]

Maṇimēkalai, the virtuous daughter of Mādhavi, visited the Cōla prison and fed the ill-fed and starving prisoners with her magic bowl and when the Cōla king heard of it, he called for her and respected her. At her request, he converted the city jail into a public charity hall.[4]

But when Kāñcaṉaṉ killed Udayakumaraṉ who loved Maṇimekalai, he was not punished. Instead Maṇimēkalai was imprisoned by the king.[5]

Punishment to the Defeated Ones:

Wars were commonly waged and the defeated rulers were severely dealt with. Apart from ravaging the territories of the enemies, war indemnity was collected, soldiers were captured and the rulers were

[1] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 74.
[2] ibid., 15.
[3] *Śilappadikāram*, **28**. 203-204.
[4] *Maṇimekalai*, **19**.
[5] ibid. **22**.

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asked to pay tribute. Moreover the victors took revenge over their enemies.

Imayavaramban Neḍuñjēralātan, father of Śeṅguṭṭuvan, tied the hands of the defeated Greeks and made them walk under the hot sun, pouring ghee over their heads.[20] A chief named Mūvan was defeated by Poraiyan who fixed the teeth of the former on the doors of the fort of Toṇḍi. Cōla Kōccengaṇāṉ imprisoned and chained the Cēra Kaṇaikkāl Irumporai, who was deprived of even drinking water.[21] Cōla Karikāla, after his successful expedition to Ceylon, brought many prisoners to construct a dam and raise the banks of river Kāveri.[22] Cēra Śeṅguṭṭuvaṉ made the defeated Kaṉaka and Vijaya carry the stone for the statue of Kaṇṇagi. Śeṅguṭṭuvaṉ, on behalf of his friend Aruhai defeated Paḻaiyaṉ and used the hair of the latter's wife as rope to pull an elephant.[23]

It was the practice of the victors to use the golden crowns of the defeated rulers for making anklets. Poet Mulaṅkiḻār sings in praise of Kiḷḷivaḷavaṉ for such deeds.[24] To insult the vanquished, the victor gave the handle of the royal umbrella to the dance master to use the same for making rhythm; similarly the *kāvalmaram* was used to make the drum.

[1] *Padiṟṟuppattu*, **2**.
[2] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 74.
[3] *Śilappadikāram*, **10**, lines 108-111.
[4] *Padiṟṟuppattu*, **5**, lines 15-16.
[5] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 40.

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Though the rulers were ruthless in their treatment of the defeated ones, they were pacified and brought to their senses by the poets of the time. It was the special privilege of the poets to appeal to the kings to see reason. Cōḷa Kiḷḷivaḷavan defeated Malayamāṉ, Tirumudikāri and captured two of his sons. To take revenge over Kāri he ordered the trampling of the children by elephants. Then poet Kōvūr Kiḷār interfered and advised him not to punish them. The king heeded to his advice and released the children.[1] When Neḍuṅ-giḷḷi ordered the death of Iḷandattaṉ, Kōvūr Kiḷār appealed to him to free the young poet. The Cōḷa responded to his appeal and let the poet go free.

THEFT:

Though theft must have been a common offence among the people, the Saṅgam literature does not say much about it. When this offence was connected with the royal people, the punishment given was very severe. When Kōvalaṉ was found with the anklet, he was executed by the Pāṇḍya without a trial. When Kaṇṇagi proved that her husband was not a thief, the king had to pay the penalty of losing his own life, his wife and the city of Madurai. Similarly when the chieftain Naṇṇan found that a girl had stolen a mango from his garden, he ordered her execution without heeding to the request of her parents. Though no one was able to prevent him from that action, we hear

[1] ibid., 46.

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that he was treated with contempt and his successors were also not respected[1]. In this context, it is interesting to note that the punishment awarded for murder, theft, mis-appropriation, etc., was very simple during the time of the Imperial Colas (i.e.) asking the offender to light a perpetual lamp in the nearby temple.

TRIAL BY ORDEAL:

Trial by ordeal was a common practice in villages. To prove one's innocence, one was asked to put his hand in a pot wherein a cobra was kept. He was accepted to be innocent, if he was not bitten by the cobra, otherwise he was treated as an offender. How far this method would help to prove the case is highly doubtful. Anyhow, it may be assumed that perhaps out of fear the offenders might come out with truth in this method.

FALSE WITNESS:

It is well known that witnesses play a dominant role since the judgement is based on their statements. But if any one gave false evidence in a case, he was severely punished (i.e.) by cutting off the tongue.[2]

SPYING:

No government functions well without a sound organization of spies. Even during the Saṅgam age spies were engaged by kings and chieftains to know the

[1] *Kuṟuntogai*, 292.
[2] *Śiṟupañcamūlam*, 9.

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happenings in their region and the enemies' lands. Though they sincerely did their job, if found by the enemies, they were cruelly punished. The punishment for spying was death. For instance when the Cola ruler Nalaṅgiḷḷi and Neḍuṅgiḷḷi were fighting, a poor poet named Iḷandattaṉ entered the fort of Neḍuṅgiḷḷi. Thinking that he was a spy sent by Nalaṅgiḷḷi, Neḍuṅgiḷḷi ordered his execution. When poet Kōvūrkiḷār heard of it, he ran to the scene, told the truth and saved the life of the poet.[1]

PROSTITUTION:

Prostitution was a permissible institution. Even kings and nobles used to hold some courtesans in high esteem and permitted them to enjoy high status. Mādhavi of *Śilappadikāram* was a good dancer. But she wanted to lead a family life, hence she chose Kōvalaṉ and lived with him alone and bore Maṇimēkalai. The prostitutes were known as *Parattaiyar* or *Kaṇigaiyar*. Though monogamy was the practice of the time among the common people, men were pleased to be in the company of harlots. It is true that Valluvar held up to scorn the life of those who took to the company of prostitutes, saying that the insincere embrace of a harlot is like the clasping of a corpse in a dark room. We hear from *Kalittogai* that there was a village in Madurai, full of prostitutes.[2] The street was known

[1] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 47.
[2] *Marutakali*, 24.

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as *Parattaiyarceri*. Though polygamy was prevalent in the royal household, the kings and chieftains did not fail to have the company of the courtesans. Pēgaṉ, a chieftain of the Saṅgam age deserted his wife Kaṇṇagi and lived with a courtesan. It needed the help of poet Kapilar who re-united Pēgan and Kaṇṇagi. Some of the courtesans were very learned and well versed in fine arts. But there were prostitutes of the lower grade who stood at their doors or in the bazaar streets and invited customers by clapping their hands.[1] Not only were the courtesans respected by learned people, but they were also expected to keep up their professional etiquette. If the courtesans neglected their professional practices, they were punished.[2] It is also interesting to note that wives patiently bore the separation and expressed their joy when their husbands returned to them.[3]

ADULTERY:

Though prostitution was accepted, cases of adultery were dealt with severely. The offenders were cruelly punished. Nāladiyār says that the legs of the adulterer were cut off.[4] The adulterous women were also punished.

[1] *Maduraikāñci*, lines 419-20.

[2] N. Subramaniam, *Saṅgam Polity*, p. 306.

[3] Kaṇṇagi was prepared to give all her jewels to her husband who presented the same to Mādhavi and when he came back to her after his misunderstanding with Mādhavi, she happily received him and obeyed his order of going to Madurai to seek new fortune.

[4] Nos. 81 & 84.

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ELOPEMENT AND DESERTING:

Tamil society accepted elopement and the parents of the boy and the girl did not make any search to find them. If they returned after their elopement, the parents welcomed them and treated them well.[1] The Saṅgam literature gives a detailed account of the love affairs. The marriageable age of the time was sixteen for boys and twelve for girls.[2] Kōvalan and Kaṇṇagi were married at that age.

In case a lover deserted a girl after having enjoyed her, and refused to marry her, the girl could bring the matter to the notice of the *avai* and it was the duty of *avai* to ascertain the truth and punish the offender. There was a case of this nature and the punishment was the following: binding him to a three pronged frame and belabouring him and unloading on his head a large quantity of burnt cowdung.[3] It is really interesting that though the parents and *Avai* permitted love affairs and elopement, they took the man to task when they knew that the girl was deserted. It shows that though non-interfering, they were keenly watching the welfare of the boys and girls.

DRINKING:

Drinking was commonly accepted in ancient Tamil country. During festivals and ceremonies, it was very much used for merry-making. We do not hear of women

[1] *Ahanānūṟu*, 195.
[2] *Śilappadikāram*, I.
[3] *Ahanānūṟu*, 256.

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taking to drinking. Varieties of drinks are mentioned in Saṅgam literary works. Apart from manufacturing wine, the Tamils imported varieties from Rome and other places. As it fetched much revenue perhaps, separate places were allotted for the sale of toddy and their location was announced by waving flags.[1] As drinking was not prohibited, the manufacture of drinks was also allowed in private houses.[2]

The use of opium was also not prohibited and it was very much in use among the nomadic class.[3] In spite of Vaḷḷuvar condemning drinking and meat-eating and explaining the evils of the same, the Saṅgam people enjoyed both.

The Rights and Privileges of the People

The king was the protector of the people. The people appealed to him for all their problems. But if the king himself was at fault, the people did not fail to bring the same to his notice. They boldly approached the king. When Pāṇḍyan Neḍuñjeḻiyan thoughtlessly ordered the execution of Kōvalan, Kaṇṇagi herself came to the court and proved that her husband was innocent and the king was wrong in his judgement. The king admitted his fault and fell dead from his throne. The queen Koppuṛndevi begged Kaṇṇagi to forgive her husband.[4]

[1] *Padiṛṛuppattu* and *Paṭṭinappālai*.
[2] *Ahanānūṛu*, 329.
[3] *Śirupañcamūlam*, 28.
[4] *Śilappadikāram*, **20**.

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Similarly when a subject of Porkkaippāṇḍian came to his court and accused the king for insecurity, the king cut off his right hand as he was the one who knocked at the door of the subject the previous night when he heard some noise.[1]

Another sensitive case was brought to the court of Maṉunīti Cola by a cow whose calf was crushed to death by the Cola prince. When the king heard the case, he decided to punish the prince on the same line. So he ordered for the crushing of the prince in the same way the calf was killed.[2] Though as a king he could have evaded justice, he did not fail to punish the prince, which resulted in the loss of his own son.

CONCLUSION:

Due to paucity of material, we are not able to bring forth many civil cases. Paucity of references does not mean absence of incidents. So long as there were people with property and different kinds of opinions, civil cases were bound to be present. Traditional laws were followed in discharging the judicial duties. The king and other officials involved in this sphere were usually following the traditional and local laws. The Court at Uṟaiyūr was very famous for its never-failing justice.[3] Precautionary methods were undertaken as highway robbery was common and *Maduraikāñci* gives a detailed description of the robbers.[4] It

[1] *Paḷamoḻi*, 102; *Śilappadikāram*
[2] *Paḷamoḻi*, 93.
[3] *Puṟanānūṟu*, 39.
[4] Lines 634-650.

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also states that kings appointed guards to protect the people from robbers.[1] Narriṇai says that a special army was engaged to protect the merchants who moved with their goods.[2] The merchants learnt the art of fighting to safeguard themselves from highway robbers. *Tirukkuṟal* says [3]about various kinds of offenders i.e. one who set fire, one who poisoned; we also hear that killing of cows and Brahmins was a great crime and abortion was unforgivable. Some criminals were asked to go for fishing and diving for pearls.[4] Thus it could be concluded that in the Golden Age of the Tamils, law and justice were given an important place and even for trivial offences, punishments were severe so that the people would be careful not to resort to the same.

[1] Lines 642-650.
[2] 387, lines 4-6.
[3] 550.
[4] Schoff, *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, pp. 40-47.

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ALEX WAYMAN

NOTES ON METAPHORIC TRANSFER

The theory of 'metaphoric transfer' (*lakṣaṇā upacāra*) is just one of the many topics which Kunjunni Raja ably treats at length in his *Indian Theories of Meaning*. There is little to add to his in-depth coverage.

I. *lakṣaṇā* (of location)

I refer now to Raja's book (2nd ed., pp. 234-5) for the example from Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra-s* of 'location': *mañcāḥ krośanti* (The cots cry); and for the example from Patañjali's *Mahābhāsya* also of 'location': *mañcā hasanti* (The cots laugh). Patañjali used the classifying term for this type, *tātsthyāt* ('due to residing in'). Then in what sense is there a 'transfer'? Dr. Raja explains (p. 234), 'Here the term *mañca* (cot) is used to refer to "the children on the cot."' Thus the meaning was transferred from the children to the cot.

A few textual spots have come to my attention:

(1) Chowkhamba edition (Haridas Sanskrit Series 59) of *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, with *Pradīpa* Sanskrit commentary of Parīkṣopayogi, and further notes by Pt. Rudraprasād Avasthī, contains in the *Pradīpa* commentary on verse

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14, these Sanskrit remarks, which I follow with my translation:

विसर्गस्योष्मसंज्ञा तु ऊष्मसु पाठेन तात्स्थ्यात् लक्षणया बोध्या, मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीतिवत्। इदमप्रसङ्गादागतमिति केचित्। तन्न, पूर्वत्र अष्टाविति पदकथनेन अष्टपदघटितस्यास्यापि स्मृतिपथारूढत्वादिति ॥ १४ ॥

> Now, the name *ūṣman* (sibilant) for *visarga* should be understood by metaphoric transfer (*lakṣaṇā*), due to its inclusion in the *ūṣman-s*, in the same manner (*iti-vat*) as *mañcāḥ krośanti*. Some persons say, "This is (something) that has come because of irrelevance to the context." Not so! Because previously the *pada-s* mentioned are eight (i.e. eight kinds of *ūṣman* or eight *visarga* changes), it is a convention in the purview of *smṛti* (memory of people) that (the *visarga*) is joined (*ghaṭita*) to the eight (*sibilant*) *pada-s*.

The comparison seems to be that, just as the children are right there on the cots and we say the cots are crying, so the *visarga-s* are right there in the *ūṣman-s* and the grammarians say the *ūṣman-s* perform the enunciations. But the transfer of meaning did not imply a physical separation, such as a hiatus.

(2) The second example stems from the Buddhist tantra, and I must re-think my previous solution[1] of a passage in the *Hevajratantra* about the mystical wand called *khaṭvāṅga*, which modern authors ordinarily leave

[1] A. Wayman, *The Buddhist Tantras: Light on Indo-Tibetan Esotericism* (New York, 1973), pp. 124-5.

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untranslated, but which can be construed as 'the body (*aṅga*) on the cot (*khaṭvā*).' Snellgrove's edition of the *Hevajra* I. i. 12, has:

> *mekhalāyāṃ sthito 'moghaḥ prajñā khaṭvāṅgarūpiṇī |*
> *ḍamarūpāyarūpeṇa yogī dveṣaviśuddhitaḥ ||*

The first *pāda* about the Buddha Amogha (siddhi) finishes a list of the previous verse (i. 11). The remainder can be rendered:

> Prajñā (insight) has the form of the *khaṭvāṅga*; the yogin is purified of aversion by the *ḍamaru*-drum which is the form of Upāya (means).

This must be interpreted by another passage derived from the master Lui-pa, 'The *khaṭvāṅga* is the divine body; Prajñā is the sound of the *ḍamaru*.'[1] Accordingly, we can make the identifications for the *khaṭvā-aṅga* that Prajñā is the cot (*khaṭvā*) or the drum (*ḍamaru*), while Upāya is the yogin who is the body (*aṅga*). Therefore, when this literature mentions that the *damaru*-drum 'sounds,' so also that Prajñā (when personified as a goddess) 'speaks,' this is a metaphorical transfer of meaning in the sense of location. In fact, it was the yogin, the divine body on the cot, who was making the sounds (the mantra-s).

(3) The preceding examples can be treated in a different way by the terminology of poetical suggestion (*dhvani*) based on the metaphorical transfer or

[1] Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

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else on literal meaning, as Dr. Raja discusses (pp. 302-3) by the two kinds, *avivakṣita-vācya* (expression not intended to be told) and *vivakṣita-vācya* (expression intended to be told). Since it is the *avivakṣita-vācya* which is based on *lakṣaṇā*, it should be of interest to apply to the two preceding examples the subdivision which Raja mentions, p. 303. This is the *atyantatiraskṛta-vācya*, completely setting aside the literal sense, and *arthāntarasaṃkramita-vācya*, which shifts the literal meaning. Chatterji explains: ' "Ūṣman" is found in *AV.* and the Brāhmaṇa-s in the sense of "heat, hot vapour, vapour." Then it came to signify "those letters or sound in the pronunciation of which there is the emission of hot breath." '[1] It follows that the grammatical example, involving the terms *visarga* (emission) and *ūṣman* (heat), shows a shifting of the literal meaning. The present author's work on the *Guhyasamājatantra* mentions the role of 'coined terminology' (*no yathāruta*) and 'hinted meaning' (*neyārtha*) in this tantric literature.[2] It follows that the Buddhist tantra example, involving the mysterious *aṅga* and *khaṭvā*, shows a complete setting aside of the literal sense. If my application of the terminology be deemed cogent it is a kind of testimonial to the viability of the terminology.

[1] Kshitish Chandra Chatterji, *Technical Terms and Technique of Sanskrit Grammar* (University of Calcutta, 1964), p. 245.

[2] A. Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra* (Delhi, 1977), p. 116.

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II. *upacāra*

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* does not contain the word *lakṣaṇā*, according to Miyasaka's Sanskrit-Tibetan word index,[1] but does have some instances of the word *upacāra*, namely, *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, verses 92, 95, 96 (Shastri's edition);[2] and *Pratyakṣa* chapter, verses 33, 35, 157. Besides these, I shall also translate the two verses, 36-37 of *Pratyakṣa*, that deal with the topic although not using the word *upacāra*.

(1) *Pramāṇasiddhi*, 92:

रसरूपादियोगश्च संयोग उपचारतः ।
इष्टश्चेद् बुद्धिभेदोऽस्तु पङ्क्तिर्दीर्घेति वा कथम्! ॥

If you claim that the union of taste, form, etc. is 'connection' (*saṃyoga*) in the sense of 'metaphoric transfer,' admit the difference of cognition! Also, how can you say, 'It is in a long list (of attributes)'?

According to the Manorathanandin commentary, the verse challenges the Vaiśeṣika theory, cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, I, i. 15 (Gaekwad Oriental Series), in part, *aguṇavān . . . iti guṇalakṣaṇam*. Among the varieties of

[1] Yūsho Miyasaka, "An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā," *Acta Indologica* III (Naritasan Shinshoji, Japan, 1973—4-5).

[2] The edition by Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi, 1968) starts the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter by two verse numbers ahead of the Tibetan version on account of numbering the two initial verses of bowing and aspiration—which go with the whole work—as the first two verses of the chapter!

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'metaphoric transfer,' the one that seems to fit is 'Praśaṃsā'; cf. Raja, pp. 237, 303. It is as though saying, 'We find no fault with your praise of the *guṇa-s* as an empty or null set; but then how can you count off a list of *guṇa-s*, such as taste, form, etc., in the null set!' However, the commentary expressly explains the 'metaphoric transfer' in the case of the *saṃyoga* as when there is the cognition of fire in regard to the lad. This is the variety called 'Sārūpya' (similarity). Presumably the 'difference of cognition' (*buddhibheda*) is the difference between cognizing 'union' (*yoga*) and 'connection' (*saṃyoga*).

(2) *Pramāṇasiddhi*, 95:

मतो यद्युपचारोऽत्र स इष्टो यन्निबन्धनः ।
स एव सर्वभावेषु हेतुः किं नेष्यते तयोः ।।

If you hold that there is a metaphoric transfer in this case, whatever be the reason you claim, precisely it is the reason (for it to be) in all modes-of-being (*bhāva*). Why don't you claim it for both (word and cognition)?

Manorathanandin explains with words of the preceding verse (94): 'in this case' — in the case of the *guṇa-s*, etc.; and the dual — word and cognition *śabdajñāna*). The reference to 'word and cognition' is Dharmarkīrti's on-going quarrel with the realists who will employ words to list the 'reals' of the external world, as though independent of the forms of cognition.

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Pramāṇasiddhi, 96:

उपचारो न सर्वत्र यदि भिन्नविशेषणम् ।
मुख्यमित्येव च कुतोऽभिन्ने भिन्नार्थतेति चेत्! ।।

(The realist responds:) The metaphoric transfer is not everywhere. If the qualifier is separate it is precisely the *mukhya* (the primary, literal case); and if the entity is separate, why (pretend it is) not separate!

For example, in the case of *visarga* and *ūṣman*, *visarga* is the *mukhya* (literal case) and serves as the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) for *ūṣman*, the metaphoric transfer. They are 'separate' as words with different meaning ('emission' and 'heat'), and in the realist view refer to different entities.

(3) *Pratyakṣa*, 33 (In the first *pāda* I substitute the reading *yadi vastu na* of Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, Patna, 1953, as against the reading *yadi vastuni* of Shastri's edition):

यदि वस्तु न वस्तूनामवाच्यत्वं कथंचन ।
नैव वाच्यमुपादानभेदाद् भेदोपचारतः ।।

If there is a given thing (*vastu*) (due to some word, as you claim [*kutaścid vacanān matam*, last *pāda* of v. 32]), somehow, among given things, no (given thing) would be inexpressible. Because there is a different material cause (*upādāna*), and because there is metaphoric transfer differently—when (something) is inexpressible.

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The key to this difficult verse is the use of the word *bheda*. Surendranath Dasgupta (*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 462-5) discusses four explanations of *bheda* from *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. The third kind seems applicable: 'difference means divergence of characteristics (*vaidharmya*) as the Vaiśeṣika-s speak of it'. That is, the realist's position about expressibility of given things involves a generalization (*sāmānya*), but when reasons are offered they are just for difference, not for the generalization.

Pratyakṣa, 35:

उपचारात् तदिष्टं चेद् वर्त्तमानघटस्य का ।
प्रत्यासत्तिरभावेन या पटादौ न विद्यते ।।

> If you claim it (to be an existent and non-existent *dharma*) due to metaphoric transfer, then, in the case of the nearby present pot, (why not also say,) it is not actually on the cloth, etc., because it is absent (in past or future time)!

Thus, when a boy is called a lion—a stock example of metaphoric transfer—and someone interprets the situation, claiming the boy both is and isn't a lion, we might just as well say of a pot agreed to be on a cloth, that it is not there, because of its absence in the past or in future time, that is, because the pot both is and isn't there. Here, the pot is understood as a *dharma* in a location.

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4) *Pratyakṣa*, 36:

बुद्धेरस्खलिता वृत्तिर्मुख्यारोपितयोः सदा ।
सिंहे माणवके तद्वद् घोषणाप्यस्ति लौकिकी ।।

The non-deviant modification of cognition is always mundane by speaking of the literal term (*mukhya*) and the superimposition (*āropitā*), like the case when a lad is (called) a lion.

The usage here of 'non-deviant modification' appears consistent with *Yoga-sūtra-s*; cf. I. 2, 'Yoga is the cessation of the modifications (*vṛtti*) of the *citta*;' and I. 6, '(The modifications are) *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā*, and *smṛti*.' Here, a 'deviant' (*skhalita*) modification agrees with the type *viparyaya*.

Pratyakṣa, 37:

यत्र रूढ्यासदर्थोऽपि जनैः शब्दो निवेशितः ।
स मुख्यस्तत्र तत्साम्याद् गौणोऽन्यत्र स्खलद्गतिः ।।

Even where is a non-existent entity, people assign a word by convention (*rūdhi*). The primary term (*mukhya*) there, has a metaphor (*gauṇa*) due to similarity. Elsewhere, it would be deviant reflection.

For the words 'by convention,' cf. Dr. Raja, p. 262: this is also Śabarasvāmin's view. Notice the agreement with the grammatical passage about the *visarga* and the *ūṣman*. Two words of different meaning were employed for the same thing, and one became,

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employed metaphorically. But some person or other concluded that there must be a separation, since one is 'emission' and the other 'heat'. This has to be rejected as a 'deviant reflection.'

5) *Pratyakṣa*, 157:

मालादौ च महत्त्वादिरिष्टो यश्चौपचारिकः ।
मुख्याविशिष्टविज्ञानग्राह्यत्वान्नौपचारिकः ।।

Whatever is claimed, with metaphoric transfer, as greatness, etc. in regard to garlands, etc.—is (in fact) not with metaphoric transfer, since it is apprehended with understanding (*vijñāna*, or 'perception') that does not distinguish (such features as 'greatness') from the primary sense (*mukhya*).

That is, Dharmakīrti insists that for *upacāra* to be present, it must satisfy the condition of 'similarity' (*tatsāmyāt*), as in his verse *Pratyakṣa*, 37, above. Most of the cases in Raja, pp. 233 ff. easily fit this stipulation, which could also be called *tulyatva* (identification).

III. Concluding considerations

Granted that I adopted the rendition 'metaphoric transfer' from Dr. Raja's book, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, where he employs it for both terms, *lakṣaṇā* and *upacāra*. It appears that the rendition fits rather well the contexts of the term *upacāra* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. Indeed, the rendition suits the prefix *upa-* in the senses of 'by the side of,' 'together with,' agreeing with the 'metaphoric' nature of the 'transfer,'

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since it is a transfer that remains in the vicinity of the literal meaning. In this sense it compares with the yogin—cf. the example from the Buddhist tantra presented above—since the yogin, after all, doesn't go anywhere, but stays under the tree, in the cave, etc., while his mind transfers to various mystic states. The word *lakṣaṇā* seems to me to be a 'metaphoric transfer' from *lakṣaṇa* (characteristic, definition, etc.), taking its meaning 'metaphoric transfer' as a derivative of a character or of definition, while it differs in form from *lakṣaṇa* only by the feminine *ā*.

Dharmakīrti employed for the primary term or sense the usual word *mukhya*, and may well have intended this implication for the word *upādāna* (material cause) in his *Pratyakṣa* chapter, 33. For the metaphoric sense he used *āropitā* (superimposition) and *gauṇa* (derivative of a *guṇa*).

Raja (pp. 245-9) also dealt with some Buddhist theories about the nature of a word, the Buddhist logicians' *anyāpoha*, and so forth. These are subtle matters, and to assess their implication for the topic of this paper would require much more space.

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J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT

PRIVILEGED LIES

Satyam eva jayate. No doubt. Is one always bound to tell the truth? To a patient who may be infected with cancer? To a mother who has just given birth to a deformed baby? To an author who asks whether one liked his article? There is the useful verse which was once quoted to me, in mild reproof, by a justice of the Supreme Court:

> *satyaṃ brūyāt priyaṃ brūyānna brūyāt satyaṃ apriyam,*
> *priyaṃ ca nānṛtaṃ brūyād eṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ.*
>
> (Manu 4. 138)

The verse is about gentlemanly conduct, and does not really apply to contentious or controverted matters. It is not really about information, where, misinformed, a person could be deceived to his loss. The very Indian character of the verse will be obvious to anyone who has any experience of India. And it is said that in Ireland, if you ask how far a distant place is, and how long it will take to get there the answer is always, 'A mile or so away, and you will be there in no time at all!'

When Europeans came to administer law in India they were struck with the fact that the 'white lie' turned up not only in litigation but even in the normative texts. The privileged lie struck them as very odd.

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When I came across something very similar in Jewish texts—the Jews being traditionally very concerned about truth-telling, and not less concerned for face-saving,[1] I thought it might be of interest to compare the two.

There is a discussion in the *Talmud* about lost property and how it is to be recognised and claimed. There is a story[2] about a rabbi who discovered that a disciple was a thief by watching him wiping his hands on someone else's clothing! Such a man had no scruples. In the course of discussion of the question who is reliable enough for his word to be believed in the matter of lost property, R. Judah reports a maxim of Mar Samuel (d. about 257) that the rabbis may conceal the truth in three contexts, (i) a tractate, (ii) a bed, (iii) a lodging. The traditional explanations of this enigmatic formula amount to this, that one may dissimulate or give a misleading answer when questioned about one's knowledge of a tractate of the *Talmud* (one disclaims the knowledge one has); when asked indiscreet personal questions about intimate domestic matters; and when confronted with inconvenient invitations or queries about hospitality, a truthful answer to which would put someone to shame.

I was at a wedding reception recently, and have been trying to sell a house: the two occasions put me in

[1] Moses ben Maimun (Maimonides), *Mishneh Torah*, Hilkot De'ot II. 6. One may modify statements in the interests of peace: *Babylonian Talmud*, Yevamot 65b.

[2] *Babylonian Talmud*, Baba Metsia, fol. 23b-24a.

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mind of yet other situations where an economy of truth is customary. The rabbis were aware at least of the first dilemma. The School of Hillel and the School of Shammai differed (or pretended to differ) as to whether one should be a stickler for truth at weddings. The latter took the view that when the bride is blind or lame one should observe the commandment to 'keep far from a false matter' (Exod. 23: 7) and not compliment her or praise her with the customary phrase 'A beautiful and graceful bride'![1] The School of Hillel on the contrary believed the occasion demanded such remarks however incongruous with the facts.[2] Similarly I see no harm in viewers' praising a house they have no intention of offering to buy. Sticklers for truth might object.

Sanskrit sources, as usual, pay us the compliment of classifying the phenomenon of the 'privileged lie', yet the information is not to be found in one single text. After a long sermon on the requirement to tell the truth in lawsuits, Manu, with good Dharma-sūtra authority, introduces exceptions:

śūdra-viṭ-kṣatra-viprāṇāṃ yatrartoktau bhaved vadhaḥ |
tatra vaktavyam anṛtaṃ tad dhi tatra viśiṣyate ||[3]

(*Manu.* **8.** 104)

[1] *Babylonian Talmud,* Ketubot, fol. 17a.

[2] G. F. Moore, *Judaism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), **2.** 189.

[3] This is the reading of Bhāruci. The Vulgate text reads *taddhi satyād viśiṣyate*, hardly varying the sense. Medhātithi gives information about privileged or permissible lies in his commentary on Manu **8.** 103ff., 112. Kullūka agreeing with Bṛhaspati (see

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Dharma is facilitated by telling lies when the life of any member of the four castes (not merely Brahmins) will be saved thereby. True, one must perform a penance for thus violating Speech (ibid., 105-6), but one is permitted to flout the heavy sanctions, spiritual and temporal, that are denounced against perjury. The Jewish outlook was very different. To obtain a conviction and punishment of an offender *two* witnesses were required. There is a Jewish maxim expressing abhorrence of a man who, knowing the crime of another, calmly produces his own, uncorroborated (and therefore infructuous) testimony![1] A righteous man would be particular to see to it that adequate testimony was available, especially in a capital case. The Jewish law fancied it had sufficient safeguards against the conviction of an innocent accused.

Hindu law goes even further in the other direction. Still dealing with oaths and the crime and sin of perjury, Manu has yet more to say:

kāminīṣu vivāheṣu gavāṃ bhukte tathendhane|
brāhmaṇābhyupapattau ca śapathe nāsti pātakam||

(*Manu.* **8.** 112)

'In dealing with sweethearts, in marriages, in what cows have eaten and also about fuel and in defence of a Brahmin there is no sin in a (false) oath.'

below), confines the privilege to cases of excessive punishment or offences arising out of negligence; Medhātithi (Jha's edn., 1939, vol. 2, p. 118) excludes convicts worthy of death.

[1] *Babylonian Talmud*, Pesaḥim, fol. 113b, Moore, op. cit., 188-9.

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'Sweethearts' obviously means in amorous conversation and endearments: one may well forget that an even more beautiful person has crossed one's path. At weddings one may well enlarge on the otherwise questionable virtues of the spouses and their relations. It is well known that cows are not to be reported if they stray and eat people's crops. When one takes fuel for a *śāstraic* fire (cf. *Manu.* 8. 339) one may be justified, it is a privileged taking; but if this cannot be satisfactorily established false evidence is allowable. In defence of a Brahmin's person, provided his life, if known, is orthodox (so says Bhāruci on the verse) lies may also be told on oath. This goes further than allowing perjury to save him from *death*. Bṛhaspati, thinking that the permission was likely to be abused,[1] adds multiple conditions;[2] *sakṛt-pramādāparādhi-vipraṃ vyāpadi pīḍitam| bhaṭādibhir vadhyamānaṃ rakṣed uktvā 'nṛtāny api||* 'Even by telling lies one may protect a Brahmin who has offended *once through negligence*, is oppressed by calamity, (or) about to be destroyed by mercenaries, etc.'

Another verse comes to hand, authorship of which is not known. It figures in a commentary on the Rāmāyaṇa:[3]

[1] K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (*Reconstructed*) (Baroda, 1941), 120,§ 76, says Manu's rule is of 'dubious morality' in a footnote he speaks of its 'immorality'.

[2] Bṛhaspati (ed. Aiyangar, 1941), 5. 43 (p. 56).

[3] V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, *Lectures on the Rāmāyaṇa* (S. Viswanathan for Madras Sanskrit Academy, 1949), 421-3. Govindarāja on Vālmīki's, *Rāmāyaṇa* V. 42. 8-10 (ed. K. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, Bombay, 1916, p. 1921).

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vivāha-kāle rati-saṃprayoge prāṇātyaye sarva-dhanāpahāre, viprasya (v.l. mitrasya) cārthe 'py anṛtaṃ vadeyuḥ pañcānṛtāny āhur apātakāni.

'At a wedding, in sexual intercourse, when a life is in danger, when a person's entire property is being taken away (or confiscated), and in respect of a Brahmin's wealth (or, in another reading, a friend's wealth) they may tell an untruth. They call (these) five lies no sins."

If this is indeed the position it is very different from the Jewish concept. One wonders where the pandits attached to our pioneer Hindu lawyers went wrong, in that they left the earliest western judges in the dark as to how the anomalies were to be reconciled. If I may suggest a solution it is a simple one. *Vyavahāra*, litigation before the (Hindu) judge, may or may not proceed primarily on the basis of *dharma*, or truth-telling by the witnesses, etc. It is perfectly well equipped to proceed without. *Dharma* alone, and not the court, decides whether supernatural penalties attach to lies told on oath. Whereas truth-telling is obligatory even in litigation, subject to horrid self-imprecations by the witnesses; on the other hand the circumstances may take a turn in which a higher duty requires that the witness be true to obligations which are at least equally binding upon him. To put it in modern terms, his conscience could not allow him (or might not allow him) to participate in sending a fellow creature to his death, in depriving someone of all his assets, which might be almost as bad (and our author perhaps had dacoits and bandits in mind as well as rapacious

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officials), or in causing a Brahmin to lose any property. One superstition cancelled another;[1] and the Dharmaśāstra (and the culture) wisely provided an escape if the individual wanted it. The courts knew how to find out if witnesses were lying (their toes twitched, etc.), and were not affected by any such superstitions, Naturally.

It seems very odd to me that European administrators of Justice to Indians should have imagined that they could import their own notions of oaths and perjury as a matter of course, just because they found that Indians had such concepts as oaths and false witness in their scriptures. The institutions might have been comparable, but there was no reason why they should have been similar.

[1] Medhātithi on *Manu*. **8.** 104: '"Nānṛta-vadane doṣo jīvanaṃ cet tad-adhīnam" ity evamādi-pratiṣedhe satyānṛtayoḥ kāma-cāra-prasaṅge satya-vacanena nimitta-bhāvaḥ pratipadyamāno "na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni" iti pratiṣedhavyatikramatayā cānṛtaṃ pratipadyata iti yuktimatvenedaṃ kṛtam.'

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PATRICK OLIVELLE

ĀNANDATĪRTHA'S SAṂNYĀSAPADDHATI

A Handbook for Madhvaite Ascetics

INTRODUCTION

ĀNANDATĪRTHA [A.D. 1238-1317], also known as Madhva and Pūrṇaprajña, was the founder of the Madhvaite sect of Vaiṣṇavism and the principal advocate of the dualistic system of Vedānta. After Rāmānuja, Ānandatīrtha was probably the most important religious reformer and thinker of medieval India.[1]

The *Granthamālikāstotra*[2] lists thirty-seven works by Ānandatīrtha. They are collectively known as *Sarvamūla*. Although other works are ascribed to him, only these thirty-seven are generally considered authentic. The last work in the list of the *Granthamālikāstotra* is entitled *Saṃnyāsapaddhati* [henceforth *S.*].

[1] On the life and work of Madhva see B. N. K. Sharma, *A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature*, 2 vols.; Bombay, 1960-61.

[2] It consists of 12 verses giving the list of 37 works of Ānandatīrtha. It has been printed in R. G. Bhandarkar, *A Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the Year* 1882-3 (Bombay, 1884), pp. 207-8. *Stotramahodadhi* (Belgaum, 1923), pp. 382-3. Its author is variously given as Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha, etc.

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The *Yatipraṇavakalpa* and *S.* are the only works of Ānandatīrtha that deal exclusively with the topic of renunciation.

Three editions of the *Sarvamūla* have been published.[1] Two omit *S.* and contain only thirty-six works. *S.* is published in the Bangalore edition as a work outside the *Sarvamūla*, though recognized as a genuine work of Ānandatīrtha.[2] The Bangalore edition of *S.* is based on a manuscript dated *śaka* 1810 [=A.D. 1888], although the editors have made some corrections. In our edition the Bangalore text is referred to by the siglum *Bg*.

I have been able to locate only one other manuscript of *S.* It is found in the library of the Oriental Institute,

[1] One was published in Kumbhakonam and another by the Nirnaya Sagar Press (Bombay, 1892). The third edition was published by the Uttaradi Mutt, Basavangudi, Bangalore.

[2] Cf. ibid., pp. 1935-6, where *S.* is published under the title *Nyāsapaddhati*. It is remarked there that three works, though not included in the *Sarvamūla*, are traditionally ascribed to Ānandtīrtha: सर्वमूलानन्तर्गता: परंतु श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादै: रचितत्वेन सांप्रदायिकैरनु मता ग्रन्था: ।

The first work is the *Kanduka* (*kṛṣṇa*) *stuti* in two verses:

अम्बरगङ्गाचुम्बितपाद: पदतलविदलितगुरुतरशकट: ।
कालियनागक्ष्वेलनिहन्ता सरसिजनवदलविकसितनयन: ।।
कालघनालीकर्बुरकाय: शरशतशकलितसुररिपुनिवह: ।
सन्ततमस्मान् पातु मुरारि: सततगसमजवखगपतिनिरत: ।।

The second is a short sentence: बिल्वमङ्गल: साधु: ।
The third work is *S.*, called there *Nyāsapaddhati*.

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Baroda,[1] and is referred to in our edition by the siglum *Bd.* The following is a description of that manuscript:

> Accession no. 9593. Paper. Devanāgarī script. 2 folia. Complete. Some errors and illegible writing due to scribal negligence. The MS. is dated *śake* 1761 [=A.D. 1839]. After the 14 verses of *S.* the MS. adds the complete text of Ānandatīrtha's *Yatipraṇavakalpa.* The MS. has the following colophon:
>
> *śake* 1761 *virodhikṛnnāmasaṃvatsare āśvinaśuddha* 12 *te divase māgheganopanāmakabālaṃbhaṭṭātmajamādhavena likhitaṃ samāpitam ||*

A manuscript entitled *Saṃnyāsapaddhati* and ascribed by M. A. Stein to Ānandatīrtha is listed in the *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Raghunātha Temple Library of the Mahārāja of Jammu and Kashmir,* ed. M. A. Stein (London, 1894), Cat. no. 2055; MS. no. 2538. This, however, is not identical with *S.* It is a very elaborate treatise covering 163 folia. The colophon of the MS., unlike the editor of the catalogue, ascribes it not to Ānandatīrtha himself but to the sect of Ānandatīrtha:

> *iti śrīmatparamahaṃsaparivrājakācāryaśrīmadānandānandatīrthasāṃpradāyikaprakaraṇaviracitasaṃnyāsaprakaraṇaṃ samāptam.*

[1] Dr. A. N. Jani, Director of the Oriental Institute, and the staff of the manuscript library were extremely helpful in granting me access to the manuscript and in deciphering some obscure readings. I thank them for their friendly and generous assistance. I am also grateful to Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja of Madras University for drawing my attention to the Bangalore edition of the *Sarvamūla* and for indicating the variant readings of *S.* found there.

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Another manuscript with the same title and ascribed to Ānandatīrtha is found in the library of the Sanskrit College, Benares [MS. no. 105]. That too is in all probability a later Madhvaite work. It is 26 folios long and cannot be identical with *S.*

The present edition is based on the Bangalore edition [*Bg.*] and the manuscript of the Oriental Institute, Baroda [*Bd.*].

S. is a small work consisting of only fourteen verses. Its importance, however, far exceeds its size. *S.* is the only handbook on renunciation written by a founder of a major Hindu sect. Next to the *Yatidharmasamuccaya* by Yādavaprakāśa, *S.* is the oldest work of its kind that has come down to us.

As the author himself points out [v. 14], these fourteen verses constitute only a very brief summary of the daily routine that a Madhvaite renouncer was expected to follow. It was probably meant to be learnt by heart in the manner of similar succinct accounts (*sūtra*) of philosophy, grammar, etc. The details were expected to be learnt orally from a teacher.

The routine of a renouncer's day did not vary substantially from sect to sect. The fuller accounts of that routine found in handbooks of the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions agree substantially with that given in *S.*[1]

[1] For the Advaita tradition see Viśveśvara Sarasvatī, *Yatidharmasaṃgraha*, Poona, 1909; Vāsudevāśrama, *Yatidharmaprakāśa*, ed. P. Olivelle, Vienna, 1976. For the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition see Yādavaprakāśa, *Yatidharmasamuccaya*, Baroda, 1937.

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Several rather detailed works on renunciation from the Madhvaite point of view have come down to us, but none has been edited so far. They exist only in manuscript. Besides the two mentioned above, I have been able to locate the following:

1. Viṣṇutīrtha, *Saṃnyāsavidhi*.

   a) A. C. Burnell, *Index of Sanskrit Manuscripts at Tanjore Palace* (London, 1880), p. 1096. MS. no. 6109. 4 Adhyāya-s, 960 grantha-s, 37 folia.

   b) Oriental Institute, Baroda. Accession no. 8512. 13 folia, 250 grantha-s [only 3rd Adhyāya]. MS. dated *śake* 1741.

2. *Mādhvamatācāravidhi* [rites and observances of the Mādhva community]. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Cat. no. 2942. 206 folia.

TEXT

नत्वा नारायण देवं पूर्ण ब्रह्माक्षरोदितम् ।
यतेराचरणं वक्ष्ये यथाशास्त्रानुसारतः ।। १ ।।

अरुणोदयवेलायामुत्थाय हरिमानसः ।
शौचादिकं यथान्यायं कृत्वा दन्तान् विशोधयेत् ।। २ ।।

[1] यथा – *Bg.* पूर्ण.
[2] –मानसः – *Bg.* मानसैः –.

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कटिशौचं मृदा कुर्याच्छुद्ध्यर्थे जलसंस्थितः ।
स्नानं कुर्याद् यथोक्तेन विधिना नियतो यतिः ॥ ३ ॥

धृत्वोर्ध्वपुण्ड्रं विधिवत् प्रकल्प्यासनमच्युते ।
मनो निवेश्याष्टमन्त्रान् यथाशक्ति जपेच्छुचिः ॥ ४ ॥

द्वादशसाहस्रवृत्तिं परं ब्रह्माक्षरं जपेत् ।
दण्डोदकं जपस्यान्ते दद्याद् विधिविधानतः ॥ ५ ॥

देवतां परमां सम्यक् पूजयेच्च विधानतः ।
भिक्षाकाले विधानेन कुर्याद् भिक्षाटनं यतिः ॥ ६ ॥

एकस्य भिक्षाचरणं जघन्यमिति चोदितम् ।
अनेकभिक्षाचरणं मुख्यधर्मो यतेः स्मृतः ॥ ७ ॥

त्रिपञ्चसप्तसद्मानि गच्छेन्नातोऽधिकं बुधः ।
भिक्षाग्रहणकाले तु गृह्णीयाद् दातृतो जलम् ॥ ८ ॥

भिक्षान्ने तज्जलं प्रोक्षेत् पुनर्ग्राह्य विदालजम् ।
निवेदयेत् तदन्नं तु वारिजस्थोदकेन तु ॥ ९ ॥

[3] मृदा – *Bg.* भृशं [MS. reads मृदा].

[4] धृत्वोर्ध्वपुण्ड्रं – *Bg.* धृतोर्ध्वपुण्ड्रः; विधिवत् – *Bg.* विधिना.

[5] द्वादशसाहस्रवृत्तिं – *Bd.* सहस्रद्वादशो वृत्तिः; – जपस्यान्ते – *Bg.* जपशौचे [जपशान्त्यै and जपस्यान्ते given as variant readings].

[6] कुर्याद् – *Bg.* चरेद्.

[7] एकस्य – *Bd.* एक°; मुख्य° – *Bd.* मुख्यो.

[8] बुधः – *Bg.* व्रजेत् [बुधः given as a variant reading].

[9] तज्जलं – *Bd.* न जलं; प्रोक्षेत् – *Bg.* प्रोक्ष्यं; ग्राह्य – *Bg.* ग्राह्यं; विदालजम् – *Bg.* and *Bd.* read विदाजलम्. The constructed reading is adopted *ex conjectura*. विदाल is used instead of विदल *metri causa*. I have taken विदलज as a synonym of वैदल, a common term for a mendicant's bowl. तु – *Bd.* तं; वारिजस्थोदकेन – *Bg.* वारिजस्योदकेन.

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प्रोक्ष्य देवाय महते मूलमन्त्रेण वाग्यतः ।
तदन्नं भक्षयेत् स्वस्थो ह्यजवद् विष्णुतत्परः ।। १० ।।

त्रिवारमुदके स्नानं यतेः शास्त्रेषु चोदितम् ।
अशक्तस्य यतेः शास्त्रे द्विवारं स्नानचोदना ।। ११ ।।

अत्यन्ताशक्तविषये त्वेकस्नानं स्मृतं बुधैः ।
वेदान्तशास्त्राभ्यसनं मुख्यधर्मो यतेः स्मृतः ।। १२ ।।

ध्येयो नारायणो नित्यं सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकारकः ।
भक्तानां मुक्तिदो नित्यमधमाज्ञानिनां तमः ।। १३ ।।

पूर्णप्रज्ञेन मुनिना व्यासवाक्यसमुद्धृतिः ।
न्यासधर्मस्य विषये कृता संक्षेपतः शुभा ।। १४ ।।

इति श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यविरचिता
संन्यासपद्धतिः समाप्ता ।

TRANSLATION

1. Having bowed to Nārāyaṇa, the God replete, proclaimed by the mystic OṂ, I shall explain the conduct of a renouncer according to the dictates of sacred scripture.

[10] विष्णुतत्परः *Bg.* हरिमानसः.

[12] अत्यन्ताशक्तविषये त्वेकस्नानं – *Bd.* अत्यन्ताशक्ते विषये स्नानमेकं .

[14] न्यासधर्मस्य – *Bd.* सदाचारस्य .

Colophon संन्यास°, *Bg.* न्यास .

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2. Rising from bed at dawn, his mind fixed on Hari [Viṣṇu], he should perform properly the purifications, etc. and clean his teeth.

3. Standing in water, he should clean his loins with earth in order to become pure. Self-controlled, the renouncer should bathe in the prescribed manner.

4. The pure [renouncer] should then put the vertical sectarian marks on his forehead, duly prepare the seat, and, directing his mind to the Imperishable [Viṣṇu], silently recite the eight-syllabic formula.

5. Let him silently recite the supreme mystic syllable OṂ twelve thousand times. At the conclusion of the silent recitation he should pour water on the staff in the prescribed manner.

[2] 'Purifications': The reference is to the purifications performed after voiding urine and excrement in the morning. For the details of the procedure see Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 25-6. According to a rule of interpretation cited often in texts on renunciation [cf. ibid., 26. 43-4], a renouncer should perform four times the number of purifications generally prescribed for a householder: *etac chaucaṃ gṛhasthānāṃ dviguṇaṃ brahmacāriṇām/ triguṇaṃ syād vanasthānāṃ yatīnāṃ tu caturguṇam//* 'That is the purification [ordained] for householders. It shall be twice that much for Vedic students, three times for forest hermits and four times for renouncers.' Manu, 5. 137; Vasiṣṭha, 6. 19; Dakṣa, 5. 8-9.

[3] For a detailed description of the procedure of bathing see Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 35-6.

[4] 'Seat': This is the place where the renouncer sits while performing the twilight devotions (*saṃdhyā*). For details of the preparation of the seat see Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 41. 19-56. 'Eight-syllabic formula': *oṃ namo nārāyaṇāya.*

[5] 'Pour water on the staff': This rite is referred to as *daṇḍatarpaṇa*, a peculiar adaptation of the well-known *tarpaṇa* (offering water to ancestors and gods) that normally follows *saṃdhyā* worship. For the procedure of the *daṇḍatarpaṇa* see Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 49. 17-31.

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6. He should also duly worship the supreme deity according to the rules. At the proper time the renouncer should go on his begging round in the prescribed manner.

7. Begging from a single house is declared to be the worst type. The principal duty of a renouncer, according to the Smṛti-s, is to beg from several houses.

8. A wise man should not visit more than three, five or seven houses. When accepting the begged food he should receive water from the donor.

[6] 'The proper time' for begging is indicated in the following celebrated verse: *vidhūme sannamusale vyaṅgāre bhuktavajjane| vṛtte śarāvasampāte bhikṣāṃ nityaṃ yatiś caret||* 'When no smoke ascends from [the kitchen], when the pestle lies motionless, when the embers have been extinguished, when the people have finished their meal, when the remnants in the dishes have been removed, let the renouncer always go to beg.' Manu, **5**. 56. cf. Vasiṣṭha, **10**. 8; *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad*, **2**. 91. On the procedure of begging see Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 57. 1-92.

[7] *Ekabhikṣā* (or *ekānna*) is a technical term for eating a full meal from one house, which is forbidden to Hindu renouncers except the sick, the old and the feeble (cf. ibid., 55. 45-6). A renouncer is expected to beg from several houses, a mouthful from each. This type of begging is called *mādhūkara* (in the manner of a bee). As a bee collects honey from many flowers without causing them injury, so a renouncer is expected to collect only a little food from each house, and thus not become a burden on the generous donors. An oft-repeated injunction states: *mādhūkaraṃ cared bhaikṣaṃ yatir mlecchakulād api| ekānnaṃ tu na bhuñjīta bṛhaspatisamād api||* 'Let a renouncer collect the *mādhūkara* type of begged food even from the house of a barbarian. However, he should not eat a full meal from one individual, not even from one equal to Bṛhaspati.' Atri, 162; *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad*, 2. 79; Vāsudevāśrama, op. cit., 55. 4-5.

[8] 'Receive water': The householder is instructed to pour water onto the hand of the renouncer before and after giving food: *yatihaste jalaṃ dadyād bhaikṣaṃ dadyāt punar jalaṃ*—'One should give water in the hand of a renouncer, [then] the food, and once again water.' Parāśara, **1**. 53.

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9-10. He should sprinkle that water on the begged food. Taking the cane bowl once again he should announce that food to the great God using the basic formula, after having sprinkled it with water from a conch shell. His mind resting on Viṣṇu, a healthy person should silently eat that food like a goat [*or* like Brahmā].

11. The scriptures enjoin a renouncer to bathe in water three times a day. An infirm renouncer is enjoined in the scriptures to bathe twice a day.

12. The wise prescribe a bath once a day in the case of an extremely feeble renouncer. The Smṛti-s lay down the study of the Vedānta treatises as the principal duty of a renouncer.

9-10 'Basic formula': Probably *oṃ namo nārāyaṇāya.*
'Like a goat': The reading *ajavad* is unclear. *Aja* has a variety of meanings, including goat and Brahmā. If the first is accepted, the meaning would be that a renouncer should eat everything he gets (whether he likes it or not) with relish, just as a goat who is reputed to eat almost anything. In the second case, it may mean that, like Brahmā, he should set his mind on Viṣṇu. If *ajavad* is somehow connected with *annam* (food), then it may mean that the renouncer is expected to contemplate the food he is about to eat as having the nature of Brahmā [*brahmabhāvena bhāvitaḥ*: cf. ibid., 58. 38]. It is prescribed that a renouncer should recollect the following verse while he is eating: *annaṃ brahma raso viṣṇur bhoktā devo maheśvaraḥ | evaṃ dhyātvā dvijo bhuṅkte so'nnadoṣair na lipyate ||* 'The food is Brahmā, the taste is Viṣṇu and the eater is the god Maheśvara [Śiva]. A twice-born who [eats after meditating in this manner is not tainted by the defilement of food.' ibid., 58. 46-7.

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13. One should ever meditate on Nārāyaṇa, the author of the creation, the preservation and the destruction (of the universe). He always grants liberation to his devotees, while he is the darkness of the vilest ignorant men.

14. The sage Pūrṇaprajña has made this excellent summary of the Law of renunciation drawn from the statements of Vyāsa.

Thus ends the handbook on renunciation prepared by the Blessed Teacher Śrī Ānandatīrtha.

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G. B. PALSULE

VERBAL FORMS PECULIAR TO THE ṚGVEDA, MAṆḌALA VI

1. This paper is a sort of supplement to my *Verbal Forms in the Ṛgveda: Maṇḍala VI.*[1] That work studies the verb-forms occurring in Maṇḍ. VI of the *Ṛgveda* with a view to examining the application of Pāṇini's rules. It tests Pāṇini's rules to ascertain how far they suffice to explain the Vedic verb-forms, whether they are exhaustive, whether all the forms can be systematically and satisfactorily explained by the Pāṇinian technique and so on.

The aim of this paper is different. This paper seeks to study the verb-forms of Maṇḍ. VI to see whether there are any tendencies peculiar to the authors of Maṇḍ. VI, whether the forms betray any preferences, likes and dislikes of the Bhāradvāja-s, in the matter of verbal roots, in the choice of different tenses and moods, in the use of voice, and in certain formations (Intensives, reduplicated forms, etc.).

In this paper I am presenting only one instalment of this study, namely, verbal forms peculiar to Maṇḍ. VI.

2. By peculiar I do not mean that there is any irregularity about them. They are not irregular.

[1] Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, class B No. 4, University of Poona, Pune, 1978.

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Actually there are only three forms which are irregular or defective: *aśāyaḥ*, *jagmyātam* and *kṛṇvaíte*.[1] Excluding these three, the remaining peculiar forms are quite regular. They follow the usual pattern. Only, they are not found in the other parts of the *Ṛgveda*.

Some other characteristics of these verbal forms are:

1. They belong to different tenses and moods. They are thus in a way representative.
2. They vary in frequency. Some occur only once, some twice, and rarely three times.
3. Some (forty, to be precise) forms are the lone representatives of their roots in this Maṇḍ.
4. Certain roots or formations represented by some of these forms are found exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI. The other parts of the *Ṛgveda* do not show them.
5. Although these peculiar forms may not be found elsewhere in the *Ṛv.*, cognate forms are often met with. Thus *coṣkūyáte* may be missing elsewhere but one comes across *coṣkūyáse* at *Ṛv.* **8.** 6. 41. Similarly *tartarīti* may not be met with elsewhere, but *tartarīthaḥ* is (*Ṛv.* **10.** 106. 7).

It is not easy to say why these forms have not been used in the other Maṇḍala-s. It is possible that their non-appearance there is purely accidental. It is possible that there was no occasion for their use. It is possible that, when the need was felt, some other forms were

[1] The references for the forms quoted will be found in the list given in section 3.

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used for them. It is possible that some of them, at least, were used in the lost literature. The possibilities are numerous.

The aim of this paper is simply to present the facts. No attempt is made—if at all it can be made—to explain why they are found exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI.

3. Out of a total of 1065 verbal forms occurring in Maṇḍ. VI, the number of forms which are thus absent in the other Maṇḍala-s and are found exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI is 149. I give below these forms, along with their places of occurrence:

aganmahi 51. 16,
átan 61. 9,
atān 67. 6,
adamāyaḥ 18. 3,
ádidyutat 11. 4,
ádhvānayat 18. 10,
anūṣi 38. 3,
apadran 20. 4,
ápaspṛdhethām 69. 8,
abhipraghnanti 46. 10,
abhiśśásati 54. 2,
ámyakṣi 11. 5,
ayujmahi 53. 1,
árcāmasi 21. 6,
avakarśáyanti 24. 7,
avaspárat 42. 4,
áviveḥ 31. 3,
aśāyaḥ 33. 2,
ásathaḥ 63. 1,
asānisam 47. 23,
asedhat 47. 21,
ástāri 63. 3,
áhvāma 50. 4,
ānaśyām 26. 7,
ānāśa 16. 26,
āpan 1. 4,
ārdayaḥ 17. 12,
ubjántu 52. 1,
ṛdhat 2. 4,
ṛdhīmáhi 37. 1,
éjān 25. 7,
kṛṇavase 16. 17,
kṛṇvaíte 25. 4,
kriyāsma 23. 6,
kṣeṣat 3. 1,
gacchāḥ 35. 3,

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ganīganti 75. 3,
cakramāthe 69. 5,
cayiṣṭam 67. 8,
coṣkūyáte 47. 16,
jagṛbháthuḥ 72. 4,
jagmyātam 50. 10,
jaṅghanti 75. 13,
jániṣva 15. 18,
járanti 24. 7,
jarhṛṣanta 17. 4,
jārayā́yi 12. 4,
tartarīti 74. 17,
tūtoḥ 26. 4,
tū́rvatam 50. 10,
dambháyat 18. 10,
dardarīti 73. 3,
dasyet 37. 3,
1 dīdhaḥ (2/1) 17. 6,
2 dīdhaḥ (3/1) 67. 4,
dhavante 47. 14,
dhaithe 67. 7,
náṃśi 51. 12,
nínitsāt 52. 2,
nīḷáyāse 35. 2,
nuttháḥ 17. 5,
nūnot 3. 7,
nonuvuḥ 45. 25,
panāyata 75. 6,
papné 60. 4,
paspṛdhré 34. 1,
pāpatīti 6. 5,
pipyatām 50, 12,
pispṛśaḥ 15. 18,
pispṛśati 49. 12,
pīpihí 17. 3; 35. 4,
pṛṇák 20. 6,
pṛṇethām 69. 7,
pratibhū́ṣati 52. 8,
pratibhū́ṣatha 42. 3,
pratyāvartaya 47. 31,
pratyétana 42. 2,
prā́ḥ 46. 5,
protha 47. 30,
bhanákti 68. 6,
bhánati 11. 3,
bharṣat 38. 1,
bhásat 3. 4; 14. 1,
bhasáthaḥ 59. 4,
bhūtháḥ 67. 5,
bhūṣataḥ 62. 4,
maniṣye 9. 6,
mardhataḥ, 60. 4,
mṛdhāti 23. 9,
medayatha 28. 6,
yamátuḥ 67. 1,
yuvāmahe 57. 6,
yuvāse 35. 1,
yodhat 39. 2,
yodhiṣṭam 60. 2,
raṇáyantu 28. 1,

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randháyaḥ 43. 1,
rarāthe 72. 5,
rarīthāḥ 44. 11,
rārapīti 3. 6,
rikha 53. 7; 8,
riṣyema 54. 9,
rīriṣiṣṭa 51. 7,
rurucyāḥ 35. 4,
vaṃsīmáhi 19. 10,
vakṣyā́mi 9. 6,
vádhiṣaḥ 17. 1,
vananti 6. 3,
vanavase 16. 18,
vanuṣyā́t 5. 4,
vartam 62. 11,
vardhan 51. 11,
vardhāse 16. 16,
várvṛtati 46. 14,
vavanda 51. 12; 63. 3,
vavṛktam 62. 10,
vavṛtat 17. 10,
vāvadīti 47. 31,
vitantasaíte 25. 6,
vivāsema 38. 5; 61. 2,
vividre 27. 1; 2,
viviṣuḥ 32. 5,
viviṣmaḥ 23. 5; 6,
vṛścánti 2. 9,
vṛhaḥ 48. 17,
vyūrṇuté 50. 8,
śaśámate 2. 4,
śasyáse 5. 6,
śiṅkte 75. 3
śiśāḥ 18. 13,
śiṣaḥ 75. 16,
śóśucan 66. 2,
śnáthat 60. 1,
śróṣi 4. 7,
sarsre 18. 7,
saścuḥ 36. 3,
sastáḥ 20. 13,
sā́dhantām 53. 4,
sāsahīṣṭhā́ḥ 45. 18,
síṣvap 20. 13; (si°) 26. 6,
sīṣadhāti 49. 8,
sṛjai (?) 20. 8,
skambháthuḥ 72. 2,
stabhāyaḥ 17. 7,
spūrdhán 67. 9,
spharīḥ 61. 14,
sphurā́n 67. 11,
srasema 11. 6,
hoṣi 44. 14,
hváyāmasi 26. 1; 33. 4; 41. 5.

4. I now take up, for a very brief comment, some of these forms. Wherever possible, I have

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arranged them in groups, according to the common factor of roots, tense-stems, secondary formations, etc.

I. ROOTS:

rikh- 'scratch': A purely Ṛgvedic root. Throughout the *Ṛgveda* this verbal root has a single verb form namely, *rikha* (Imper.) which occurs (twice) in the same pāda in Maṇḍ VI. alone: *ā́ rikha kikirā́ kṛṇu*. From the *Atharvaveda* onwards, the usual form is *likh*.

śiñj- 'twang': This root has a single verbal form in the *Ṛgveda*, namely, *śiṅkte* which has only two occurrences, the other being in Maṇḍ. I (164. 29).

spṛdh- 'contend': From this root which is one of the common roots in *Ṛv.* three forms occur exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI: *ápaspṛdhethām*, *paspṛdhré* and *spūrdhán*. The form *aspṛdhran* of our Maṇḍ. (66. 11) is once found in Maṇḍ. VII (56. 3) also.

pī-(pīpī-) 'swell': From this Vedic (and predominantly Ṛgvedic) root *pipyatām* and *pīpihí* occur exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI. The other forms of this root are quite copious in the *Ṛv.* including *pīpā́ya* and *pipyathuḥ* which appear in our Maṇḍ. also.

sphar/sphur- 'jerk': A similar root. Two of its forms are peculiar to Maṇḍ. VI, namely, *spharīḥ* and *sphurā́n*. Even otherwise the forms are rare in the *Ṛv.*: *sphura* once in Maṇḍ. IV (3. 14), *sphurat* once in Maṇḍ. I (84. 8), and *sphuranti* once in Maṇḍ. X (34. 9). Incidentally, *spharīḥ* is the only verbal form showing the strong root-grade (*ar*).

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hve/hū- 'call': This root shows a particular preference in the use of its two forms: the form *hve* appears in the Active (*hváyāmi, hváyāmasi, áhvāma, johavīmi*) and *hū* in the Middle (*huvé hávate, hávāmahe, hūmahe, hávante, áhūmahi, juhvé*). The only exception is *huvéma* (57. 1).

II. PRESENT STEMS:

viṣ- 'be active' shows copious forms according to the third conjugation in the *Ṛv.* Still *áviveḥ* (contrast with the *seṭ* form *áviveṣīḥ Ṛv.* 4. 19. 10, etc.), *viviṣmaḥ* and *viviṣuḥ* are found exclusively in Maṇḍ. VI.

bharti, bhūtháḥ, jániṣva and *rāṭ* are the rare examples of the roots *bhṛ, bhū, jan* and *rāj* respectively showing forms according to the second conjugation (*ad*-class). Of these *bhūtháḥ* and *janiṣva* belong exclusively to our Maṇḍ. while *bhárti* occurs once in Maṇḍ. I (173. 6) also, and *rāṭ* is met with in Maṇḍ V (46. 8) also. *rāṣṭi* (I. 104. 4) is another similar example.

bhas 'devour' is a purely Vedic root which is conjugated normally according to the third conjugation (*hu*-class). Maṇḍ. VI however has once a form *bhásat* according to the first conjugation and once *bhasáthaḥ*[1] according to the sixth conjugation (*tud*-class).

mṛdh 'neglect' is another purely Vedic root. It is normally conjugated according to the first conjugation (*bhū*-class) (cf. *mardhataḥ* in our Maṇḍ.). Maṇḍ. VI however once shows a form *mṛdhāti* according to the sixth conjugation (*tud*-class).

[1] A doubtful form.

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pṛṇ 'fill' (restricted to the Present-stem in VI: *pṛṇá-*) has many forms in Maṇḍ. VI, as in other parts of the *Ṛv*. The form *pṛṇethām* is however found only in our Maṇḍala (69. 7).

Similarly, the present-stem *yuva-* (cl. VI fr. *yu*) is quite common in the *Ṛv*. The forms *yuvāse* and *yuvāmahe* however belong exclusively to our Maṇḍala. (*yuvase* and *yuvasva* occur in the other parts of the *Ṛv*. also).

spṛdh 'contend': The form *spūrdhán* occurring in this Maṇḍ. (67. 9) is the only example of the conjugation of *spṛdh* according to the sixth (*tud*) class. Everywhere else it belongs to the *bhū*-class.

III. AORIST:

(except Subjunctives, which are given separately below):

I. *atan*. There is also another form *ādabhúḥ*, which however appears once in Maṇḍ. III also.

II. *sasema* (the only *a-* Aor. form from *sraṃs*).

III. *ádidyutat*, *tūtoḥ*, *dīdhaḥ* (2/1 and 3/1), *nūnot*, *pispṛśaḥ* *nirniṣṭa*, *vavṛtat*, *siṣvap* (*siṣvapaḥ*, *Ṛv*. 1. 121. 11; no other form from the stem *siṣvap-* in the *Ṛv*.). There are also the forms *arīramat*, *páptan* and *sīṣadhaḥ* which however appear in the other Maṇḍala-s also.

IV. *atān* (the *Brāhmaṇa-s* show the later form *atāṃsīt*). There is also the form *acchān*, which is however met with once in Maṇḍ. X also.

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V. *asāniṣam* (the only *iṣ*-Aor. Indic. from *san* in the *Ṛv.*), *caviṣṭam* (the only Aor. from *ci*), *yodhiṣṭam*.

IV. PERFECT (except Subjunctives):

(1) Indic.: *ānāśa*, *cakramāthe*, *jagṛbhathuḥ*, *papné*, *rarāthe*, *vavanda* (the only form from *vand* in this Maṇḍ; elsewhere *vavandima*), *vividre* (*vividrire Ṛv.* 2. 21. 5), *saścuḥ*.

(2) Imper. *vavṛktam*. (3) Opt. *ānaśyām*, *jagmyātam*, *rurucyāḥ* (the only perf. opt. from *ruc* in the *Ṛv.*).
—(Without redupl.[1]): *yamátuḥ* (*yamuḥ Ṛv.* 5. 61. 3) *skambhathuḥ*.

V. SUBJUNCTIVE (in all the three systems):

(1) Pres. *ásathaḥ* (*ásati*, etc. occur elsewhere), *ejān* (*ejāt Ṛv.* **10.** 27. 5), *kṛṇavase* and *kṛṇvaite* (other forms copious), *gacchāḥ* (other forms occur), *vanavase* (*vanavat* frequent in the *Ṛv.*), *vardhāse* (the only Mid. Subj. from *várdha-* in the *Ṛv.*), *sṛjai*(?), *sphurān* (the only Subj. from *sphur* in the *Ṛv.*),—Secondary. Denom. *nīḷáyāse*, *vanuṣyāt*—Desid. *ninitsāt*. In the *Ṛv.* the only other form from this Desid. stem is the noun *ninitsú*.

(2) Aor. I. *avaspárat*, *dhaithe*. III. *pispṛsáti* (apart from *pispṛśaḥ* mentioned above, there is no other redupl. Aor. from this root in the *Ṛv.*), *sīṣadhāti* (apart from *śiṣadhaḥ* mentioned above, the only other form from this

[1] Excluding, of course, the roots *vid* and *ah*.

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stem in the *Ṛv.* is *śīṣadhāma*, **10.** 175. 1). IV. *kṣeṣat* (there is no other Aor. form from *kṣi* 'possess' in the *Ṛg.*), *bharṣat*. V. *vádhiṣaḥ*.

(3) Perf. *śaśamate* (the only modal form from the stem *śaśam-* in the *Ṛv.*; also the single Middle in Perf. Subj. in Maṇḍ. VI).

VI. INTENSIVE

ganīganti, *coṣkūyáte* (*coṣkūyáse Ṛv.* **8.** 6. 41, and °*yamāṇa* **1.** 33. 4), *jaṅghanti* (also the Subj. *jaṅghanat* at 16. 34 which occurs elsewhere also), *jarhṛṣanta*, *tartarīti* (*tartarīthaḥ Ṛv.* **10.** 10. 67), *dardarīti* (elsewhere *dardarīmi*, etc.), *nonuvaḥ*, *pāpatīti* (elsewhere only *pāpatan Ṛv.* **8.** 20. 4), *rārapīti* (single Intens. form from *rap* in the *Ṛv.*), *varvṛtati*, *vāvadīti*, *vitantasaíte*, *śośucan* and *sarsre* (the only Intens. form from *sṛ* occurring in this Maṇḍ.).—Four of these forms have only a participle (*gánigmat* **10.** 141. 1, *jarhṛṣāṇa*, *vāvadat*) or some other noun (*vitantasā́yya*, occurring four times in the *Ṛv.*, once in our Maṇḍ. too) by their side.

VII. DENOMINATIVE

Apart from the Subj. *nīḷayāse* and *vanuṣyā́t* mentioned above, there are Imperf. *adamāyaḥ*,[1] *stabhāyaḥ*, and an Aor. Pass. *jārayā́yi*. A corresponding participle

[1] This (Denom.) interpretation is to be preferred to my older one in *Verbal Forms in the Ṛgveda*, p. 10, where I have looked upon it as a Causative, following the Padapāṭha which reads *adamayaḥ*.

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damáyat is found, in our Maṇḍ. itself (47. 16; contrast *damáyat Ṛv.* **7.** 6. 4; **10.** 74. 5). *stabhāyaḥ* also has some corresponding forms. There is no other form anywhere corresponding to *jārayáyi*.

VIII. PRES. IND. ACT 1. PL. IN -MASI:

arcāmasi, *hvayāmasi* (thrice in Maṇḍ. VI; elsewhere *hvayāmahe Ṛv.* **1.** 47. 10; 114. 4; **10.** 40. 4).

IX. IMPERATIVES in *-si*:

śróṣi, (4. 7) *hoṣi* (44. 14).

X. AOR. PASS. (in *CiÑ*):

ámyakṣi, *ástāri*, *pādi* and the curious *jārayāyi*.

XI. PRECATIVE OPT.

(1) Aor. I. *kriyāsma* (the only such 1. pl. form in the *Ṛg*. Three more such forms are seen in the later *saṃhitā-s*). (2) Redupl. Aor. *rīriṣīṣṭa*. The only other example of a Prec. Opt. from a Redupl. Aor. in the *Ṛv.* is a variation of this form itself: *ririṣīṣṭa*, *Ṛv.* **8.** 18. 13. (3) Perf. *sāsahīṣṭhāḥ*. There is no other example of a Perf. Prec. Opt. in the *Ṛv.*

XII. PREFIX-VERB COMPOUNDS[1]:

(1) *abhipraghnánti*, *abhiśāsati*. No other example in *Ṛv.* of the compound forms *abhiprahan-* and *abhiśās*.

[1] The simple construction of these prefixes with verbs (in the main clauses) is of course not denied.

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(2) *avakarśáyanti*, *avasparat*. A similar rare combination of *ava* with *kṛś* and *spṛ*.

(3) *pratibhūṣati* and °*bhūṣatha* (other forms from *prati-bhūṣa-* occur), *pratyávartaya*, *pratyétana* (elsewhere *pratítya*).

XIII. DEFECTIVE FORMS:

aśāyaḥ[1] (for *aśāyayaḥ*), *jagmyātam* (for *jagamyātam*) and *kṛṇvaite* (for *kṛṇavaite*). For Perfect without reduplication, see above under Perfect.

XIV. MISCELLANEOUS FORMS

Now follow a number of forms, which are too varied to classify, and so are best given individually.

aganmahi. Elsewhere *aganma* is frequent in the *Ṛv*.

ádhvānayat. The only other forms in the *Ṛv*. are *dhvanayīt* **1.** 162. 15 and *ádhvanīt* **8.** 6. 13 with a short radical vowel. The Pp. 'corrects' the Saṃh. by reading the form with a short radical vowel: *ádhvanayat*.

anūṣi. *ánūṣata*, a very frequent form in the *Ṛv*. occurs (unaccented) in our Maṇḍ. also.

apadran. Our Maṇḍ. seems rather averse to such typically Vedic Aor. *ran*-forms, the only other form used here being *aspṛdhran*.

asedhat. *asedhaḥ Ṛv*. **5.** 31. 7. *sedha* (Imper.) occurs in our Maṇḍ. (44. 9; 47. 29) also.

[1] If from the caus. of *śī-*, following Sāyaṇa, VELANKAR, etc. Modern scholars are more inclined to derive it from *aś-*.

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ādabhúḥ (also *Ṛv.* **3.** 16. 2). The only other example of Root-Aor. Ind. 3. pl. Act, in *-ur* in our Maṇḍ. is *ásthuḥ*. (As against it there are six forms in *-an*.)

āpan. The only form fr. *āp* in this Maṇḍ.

ārdayaḥ. The only form fr. *ard* in this Maṇḍ.

ubjántu. The only form fr. *ubj*. in this Maṇḍ.

ṛdhat and *ṛdhīmáhi*. The only two forms fr. *ṛdh* in this Maṇḍ.

járanti. Elsewhere *jarante* is quite frequent in the *Ṛv*. The only form fr. *jṝ* in this Maṇḍ.

tū́rvatam. The only verbal form fr. *tūrv* in this Maṇḍ. Even elsewhere the forms are rare. The participle *tū́rvan* occurs in our Maṇḍ. (15. 5; 20. 3) also.

dambháyat. Elsewhere *dambháyaḥ*, etc. occur.

dasyet. The only form fr. *das* in our Maṇḍ.

dhavante. The only form fr. *dhav-* in our Maṇḍ. The root *dhav* has only two other verbal forms in the *Rv*., once *dhavadhve* **5.** 60. 3 and once *adhavanta* **7.** 10. 15. (and once a single derivative *dhávīyas-* in our Maṇḍ itself—at 12. 5).

náṃśi. A difficult form (see Note, *Verbal forms in the Ṛgveda* (*Maṇḍala VI*) on it).

nutthā́ḥ. adhithāḥ is the only other Root-Aor. Indic 2. sing. Mid, form occurring in this Maṇḍ (31. 1). (It is however possible that *nutthāḥ* belongs to *s*-Aor.)

pátyase. Unaccented at *Ṛv*. **2.** 1. 8 also. *pátyate* is elsewhere quite frequent (including our Maṇḍ.).

panāyata. The single verbal form fr. *panāy-* in the *Ṛv*., with its single occurrence here. The only other derivative is *panā́yya-*, *Ṛv*. **1.** 160. 5 and **8.** 57. 3.

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pinvatām. The accented form (*pínvatām*) at *Ṛv.* **10.** 36. 5 also. Other forms fr. √*pinv* occur (in our Maṇḍ. also).

pṛṇák and *pṛṇakṣi*. *pṛṇákṣi* occurs elsewhere in the *Ṛv.* also.

práḥ. Although Pres. forms acc. to cl. II are rare in the Veda (*Ṛv.* knows only *prási*), *aprāḥ* (Root-Aor?) in quite common.

pruṣṇute (also *Ṛv.* **10.** 23. 4). This is the only form fr. √*pruṣ* in our Maṇḍ. The other forms also are rare even elsewhere: *pruṣṇuvánti Ṛv.* **1.** 168. 8, *pruṣṇávat* **3.** 13. 4.

protha. The only form of *pruth* in this Maṇḍ.

bhanákti. The only form of *bhañj* occurring in our Maṇḍ. Elsewhere also the Pres. forms are rather rare.

bhánati. The only form of *bhan* (to speak) in this Maṇḍ. Other forms occur elsewhere.

bhūṣataḥ. See above for forms fr. *prati-bhūṣ*.

maṃsīmáhi. The only *s*-Aor. form fr. *man* in this Maṇḍ. It occurs at *Ṛv.* **1.** 136. 7 and **10.** 26. 4 also.

mardhataḥ. For the stem *mṛdha-*, see above *mṛdhāti*. Other forms like *maṛdhati* occur elsewhere.

medayatha. The only form fr. *mid* occurring in this Maṇḍ.

yamyāḥ (also *Ṛv.* **4.** 22. 8). A similar Root-Aor. Opt. 3. Act. (with the ending *-t* elided) in this Maṇḍ (28. 7) is *vṛjyāḥ*.

yodhat. This could be Root-Aor. Actually the Maṇḍ. does not show any Pres. form according to the *bhū*-class, or any Root-Aor. form.

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raṇáyantu. *raṇayanta* also appears in this Maṇḍ. (1. 4). Other forms from *raṇaya-* are abundant elsewhere in the *Ṛv*.

randháyaḥ. The augmented form *árandhayaḥ* and the Imper. *randhaya* also appear in this Maṇḍ. (23. 3 and 19. 12 resp. etc.).

rabhāmahe (also twice in Maṇḍ. **10**). The only form fr. *rabh* in this Maṇḍ).

rarīthāḥ. Our Maṇḍ. also shows thrice *rirīhi* (with *i* as the redupl. vowel). *rarīdhvam* in *Ṛv*. **5**. 83. 6.

riṣyema. *riṣyati* also occurs in our Maṇḍ. (54. 3).

vaṃsīmahi. Other forms fr. *vaṃs-* (*s*-Aor. of *van*) are frequent in the *Ṛv*., including Maṇḍ. VI.—The form *vasīmahi* occurs at *Ṛv*. **9**. 27. 8.

vananti. The only occurrence of this form in the *Ṛv*.

várate. The only form fr. *vṛ* acc. to *bhū*-class in this Maṇḍ.

vartam. Mark the strong grade.

vardhan. Other forms (fr. *vardha-*) are frequent, including our Maṇḍ.

vivāsema. Other forms fr. *vivāsa-* (Desid. of √*van*) are quite frequent even in Maṇḍ. VI.

vurīta (also **5**. 50. 1). The root *vṛ* shows the form *vur* otherwise in the deriv.—*vûrya* only.

vṛścánti. *vṛśca* (Imper.) also occurs in our Maṇḍ. (8. 5).

vṛhaḥ. The only occurrence of this form in the *Ṛv*.

vyūrṇuté. The compound of *vi* + *ūrṇu* is otherwise seen only in the Pres. participle *vyūrṇvatí* and *vyûrṇvan*.

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śiśāḥ (*śo* 'sharpen'). Other forms are frequent including *śiśādhi*, *śiśīta* 1 (Imperf.) and *śiśīta* 2 (Imper.).

śiṣaḥ. This is the only *a*-Aor. form fr. *śiṣ* 'leave' in this Maṇḍ.

śnáthat. This is the only form of *śnath* acc. to the first conjugation in the whole of the *Ṛv*. (unless one looks upon it as Pres. II Subj. with WHITNEY).

śruvantu (also *Rv*. **10**. 15. 5). Other Root-Aor. forms *śrudhī* and *śrutám* occur in this Maṇḍ. (and also the *-si* Imper. *śróṣi*).

sadema (also *Rv*. **10**. 169. 4). The Indic. *asadat* also occurs in this Maṇḍ. (57. 2).

sastáḥ (*sas* 'sleep'). Forms acc. to this second conjugation (*ad*-class) occur sporadically in the other Maṇḍala-s. In the later Saṃhitā-s the forms according to the *hu*- class alone are met with.

sādhati and *sādhantām*. *sādhati* at *Ṛv*. **1**. 94. 2, etc.

syatam (also *Rv*. **10**. 143. 2). Another form, *sya*, also occurs in this Maṇḍ. (40. 1).

hinu (also *Ṛv*. **9**. 36. 3) and *hinuhi* (also **1**. 143. 4); both in one and the same *Sūkta* (VI. 45). Other forms fr. the stem *hinu*- are not wanting in this Maṇḍ. also.

hīyatām (also **7**. 104. 10). The only other 3. sg. Pres. Imper. pass. in this Maṇḍ. is *pṛcyatām* (28. 8).

hváyāmasi. See (above) the note[1] on the Act. use of the stem *hváya*.

[1] On *hve*/*hū* in section I. ROOTS.

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SATYA VRAT SHASTRI

TADDHITA FORMATIONS IN THE *YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA*

It is natural for a voluminous work like the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* to have all kinds of formations in its thousands of stanzas. A thorough study of them could be revealing from many points of view. The present one aims at bringing into focus the large number of Taddhita formations in the work which could serve a useful purpose in its linguistic analysis. The author has been rather prolific in their use deviating from Pāṇini only occasionally.

By far the largest number of Taddhita formations in the work are those with *aṇ*, added in the sense of belonging as enjoined by Pāṇini in the sūtra *tasyedam* (**4.** 3. 120). They are: *ābja*[1], *aindava*[2], *aindavī*[3], *aindrī*[4], *aindriya*[5], *āmara*[6], *āmbhoda*[7], *āmṛtī*[8], *ānila*[9], *āntara*[10], *ārka*[11], *ārṣa*[12], *āsura*[13], *auśanasa*[14], *āyasī*[15] (*anāyasī*), *avāstavī*[16],

[1] **6** (ii). 138. 1. [2] **6** (ii). 176. 26.
[3] **2.** 18. 20; **3.** 60. 9; **5.** 34. 83; **6** (i). 112. 12.
[4] **6** (i). 7. 38. [5] **6** (ii). 59. 13. [6] **6** (ii). 214. 1.
[7] **3.** 104. 47. [8] **3.** 82. 19. [9] **6** (ii). 85. 6. [10] **6** (ii). 59. 13.
[11] **6** (ii). 88. 16. [12] **3.** 9. 63. [13] **5.** 30. 20; 32. 20.
[14] **4.** 10. 52. [15] **3.** 69. 3. [16] **4.** 46. 12.

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bādara[1], *bhārgavī*[2], *brāhma*[3], *brāhmī*[4], *daivasī*[5], *jāgata*[6], *jāgatī*[7], *kālabha*[8], *kārśānava*[9], *kātaka*[10], *kausuma*[11], *kausumī*[12], *lāvaṇī*[13], *lāvaṇasaindhavī*[14], *mādirī*[15], *mādhavī*[16], *māgadha*[17], *māhendrī*[18], *mairava*[19], *mairavī*[20], *mānasī*[21], *mauna*[22] (*maunaṃ śarīram*), *maunī*[23], *nābhasa*[24], *nābhasī*[25], *nāgara*[26], *naidhana*[27], *nārasiṃha*[28], *pādma*[29], *paitāmaha*[30], *pārameśvara*[31],

[1] **3.** 120. 19. [2] **4.** 16. 4.

[3] **5.** 6. 17; 82. 47; **6** (i). 66. 16; **6** (ii). 68. 15; 72. 6; 208. 6.

[4] **4.** 12. 4; 13. 6; 40. 4; 59. 50; **5.** 34. 83.

[5] **6** (ii). 203. 38.

[6] **4.** 15. 20; 59. 31; **5.** 50. 25; **6** (i). 20. 15; **6** (ii). 149. 1; 158.4.

[7] **4.** 15. 11; 39. 45; 44. 14; 47. 37; 48. 2; 59. 31; **5.** 18. 2; 11; 19. 36; 34. 33; 38. 2; 50. 25; 51. 25; 59. 24; 91. 13; **6** (i). 7. 27; **6** (ii). 56. 7; 102. 51; 127. 18; 149. 1; 158. 14.

[8] **6** (ii). 138. 80. [9] **6** (i). 15. 17. [10] **4.** 29. 6; 22. 8.

[11] **4.** 6. 5. [12] **6** (i). 104. 27. [13] **3.** 116. 2.

[14] **6** (ii). 120. 34. *Ubhayapadavṛddhi* is the peculiarity here, vide Pāṇ. *hṛdbhagasindhvante pūrvapadasya ca* (**7.** 3. 19).

[15] **5.** 34. 87. [16] ibid.

[17] **4.** 48. 9. The commentator explains *māgadha* as *magadhānāṃ nivāso janapadaḥ*, the country inhabited by the Magadha-s and forms the word with the addition of *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *tasya nivāsaḥ* (**4.** 2. 69). Now, if this explanation were to be accepted, the form *māgadha* would be impossible, for by dropping the *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *janapade lup* (**4.** 2. 81) the form would be *magadhāh*. For *māgadha* to be formed as such, it is better to take it in the sense of belonging, *magadhānām ayam*, and have *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *tasyedam*.

[18] **5.** 2. 10. [19] **3.** 50. 35; **5.** 89. 59; **6** (i). 14. 26.

[20] **4.** 8. 7. [21] **5.** 34. 84. [22] **6** (ii). 9. 8. [23] **5.** 34. 85.

[24] **6** (i). 128. 7. [25] **5.** 34. 88. [26] **4.** 49. 34; 55. 12.

[27] **6** (ii). 93. 71. *naidhana=nidhanasaṃbandhi*, leading to death.

[28] **5.** 30. 19. [29] **5.** 84. 35. [30] ibid. [31] **6** (i). 63. 57.

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pārameśvarī[1], *pāyasī*[2], *pauruṣa*[3] (*pauruṣeṇa prayatnena*), *pauṣpī*[4], *prāhrādī*[5], *sāhakārī*[6], *saiṃha*[7], *śākrī*[8], *śāṃbhava*[9], *sāṃsārī*[10], *sāmudra*[11], *sāmudrī*[12], *sānātana*[13], *sāṃdhyā*[14], *śāṃkara*[15], *śārīra*[16], *sārṣapa*[17], *sārvī*[18], *saugatī*[19], *saura*[20], *taijasa*[21], *taijasī*[22], *tāmasī*[23], *tāpana*[24], *tauṣārī*[25], *vaibudhī*[26], *vaiṇavī*[27], *vaiñca*[28], *vaiṣṇava*[29], *vaiṣṇavī*[30], *vārkṣī*[31], *vāyavī*[32], *yākṣī*[33], *yāmuna*[34], *yauvana*[35], all from *abja*, *indu*, *indra*, *indriya*,

The present study is based on the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* with the commentary *Tātparyaprakāśa*, Two Volumes, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1937. **6.** (i) denotes the Pūrvārdha, the first half and **6.** (ii) the Uttarārdha, the second half, of the Sixth Book, the Nirvāṇa Prakaraṇa.

The study does not include the *ka* (*kan*)-ending Taddhita formations, these having already been noticed in the article: 'A Note on *Ka* (*Kan*)-ending Words in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona, Diamond Jubilee. Volume, 1977-78.

[1] **6** (ii). 85. 14; 16. [2] **5.** 34. 85.
[3] **3.** 6. 9; **4.** 62. 17; **5.** 24. 9; 60; 43. 3; 92. 3.
[4] **6** (i). 128. 108. [5] **5.** 33. 15. [6] **5.** 43. 32.
[7] **5.** 45. 43. [8] **5.** 34. 83. [9] **4.** 8. 6; **6** (i). 128. 61.
[10] **6** (i). 112. 9; 12. [11] **5.** 66. 33; 82. 48. [12] **5.** 34. 86.
[13] **5.** 43. 27. [14] **6** (ii). 134. 10. [15] **5.** 68. 27.
[16] **5.** 54. 12. [17] **6** (ii). 59. 13. [18] **5.** 34. 84. [19] **5.** 34. 87.
[20] **5.** 54. 91. [21] **6** (i). 128. 6; **6** (ii). 95. 11. [22] **5.** 34. 83.
[23] **4.** 57. 20. [24] **4.** 21. 40; **5.** 85. 14. [25] **5.** 34. 88.
[26] **4.** 7. 1; **6** (ii). 163. 10. [27] **6** (ii). 160. 14.
[28] **4.** 47. 21; **6** (ii). 69. 4. [29] **5.** 39. 4.
[30] **4.** 34. 24; **5.** 34. 84. [31] **3.** 86. 9.
[32] **5.** 34. 84; **6** (ii). 66. 15. [33] **5.** 34. 88. [34] **5.** 45. 5.
[35] **6** (i). 105. 47. The meaning of the word is 'pertaining to a young woman', *yuvatyā idam*.

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amara, *ambhoda*, *amṛta*, *anila*, *antar*, *arka*, *ṛṣi*, *asura*, *uśanas*, *ayas*, *avastu*, *badara*, *bṛhaspati*, *bhṛgu*, *brahman*, *divasa*, *jagat*, *kalabha*, *kṛśānu*, *kataka*, *kusuma*, *lavaṇa*, *lavaṇa-sindhu*, *madirā*, *madhu*, *magadha*, *mahendra*, *meru*, *manas*, *muni*, *nabhas*, *nagara*, *nidāgha*, *niśā*, *narasiṃha*, *pitāmaha*, *paramātman*, *parameśvara*, *payas*, *puruṣa*, *puṣpa*, *prahrāda*, *sahakāra*, *siṃha*, *śakra*, *śaṃbhu*, *saṃsāra*, *samudra*, *sanātana*, *saṃdhyā*, *śaṃkara*, *śarad*, *śarīra*, *sarṣapa*, *sarva*, *sugata*, *sūrya*, *tejas*, *tamas*, *tapana*, *tuṣāra*, *vibudha*, *veṇu*, *viriñca*, *viṣṇu*, *vṛkṣa*, *vasiṣṭha*, *vāyu*, *yakṣa*, *yamunā* and *yuvan* respectively.

The work has a few words in the sense of *samūha*, group. Three of these, *pādāta*[1], a group of foot soldiers, *vāna*[2], a group of forests and *yauka*[3], a swarm of lice, are formed from *padāti*, *vana*, and *yūkā*; *pādāta* with *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *bhikṣādibhyo 'ṇ* (**4**. 2. 38), and *vāna* and *yauka* by *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *tasya samūhaḥ* (**4**. 2. 37). The same number is found with different suffixes: *hāstika*[4] a herd of elephants, formed from *hastin*+*ṭhak* (*ika*), vide Pāṇ. *acittahastidhenoṣ ṭhak* (**4**. 2. 47), *kānanīya*[5]. a group of forests, formed from *kānana*+*cha* (*īya*) by Pāṇ, *vṛddhāc chaḥ* (**4**. 2. 114) and *tṛṇya*[6], a heap of straw, formed from *tṛṇa*+*ya*, vide Pāṇ. *pāśādibhyo yaḥ* (**4**. 2. 49).

In the sense of bhāva, nature, words are formed with a number of suffixes the most numerous being

[1] **6** (ii). 112. 26.
[2] **6** (ii). 114. 12.
[3] **3**. 107. 10; 44; **6** (ii). 88. 19.
[4] **3**. 19. 8.
[5] **6** (ii). 115. 40.
[6] **6** (ii). 139. 25; 169. 41.

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formed with *syañ* enjoined by Pāṇ. *guṇavacanabrāhmaṇādibhyaḥ karmaṇi ca* (**5**. 1. 124), e.g., *aikātmya*,[1] *āndhya*[2], *auṣṇya*[3], *bālya*[4], *bārhaspatī*[5], *brāhmaṇya*[6], *dainya*[7], *dārḍhya*[8] *daurbhāgya*[9], *dauḥsthitya*[10], *kāruṇya*[11], *māndya*[12], *maurkhya*[13], *naibiḍya*[14], *naikaṭya*[15], *pāṇḍitya*[16], *paunaḥpunya*[17], *prasaugandhya*[18], *saubhāgya*[19], *saugandhya*[20], *śauklya*[21], *sauṣirya*[22], *sāyujya*[23], *staimitya*[24], *sthairya*[25], *svāsthya*[26], *taikṣṇya*[27], *taimirya*[28], *vaidhurya*[29], *vaipaścitī*[30], *vaiphalya*[31], *vaitṛṣṇya*[32], *vaivaśya*[33], and *vaiyarthya*[34] formed from *ekātman*, *andha*, *uṣṇa*, *bāla*, *bṛhaspati*, *brāhmaṇa*, *dīna*, *durbhaga*, *duḥsthita*, *karuṇa*, *manda*, *mūrkha*, *nibiḍa*, *nikaṭa*, *paṇḍita*, *punaḥpunaḥ*, *prasugandha*, *subhaga*, *sugandha*, *śukla*, *suṣira*, *sayuj*, *stimita*, *sthira*, *svastha*, *tīkṣṇa*, *timira*, *vidhura*, *vikala*, *vipaścit*, *viphala*, *vitṛṣṇa*, *vivaśa*, and *vyartha* respectively.

[1] **6** (ii). 94. 55. [2] **3.** 77. 13.
[3] **3.** 47. 6; 95. 37; **4.** 56. 23; **5.** 78. 5.
[4] **1.** 19. 1; 2; 3; 10; 21; **6** (ii). 204. 20.
[5] **5.** 34. 85. First *bārhaspatya* and then in the feminine *bārhaspatī*
[6] **3.** 81. 47. [7] **5.** 60. 1. [8] **4.** 32. 37. [9] **6** (ii). 129. 6.
[10] **4.** 32. 37. [11] **6** (i). 21. 13. [12] **6** (ii). 109. 47.
[13] **1.** 19. 27; **2.** 11. 63; **6** (i). 10. 9; 116. 4.
[14] **2.** 13. 14; **6** (ii). 47. 34. [15] **6** (ii). 143. 32.
[16] **6** (ii). 67. 29. [17] **6** (ii). 91. 32. [18] **5.** 30. 12.
[19] **6** (i). 85. 143. [20] **5.** 6. 7. [21] **5.** 78. 5.
[22] **3.** 9. 63; **5.** 74. 6; 7; 78. 5; 12.
[23] **3.** 55. 65. [24] **6** (ii). 143. 32. [25] **6** (ii). 179. 13.
[26] **6** (ii). 84. 25. [27] **5.** 89. 59. [28] **6** (ii). 173. 27.
[29] **6** (ii). 75. 6. [30] **6** (ii). 190. 89 [31] **6** (ii). 67. 32.
[32] **6** (ii). 93. 94; 194. 10; 31. [33] **6** (i). 2. 34; 32. 4.
[34] **6** (ii). 79. 22.

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In the word *bālya*[1] *syañ* is added in the sense of karma, *bālya* = *balikarma*, which means in effect *āhāra*, food. *Syañ* here too is by Pāṇ. *guṇavacanabrāhmaṇādibhyaḥ karmaṇi ca* (**5.** 1. 124).

The word *śaiśava*[2], childhood, also has the sense of *bhāva*. The suffix here is *aṇ* by Pān. *igantāc ca laghupūrvāt* (**5.** 1. 131).

Next in frequency to *syañ* in the sense of *bhāva* are found used in the work the suffixes *tal* and *tva*. The words with *tal: acopatā*[3], *ahaṃtā*[4], *amāvāsyārthatā*[5], *ambutā*[6], *ātmīyatā*[7], *āvartāditā*[8], *daṇḍatā*[9], *digdhatā*[10], *dīnatā*[11], *dvitā*[12], *duḥkhitā*[13], *jagattā*[14], *kartṛtā*[15], *khaṇḍatā*[16], *khedita*[17], *niścittā*[18], *paratā*[19], *pelavatā*[20], *pīnatā*[21], *pīvaratā*[22], *prakaṭatā*[23], *reṇutā*[24], *sādhutā*[25], *śailatā*[26], *samadṛṣṭitā*[27], *śataśākhatā*[28], *sāṃśokitā*[29], *sāmyatā*[30], *śokitā*[31], *svāgatatā*[32], *sukhitā*[33], *tamastā*[34], *vāstavyatā*[35], *viśrāmatā*[36], *vyasanitā*[37], and *yuvatā*[38],

[1] **4.** 9. 14. The text where the word occurs reads: *araṇyalakṣmīr bālyeva*. Since *bālyeva* does not mean anything, our suggestion is that it should be emended as *bālyena*.

[2] **1.** 19. 4; 15; 30. [3] **5.** 89. 6. [4] **5.** 57. 19; **6** (ii). 187.43.
[5] **5.** 70. 11. [6] **3.** 22. 9. [7] **5.** 18. 56. [8] **5.** 57. 21.
[9] **5.** 91. 71. [10] **5.** 71. 55. [11] **5.** 58. 40. [12] **6** (ii). 101. 8.
[13] **1.** 30. 19; **6** (ii). 11. 23. [14] **5.** 57. 19. [15] **4.** 56. 37.
[16] **5.** 49. 9. [17] **1.** 18. 4. [18] **6** (ii). 22. 38.
[19] **5.** 18. 56. [20] **5.** 58. 29; **6** (ii). 29. 51. [21] **4.** 27. 28.
[22] **5.** 39. 18; 53. 63. [23] **3.** 61. 14. [24] **5.** 91. 71.
[25] **6** (ii). 65. 6. [26] **6** (ii). 49. 22. [27] **6** (ii). 65. 6.
[28] **5.** 93. 2. [29] **6** (ii). 214. 5. [30] **6** (i). 105. 30.
[31] **6** (ii). 101. 21. [32] **5.** 66. 9. [33] **6** (i). 11. 23.
[34] **5.** 36. 67. [35] **4.** 32. 24. [36] **5.** 41. 3.
[37] **6** (ii). 198. 15. [38] **6** (i). 56. 32.

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formed from *acopa*, *aham*, *amāvāsyārtha*, *ambu*, *ātmīya*, *āvartādi*, *daṇḍa*, *digdha*, *dīna*, *dvi*, *duḥkhin*, *jagat*, *kartṛ*, *khaṇḍa*, *khedin*, *niścit*, *para*, *pelava*, *pīna*, *pīvara*, *prakaṭa*, *reṇu*, *sādhu*, *śaila*, *samadṛṣṭi*, *śataśākha*, *saṃśokin*, *sāmya*, *śokin*, *svāgata*, *śukhin*, *tamas*, *vāstavya*, *viśrāma*, *vyasanin*, and *yuvan* respectively.

The words with *tva*: *ahaṃtva*[1], *āryātva*[2], *asahyatva*[3], *ekatva*[4], *mattva*[5], *sāpekṣatva*[6], *tvantva*[7], and *vartamānatva*[8] formed respectively from *aham*, *āryā*, *asahya*, *eka*, *mat*, *sāpekṣa*, *tvam* and *vartamāna*.

In the sense of *bhava*, residing therein, the words are found in the work with a number of suffixes: With *aṇ* by Pān. *tatra bhavaḥ* (**4.** 3. 53): *hārda*[9] (from *hṛdaya*), *mādhyāhna*[10] (from *madhyāhna*), *nāraka*[11] (from *naraka*), and *sāṃdhya*[12] (from *saṃdhyā*). With the same *aṇ* but by a different sūtra *hāyanāntayuvādibhyo'ṇ* (**6.** 1. 130): *sauhārda*[13] (from *suhṛd*). With *ṭhañ* by the Vārttika *adhyātmādeṣ ṭhañ iṣyate: āṃśika*[14], *aurdhvadehika*[15], *daivikī*[16], *pāramātmikī*, *sāṃsārikī*[17], *sāttvikī*[18], and *vyāvahārika*[19] (from *aṃśa*, *ūrdhvadeha*, *deva*, *saṃsāra*, *sattva* and *vyavahāra* respectively). With other suffixes: *bāhya*[20], with *yañ* by the Vārttika

[1] **6** (ii). 8. 5; 212. 21. [2] **6** (ii). 60. 2.
[3] **6** (ii). 75. 40. [4] **6** (ii). 101. 80. [5] **6** (ii). 67. 29.
[6] **4.** 29. 16. [7] **5.** 18. 56; **6** (ii). 8. 5. [8] **6** (ii). 99. 34.
[9] **6** (ii). 214. 26. The word *hṛdaya* is changed to *hṛd* by Pāṇ. *hṛdayasya hṛllekhayadaṇlāseṣu* (**6.** 3. 50).
[10] **5.** 50. 50. [11] **3.** 107. 6; 17; 114. 68; **5.** 18. 52.
[12] **6** (ii). 134. 10. [13] **6** (ii). 44. 33. [14] **3.** 82. 37.
[15] **4.** 42. 8. [16] **5.** 61. 43. [17] **6** (ii). 216. 13.
[18] **4.** 59. 50. [19] **6** (i). 108. 2. [20] **6** (ii). 214. 26.

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bahiṣaṣ ṭilopo yañ ca under Pān. **4.** 1. 85; *pāścātya*[1], with *tyak* by Pān. *dakṣiṇāpaścāt purasas tyak* (**4.** 2. 98); *vanya*[2], with *yat* by Pān. *digādibhyo yat* (**4.** 3. 54).

In the sense of *vikāra*, modification, the majority of the words formed are with *aṇ* by Pān. *tasya vikāraḥ* (**4.** 3. 134): *aurṇa*[3], woollen (from *ūrṇā*+*aṇ*), *haima*[4] and *sauvarṇa*[5] or *sauvarṇī*[6], golden (from *heman*+*aṇ* and *suvarṇa*+*aṇ* respectively), *tārṇa*[7], made of straw (from *tṛṇa*+*aṇ*). There are two other commonly used words also with the suffixes *aṇ* and *añ*. They are *kānaka*[8] made of gold which has *aṇ* by Pān. *kopadhāc ca* (**4.** 3. 137) and *tāntava*[9], made of thread, which has *aṇ* by Pāṇ. *or añ* (**4.** 3. 139).

The words *āvika*[10] and *mārga*[11] have *aṇ* added to *avi* (which must have *svārthe ka* and be *avika* for purposes of addition of a suffix according to the *aviravikanyāya*) and *mṛga* in the sense of *avayava*, part, vide Pān. *avayave ca prāṇyauṣadhivṛkṣebhyaḥ* (**4.** 3. 135). Both denote the flesh which is the *avayava*, part, of the respective animals ram or sheep and deer.

Of the *matvarthīya* or possessive suffixes *ini* and *ṭhan*, Pāṇ. *ata iniṭhanau* (**5.** 2. 115), *ini* is found in *dhanin*[12], wealthy (from *dhana*), *jālin*[13], having a net (from *jāla*), *pāpin*[14] sinner (from *pāpa*) and *vivekin*[15] discriminating,

[1] **6** (ii). 93. 29. [2] **6** (ii). 93. 71. [3] **6** (ii). 113. 20.
[4] **3.** 26. 15; **6** (i). 104. 29.
[5] **3.** 50. 35; **4.** 47. 43; **6** (ii). 206. 20. [6] **6** (i). 126. 23.
[7] **2.** 13. 33; **5.** 51. 35. [8] **4.** 10. 20. [9] **4.** 11. 56.
[10] **3.** 107. 22. [11] ibid. [12] ibid. [13] **5.** 9. 9.
[14] **6** (i). 127. 8. [15] **6** (ii). 51. 32.

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judicious (from *viveka*) and *ṭhan* in *Śāmbarika*[1] and *timirika*[2]. *Itac*, Pāṇ. *tadasya saṃjātaṃ tārakādibhya itac* (**5.** 2. 36) is found in words like *jālakita*[3] latticed (from *jālaka*), *ṭakaṭakita*[4], clanked (from *ṭakaṭaka*) and *tārakita*[5] starry, (from *tāraka*).

Of the words each in a different sense and with a different suffix mention may be made of *āgneyī*[6], belonging to or residing in *agni*, formed from *agni+ḍhak*, vide the Vārttika, *prāgdīvyatīyeṣu taddhitārtheṣu sarvatrāgnikalibhyāṃ ḍhag vaktavyaḥ* under Pāṇ. *agner ḍhak* (**4.** 2. **33**), *aindriya*[7] that which can be grasped with senses (*indriyair grāhyaḥ*), formed from *indriya+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *śeṣe* (**4.** 2. 92), *āmbikeya*[8], son of Ambikā, Kārttikeya, formed from *ambikā+ḍhak*, vide Pāṇ. *strībhyo ḍhak* (**4.** 1. 120), *daiṣṭika*[9], that has Destiny as a cause for appearance, formed from *diṣṭa+ṭhak*, vide Pāṇ. *astināstidiṣṭaṃ matiḥ* (**4.** 4. 60), *dantura*[10], with high or protruding teeth or figuratively, overspread, covered with, formed from *danta+urac*, vide Pāṇ. *danta unnata urac* (**5.** 2. 106), *dharmya*[11], lawful, formed from *dharma+yat*, vide *Pāṇ. dharmapathyarthanyāyād anapete* (**4.** 4. 92), *lokya*[12], good

[1] **3.** 116. 2. [2] **6** (ii). 127. 3. [3] **3.** 38. 48. [4] **3.** 46. 31.
[5] **5.** 1. 2. [6] **5.** 34. 85. [7] **5.** 88. 15. [8] **6** (ii). 125. 5.
[9] **5.** 48. 40. The commentator's explanation of *daiṣṭika* is: *diṣṭaṃ daivam eva matiḥ pravṛttinimittaṃ yasya*. This militates against the traditional interpretation of it in grammatical works which is: *asti diṣṭam iti matir yasya* according to which *daiṣṭika* should mean fatalist or believer in Destiny.
[10] **3.** 28. 29; **5.** 31. 14; **6** (ii). 45. 12; 71. 40; 141. 8.
[11] **6** (ii). 116. 3. [12] **6** (ii). 47. 5.

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for the people, formed from *loka+yat*, vide Pāṇ. *tasmai hitam* (**5.** 1. 5), *maitra*[1], relating to *mitra*, friend, formed from *mitra+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *śeṣe* (**4.** 2. 92), *mārga*[2], of the deer species (*mṛga-jātīya*), formed from *mṛga-aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *śeṣe* (**4.** 2. 92), *naidāghī*, of the summer, formed from *nidāgha+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *sandhivelādyṛtunakṣatrebhyo'ṇ* (**4.** 3. 16), *naiśa*[3], nocturnal, formed from *niśā+aṇ* vide Pāṇ. *niśāpradoṣābhyāṃ ca* (**4.** 3. 14), *pārvatī*[4], of the mountain, formed from *parvata+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *vibhāṣā 'manuṣye* (**4.** 2. 144), *śārada*[5], autumnal, formed from *śarad+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *sandhivelādyṛtunakṣatrebhyo'ṇ* (**4.** 3. 16), *sārva*[6] (*sarvasamai hitam*), good for everybody, formed from *sarva+ṇa*, vide Pāṇ, *sarvapuruṣābhyāṃ ṇaḍhañau* (**5.** 1. 10). *straiṇa*[7], feminine, formed from *strī+nañ*, vide Pāṇ. *strīpuṃsābhyāṃ nañsnañau bhavanāt* (**4.** 1. 87), *svāpna-pura*[8] (*svapnena sṛṣṭaṃ puram*), the dream city, formed from *svapnapura+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *śeṣe* (**4.** 2. 92), *vaimānika*[9] an aeronaut, formed from *vimāna+ṭhak*, vide Pāṇ. *carati* (**4.** 4. 8.), *vaivadhika*[10], a pedlar, a hawker, formed from *vivadha* or *vīvadha+ṭhak*, vide Pāṇ. *vibhāṣā vivadhāt* (**4.** 4. **17**), *vārṣikī*[11], annual, formed from *varṣa+ṭhak* vide Pāṇ. *varṣābhyaṣ ṭhak* (**4.** 3. 18), *vāsiṣṭhī*[12] (*vāsiṣṭhīḥ giraḥ*) (words) uttered (*proktāḥ*) by *Vasiṣṭha*, formed from *vasiṣṭha+aṇ*, vide Pāṇ. *śeṣe* (**4.** 2. 92), *vāyavya*[13]

[1] **6** (ii). 216. 4. [2] **5.** 20. 9. [3] **5.** 34. 88.
[4] **6** (ii). 64. 27. [5] **5.** 9. 64; **6** (ii). 135. 4. [6] **5.** 87. 21.
[7] **6** (ii). 77. 16; 103. 3; 105. 32.
[8] **6** (ii). 144. 9; 209. 37. [9] **6** (ii). 93. 17; 112. 35.
[10] **5.** 19. 18. [11] **5.** 34. 87. [12] **5.** 1. 8. [13] **6** (i). 128. 7.

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the wind, formed from *vāyu+yat*, vide Pāṇ. *digādibhyo yat* (**4.** 3. 54), *yāṣṭīka*[1], having club as the weapon, (*yaṣṭiḥ praharaṇam asya*), formed from *yaṣṭi+īkak*, vide Pāṇ. *śaktiyaṣṭyor īkak* (**4.** 4. 59).

As is well known, not all the Taddhita suffixes are added in any additional sense. Suffixes of this type are called *svārthika-s*, i.e. added in the sense of the *prakṛti*, base, itself. A couple of instances of them may well be noted here: *aupayogika*[2], which is the same as *upayoga*, utility, usefulness (*upayoga+ṭhak*), *kārṣṇya*[3], which is the same as *kṛṣṇa*, dark (*kṛṣṇa+syañ*), *mākara*[4] which is the same as *makara*, crocodile, (*makara+aṇ*), *tānavī*[5] which is the same as *tanu*, slim, thin (*tanu+aṇ*), *vārdhakya*[6] which is the same as *vṛddhaka* meaning *vṛddhatva*.

Though a vast majority of the Taddhita formations in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* are Pāṇinian, some are definitely not so. A couple of them have suffixes for which there is no sanction of Pāṇini. Thus in *yāmya*[7], belonging to Yama, *ṇya* is found in the sense 'to belong to' (*tasyedam*) for which there is no sanction of Pāṇini.

[1] **1.** 6. 10; **2.** 1. 20.

[2] **6** (ii). 128. 3. *Ṭhak* by Pāṇ. *vinayādibhyaṣ ṭhak* (**5.** 4. 34).

[3] **4.** 44. 35. Formed on the analogy of words like *cāturvarṇya*, vide the commentary: *cāturvarṇyādivat svārthe ṣyañ.*

[4] **6** (ii). 26. 8. [5] **5.** 91. 57.

[6] **4.** 16. 17. Formed on the analogy of words like *cātūrvarṇya.*

[7] **3.** 34. 13; **6** (ii). 140. 21. The author of the *Vṛtti* seeks to justify the form by a Vārttika: *yamāc ceti vaktavyam* which is not found in the *Mahābhāṣya.*

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Similarly *āpya*[1], watery, is against the Pāṇinian school according to which the form should be *ammaya*, vide the Iṣṭi: *ekāco nityaṃ mayaṭam icchanti*, (the grammarians) want the monosyllabic bases to take *mayaṭ* without exception. In *śārvara*[2], belonging to the night, *aṇ* is found for which Pāṇini enjoins *ṭhañ*, vide his sūtra: *kālāṭ ṭhañ* (**4.** 3.11).

Occasionally is found in the work a word or two where a double suffix in the same sense is used. The examples are: *auṣṇyatva*[3] where *ṣyañ* and *tva*, both in the sense of *bhāva*, nature, are found, *sāmyatā*[4] where *syañ*, and *tal*, both again in the sense of *bhāva* are used, *śārīraka*[5] where *aṇ* and *kan*, both in *svārtha*, in the sense of the original word itself, are found.

Of other anomalous forms there are three that deserve particular notice. One is *āruṣeya*[6]. The peculiarity here lies in the anaptycal *u*. Another is *grāmyeyaka*[7] where *grāmya* only should have sufficed. *Ḍhakañ*[8] for which there is no sanction of Pāṇini need not have been used. The third is *sāptapada*.[9] According to Pāṇini it should be *sāptapadīna*, vide his *sūtra: sāptapadīnaṃ sakhyam* (**4.** 2. 22).

[1] **6** (i). 128. 6.

[2] **4.** 10. 55; 13. 6; **5.** 54. 45. The word is not the peculiarity of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* only, having been used by ancient authors like Kālidāsa, vide *Kumārasambhava*, **8.** 58.

[3] **6** (i). 81. 96. [4] **6** (i). 105. 30. [5] **5.** 91. 57.

[6] **6** (ii). 175. 76. [7] **6** (ii). 94. 77.

[8] Vide the commentary *Tātparyaprakāśa: grāmyaśabdāt svārthe ḍhakañ chāndasaḥ.*

[9] **6** (ii). 216. 4.

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There are two interesting instances in the work where the Taddhita suffix should have been used but is not used actually. One is *indrajāla*[1] which gives the sense of *aindrajālika*, magician. The other is *vṛddha*[2] used in the company of *bālya* and *yauvana* which gives the sense of *vṛddhatva*. Though peculiar, they are not violative of usage. Even the great Ācārya Pāṇini uses *dvi* and *eka* in the sense of *dvitva* and *ekatva* in the *sūtra*, *dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane* (**1.** 4. 22). Such uses are accepted as good Sanskrit and are called *bhāva-pradhānanirdeśā-s*.

[1] **5.** 9. 9. 216. [2] **5.** 50. 33.

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SADASHIV A. DANGE

THE GIFT OF THE BED

One of the most interesting gifts recorded by the Purāṇa-s is that of a bed or a cot. It is connected with the *vrata-s* called Aśūnya-śayana and Saubhāgya-śayana; but it is not restricted to these. On a minute examination it becomes clear that the gift is an extension of the belief that the gods sleep on certain days in the year, in the first month of the *cāturmāsya* period; the month is Āṣāḍha (June-July), and the sleeping starts from the bright eleventh day in that month. The *Vāmana P.* (17. 3 ff.) gives the various days in this period for the various gods to sleep; and though a particular day is not quite restricted to a particular god, others also being associated with the same, there appears to be a fair association of the days and the gods. Thus, Caturthī and Gaṇeśa; Ṣaṣṭhī and Skanda, the six-faced Kārtikeya; Saptamī and the sun; Aṣṭamī and Navamī and the goddesses Kamalā and Durgā, and so on. One remarkable point is the association of Śiva with the full-moon-day (ibid). The association is not quite common; but, then, we may bring to our mind that it is on the full-moon-day of Phālguna that Śiva is said to have burnt the god of love; and we also know the event of the Tripura Paurṇimā on which day

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Śiva is said to have burnt the three cities of the demons. But, the full-moon-day is not the only day for Śiva; for he is also associated with the day called Kālāṣṭamī, which is the dark eighth day of the month Bhādrapada (*Vāmana P.* 17. 30-31). The belief associated with the Kālāṣṭamī helps indicate a general belief regarding the gods and their association with their days. It is said that on the Kālāṣṭamī, Śiva sleeps in all the Śiva-*liṅga-s*; hence, on this day the worship of Śiva at a *liṅga* directly goes to him (ibid.)[1]. This renders added implication to the belief that the various gods sleep on particular days. These days are, then, to be taken as days when the gods do not move out; and the same may be supposed to be true about the *cāturmāsya* period as a whole. On the Kālāṣṭamī, special worship of Śiva is enjoined; and the vow is called Aśūnyaśayana ('The non-empty Bed'). The non-empty bed in respect of Śiva, then, indicates Śiva's bed (*liṅga*) being not devoid of the god Śiva. There is also the Vaiṣṇavite *vrata* of the same name; and it is to be observed on the dark second day of Śrāvaṇa (July-August), and may be continued for the whole of the *cāturmāsya* period, being performed on the dark second day of the other months in it. The main purpose behind the performance of this *vrata* is said to be the non-separation of the husband and the wife. As such, it can be performed by a married

[1] *Vāmana P.* 17. 31.

तस्यां सर्वेषु लिङ्गेषु तिथौ स्वपिति शंकरः ।
वसते संनिधाने तु तत्र पूजाऽक्षया स्मृता ।।

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woman or a married man. The prayer is clear: 'O God, as you never get separated from Lakṣmī, so may I not be separated from my wife.' (*Vāmana P.* loc. cit., 23 *Matsya P.* **70**. 7; cf. also ibid. **92**. 73; *Padma P.* **5**. 24. 1-19).[1] According to the *Skanda P.* (**6**. 265. 23 ff.), the *vrata* is to be observed on the second dark day of Śrāvaṇa marked by a constellation auspicious to Viṣṇu; and Viṣṇu sleeping on (the serpent-bed in) the water is to be worshipped. There is no clear mention in this place of Lakṣmī also being on the bed along with Viṣṇu, but it is to be taken as indicated. The gift of a bed (*śayyā*) is enjoined, and the bed-stead is to be covered with fruits and paddy (i.e. 30-32). The same details are mentioned in the *Bhaviṣya P.* (*Uttara* **15**. 4 ff.); and the *vrata* is enjoined with a desire to avoid widowhood. The dark second day is itself called here Aśūnya-śayanī-dvitīyā[2], though at the end of the *vrata*, on the dark second day of Kārttika a bed is to be given to a brāhmaṇa placing Viṣṇu, the lord of Lakṣmī on it (ibid., 16[b] *śayyām śrī-kānta-saṃyutām*), along with other things. The time of the worship of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī is mentioned as mid-day in the *Sk. P.*, while in the *Padma P.* it is night when the moon has risen. A point to be noted is that the bed to be donated is not clearly said to be with both Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī. The reference

[1] *Matsya P.* 70. 7.

लक्ष्म्या वियुज्यते देव न कदापि यथा भवान् ।
तथा कलत्रसंबन्धो देव मा मे वियुज्यताम् ।।

[2] अशून्यशयनीं नाम द्वितीयां शृणु तां मम ।
मामुपोष्य न वैधव्यं प्राप्नोति स्त्री युधिष्ठिर ।।

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from the *Sk. P.* noted above mentions only 'Viṣṇu sleeping in water' (v. 30 *jalaśāyinam uttamam*) while in the *Bhaviṣya P.* the word is *śrīkānta-samanvitām*, which may mean 'with Viṣṇu' (the lord of Śrī) or 'with Śrī and her husband'. From this point, yet another mention of the Aśūnya-śayana-vrata may be noted. This is in *Sk. P.* (2. 7. 10. 6 ff.). Here the *vrata* is prescribed on the bright second day (v. 6[a] *śrāvaṇe śukla-pakṣe tu dvitīyāyām . . .*); and, though the worship of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī is enjoined, the bed to be given to the brāhmaṇa is said to be with the idol of Viṣṇu made of gold or silver (ibid.). According to this reference, the said *vrata* may be continued for the whole year and not only for the duration of the *cāturmāsya*. However, the unit of four months is maintained; and in each of the three sets of four months Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī are to be worshipped in different forms. Thus, for Śrāvaṇa-Kārttika Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī; for Mārgaśīrṣa-Phālguna Hari and Rukmiṇī; and for Caitra-Āṣāḍha Varāha (Boar-incarnation) and Earth. The yearly vow is to come to end on the second day of Āṣāḍha, when the invocation to Viṣṇu is the same as in the previous versions of the *vrata*, namely that the bed of the observer should not be devoid of the spouse. But, here is an interesting point. The last version (*Sk. P.* 2. 7. 10. 6 ff. says that the *vrata* may be observed even by a widow (v. 27 *puruṣo vā satī vā 'pi vidhavā vā samācaret*). The mention of the *vidhavā* would indicate that the *vrata* is not necessarily for a happy married life now, but for the future as well.

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From what has been said above, it would be clear that the Aśūnya-śayana-vrata was not restricted to the gain of happy married life, or sexual happiness only at the present time. That there were at least two different versions of the *vrata* is clear from the mention of the bright Second day, in addition to the dark one. The most original idea associated with the *vrata* seems to be the gift of a bed during the 'Sleeping period', for the gods to sleep upon, as is indicated by the *jalaśāyin* Viṣṇu and the *liṅga-śāyin* Śiva. The bed with the god and the goddess, his wife, upon it, marks a different stage, when conjugal or sexual happiness came to be associated with the bed-gift. With the addition of this motif such expressions as *Śrī-kānta* (*Bhaviṣya P.* noted above) or *Lakṣmī-pati-samanvitām* (*Matsya P.* **70**. 11) came to be used, which could indicate a single god, or also the god along with his wife! It may be noted in this connection that the gift of the bed forms part of various *vrata-s*. Even in the case of the prostitutes, in certain vows, the gift of the bed is enjoined (*Matsya P.* **69**. 47), which cannot be said to be for happy married life, or sexual happiness; it is obviously for good prospects in their profession, in which the bed plays a prominent part. As the gift of the bed, along with the mattress thereupon, is not restricted to the happy married life (cf. the widow's gift of a bed, or that of the prostitute), so was it not restricted to the *cāturmāsya*. Some of the *vrata-s* where the bed is enjoined to be given are Śiva-caturdaśī (*Matsya P.* **94**. 27), coming on Mārgaśīrṣa bright thirteenth day; Bhīmadvādaśī (ibid. **68**. 54), Māgha

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bright twelfth day; Vibhūti-dvādaśī (ibid. **98**. 15), tenth day of bright Kārttika; even in the context of the Aṅgāraka-*vrata*, which is in respect of the planet Mars, a bed is ordained to be given, (ibid. **71**. 38). Other *vrata-s* supporting the point are Śarkarā-saptamī, on Caitra bright seventh day (ibid. **74**. 9); Kamalā-saptamī, in respect of the sun on the bright seventh day of Caitra itself, when a golden lotus is to be given on a bed well furnished (ibid. **77**. 8); Śubha-saptamī, when sugar-cane and jaggery-bits are to be given being placed on a well-furnished bed, on the bright seventh day of Āśvina (ibid. **79**. 8), etc.

That the gift of the bed had wider implications would be clear from some more examples. This gift is mentioned also in the worship of Rādhā, where, it is said, the bed was covered with a cloth bright like the hue of the fire and smeared with sandal-paste (*Brahma-vaivarta P.* Prakṛtikhaṇḍa **55**. 38); in the *vrata* at the birth of Kṛṣṇa (ibid. **2**. 8, 29); in the worship of Mahā-lakṣmī (ibid. Prakṛti **39**. 40); in the *vrata* of Sāvitrī (in the famous story of Sāvitrī and Satyavān), after she is worshipped with the traditional sixteen *upacāra-s* (acts) (ibid. **23**. 70). In an interesting bit of information from the *Padma P.* (Brahma-khaṇḍa **2**. 12-14) a robber named Daṇḍaka, once, entered at night the temple of Kṛṣṇa. His intention was to commit theft; but what he saw interested him. The inner shrine was teeming with the fragrance of the wick-lamp provided with fragrant oil; and, in its light, he saw a bed whereupon the idol of Kṛṣṇa was placed to sleep with that of Rādhā

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(*-paryaṅke sumanohare ; śāyito rādhayā sārdhaṃ dṛṣṭaḥ pītāmbaro 'cyutaḥ*). This detail indicates a festival in honour of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa when they were made to lie, or sleep together. The Śayanotsava of Kṛṣṇa, Balarāma, and Subhadrā at Jagannāthapurī is mentioned in the Purāṇa-s (eg. *Sk. P.* **2.** 2. 36. 1 ff.); but there the gods sleep separately, as Kṛṣṇa and Subhadrā are brother and sister. Hence the Radhā-Kṛṣṇa motif has to be taken as a special one, as far as the temples are concerned. Śiva and Umā are mentioned, like Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī, to be given on a bed, along with a pair of a bull and a cow, in the *vrata* called Saubhāgya-śayana (*Matsya P.* **60**. 41^{cd} *vratānte śayanam dadyād . . .; umā-maheśvaraṃ haimaṃ vṛṣabhaṃ ca gavā saha*). In the case of the gift of a bed at the birth of Kṛṣṇa, at the *vrata* in respect of Rādhā, or the *vrata* of Sāvitrī mentioned above, a simple bed without an idol is to be given, while in such *vrata-s* as the Saubhāgya-śayana or the Aśūnya-śayana a bed with the god and the goddess is to be given, along with a prayer to bestow happy married life with full sexual pleasure. Apart from these types of gifts of a bed, there is another one. This is the gift of a bed on which one's own golden image or idol is to be placed. The main motive in doing so is said to be the achievement of heaven after death (*Agni P.* **211**. 17 *haimīm pratikṛtiṃ kṛtvā dattvā svargas tathātmanaḥ*). The gift of oneself has to be compared with *tulā-dāna*,[1] in which things equal to

[1] *SK. P.* **5.** 1. 8. 67, 69; **7.** 4. 8. 15-16. The idea in such rites seems to be redemption of oneself from all evils and sins committed unknowingly.

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one's own weight are to be distributed, or are to be given to a brāhmaṇa. In a variant of this gift, the image may be made of iron (*Bhavisya P.* Uttarakhaṇḍa **185**. 3 *lohajām prakṛtim bhavyām*) and decorated with various costly things is to be donated on a bed. Even a woman may give such an idol of herself (ibid. 5cd *strī ced dadāti śayane śāyitām kārayet svayam*). In yet another type of this gift, the image of oneself is to be given along with that of Viṣṇu, but on a different bed, with the expressed desire that the giver should go to the region of Viṣṇu and be identified with the god after death (*Agni P.* **204**. 12-15). It is with the same belief that, in the funeral rites after the death of a person, his image is enjoined to be given being placed on a bed. It is said that, thereby, the person gets free from the state of the dead (*preta*) and becomes a resident among the gods, enjoying life with them (*Garuḍa P.* **2**. 21. 21).[1] In the same text, it is said that one may give a bed covered with a mattress stuffed with cotton even in his own life-time, if one has a doubt as to which of the sons would give such a gift after his death (ibid. 24. 50).[2] The cot may be made of excellent wood, ivory or gold-plated along with the pillow (ibid. 51-53). According to the *Brahmavai. P.* (I Gaṇapati-khaṇḍa 28. 49 ff.) at the funeral rites of his father, Jamadagni, Paraśurāma gave to the brāhmaṇa-s various gifts, including

1 शय्या तूलीपट्टयुक्ता दद्याद् देवद्विजातये ।
तथा प्रेतत्वमुक्तोऽसौ मोदते सह दैवतैः ।।

2 भूतानां कः सुतो यच्छेच्छुभशय्यां सतूलिकाम् ।
एवं जीवति सर्वस्वं स्वहस्तेनैव दापयेत् ।।

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a bed, charming and divine in appearance (*divya-śayyāṃ manoramām*).

From what has been said uptil now, the varieties of the bed that is given at a rite are as follows: (i) A bed without any image or an idol on it dedicated to a god, and subsequently given to a brāhmaṇa; (ii) A bed with the idol of the god upon it given to the god; (iii) A bed given to a brāhmaṇa with one's own idol on (iv) A bed given to a brāhmaṇa in respect of the dead, with the figure representing the dead; and (v) A bed with a god and a goddess upon it. The motive of the gift of a bed with one's own idol in one's life-time and the one for a dead person, with his representative idol on, is similar; and it is expressed as the gain of heaven and the company of the gods after death. A bed without the image of a god and that with it, have the same motif. Actually the latter is only the extension of the former; and it seems to have originated with the belief that the gods sleep in a certain period (*cāturmāsya*). As an extension of the same belief, it seems probable that the gift of a bed to the god (with his image on it, or without it) is with the belief that the god would stay in the house of the giver. This is on the analogy of the principle of *aśūnyatva*, as is seen in the case of Śiva and his *liṅga* and noted above. The sleep of the god, then, is indicative of his presence in the same place; and the bed acts as a charm for keeping his divine presence in the house of the giver of the bed, for prosperity and good luck. The gifts of bed by even a widow and a prostitute explain the point. The last one, where the

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bed with the god and the goddess is to be given, is a clear case of *mithuna*; and here the principle of *aśūnyatva* gets an added angle: Not devoid of the spouse! In this case the giving of a *mithuna* of the gods acts as a charm for happy conjugal life, the gain of progeny included. The earlier instance of a couple on a bed, or what looks like a bed, obtains from the second century B.C.; and it has to be connected with the tradition of ritual-coupling (*mithunīkaraṇa*) for prosperity and progeny prevalent among the Vedic people. The second-century B.C. couple mentioned above is from Tamluk, and is in something like a chair, or may be a small bed; and it is in the *puruṣāyita* posture, both the parties being nude.[1] In another terracotta instance of a couple, in which both the parties are nude, the woman is shown as sitting on the lap of the man. And both are shown as sitting on a spacious chair-like cot.[2] These figures could never have been used for hanging on the walls as decorative pieces. They have to be taken as votive offerings, as in the case of the bed, with the god-goddess motif gifted to a brāhmaṇa, as we have noted in the Purāṇic examples. Figures showing a goddess on the lap of the god, her husband, are quite common even today; and to the instance of Viṣṇu-Lakṣmī and Umā-Maheśvara from the Purāṇic records, were added that of Rāma and Sītā, which is a popular motif,

[1] Devangana Desai, *Erotic Sculptures of India*, Tata McGrew Hill, New Delhi, 1975, plate 11.

[2] ibid., plate 12. See Dange, *Sexual symbolism from the Vedic Ritual*, (last chapter), Delhi, 1979.

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(though I have not been able to locate it from the main Purāṇa-s). The gift of the divine couple, thus, has to be connected with the terracotta figures of a similar nature, wherein the bed (or a chair-like seat) indicated conjugal happiness. A variation of the same motif is the close embrace of the divine couple, described, for example, by Kālidāsa[1] and Śūdraka.[2] But, prior to the use of the god-and-the-goddess couple, the motif was that of an amorous couple. This terracotta couple gave place, in course of time, to the god-and-goddess couple; this was obviously because the couple on the terracotta indicated the divine mates that would give prosperity, when offered to a divine person—a brāhmaṇa, or the 'medium' in a non-Vedic cult. A later aspect of the same motif is where the observer of a *vrata* has to give the gifts to many brāhmaṇa-couples, making the latter sit on bed (*Padma P.* Sṛṣṭi, 21. 43 *śayanasthāni pūjyāni*).

[1] The opening verse of the *Raghuvaṃśa*

वागर्थाविव संपृक्तौ वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये ।
जगतः पितरौ वन्दे पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ।।

Mark the word संपृक्तौ.

[2] *Mṛcchakaṭika* **1.** 2.

पातु वो नीलकण्ठस्य कण्ठः श्यामाम्बुदोपमः ।
गौरीभुजलता यत्र विद्युल्लेखेव राजते ।।

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BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

RĀMA'S MORAL DECISIONS

THE story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* extols certain ethical virtues. These ethical virtues, as I shall argue here, are nothing if not formalistic in character. In fact, some of them were so formalistic and so much lacking in human material that they have been controversial over the ages.

I shall call a virtue formalistic if it depends upon the fulfilment of a formal promise, of a formal duty of a son to his father, of husband to his wife, of a friend to his friend. Daśaratha had to banish his son, Rāma, against his own will and judgment as well as the will of everybody else, the citizens of Ayodhyā, the ministers and the priests, simply because he had to fulfil his formal promise to his once beloved queen, Kaikeyī. Rāma had to go to the forest abandoning his rightful claim to the throne in order simply to fulfil his formal duty as a son. He had to abandon his beloved wife, Sītā, being well aware of her innocence, in order simply to fulfil his formal duty as a ruler, as a king. If the opinion of the citizens was so important that Sītā had to be abandoned in an almost inhuman manner, why did Rāma go to the forest in the first place against the will of all citizens? The answer lies in understanding the same kind of formalistic ethical principles

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that held the highest authority in the society of which Rāma was a part. It is the most flexible and pervasive Sanskrit term, DHARMA, that is substituted for all such formalistic ethical principles that I am trying to draw attention to here. Even a sage called Jāmadagnya, in this highly patrilineal society, decapitated his own mother at his father's behest simply because it was his *dharma* to obey his father. And in the same Ikṣvāku family in the past, one thousand sons of King Sagara met their destruction simply at the command of the father. It is the same *dharma*, *kuladharma* to be sure, that Rāma was afraid of, when he decided to abandon Sītā. The same *pitṛpaitāmaha dharma* was invoked by Rāma when he was trying to justify his killing of Vālin:

tvaṃ tu dharmam avijñāya kevalaṃ roṣam āsthitaḥ|
vidūṣayasi māṃ dharme pitṛ-paitāmahe sthitam|| 4.18.43

The climax of formalism comes at the end of the story when Rāma had to banish his totally innocent brother, Lakṣmaṇa, because of a formal promise he made. Here is the episode. A sage, who was none but Kāla (Time) himself in disguise, came to hold consultation with Rāma on the condition that no one should disturb them while they would be in the consultation room. Rāma promised to kill the person who would disturb and Lakṣmaṇa was asked to guard the door. Meanwhile the great sage, Durvāsas, who, by the way, had already earned a reputation about handing down fatal curses to other people, appeared and demanded an audience with Rāma immediately. Lakṣmaṇa tried to appease him in vain. The irate sage threatened to

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curse the whole royal family if Rāma did not come to receive him immediately. Lakṣmaṇa, as anybody with some sense would, under these conditions, chose to enter the consultation room. Rāma came out to receive the sage, who only wanted a good meal at the royal palace on the occasion of his one thousandth birthday! As the sage left, being satisfied with a sumptuous dinner, Rāma had to make the last important moral decision in his life. He would have to kill Lakṣmaṇa in order to fulfil his formal promise. There was a little cheating, at last in the matter, (reminiscent of Yudhiṣṭhira's cheating in his attempt to kill Droṇa). For Rāma said: *tyāgo vadho vā vihitaḥ sādhūnāṃ hy ubhayaṃ samam|* 'With regard to the good people, abandonment is the same thing as killing'. **7.** 106. 13cd.

What does this episode signify? At long last it is clear that factual faults or real crimes do not matter that much. Violation of a formal rule or a stupid promise is all that matters. What wrong did Lakṣmaṇa do? Nothing that was material. He simply wanted to save the family from the terrible curse of Durvāsas. Hence he broke a formal rule. There might have been a shade of doubt, as far as the common citizens were concerned, regarding Sītā's innocence. After all, she lived in Rāvaṇa's place for some time. And we know the nature of the power of gossip. The poet Bhavabhūti rightly observed:

sarvathā vyavahartavyaṃ kuto hy avacanīyatā|
yathā strīṇāṃ tathā vācāṃ sādhutve durjano janaḥ||

(*Uttararāmacarita* **1.** 5)

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But what about Lakṣmaṇa? He had not done anything in this context which could be morally questionable. But remember there is that formalistic ethical principle, *dharma*. Violation of a stupid promise would be violation of this formalistic principle. Even Vasiṣṭha declared on this occasion:

tyajainaṃ, balavān kālo, mā pratijñāṃ vṛthā kṛthāḥ|
pratijñāyāṃ hi naṣṭāyāṃ dharmo hi vilayaṃ vrajet||
7. 106. 9.

'Abandon him, (for) KĀLA 'Time' is all powerful, do not fail to keep your promise. For when a promise is not kept, *dharma* is destroyed'.

In a man-made legal system, such formalism is not difficult to find. If I promise to pay back my debts before 4.30 p.m. today, but produce the money only at 4.31 p.m., legally this will be actionable. It was the same insistence on a formalistic legal system that was invoked by Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*, when he wanted to have a pound of flesh from Antonio's breast without accepting the money that Antonio borrowed from him. Yudhiṣṭhira's adherence to truthfulness had the same formalistic character. And rightly he is called Dharmarāja.

'To tell a lie is *adharma* no matter what': this is what I am calling here one of the formalistic ethical principles. Thus, to tell a harmless lie so as not to hurt the feelings of an otherwise honest and nice man, would be considered an *adharma*, according to this norm. But Yudhiṣṭhira lied only once—the lie that he knew would be sufficient to kill his own guru, Droṇa.

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But Yudhiṣṭhira deluded himself into believing that he was, after all, making a formally true statement. Here is the story:

It was impossible to defeat and kill Droṇa as long as he was fighting against the Pāṇḍava-s with his bow and arrow. So Kṛṣṇa devised a trick. If it were announced that Aśvatthāman, Droṇa's beloved son, was dead, Droṇa was sure to abandon his bow and arrow in grief. And Arjuna would take that opportunity to kill Droṇa. But Droṇa would not trust anyone unless the death news was announced by Yudhiṣṭhira himself. But Yudhiṣṭhira would not listen. He would not lie even if that lie meant his victory and survival. But what a *volte face* in the next moment! It so happened that an elephant of the name of Aśvatthāman was killed in the battle at that moment. Hence, at the request of Kṛṣṇa, Yudhiṣṭhira announced: Aśvatthāman is dead. Droṇa believed it and as a result was killed by Arjuna.

One should remember here that Yudhiṣṭhira was aware of the full consequence of this little lie: namely, the death of Droṇa and victory for him. For this heinous little lie Yudhiṣṭhira was only nominally punished (a mere view of the sinners in hell) at the end of the *Mahābhārata*. Why? Remember that he did not, after all, violate any formalistic ethical law, i.e., any *dharma* of uttering formally true statements.

If a man-made law cannot be broken, how can the DHARMA, which is presumably either divinely ordinated or traditionally sacred or both, be broken? Dharma

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was the dehumanized norm of human conduct. Rāma once said, when he was sadly reconciling himself to his hard life in the forest:

eko hy aham Ayodhyāṃ ca pṛthivīṃ cāpi Lakṣmaṇa|
tareyam iṣubhiḥ kruddho, nanu vīryam akāraṇam||
adharma-bhaya-bhītaś ca paralokasya cānagha|
tena Lakṣmaṇa nādyāham ātmānam abhiṣecaye||

2. 53. 25, 26

'If I am angry, O Lakṣmaṇa, I am alone capable of conquering not only Ayodhyā but the whole earth. But alas, strength is of no avail here. Being afraid of *adharma* and *paraloka*, O sinless Lakṣmaṇa, I have not allowed myself to be anointed king this time'.

Thus it is that to uphold this dehumanized norm, DHARMA, i.e., this body of formalistic ethical laws, Rāma could punish innocent persons like Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa, and kill an innocent Śūdra, Śambūka, who was only striving for his own salvation.

To come back to the killing of Vālin. Why was this act regarded as *almost* unpardonable even by the orthodox Sanskrit tradition? I think this was because the method of killing was *apparently* a flagrant violation of the very formalistic ethics of war, of which Rāma was supposed to be the upholder. Thus, the Bengali poet Kṛttivāsa laments:

Kṛttivās paṇḍiter ghaṭila viṣād|
Vālibadh kari kena karilā pramād||

'Krittivas is sad: Why did you blunder and kill Vālin?'

But how did Rāma justify his own act when he was confronted by the dying Vālin? He referred to

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Dharma, that formalistic ethic. Due to the friendship with Sugrīva, Rāma promised to kill Vālin, provided Sugrīva helped him in recovering Sītā. It was Kabandha, the Rākṣasa, who told Rāma to seek Sugrīva's friendship because he and his four associates would be helpful in recovering Sītā and the family honour (*kuladharma*) as well, from the clutches of Rāvaṇa. Hence Sugrīva's enemy would be Rāma's enemy too. And the killing of Vālin would mean (a) protecting a friend, and (b) keeping a formal promise and thereby upholding dharma. One should add to these the following fact (Rāma says it in so many words): Killing of an animal from behind is no *adharma* for a Kṣatriya prince, because no formalistic ethical principle would be violated thereby. So what more do we need to persuade Rāma, the supreme upholder of the formalistic ethical laws, to kill Vālin? Protecting a useful friend, recovery of the family honour and prestige by recovering Sītā from Rāvaṇa, and keeping a formal promise—these three should be enough.

Whether one commends or condemns the formalistic ethics, which played such an important role in moral decisions in the ancient Indian epics, it is important to know what these were. Rāma, by his own admission, feared nobody but *adharma* which, I have pointed out, amounted to violation of some formalistic ethical principle devoid of human interest.

Since between Sugrīva and Vālin, the latter is often thought better of the two, I wish to say a few words in defence of Sugrīva. Sugrīva, it is true, was always

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attracted to Vālin's wife, Tārā, and he slept with her when Vālin was away, supposedly dead. It might very well be wish-fulfilment on the part of Sugrīva. But remember, wish-fulfilment or dreams do not violate any formalistic ethical principle, any *dharma*. So Sugrīva, at least, was not formally guilty. But what did Vālin do in revenge? He chased Sugrīva away and stole his wife, Rumā. He, unlike Sugrīva, had no pretext to delude himself with: namely, that Sugrīva was dead and so there was no harm in stealing his wife. (We should recall that marrying the elder brother's widow was only a custom in some Vānara society). Thus, in the eye of Rāma, Vālin was formally guilty while Sugrīva was not. This, Rāma did not forget to remind the dying Vālin:

asya tvaṃ dharamāṇasya Sugrīvasya mahātmanaḥ|
Rumāyām vartase kāmāt snuṣāyāṃ pāpakarmakṛt||
4. 18. 19.

Rāma's considered reply to Vālin's charge was:

tad alaṃ paritāpena dharmataḥ parikalpitaḥ|
vadho vānaraśārdūla na vayaṃ svavaśe sthitāḥ|| **4.** 18. 35.

'O king of Vānara-s, do not grieve, (your) killing has been done according to DHARMA. I had (practically) no control over myself (in this matter).'

And the *Tilaka* commentary finally says: *daṇḍārthavadhe darśanānapekṣaṇāt*. The implication is: When killing is meant for punishment, formal war ethics need not be maintained!

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HARTMUT SCHARFE

OVERINTERPRETATION VERSUS REDUNDANCY

WITHIN the section on particles (Pāṇini **1**. 4. 56-**1**. 4. 97) Pāṇini's grammar has a sub-section listing the so-called Karmapravacanīya-s (**1**. 4. 83-**1**. 4. 97). One of the last *sūtra-s* in this section is **1**. 4. 96 [*karmapravacanīyāḥ*] *apiḥ padārtha-saṃbhāvanânvavasarga-garhā-samuccayeṣu* which in traditional interpretation rules that '*api* [is part of the Karmapravacanīya class] if it denotes (a) a word meaning, (b) a supposition, (c) a permission, (d) a censure, or (e) an addition'. There should be no hesitation concerning the items listed under (b) through (e) with such common examples as (b) *api siñcen mūlaka-sahasram* 'He could sprinkle even a thousand radishes', (c) *api siñca* 'Sprinkle then!', (d) *api stuyād vṛṣalam* 'He would even praise a low person', and (3) *api siñca* 'Sprinkle also!'. But there is a problem with the first item. Patañjali (*Mahābhāṣya* **1**. 348, 22)[1] gives two examples: *sarpiṣo 'pi syāt* 'There shall also be [a drop] of molten butter' and *go-mūtrasyâpi syāt* 'There shall also be

[1] The *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, ed. F. Kielhorn third ed. by K. V. Abhyankar, Poona 1962; quoted by vol., page and line. G. Cardona, 'On the paribhāṣā *upapada-vibhakteḥ kāraka-vibhaktir balīyasī*,' *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 5/6 (1980), p. 34-36, 41-43 gives an overview of the traditional discussion.

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[a drop] of cow's urine',[1] where *api* is supposed to indicate the notion of 'drop, small amount'. If *api* here is a Karmapravacanīya, we would expect to find the nouns *sarpis* and *gomūtra* in the accusative case by the force of Pāṇini **2**. 3. 8 *karmapravacanīya-yukte dvitīyā* 'In conjunction with a Karmaparvacanīya the second [triplet of case endings]' —not the genitive. Patañjali offers two solutions: (1) We could assume that *api* is primarily attached to the verb, allowing *sarpis* to take the genitive ending according to Pāṇini **2**. 3. 50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* 'In the remainder, the sixth [triplet of case endings]'. (2) We could assume that a word like *bindu* 'drop' is suppressed; *api*, being a Karmapravacanīya, would require this unspoken word to be in the accusative. A new problem arises, however, if the word *bindu* is not suppressed; for then it clearly does not appear in the accusative but in the nominative *sarpiṣo bindur api syāt*. To solve this problem Patañjali has to introduce the metarule *upapada-vibhakteḥ kāraka-vibhaktir balīyasī*.[2]

[1] Cf. *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā*, ed. L. V. Schroeder, **10**. 11 *gomūtrasyâpi syāt*.

[2] F. Kielhorn, *The Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgojībhaṭṭa*, 2nd ed. by K. V. Abhyankar, part II, p. 452 (Poona 1960) translates this Paribhāṣā no. 94 as follows: 'A case-termination, which (if it were added to a base would show that the person or thing denoted by that base) is (instrumental in) bringing about the action (denoted by the verb of the sentence), possesses greater force than a case-termination (which might be added to the same base) because of the presence (in the same sentence) of a word (requiring the addition of that particular termination, and it accordingly is added in preference to the latter).'

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All these explanations are unsatisfactory, both grammatically and philologically. Grammatically, it should be the partitive genitive *sarpiṣaḥ* that suggests a governing noun like *bindu* (cf. the French construction *du beurre* 'some butter', etc.); *api* could here well have any meanings assigned under (b), (c), (d) or (e): supposition, permission, censure or addition.[1] On the philological level, *padārtha* 'word meaning' in Pāṇini's *sūtra* gives no indication that only words meaning 'drop, little, etc.' are intended.[2] On the contrary, one would expect *api* to denote any word meaning—which however in a grammar is quite absurd. *Padārtha* in Pāṇini 1. 4. 96 stands apart from the other four terms: these namely, *saṃbhāvana* 'supposition, aptness, capacity,' *anvavasarga* 'permission [to do something as one wishes], *garhā* 'censure' and *samuccaya* 'addition, accumulation', denote relations and processes; *padārtha* 'word meaning' does not. I propose to analyze Pāṇini's compound as *padārthasya* (or *padārthānām*) *saṃbhāvanânvavasarga-garhā-samuccayeṣu* so that his rule says '*api* [is part of the karmapravacanīya class] if it denotes a supposition, permission, censure or addition of a word meaning'. The qualification *padārtha-* then stresses the obligatory

[1] In a quotation taken from Vedic texts *api* √*as* could also mean 'to be in, be closely connected with'.

[2] O. Böhtlingk's common sense was obviously bothered by this suggestion; for he remarked in a note to his German translation (*Pāṇini's Grammatik;* reprint Hildesheim 1964) on p. 41: 'hier soll *api* so v.a. *mātrā, binduḥ* oder *stokam* bedeuten' (=here *api* is supposed to mean *mātrā, binduḥ* or *stokam*).

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link of *api* with the word next to it. For Patañjali this qualification could appear redundant since in speech all relations are likely to be with other parts of the sentence, i.e. words and their meanings. At the same time, it was almost unthinkable for Patañjali that Pāṇini should have used a redundant expression. His solution was the assumption of one long Dvandva compound, that had *padārtha* parallel with *saṃbhāvana*, *anvavasarga*, *garhā* and *samuccaya*, and he found an application for the item *padārtha* in sentences like *sarpiṣo 'pi syāt* where the so-called partitive genitive (*sarpiṣaḥ*) combines with the ellipsis of the governing noun (*bindu*).[1]

If this suggestion concerning Pāṇini's original intention and Patañjali's re-interpretation of the rule **1**. 4. 96 is accepted, the discussion of this rule would not only throw light on Patañjali's thinking but also support the modern critique of the traditional interpretation of Pāṇini **2**. 3. 46 *prātipadikārtha-liṅga-parimāṇa-vacana-mātre prathamā* 'The first [triplet of case endings] to denote nothing but the nominal stem notion, gender, measure or number'. J. S. Speijer[2] and P. Thieme[3] have shown the weaknesses of this interpretation and suggested a rendition 'The nominative ending is added

[1] For an elliptic use of a partitive genitive without *api* cf. *Mānava Śrauta Sūtra* (ed. Jeannette M. van Gelder, New Delhi 1961) V. 1, 6, 39 ... *gomūtrasyâścotayet* '. . . shall sprinkle some cow's urine '.

[2] J. S. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, Leyden 1886, p. 26, fn. 1.

[3] P. Thieme, 'Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 76 (1956) pp. 1-10 (=*Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1971), pp. 573-82.

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when there is to be designated nothing but the gender and the number of the nominal stem notion'. Thieme[1] pointed out that probably Kātyāyana still followed the original interpretation since his *Vārttika-s* on this *sūtra* **2.** 3. 46 make no attempts to deal with the problem that arise with the new interpretation. But recently G. Cardona[2] has tentatively returned to the traditional interpretation, primarily because he believes that it was already followed by Kātyāyana. Cardona relies on Patañjali's interpretation of *vārttika* 4 on Pāṇini **2.** 3. 1., namely *abhihite* [*hi*] *prathamābhāvaḥ* (analysed as *prathamā-abhāvaḥ*). The *vārttika* is so ambiguous that Patañjali's interpretation of it is by no means certain; the crucial word *prātipadika* does not occur in it at all.[3] Furthermore, the *vārttika* is not paraphrased in the *Bhāṣya* and one might wonder if it is an authentic *vārttika* at all.[4] Even if all points are conceded and if Kātyāyana already followed the same interpretation of Pāṇini **2.** 3. 46 as Patañjali, this would not resolve the difficulties pointed out by Speijer and Thieme as far as Pāṇini's intentions are concerned. A comparison with Pāṇini **1.** 4. 96

[1] ibid., p. 3 (=575).

[2] G. Cardona, 'Pāṇini's Kāraka-s: Agency, Animation and Identity', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1974), pp. 287-88, fn. 42, and in his book *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*, The Hague 1976, p. 229.

[3] For the argument itself I refer the reader to Cardona's article in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1974), pp. 287-88, fn. 42; it need not detain us here.

[4] Vedavrata remarks in his edition of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Rohtak 1962/1963) vol. II, p. 756 that some attribute it to Patañjali: *idaṃ bhāṣyam iti kecit*.

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shows a parallel in the position of an initial qualifier *prātipadikārtha-* resp. *padārtha*[1] in these two rules. The reinterpretation began with a feeling that the qualification was redundant, and it resulted in an overinterpretation that read notions into the *sūtra-s* that Pāṇini obviously had not intended.

[1] The nominative enjoined in Pāṇini 2. 3. 46 clearly can refer only to noun stems (*prātipadika*), whereas the particle *api* dealt with in Pāṇini 1. 4. 96 is used in connection with nouns as well as with verbs (*pada*).

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E. A. SOLOMON

NYĀYA-SŪTRA, 5. 2. 2—THE *NIGRAHASTHĀNA PRATIJÑĀ-HĀNI*

'*Nigraha*' signifies crushing the pride of another, (in a debate-) inflicting check or defeat on the part of one whose pride is unshaken; *pratijñā-hāni* (violating the proposition) and the like are the grounds (*sthāna*) of *nigraha*; that is to say, it is by reason of these that defeat can be inflicted, or the opponent can be checked in a debate, and so they are called *nigrahasthāna-s* (grounds of censure or defeat).[1] The urging or the exposure of these we may call 'check'.

The *Nyāya-sūtra* defines *nigrahasthāna* thus: *Viprati-pattir apratipattiś ca nigrahasthānam*—(*NS.* **I.** 2. 19). It is a case for 'check' when there is misapprehension as also when there is incomprehension. Misapprehen-sion (*vipratipatti*) is that apprehension which is either wrong or reprehensible (*viparītā vā kutsitā vā pratipattir vipratipattiḥ—Nyāyabhāṣya*, **I.** 2. 19). As Vācaspati explains in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, a misapprehension is said to be simply wrong knowledge when the subject-matter is something too subtle to be grasped by the ordinary intellect; it is said to be reprehensible when it is about something gross, quite within the range of ordinary

[1] *Vādivinoda*, p. 30; also *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 319.

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minds (*Sūkṣmaviṣayā pratipattir viparītā, sthūla-viṣayā ca kutsitā*). It is a case of incomprehension (*apratipatti*), on the other hand, when the subject being one on which something has been said, yet the debater does not say anything; for instance, if he does not oppose what is attempted to be proved by the opponent, or does not answer the objections that have been raised against his own position.[1] Uddyotakara gives further clarification by saying that it may happen that a debater supports his thesis by a perfectly sound argument and yet when his opponent confronts him with a *jāti* type of argument (—a counterfeit rejoinder—), he becomes embarrassed and fails to find a proper answer to that *jāti*. Even this is a case of *nigrahasthāna* as there is here incomprehension inasmuch as the man does not comprehend the soundness and strength of his own argument, and misapprehension as he regards his own sound argument as unsound.[2]

Twenty-two varieties of *nigrahasthāna-s* are described in the second Āhnika of the fifth Adhyāya of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Of these we shall take up for consideration here the first one, namely *pratijñā-hāni*, as there is difference of opinion among the different commentators as regards its interpretation. This would also serve as a good example of the subtlety of argument and likewise of the boldness often displayed by the great masters.

According to the *Nyāya-sūtra*, it is a case of *pratijñā-hāni* (violating the proposition) when the property of the

[1] *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, **1.** 2. 19.
[2] *Nyāya-vārttika*, **1.** 2. 19.

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counter-example (*prati-dṛṣṭānta*) (adduced by the opponent) is admitted by a debater to be present in the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) cited by himself (*pratidṛṣṭānta-dharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte pratijñā-hāniḥ*—*NS.* 5. 2. 2). For instance, the original argument of the *vādin* (proponent) is advanced in the form: *śabda* (sound, word) must be non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the sense, like the jar (*anityaḥ śabdaḥ aindriyakatvād ghaṭavat*). The *prativādin* rejoins: *Sāmānya* (generality) which is eternal is also perceptible by the sense; why cannot *śabda* too be similarly eternal? On this the *vādin* may say, if *sāmānya* perceptible by the sense is eternal, let jar also be eternal. He wants to say that arguing on these lines the jar will have to be admitted as eternal, which is absurd. While thus urging a contingency about the example jar having to be eternal, he gives up or violates his own thesis or stand down to the final conclusion, and doing so he is said to violate his proposition, since the thesis rests on the proposition.[1]

Uddyotakara does not approve of this explanation given by Vātsyāyana. He says that he fails to understand how the *pratijñā* could be said to be violated if Vātsyāyana's interpretation is accepted. The opponent urges the fault of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatva*) of the reason by giving the example of '*sāmānya*,' and the proponent instead of defending himself against this charge and showing that the fault of inconclusive reason

[1] Sa khalv ayaṃ sādhakasya dṛṣṭāntasya nityatvaṃ prasañjayan nigamanāntam eva pakṣaṃ jahāti; pakṣaṃ jahat pratijñāṃ jahātīty-ucyate pratijñāśrayatvāt pakṣasyeti—*Nyāyabhāṣya*, 5. 2. 2.

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is not there, admits eternality in his own example 'jar'. Thus there would be the fault of *asiddhatā* in the example—what is to be proved, namely, non-eternality, would not be there in the example, jar. And this would be a case for *nigraha* or 'check' by urging the fault of example or of reason, but certainly not a case of *nigraha* on the ground of *pratijñā-hāni*.[1] If it is at all a case of *pratijñā-hāni*, it could be said to be so only secondarily. But secondary usage is not possible unless there is a case of *pratijñā-hāni* in the primary sense of the term; and the scope of such a case yet remains to be stated.[2]

How then would Uddyotakara explain the *sūtra*? According to him the term '*dṛṣṭānta*' is to be taken in its literal sense—'what is seen and is established at the end'; so '*svadṛṣṭānte*' means 'in one's own thesis or view', and '*pratidṛṣṭānta*' means the counter-thesis or counter-view. Thus the *sūtra* would mean: when one admits the presence of the property of the counter-thesis in his own thesis, it is a case of *pratijñā-hāni*. For instance, the original thesis being '*śabda* is non-eternal because it is perceptible by the sense', the *prativādin*

[1] Etat tu na buddhyāmahe katham atra pratijñā hīyata iti; hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ sāmānya-dṛṣṭāntena pareṇa codyate; tasyānaikāntikadoṣoddhāram anuktvā svadṛṣṭānte nityatvaṃ pratipadyate; nityatāpratipatteś cāsiddhatā dṛṣṭāntadoṣo bhavati. So' yaṃ dṛṣṭāntadoṣeṇa sādhanadoṣeṇa vā nigraho na pratijñāhāniḥ. —*Nyāya-vārttika*, **5.** 2. 2.

[2] Dṛṣṭāntaṃ ca jahat pratijñām api jahātīty upacāreṇa nigrahasthānam. Na ca pradhānāsaṃbhave upacāro labhyata iti pratijñāhāner mukhyo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ—*Nyāya-vārttika*, **5.** 2. 2.

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urges against it the case of *sāmānya*, and the *vādin* says 'If *sāmānya*, which is perceptible by the sense is eternal, then *śabda* also may be eternal'. Initially the *vādin* had put forth the thesis that *śabda* is non-eternal, but when charged with the fault of the reason being inconclusive since *sāmānya* being perceptible by the sense is yet eternal, he admits *śabda* as eternal—a clear case of *pratijñā-hāni*. Since the *vādin* gives up a fact that has been determined by a valid means of proof and thereby shows his misapprehension, it becomes a case of *nigraha* ('check').[1]

It may be argued that this is only a case of urging a contingency, namely 'If as you say, *sāmānya* being perceptible by the sense is seen to be eternal, then *śabda* also may be so'; the *vādin* does not even later actually admit eternality in *śabda*, but urges a contingency. But this does not change the situation as even so the 'check' becomes applicable. Instead of defending his thesis against the charge of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatva*), he goes on to urge a contingency and thus becomes subject to 'check'.[2]

[1] Dṛṣtaś cāsāv ante vyavasthita iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ; svaś cāsau dṛṣṭāntaś ceti svadṛṣṭāntaśabdena pakṣa evābhidhīyate; pratidṛṣṭāntaśabdena ca pratipakṣaḥ—pratipakṣaś cāsau dṛṣṭāntaś ceti. Etad uktaṃ bhavati parapakṣasya yo dharmas taṃ svapakṣa evānujānātīti.—*Nyāya-vārttika*, 5. 2. 2.

[2] Prasaṅgavidhānād iti cet—atha manyase nāsau paścād api śabdasya nityatāṃ pratipadyate; kiṃ tu prasaṅgaṃ karoti—yadi sāmānyam aindriyakaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣtaṃ śabdo'py evaṃ bhavatv iti prasaṅgaṃ vidhatte. tac ca nātaḥ eva tatprāpteḥ, yata evāsau hetudoṣoddhāre kartavye prasaṅjayaty ata eva nigṛhyata iti—*Nyāyavārttika*, 5. 2. 2.

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Others (the Buddhists) have argued that the case of *pratijñā-hāni* is covered by the fallacy of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatva*) attaching to the reason and so it need not be regarded as a distinct *nigrahasthāna*, for its purpose is served by 'inconclusive reason'. What the *vādin* in the present case would be checked by is the fact of his reason 'because it is perceptible by the sense' being inconclusive. Uddyotakara says that this is not right for in averting the charge of inconclusive reason he subjects himself to the check 'pratijñā-hāni' which should therefore be accepted as a distinct *nigrahasthāna*.[1]

It may be remarked here that Vātsyāyana's explanation is not as absurd or irresponsible as Uddyotakara makes it out to be. Both the parties are in agreement as to the nature of the example (jar). What the *vādin* does is to try to put the *prativādin* in the difficult and absurd position of having to regard the example 'jar' as eternal, when he should have answered the charge of inconclusiveness. Thus the original proposition is shelved and remains unestablished.

Later commentators and thinkers also have expressed their own opinions, some siding with Vātsyāyana, others with Uddyotakara, or even admitting a wider scope for this *nigrahasthāna*, *pratijñā-hāni*.

Vācaspati does not seem to say anything special or striking in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *Vārttika*. But if we read it in the light of Aniruddha's

[1] *Nyāya-vārttika*, **5.** 2. 2.

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Vivaraṇa-pañjikā (which is of the form of brief critical and exegetical notes on important expressions in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-vārttika* and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* with occasional references to Trilocana's *Nyāyamañjarī* and Viśvarūpa's *Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā*), some new light is thrown on the history of the interpretation of the *nigrahasthāna pratijñā-hāni*, and we can also understand the *Tātparyaṭīkā* better.

Commenting on the *Nyāya-vārttīka*, Vācaspati here puts forth Vātsyāyana's view, shows why Uddyotakara disagrees with it and then explains Uddyotakara's interpretation. He remarks that when Uddyotakara speaks of the *vādin* being confronted by the *prativādin* with the fault of inconclusiveness, this is only meant to serve as an indication, or is just illustrative. What is really meant is that when the *vādin* sees that he will not be able to establish his proposition in one way or the other, he gives up what he had set out to prove and therefore becomes subject to the 'check' *pratijñāhāni*.[1]

Aniruddha points out that Uddyotakara has in his *Vārttika* rejected Vātsyāyana's interpretation. Trilocana (Vācaspati's *guru* and author of *Nyāyamañjarī*) supports the position of the *Bhāṣya* in his commentary on it. Vācaspati, in his turn, while explaining the

[1] Atra cānaikāntikatvena pratyavasthita ity upalakṣaṇaṃ; yena kenacit prakāreṇa svapratijñārthānirvāhaṃ paśyan pratijñārthaṃ jahat pratijñāhānim āpnotīti paramārthaḥ—*Tātparyaṭīkā*, **5.** 2. 2.

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Vārttika presents the view of the author of the *Mañjarī* also and refutes it.[1]

Trilocana seems to have argued that when the *vādin* admits the property 'eternality' of the counter-example '*sāmānya*' in his own example 'jar', his idea is that thus the reason 'because it is perceptible by the sense' would not any longer be an inconclusive one, as it would be concomitant with just eternal things for he has admitted jar and the like also to be eternal. Even then since he does not defend himself against the charge of inconclusive reason directly in so many words, but instead admits eternality in his own example, the fault in the example comes to be that of *asiddhatā*—the example is devoid of what is to be proved, namely, non-eternality.[2]

Vācaspati says that this is in no way a case of *pratijñāhāni*; and yet if it is said to be *pratijñāhāni* then each and every fault of reasoning can be said to be a case of *pratijñāhāni*, though as a matter of fact, no *pratijñāhāni* (violation of the proposition) is involved. Thus Vācaspati supports Uddyotakara and does not

[1] Iha Vārttikakāreṇa Bhāṣyabhaṅgaḥ kṛtaḥ. Sa ca Mañjarīkārena Bhāsyaṃ vyācakṣāṇenaiva parihṛtaḥ. anupapannaṃ paśyan Ṭīkākāro Vārttikaṃ vyācakṣāṇa eva Mañjarīkāra-matam apy upanyasyāpāsyati—*Tathā Saty aindriyakatvam anaikāntikaṃ na bhavatī*-tyādinā.—*Vivaraṇapañjikā*, **5.** 2. 2. (p. 60).

[2] Tathā saty aindriyakatvam anaikāntikaṃ na bhavati nityamātragāmitvād ghaṭādīnām api nityatābhyupagamād ity āśayena yady api tathāpi sākṣād anaikāntikadoṣoddhāram akṣarārūḍham anuktvā svadṛṣṭānte nityatāṃ pratipadyate, nityatāpratipatteś cāsiddhatā dṛṣṭānte doṣo bhavati sādhyavikalety arthaḥ—*Tātparyaṭīkā*, **5.** 2. 2. (p. 493).

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accept the argument advanced by Trilocana in favour of Vātsyāyana's interpretation.

Further, Uddyotakara said that it could not be a case of *pratijñāhāni* in the secondary sense, for the secondary usage presupposes that there is elsewhere *pratijñāhāni* in the primary sense of the term, and there is no such case of *pratijñāhāni* in the primary sense of the term. But Aniruddha says that this is not proper for we do have a case of the renouncing of the proposition in the primary sense of the term in the case of the *nigrahasthāna pratijñā-saṃnyāsa*, and so the use of the term here in a secondary sense is quite justifiable. In *pratijñā-saṃnyāsa*,[1] the proposition is directly or straightaway renounced, whereas in *pratijñāhāni*, the *vādin* renouncing the example is (secondarily) said to be renouncing or violating the proposition. Therefore, the author of the *Mañjarī* has rightly said that the remark of Uddyotakara (mentioned above) is an irrelevant one, and even though Vācaspati has allegiance to Uddyotakara, he has not at all attempted to refute this statement of the author of the *Mañjarī*. Even one following Uddyotakara would have to accept the distinctness of *pratijñā-saṃnyāsa* and *pratijñā-hāni* and the former serves as a case of the renouncing of the proposition in the primary sense of the term.[2]

[1] See *Nyāya-sūtra*, 5. 2. 5—*pakṣapratiṣedhe pratijñātārthāpanayanaṃ pratijñā-saṃnyāsaḥ*—The original thesis being opposed, if what was formerly affirmed happens to be retracted, it is a case of 'Renouncing of the Propositon'.

[2] *Na cāsau pradhānaṃ pratijñāhānim ity ādi.* Etac cāyuktaṃ pratijñāsaṃnyāsasya pratijñāhāneḥ pradhānatvāt. tatra hi sākṣād

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From what has been said above it is clear that the thinkers of the Nyāya school found the name '*pratijñā-hāni*' to be inconsistent with what it was meant to signify, especially when another *nigrahasthāna* named *pratijñā-saṃnyāsa* was recognized. Udayana remarks that the *sūtra* (*NS.* **5.** 2. 2) describes two kinds of *pratijñā-hāni*; one is described by the very name *pratijñā-hāni*, and the other one by the rest of the *sūtra*.[1] The example of the former kind would be the case where the *vādin* surrenders his point by saying, 'All right, *śabda* is not non-eternal'. What is cited by the *Nyāya-bhāsya* is an illustration of the second kind. Udayana has further widened the scope of this *nigrahasthāna* by saying that it applies to all those cases where there being opposition, the *sādhya* (probandum), the *sādhana* (probans) or the *pakṣa* (subject) or an epithet (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the *sādhya* or of the *pakṣa* or of the *sādhana* or of the *dṛṣṭānta* is renounced or violated. Or when, for example, the *vādin* urges the fallacy of *asiddha hetu* (unreal reason) in the *prativādin's* argument and the latter proves that it is not there, if the *vādin* says, if there is not *asiddha*, at least *bādhita* (contradicted) reason is there—this also is a case of *pratijñā-hāni*.[2] The later logicians also

eva pratijñā hīyate, atra ca dṛṣṭāntaṃ jahatā pratijñā tyajyata iti ca kṛtvā bhedo hy anayor iti *Varttikakāramate* 'pi sthitvā vaktavyaṃ. tataś copacāro, yatra copacāraḥ pradhānam antareṇa [na] bhavati; pradhānaṃ cātra nāstīty etad asambaddham uktam iti *Mañjarī-kārasya* vacanaṃ *Vārttikakṛn*-matopajīvinā'pi *Ṭīkākṛtā* na dūṣitam eveti.—*Vivaraṇapañjikā*, **5.** 2. 2. (pp. 60-6).

[1] See *Bodhasiddhi*, pp. 81-82.

[2] See *Bodhasiddhī* pp. 82-83; also *Tārkika-rakṣā*, pp. 319 ff; *Vādivinoda*, p. 30; *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, 176-77.

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include all these under *pratijñā-hāni*. Veṅkaṭanātha gives this *nigrahasthāna* the name *ukta-hāni* in conformity with its widened scope; he calls '*pratijñā-saṃnyāsa*' by the name '*uktāpalāpa*' (denial or disowning of what one has stated) to avoid confusion with *ukta-hāni*, (i.e. *pratijñā-hāni*), since '*saṃnyāsa*' and '*hāni*' signify the same thing.

Thus it can be seen that the *Nyāya-sūtra*, its *Bhāṣya*, and the various commentaries (most of which are known now only through stray references) on the *Bhāṣya* and the sub-commentaries present an interesting history of critical exposition and the gradual development of concepts.

Nyāya-sūtra with *Bhāṣya*—G. Jha (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939)

Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara (Vidya Vilas Press, Benares, 1915)

Nyāya-vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1898)

Nyāya-bhāṣya-vārttika-Tātparya-vivaraṇapañjikā of Aniruddha (Mithila Institute Series, Darbhanga, 1969)

Bodha-siddhi (or *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*) of Udayana (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1938)

Tārkikarakṣā of Varadarāja (Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1903)

Vādivinoda of Śaṃkara Miśra (Indian Press, Prayāga, 1915)

Nyāya-pariśuddhi of Venkaṭanātha (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series).

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S. D. JOSHI

KAUṆḌA BHAṬṬA ON THE MEANING OF COMPOUNDS

KAUṆḌA BHAṬṬA (=KB) gives a sixfold classification of compounds on the basis of the structure of constituents without involving the primary and subordinate status of their meanings.

(i) *supāṃ supā* 'combination of case-inflected words' before entering into compounding, for instance, *rājapuruṣaḥ* 'a king-man' which is derived from two case-inflected words *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*.

(ii) *supāṃ tiṅā* 'a combination of case-inflected word with a verb form', for instance, *paryabhūṣat* 'he attended to', *anuvyacalat* 'he moved subsequently'. This combination consists of the preverb as the first member and the verb as the second member. These forms become single finished words (*pada-s*) due to compounding.

(iii) *supāṃ nāmnā* 'a combination of case-inflected word with a nominal stem (*kṛdanta*)', for instance, *kumbhakāraḥ* 'pot-maker'. Here the case-inflected word *kumbham* is compounded with the *kṛdanta* noun *kāra* before the case ending has been added to it. This is called the *upapadasamāsa*.

(iv) *supāṃ dhātunā* 'a combination of case-inflected word with a verbal base', for instance, *āyatastūḥ* 'a

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panegyrist'. Here the case-inflected word *āyatam* is compounded with the verbal base *stu*.

(v) *tiṅāṃ tiṅā* 'a combination of two finite verb forms', for instance, *khādatamodatā* 'eat and rejoice'. Here two finite verb forms *khādata* and *modata* are compounded.

(vi) *tiṅāṃ supā* 'a combination of a finite verb-form with a case-inflected word'. This consists of the verb as a first member and the case-inflected word as a second member, for instance, *jahisthambaḥ* 'constantly striking against the post' (verse 28, *Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 134).

Four broad categories of compounds according to Pāṇini are:

(*i*) *avyayībhāva*,
(ii) *tatpuruṣa* (with subdivisions *vibhaktitatpuruṣa*, *karmadhāraya* and *dvigu*),
(iii) *dvandva* (with subdivisions *samāhāradvandva* and *itaretarayogadvandva*), and
(iv) *bahuvrīhi*.

Pāṇini has not defined these terms semantically but by way of enumeration. This fourfold classification of Pāṇini cannot cover all the cases of compounds. For instance, *bhūtapūrva*, *iva*-compounds, etc. do not come under any one of these categories.

Patañjali has defined these terms semantically. The *avyayībhāva* is a compound in which the meaning of the first member is predominant. The *tatpuruṣa* is a compound in which the last member is predominant. The *bahuvrīhi* is a compound in which the meaning of another word is predominant. KB says that these

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semantic definitions work in the majority of cases, not everywhere. For instance, in an *avyayībhāva* compound, *sūpaprati* 'a small quantity of broth', the meaning of the second member is predominant. In the compound *unmattagaṅgam* 'the country where the Ganges flows impetuously' the additional meaning stands predominant. In the *tatpuruṣa* compound *ardhapippalī* 'the half of a pepper' the first member stands predominant (verses 29-30, *Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 134-5).

First KB states Patañjali's views on compound-formation. Kātyāyana and Patañjali maintain that compoundforms denote single (integrated) meaning (*ekārthībhāva*). That is to say that the meaning of the compound-constituents are not presented separately, but they present their meanings which have inseparably fused together.

Then Kātyāyana and Patañjali state another view, namely, *parasparavyapekṣā* 'mutual dependence'. According to this view, the constituents of compounds present their meaning separately. This view maintains that the constituents of a compound present their meaning in the same way as the constituents of the uncompounded wordgroup presents their meaning. This means that *rājapuruṣaḥ* and *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* are syntactically equivalents (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 135-40).

Patañjali (under *Vārttika* 11 on P. 2. 1. 1) mentions the *nityapakṣa* view. According to this view, there is no need to formulate grammatical rules to explain the meaning of compounds. According to the *nityapakṣa*, compounds are not generated by grammatical rules.

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In this view a compound is a single word standing for a single meaning (*ekārthībhāva*). In the *nityapakṣa* view there cannot be *vyapekṣā* 'mutual-dependence' because the constituents of a compound do not present their meaning separately (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 140). The *kāryaśabdavāda* differs from the *nityapakṣavāda* in the explanation of the *ekārthībhāvapakṣa* view. According to this view the compounds and the corresponding wordgroups are derived according to the rules of grammar, and the underlying syntactic structure of a compound and the corresponding wordgroup is identical. In this view the unified sense of a compound is not intrinsic (*svābhāvika*) but it is the result of the application of grammatical rules. The *kāryaśabdavāda* uses the term *vṛtti* 'complex-formation' to explain how the compound is formed out of the corresponding wordgroup. *Vṛtti* means integration which gives rise to the additional meaning (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 141-2).

But when the constituents are connected what happens to the meaning of constituents? In this connection Patañjali mentions two theories: *jahatsvārthā vṛtti* 'loss of meanings of constituents due to integration' and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* 'integration without abandoning the meaning of constituents'.

According to the first view, the constituents of a compound give up their own meaning. A compound as a whole conveys an integrated meaning. In conveying meaning the constituents have no separate function from the whole. This does not mean constituents lose their meaning completely. Still in a compounding,

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the meanings of the constituents are either related to each other (*saṃsarga*) or differentiated from each other (*bheda*) or both related and differentiated (*ubhaya*). For instance, in the compound *rājapuruṣa*, the meaning king and servant are related to each other (*saṃsarga*) excluding the servant that is not related to a king (*bheda*). *Bheda* and *saṃsarga* which are responsible for the syntax in the sentence are also responsible for compounds.

According to the *ajahatsvārthā* view, the first constituent retains its meaning as a qualificant to the meaning of the main member, but does not independently denote its meaning.

These two views have place in the *nityapakṣa* and *kāryapakṣa* too to explain the role of constituent meaning in the meaning of a compound. KB refers to the several views stated in the *Mahābhāṣya* and then he makes his own comments on the outcome of the several views (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 135-42).

KB states Kaiyaṭa's view first. Kaiyaṭa summarizes the whole discussion of the *Mahābhāṣya* into three different views.

(i) The compound as a whole denotes a single indivisible meaning. The compound and the corresponding wordgroup belong to two different domains. In the uncompounded wordgroup, meanings are separately presented. This view of *ekārthībhāva* has been propagated by the *nityapakṣavādin* who says that we do not require the grammatical rules to explain specialized compound-meaning. A compound is not to be derived but it is natural data of language.

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(ii) The second view says that a compound is derived from the corresponding uncompounded word-group. For the formation of compound the mutual dependence (*vyapekṣā*) between the constituents is required. But the derived compound conveys one single integrated meaning. The generation of compounds from the uncompounded wordgroup is the view propagated by the *kāryaśabdavādin*. In the *kāryapakṣa* there are two theories, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā* which decide the meaning of compounds. In the second view the compound-constituents give up their own meaning and assume one unified meaning (*jahatsvārthā*).

(iii) The third view is that the compound and the corresponding uncompounded wordgroup, are syntactically and semantically equivalent. Both in compound and uncompounded wordgroup, the constituents are mutually dependent (*vyapekṣā*). This view has been adopted by the *kāryaśabdavādin*. The third view adopts the *ajahatsvārthāpakṣa*.

Then KB refers to the view of Haradatta. According to Haradatta, *ekārthībhāva* implies that the principal member denotes its meaning as qualified by the meaning of the subordinate member, and the subordinate member denotes its meaning in a qualifying function, not as an independently signifying something. If the constituents of the compound are independently denotative of their meanings, the subordinate member could form connection with the word lying outside the compound.

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Haradatta says that for the compound formation *vyapekṣā* 'mutual dependence' is also equally necessary. Otherwise the compound could have been formed out of the constituents semantically unrelated. Another point mentioned by Haradatta is that the *jahatsvārthā vṛtti* has no place in compoundformation. The reason is that the constituents are related to each other without abandoning their meaning. If we assume that the constituents lose their meanings completely we will have to assign special donotative function to a compound as a whole which becomes a separate lexical item. But the assumption of such a denotative function is unnecessary because the compound-meaning can be derived from the constituent-meaning itself. Thus KB remarks that according to Haradatta *ekārthībhāva*, *vyapekṣā* and *ajahatsvārthā* all the three are necessary conditions for the formation of the compound.

KB disagrees with Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta and maintains that the whole discussion of Patañjali can be reduced into two views, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā* which correspond to *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* respectively. His claim is that the views *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā* are explained by Patañjali in terms of the *jahatsvārthā* and the *ajahatsvārthā* respectively. According to the *jahatsvārthā* view, when integration takes place the members of the compound do not express their meanings separately. Therefore, a compound as a whole denotes its meaning; consequently for the denotation of single integrated meaning we have to assign an aggregate denotative function (*samudāyaśakti*) to

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the compoundform as a whole. In the *vyapekṣā* view the meanings of the constituents are presented separately, and syntactic connection between them is denoted by the morphemic elements. Therefore, the *vyapekṣā* view is reduced to the *ajahatsvārthā* view, according to which, constituents retain their meaning.

KB criticises Kaiyaṭa's view: According to Kaiyaṭa in the *nityapakṣa* view *ekārthībhāva* amounts to mean indivisibility of the meaning of compound. But to KB this goes against the logical interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. According to Patañjali *samartha* means emergence of a single integrated meaning of constituents which present their meanings separately in the uncompounded wordgroup. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation of the *nityaśabdavāda* which totally denies the relation between the constituent-meaning and the compound as a whole is not correct. If the *ekārthībhāva* claims that the compound is indivisible and the constituents in a compound do not have any meanings at all, then one could extend this theory to the sentence also and deny meaning to the constituents of sentence also. This would mean that the undivided sentence conveys undivided meaning. But this goes against the intention of Patañjali who maintains the *vyapekṣā* 'mutual dependence' of the constituents in a sentence (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 141-5).

Similarly Haradatta's statement is also subject to criticism. Haradatta says that *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthībhāva* both are the necessary conditions for the formation of compounds. But this also goes against Patañjali's

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intention who, according to Kaiyaṭa, maintains that *ekārthībhāva* 'single integrated meaning' exists in a compound and *vyapekṣā* 'mutual dependence' exists in a sentence. It is also an incorrect view that the *jahatsvārthā* view has no place in a compound formation. Patañjali himself shows at length that in the *jahatsvārthā* view the subordinate member of the compound does not lose its meaning completely. The *jahatsvārthā* view is also necessary to explain the relation between the constituent-meanings and the meaning of the compound as a whole.

According to KB, of these two views, *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā*, the first one implies that a compound as a whole denotes one single meaning and has a separate denotative function (*samudāyaśakti*) through which a compound gives rise to a single meaning. However, the second view states that each word in a compound has a separate denotative function, and a compound as a whole has no separate denotative function. Of these two views Bhaṭṭoji, the author of the verse text, and KB maintain that the *ekārthībhāva* only is the correct view. Just as in the case of the word *paṅkaja* its etymological meaning (growing in the mud) cannot explain the conventional meaning, lotus, so it is assumed that a word as a whole denotes conventional meaning. Similarly, the compound as a whole has the separate denotative function (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 145-56).

Moreover, the *ekārthībhāva* view has been adopted because the other view involves complexities (*gaurava*). We will have to formulate rules to account for the special

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features of a compound. The following are the special features:

(i) Absence of inflectional suffixes after the constituent members of a compound.
(ii) The members of a compound cannot be separated by other words.
(iii) Fixed order of the constituents.
(iv) Single accent.
(v) Ambiguity as regards the number of the subordinate member.
(vi) Ambiguity as regards the syntactic relation between the compound members.
(vii) The subordinate word cannot be construed with a word outside the compound.
(viii) To indicate conjunction, etc. the words *ca* 'and', etc. are not used.
(ix) The statement of option between a compound and uncompounded word-group (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 153).

In the following compounds *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* 'departed from Kauśāmbī' (departed from), *gorathaḥ* 'a chariot to which oxen have been yoked' (to which have been yoked), *ghṛtaghaṭaḥ* 'a pot filled with ghee' (*pūrṇa* 'filled with'), *guḍadhānāḥ* 'crisps made of barley mixed with brown sugar' (mixed with), *suvarṇālaṃkāraḥ* 'gold-produced ornament' (produced), *dvidaśa* 'two times ten' (times), *saptaparṇa* 'a tree having clusters of seven leaves' (at each point), we understand the additional meanings not conveyed by constituents, namely, *krānta* 'departed from', *yukta* 'driven', *pūrṇa*

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'filled', *miśra* 'mixed', *vikāra* 'product' 'counting', *vīpsā* 'distribution'. In the *vyapekṣā* view every meaning element should occur in the analytical paraphrase. Therefore, the lexical items like *krānta*, *pūrṇa*, etc. should be supplied in the constituent analysis, which are to be subsequently deleted. For the deletion of these elements we will have to phrase new rules. But according to *ekārthībhāva* as explained by KB there is no question of deriving compounds from the uncompounded wordgroups to account for these meanings. In the view of the *ekārthībhāva* the compounds and the corresponding uncompounded wordgroups may differ a great deal as far as meaning is concerned. The compound as a whole conveys the specialized meaning and we do not require special rules. Thus there is an advantage in adopting the *ekārthībhāva* view.

In other words KB recognizes a separate denotative function for the compounds which is called *samudāyaśakti* 'aggregate denotative function' apart from that of constituents. He argues that the compound should be assigned a distinct function because it conveys a meaning which is over and above the meaning denoted by constituents. For instance, the *bahuvrīhi* compound *citragu* does not mean 'a brindled cow' which is the meaning of constituents but refers to a person who owns brindled cows. Similarly, the compound *pāṇipādam* does not mean 'hands', 'feet' but it means an aggregation of hands and feet. Many meanings like *krānta* 'departed from', *pūrṇa* 'filled with', etc. are denoted by the compound as a whole but not by its constituents. Further,

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in the case of *nityasamāsa*, 'unanalysed compounds' a formally corresponding uncompounded wordgroup is lacking In such cases the meaning of a compound is determined by the compoundform as a whole and not by the constituents themselves (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 153-7).

The Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that the compound is formed of constituents and the meanings of constituents give rise to the qualified meaning denoted by a compound. They do not accept that there is necessity of assigning a separate denotative function (*samudāyaśakti*) to a compound as a whole. Both the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s accept only *vyapekṣā* 'mutual dependence' and do not accept any *vṛtti* or *ekārthībhāva* in *samāsa*. Both the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s resort to *lakṣaṇā* 'a secondary function of words' to explain any additional meaning that is denoted by the compound over and above the constituent-meanings. For instance, in *rājapuruṣaḥ* the constituent *rājan* signifies the sense of relation by the secondary function along with its lexical meaning. In the case of *karmadhāraya*, *lakṣaṇā* need not be resorted to since the constituents themselves can convey the qualified sense. In the case of *bahuvrīhi* the Naiyāyika-s adopt the *padalakṣaṇā* while the Mīmāṃsaka-s adopt the *vākyalakṣaṇā*. So all these differences between compounds and corresponding uncompounded wordgroups which are due to *ekārthībhāva* according to the grammarians are explained as caused by the *nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā* 'conventional function' (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 157, 168-70).

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Kumārila observes that a denotative function assigned to the *bahuvrīhi* as a whole conveys *anyapadārtha* 'denotation of meaning of another word'. In a *bahuvrīhi* the constituents express their own meaning but not *anyapadārtha*. The sense *anyapadārtha* cannot be brought out by the primary or secondary function of words because the primary meanings of constituents is not given up at all. The reason is that the reference to the meaning other than what is denoted by the compound-constituents is understood only when the outside word is used along with the *bahuvrīhi* compound. Therefore the *anyapadārtha* is the denoted meaning of a compound. The Mīmāṃsaka-s observe that the *anyapadārtha* is conveyed by the *nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā* through the primary meanings of the constituents of the compound. In *bahuvrīhi* the Mīmāṃsaka-s postulate the *vākyalakṣaṇā* where the *vākya* means a phrase as a whole. The semantic connection exists between *citraguḥ* (and) *devadattaḥ* 'brindled cow (owner) Devadatta'. The question is how this meaning 'owner' is arrived at. The answer according to the later Mīmāṃsaka-s is that this meaning 'owner' is conveyed by the secondary function belonging to a sentence (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 182-3).

But, according to the Naiyāyika-s, either the word *citrā* or *go* conveys the additional meaning, i.e. reference to the *anyapadārtha*. But this view is untenable because the first member *citrā* cannot be indicative of the meaning 'the owner of the brindled cows'. Consequently, *go* cannot be connected with *citrā*. The reason is *citrā* does not refer to the meaning 'brindled' any longer.

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Similarly it is also wrong to say that the word *go* indicates the sense of *gosvāmī* 'owner of the cows', because in that case *citrā* no longer forms connection with *go*. We cannot say either that both the *pada-s* together convey the sense 'owner of the brindled cows'; for even then it will be impossible to bring out the proper sense of the *bahuvrīhi-s* like *prāptodako grāmaḥ* 'water-reached village'. In the analysis *prāptam udakaṃ yam*, *udaka* 'water' is the agent and the village is the object of the action of reaching. In *prāpta* the suffix *kta* has been added in the sense of agent. The sentence denotes primarily the agent of the action of reaching, whereas the compound denotes primarily the object of the action of reaching. Here reference to the object (i.e., to the village), by a compoundform cannot be explained by the secondary function (*lakṣaṇā*) because the constituents in the sentence stand in the syntactic agreement 'water' 'the agent of the action of reaching'. If the secondary function indicates the sense of object (i.e., village) then the compound would mean 'the village, identical with the object of reaching'. But this is not the intended meaning of the compound. The other word *udaka* also cannot imply the sense of *karman* because the meaning of the compound cannot be judged without the proper understanding of the first member. To avoid all these difficulties KB advocates the aggregate denotative function on the basis of practical experience that a compound is one word. He puts forth the view that the compound-meaning is understood even by

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children without knowing the grammatical or constituent analysis of compound. (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 176-7).

The Naiyāyika-s advocate that the indeclinables in compounds also are indicative (*lakṣaṇā*) of the sense of proximity, etc., as in *upakumbham* 'in the vicinity of jars'. The sense of nearness is not included in the meaning of the second member of the compound. Therefore, it is held to be implied by the second member. KB argues that the indeclinables are indicative (*dyotaka*) of the sense 'nearness', etc., but the sense of the compound as a whole, namely, 'near a jar' is denoted by the aggregate power of the compound (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 157-8).

Kātyāyana proposes the view *yugapadadhikaraṇa-vacanatā* for the formation of *dvandva* compounds. According to this view, each item in a *dvandva* compound, just as in the case of *ekaśeṣa*, represents the meaning of the other item simultaneously. The *ekaśeṣa* and *dvandva* items are not singly represented but always together with another item or the other items. In the case of *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa* we find joint representation of items.

But Patañjali rejects the view of joint representation and states that in a *dvandva* the items are separately presented, and that meaning of conjunction comes from integration only. The joint representation of items in a *dvandva* or *ekaśeṣa* is a result of *ekārthībhāva* (integration) only.

KB remarks that this view of simultaneous representation is formulated by the *vyapekṣāvādin-s* who maintain that constituent-meanings are separately

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represened. This view *yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā* is specially necessary to maintain the joint representation of the two items in the constituent analysis. But this simultaneous representation according to KB cannot exist in the constituent analysis because dual or plural is not added to each constituent in the analytical paraphrase. We have instances like *dyāvāpṛthivī* where items are separately represented in dual. But these are the Vedic usages which are exception to general rules. According to the theory of *samudāyaśakti* or *ekārthībhāva*, a *dvandva* compound is a single word denoting an aggregate of several individuals (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 137, 151).

In the case of *dvandva* the Naiyāyika-s accept *yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā* in a different sense. The Naiyāyika-s argue that there is a syntactic relation between the primary sense of the constituents and the dual number added to a compound. If each constituent is related to a dual then the compound would mean 'two *dhava-s*' and 'two *khadira-s*'. Therefore to justify the dual number we must assume that the first constituent denotes 'association' (*sāhitya*). Since this sense of association is not conveyed by the primary function of the constituents the Naiyāyika-s resort to the indication (*lakṣaṇā*) to convey *sāhitya* which indicates the 'joint representation of two objects', and the number, dual or plural, represents the objects whose association is formed.

The sense association indicated by the first member in compounds like *dhavakhadirau* does not mean two *dhava-s*. It (*dhava*) does not mean *dhava* and *khadira*

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either because *dhava* cannot mean *khadira*. The sense 'association' or 'simultaneous representation' is only through indication (*lakṣaṇā*) (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 158).

According to KB, as in the case of other compounds the aggregate denotative function expresses the meaning of a *dvandva* compound also. In the *itaretarayoga* the aggregate denotative function expresses that the items are grouped together which justifies reference to two or more items. In the case of *samāhāra* (group of items) the *samudāyaśakti* (aggregate denotative function) denotes aggregation or group which justifies singular number (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 158).

The later Mīmāṃsaka-s do not accept the aggregate denotative function of the whole compound (*samudāyaśakti*) or *lakṣaṇā* (indication) in the case of *karmadhāraya* compound. In *nīlaghaṭa* 'a blue jar' the word *nīla* and *ghaṭa* are in apposition and their co-referentiality is brought out by merely joining the stems *nīla* and *ghaṭa*. On the other hand, in the *tatpuraṣa* compound like *rājapuruṣaḥ* 'king's man' the servant-master relationship cannot be brought about by mere constituents. The syntatic relationship is dependent on the case termination. In the compound the case termination is not there. Therefore this relationship is indicated by the secondary function. Therefore, in case of doubts, the *karmadhāraya* compound which does not involve the secondary function is preferred to the *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* which involves the operation of the secondary function. Consequently, 'the word *niṣādasthapati* is taken to mean *niṣādaḥ sthapatiḥ* a chief who

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himself is niṣāda' rather than to mean *niṣādānāṃ sthapatiḥ* 'a chief of the Niṣāda tribe'. But KB's standpoint is that the aggregate denotative function belongs to all compounds. And there would be no difference between a *tatpuruṣa* and a *karmadhāraya* compound. And it would go against the Mīmāṃsā doctrine which proves that *niṣādasthpatiḥ* must be taken as a *karmadhāraya* compound and not as a *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* for the sake of economy. To avoid this difficulty KB answers that when a compound word denotes various meanings *tātparya*, 'speaker's intention' must be taken to decide the sense of the compound. If we take the compound *niṣādasthapati* in the context of ritual as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* compound it will go against the interest of the author's statement. Moreover the true meaning of the compound is determined by means of the accent (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 180-81, 186).

The Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s do not accept a separate denotative function with regard to a compound as a whole. The grammarians argue that if an aggregate denotative function is not assigned to a compound as a whole a compound form cannot be called *prātipadika* 'nominal stem' by P. 1. 2. 45, because the basic condition for the designation *prātipadika* is meaningfulness. Since a compound as a whole has no sense according to the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s it will not be called a nominal stem (*prātipadika*). We cannot apply the designation *prātipadika* by the next rule P. 1. 2. 46 either because the word *samāsa* in that rule is restrictive. The *sūtra* means that if the

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designation *prātipadika* is to be applied to a collection of words having a sense it must be restricted to a compound. It is not to be applied to a sentence. Moreover, if the compound as a whole has no denotative function, it cannot have a *lakṣaṇā* which is based on the denotative function (*abhidhā* or *śakti*) of words (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 161).

The Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that the genitive compound like *rājapuruṣa* must be analysed as *rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca* and not as *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. The first analysis indicates that the relation of qualified and qualifier is dependent on the mutual expectancy of constituents and not on the case terminations added to them. In the case of the genitive *tatpuruṣa* compounds, the sense of relation, namely, 'servant and master' is to be conveyed by the genitive suffix. But the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ* does not refer to the relation between the two relata but *rājan* in *rājapuruṣaḥ* denotes the meaning of *puruṣa* in the sense that *rājan* becomes a qualifier to *puruṣa*. The constituent analysis must convey the meaning of the compound. The constituent analysis *rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca* can convey the qualifier and qualified relation (*abheda*), but the analysis *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* fails to point it out. Therefore *rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca* is a proper analysis. Similarly, the *bahuvrīhi* compound *citraguḥ* must be analysed as *citrāṇāṃ gavām ayam* 'he, owner of the brindled cows' and not as *citrā gāvo yasya* 'possessed of brindled cows'. In the case of *bahuvrīhi* compounds the constituent anaylsis must be such as can convey reference to the *anyapadārtha*. If we assume the analysis *citrāṇāṃ gavām ayam* it can point out reference to the

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anyapadārtha. But the constituent analysis *citrā gāvo yasya* primarily refers to the *svapadārtha* 'constituents' own meaning' (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 174-5, 177).

To this KB replies that the constituent analysis and compound need not be semantically and syntactically equivalents. Therefore, we may find the reversion of the principal and subordinate relation in the meaning indicated by the constituent analysis and compound. Consequently, the analysis *citrā gāvo yasya* for the compound *citraguḥ and rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* for the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ* may not be objected to.

Even the Mīmāṃsaka-s assume that *bhāvanā* 'productive operation' stands as predominant with respect to the *kāraka-s* 'operators' in the case of verbal forms, whereas in the case of *kṛdanta* words the *kāraka-s* stand predominant with respect to *bhāvanā*. Therefore the constituent analysis may not be exactly equivalent to the compound-meaning (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 183-6).

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BISWANATH BHATTACHARYA

YAMAKA IN ĀRYA-ŚŪRA'S *JĀTAKA-MĀLĀ*

Like Kumāralāta's (*c.* A. D. 3rd century) [*kalpanā-maṇḍitikā* or *kalpanā'-laṅkṛtikā*] *Dṛṣṭānta-paṅkti*, Ārya-Śūra's (*c.* A.D. 4th century) *Jātaka-mālā* is a Gadya-kāvya composed in elegant Sanskrit. In ornate prose interspersed with strophes in fancy classical metres, the *Jātaka-mālā* retells thirty-four old legends about the previous births of the Buddha. Of these legends the twenty-ninth one, the Brahma-jātaka, gives us some instances of spontaneous rhyming at the end of each *pāda* in the following verses:

1. *adharmam asmād bhṛśa-durjayaṃ jayan*
   kadarya-bhāvaṃ ca duruttaraṃ taran |
   upaihi ratnātiśayojjvalaṃ jvalan
   divaspateḥ kāñcana-gopuraṃ puram || [29/50]
2. *manasy asad-darśana-saṃstute 'stu te*
   ruci-sthiraṃ saj-jana-saṃmataṃ matam |
   jahīhi taṃ bāliśa-rañjanair janaiḥ
   pravedito 'dharma-viniścayaś ca yaḥ || [29/51]
3. *tvayā hi sad-darśana-sādhunādhunā*
   narendra vṛttena yiyāsatā satā |
   yadaiva citte guṇa-rūksatā kṣatā
   tadaiva te mārgakṛtāspadaṃ padam || [29/52]
4. *kuruṣva tasmād guṇa-sādhanaṃ dhanaṃ*
   śivāṃ ca loke sva-hitodayāṃ dayām |
   sthiraṃ ca śīlendriya-saṃvaraṃ varaṃ
   paratra hi syād aśivaṃ na tena te || [29/53]

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5. *sva-puṇya-lakṣmyā nṛpa dīptayāptayā*
sukṛtsu śuklatva-manojñayājñayā /
carātmano 'rtha-pratisaṃhitaṃ hitaṃ
jagad-vyathāṃ kīrti-mano-haraṃ haran // [29/54]
6. *tvam atra san-mānasa-sārathī rathī* [29/55ᵃ]

[Dr. Hendrik Kern's edn., Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 1, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 3rd Printing, 1943, pp. 198-9; Dr. P. L. Vaidya's edn., Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 21, The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1959, pp. 207-8]

In the rhyming units cited above the minor distinction between «ṃ» and «n» appears to have been ignored. Similarly the immaterial difference between «m» and «ṃ», «ḥ» and «r», and «ḥ» and «ś» (i.e., the original sound and its due change in external sandhi in each case) has been overlooked. Again, the presence of the *lupta akāra* and *ākāra* in euphonic combination need not be taken into consideration.

Further, in the rhyming units we find both *sārthaka* and *nirarthaka* sound combinations.

Technically speaking, this type of rhyming within the same *pāda* towards the end in each case can be called Pādānta-yamaka from the viewpoint of the *Bhaṭṭikāvya*, **10**. 3 as interpreted by Jayamaṅgala.[1] Narendraprabha accepts and illustrates this type of yamaka.[2]

[1] *nikhilā 'bhavan na sa-hasā sahasā*
jvalanena pūḥ prabhavatā bhavatā /
vanitā-janena viyatā viyatā
tri-purāpadaṃ nagam itā gamitā // [**10**. 3]
Jayamaṅgala: pādānta-yamakam iti pādānteṣu yamitatvāt /
[Jīvānanda's edn., pt. 3, Fourth Impression, Calcutta, 1913, p. 3]

[2] pādānte yathā—
vyathita-sindhum anīraśanaiḥ śanair
amara-loka-vadhū-jaghanair ghanaiḥ /

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But this Pādānta-yamaka has to be distinguished from Bharata's Pādānta-yamaka[1] which has been termed Puṣpa-yamaka in the *Bhaṭṭi-kāvya* as explained by Jayamaṅgala.[2] In Bharata's Pādānta-yamaka, or Bhaṭṭi's Puṣpa-yamaka, we find inter-pādānta rhyming.

Coming back to Ārya-śūra, we observe schematic illustrations of Pādānta-yamaka in the first five verses.

phaṇabhṛtām abhito vitataṃ tataṃ
dayita-ramya-latā-bakulaiḥ kulaiḥ (priya-lavaṅga-latā°—sic)//
[=Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīya*, **5**. 11]

[*Alaṅkāra-mahodadhi*, **7**. 20. (579), p. 217 in L.B. Gandhi's edn., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. 95, Baroda, 1942.]

[1] *caturṇāṃ yatra pādānām ante syāt samam akṣaram /*
tad vai pādānta-yamakaṃ vijñeyaṃ nāmato yathā // [**16**. 63]
dina-kṣayāt saṃhṛta-raśmi-maṇḍalaṃ
divīva lagnaṃ tapanīya-maṇḍalam /
vibhāti tāmraṃ divi sūrya-maṇḍalaṃ
yathā taruṇyāḥ stana-bhāra-maṇḍalam // [**16**. 64]
[*lokānāṃ prabhaviṣṇur daityendra-gadā-nipātana-sahiṣṇuḥ /*
jayati sura-daitya-jiṣṇur bhagavān asura-vara-mathanakārī Viṣṇuḥ//]

[*Nāṭya-śāstra* in M. R. Kavi's edn., vol. II, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. 68, Baroda, 1934, p. 327]

[2] *atha lulita-patatri-mālaṃ*
rugṇāsana-bāṇa-keśara-tamālam /
sa vanaṃ vivikta-mālaṃ
Sītāṃ draṣṭuṃ jagāmā 'lam// [**10**. 14]
Jayamaṅgala: puṣpa-yamakam iti pratipādaṃ vṛntād upari puṣpam iva avasthitatvāt /

[Jīvānanda's edn., op. cit., pp. 11-12]

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But the sixth verse shows Pādānta-yamaka in the first *pāda* only and as such this case is marred by *aprayuktatva-doṣa* from the standpoint of the later Ālaṃkārika-s.

We might be permitted in the present context to point out *en passant* that similar instances of Pādānta-yamaka in more or less refined form are also traceable in Aśvaghoṣa's (*c.* A.D. 100) *Buddha-carita* and *Saundara-Nanda*.[1]

[1] *yāvat sva-vaṃśa-pratirūpa rūpaṃ*
na te jarābhyety abhibhūya bhūyaḥ |
tad bhuṅkṣva bhikṣāśrama-kāma kāmaṃ (*kāmān*—sic)
kāle 'si kartā priya-dharma dharmam ||

[*Buddha-carita*, **10**. 33 in S. Chaudhari's edn., pt., 1, 3rd impression, Kaṭhotiyā, 1955, p. 134]

tad etad ājñāya vipāpmanātmanā
vimokṣa-dharmādy-upasaṃhitaṃ hitam (*hitaṃ*—sic) *|*
juṣasva me saj-jana-saṃmataṃ mataṃ
pracakṣva vā niścayam udgiran giram (*giraṃ*—sic) *||*

[*Saundara-Nanda*, **9**. 49 in S. Chaudhari's edn., 2nd impression, Kaṭhautiyā, 1959, p. 118]

anena daṣṭo Madanāhinā hi nā
na kaścid ātmany anavasthitaḥ sthitaḥ |
mumoha Vodhyor (sic) *hy acalātmano mano*
babhūva dhīmāṃś ca sa Śantanus tanuḥ ||

[ibid., **10**. 56, p. 133]

sthite viśiṣṭe tvayi saṃśraye śraye
yathā na yāmīha vasan diśaṃ diśam (*diśaṃ*—sic) *|*
yathā ca labdhvā vyasana-kṣayaṃ kṣayaṃ
vrajāmi tan me kuru śaṃsataḥ sataḥ ||

[ibid., 10. 57. p. 133]

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GEORGE CARDONA

ON THE DOMAIN OF PĀṆINI'S METARULE 1. 3. 10: *YATHĀSAṂKHYAM ANUDEŚAḤ SAMĀNĀM*

PĀṆINI's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* contains the following metarules: (1) **1**. 1. 50: *sthāne'ntaratamaḥ*, (2) **1**. 3. 10: *yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām*. These differ obviously in their scopes, since the first applies only in connection with substitution rules, and the domain of the second is not so limited. According to (1) **1**. 1. 50, if there is a possible choice of substitutes to replace a given substituend, that one occurs which is most similar to the substituend. For example, according to (3) **8**. 4. 62: *jhayo ho'nyatarasyām* (*pūrvasya* 61, *savarṇaḥ* 58), *h* which follows a non-nasal stop is optionally replaced by a sound that is homogeneous (*savarṇaḥ*) with the preceding sound. By (4) **1**. 1. 9: *tulyāsyaprayatnaṃ savarṇam* and (5) **1**. 1. 10: *nājjhalau*, a sound is said to be homogeneous with another if it is produced with the same articulatory effort at the same place of production in the oral cavity as that sound, provided that one is not a vowel and the other a consonant. Thereby, the stops *k kh g gh ṅ* make up a set of homogeneous sounds. Now, by (3) **8**. 4. 62, if *hasati* 'laughs, is laughing' follows *vāg*

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'voice,' its *h* is optionally replaced by a sound homogeneous with the preceding *g*, and this can be any member of the set noted. (1) **1**. 1. 50 serves to let the voiced aspirated stop *gh* replace *h*, to which it is more similar than any other velar stop. (2) **1**. 3. 10 does not concern only substitutions. According to this metarule, if a rule concerns entities A_1, A_2 . . . A_n and subsequently enumerated entities B_1, B_2 . . . B_n which are the same in number, these are to be related in order. The entities in question may be individuals or groups. For example, (6) **4**. 3. 94: *tudīśalāturavarmatī-kūcavārāḍ ḍhakchaṇḍhañyakaḥ* introduces four taddhita affixes which serve to form derivatives that denote persons native to certain places.[1] The affixes are *ḍhaK*, *chaṆ*, *ḍhaÑ*, *yaK*,[2] introduced after complexes consisting of place names and a nominative ending. The place names in question are *tudī*, *śalātura*, *varmatī*, *kūcavāra*. By (2) **1**. 3. 10, the bases and affixes given in (6) **4**. 3. 94 are related in order, so that the rule accounts for *taudeya*, *śālāturīya*, *vārmateya* and *kaucavārya*, with the respective affixes *ḍhaK*, *chaṆ*, *ḍhaÑ* and *yaK*. Another rule (2) **1**.3.10 serves to interpret is (7) **3**. 1. 134: *nandigrahipacādibhyo lyuṇinyacaḥ*, which enumerates three affixes: *Lyu*,[3] *ṆinI*, *aC*. These are introduced respectively after verbal

[1] By anuvṛtti, one understands in (6) **4**. 3. 94 *so'sya* and *abhijanaḥ* of earlier rules (**4**. 3. 89, 90). Details of the derivation need not be considered here.

[2] Markers used by Pāṇini are shown in upper case type. Affix-initial *ḍh*, *ch* are replaced by *ey*, *īy* respectively (**7**. 1. 2: *āyaneyīnīyiyaḥ phaḍhakhacchaghāṃ pratyayādīnām*).

[3] *yu* is replaced by *ana* (**7**. 1. 1: *yuvor anākau*).

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bases belonging to three groups, which begin with *nandi* (*nandana* 'who gladdens, son'), *grah* (*grāhin* 'who seizes'), *pac* (*paca* 'who cooks').

Pāṇinīya-s accept that (2) **1**. 3. 10 can also apply to interpret substitution rules such as (8) **6**. 1. 78: *eco'yavāyāvaḥ* (*aci* 77). This rule enumerates four replacements: *ay*, *av*, *āy*, *āv*. The substituends for these are referred to by the term *eC*. According to (9) **1**. 1. 71: *ādir antyena sahetā*, a term of the type *I-M*, consisting of an item *I* of an ordered set and a final marker *M*, denotes *I* and all intervening items that follow, up to *M*. The sound catalogue which accompanies Pāṇini's rules contains the subsets *eo Ṅ*, *ai au C*. By (9) **1**. 1. 71, then, *eC* of (8) **6**. 1. 78 refers to the vowels *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*. Together with (2) **1**. 3. 10, then, (8) **6**. 1. 78 provides that these vowels are replaced by *ay*, *av*, *āy*, *āv*, respectively, when a vowel (*aC*) follows. Pāṇinīya-s agree that this substitution rule is thus to be interpreted.[1]

However, Pāṇinīya-s disagree concerning a rule such as (10) **6**. 1. 77: *iko yaṇ aci*, a substitution rule in which, as in (8) **6**. 1. 78, abbreviations are used to refer to groups of sounds. The term *iK* refers to the vowels *i u ṛ ḷ* of the subsets *a i u Ṇ*, *ṛ ḷ K* in Pāṇini's catalogue,

[1] Thus, *Kāśikā* (ed. Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao Deshpande. D. G. Padhye, Hyderabad: Sanskrit Academy, 1969-70), vol. II, p. 616: *ecaḥ sthāne aci parataḥ ay av āy āv ity ete ādeśāḥ yathāsaṃkhyaṃ bhavanti*. Similarly, *Rūpāvatāra* (ed. M. Rangacharya, M. B. Varadarajiengar, Madras, Bangalore, 1916, 1927) I. 9, *Prakriyā-kaumudī* (ed. K. P. Trivedi, Bombay, 1915) I. 53, *Siddhāntakaumudī* (ed. Giridhara Śarmā Caturveda, Parameśvarānanda Śarmā Bhāskara, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1958-61) I. 74 (sūtra 61).

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yAṆ to the semivowels *y v r l* of the subsets *h y v r Ṭ*, *l Ṇ*, and *aC* refers to the vowels in the subgroups *a i u Ṇ*, *ṛ ḷ K*, *e o Ṅ*, *ai au C*. Since *iK* and *yAṆ*, as interpreted by (9) **1**. 1. 71, designate four vowels and four semivowels, one may consider that these are related in order, according to (2) **1**. 3. 10. Indeed, (10) **6**. 1. 77 is thus interpreted by some Pāṇinīya-s, as in the *Rūpāvatāra* and the *Prakriyākaumudī*.[1] On the other hand, another Pāṇinīya, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, denies this and holds instead that (1) **1**. 1. 50 serves to determine which semivowel replaces which vowel by (10) **6**. 1. 77.[2] Moreover, this disagreement goes back to a much earlier time. (10) **6**. 1. 77 is cited as a rule which (1) **1**. 1. 50 serves to interpret, in the *Mahābhāṣya* on this metarule: palatal *i* is replaced by palatal *y*, labial *u* by *v*, which is also labial, etc. This position is then rejected, with the claim that (2) **1**. 3. 10 applies to determine what semivowel substitutes for which vowel.[3] On the other hand, the *Mahābhāṣya* on (2) **1**. 3. 10 first says this metarule serves to interpret (10) **6**. 1. 77,

[1] *Rūpāvatāra* I. 8 (*iko yaṇādeśo bhavati aci parataḥ saṃhitāyām/ yathāsaṃkhyaparibhāṣāyā atrāpi pravṛttiḥ*). The *Prakriyākaumudī* (I.44-5) gives (2) 1. 3. 10 immediately after (10) **6**. 1. 77, interpreting the latter with this metarule.

[2] For example, *Siddhāntakaumudī* I. 55 (sūtra 47): . . . *sudhīupāsyaḥ iti sthite sthānata āntaryād īkārasya yakāraḥ*.

[3] *Mahābhāṣya* (ed. F. Kielhorn, 3rd ed. by K. V. Abhyankar, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962, 1965, 1972), vol. I, p. 120, lines 2-4: *kim udāharaṇam/ iko yaṇ aci . . . tālusthānasya tālusthāna oṣṭhasthānasyauṣṭhasthāno yathā syāt/ niatad asti/ saṃkhyātānudeśenāpy etat siddham*.

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then claims that (1) **1**. 1. 50 applies to determine which semivowel replaces which vowel.[1]

That either (1) **1**. 1. 50 or (2) **1**. 3. 10 is brought into play in connection with (10) **6**. 1. 77 is a consequence of how one considers the terms *iK* and *yAṆ* to be used. As noted earlier, these are abbreviatory terms which, in accordance with the convention established by (9) **1**. 1. 71, denote *i u ṛ ḷ* and *y v r l*. Now, according to (11) **1**. 1. 69: *aṇ udit savarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ*, a vowel *a i u ṛ ḷ e o ai au* or a semivowel *y v r l* as given in Pāṇini's sound catalogue and denoted by *aṆ*, provided it is not an affix (*apratyayaḥ*), is a class name which denotes not just itself but any sound homogeneous with this.[2] Thus, *a* refers to eighteen vowels: short *a*, long *ā* and extra-long *a*3, nasalized or not and with three possible pitches: high, low or a combination of the two; *y* denotes either simple *y* or its nasalized counterpart.[3] If, then, one considers that *i*K and *y*AṆ in (10) **6**. 1. 77 are immediately interpreted as denoting not only *i u ṛ ḷ* and *y v r l* but also, by virtue of these being class names according to (11) 1. 1. 69, sounds homogeneous with them, and one also considers the metarules (1) **1**. 1. 50, (2) **1**. 3. 10 to be on a par, only the first may be brought into play in connection with (10) 6. 1. 77,

[1] *Mahābhāṣya* I. 267. 8-9: *kim ihodāharaṇam/ iko yaṇ aci ... naitad asti/ sthāne'ntaratamenāpy etat siddham.*

[2] (11) **1**. 1. 69 makes another provision, which is not pertinent to this discussion.

[3] Similarly for other vowels and semivowels, except that *e o ai au* have no short counterparts and *r* has no nasalized counterpart.

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since the substituends and the replacements now given are not equal in number, so that (2) **1**. 3. 10 cannot come into play.

We have, therefore, the following issues to consider: Should a rule such as (10) **6**. 1. 77, in which an abbreviatory term like *i*K is used, apply with respect to long vowels as well as short ones, and, if so, is there some indication that Pāṇini's rules provide for this? If this is the case, is it possible to have a term such as *i*K refer to long vowels, given Pāṇini's rules as formulated? Finally are the metarules (1) **1**. 1. 50 and (2) **1**. 3. 10 to be considered on a par or are their scopes such that the possibility of their competing for application does not arise?

Semivowel replacement does indeed apply to long vowels in Sanskrit, and the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* comforms to this norm. Thus, for example, (12) **8**. 2. 44: *lvādibhyaḥ* (*niṣṭhāto naḥ* 42) provides that the *t* of the affixes K*ta* and K*tavat*U—referred to by the class name *niṣṭhā*—is replaced by *n* after a group of verbs, the first of which is *lū* 'cut': *lūna-* 'cut,' *lūnavat-* 'who has cut.' To refer to this set of verbs, Pāṇini uses the term *lvādi*, in which one has prevocalic *lv* instead of *lū*. Moreover Pāṇinian rules such as (10) **6**. 1. 77 provide operations that apply not only to short vowels but also to such long vowels.[1] In this connection, consider the

[1] As indeed they must, since Pāṇini describes a contemporary language. His grammar is different, in so far as concerns rules for his bhāṣā, from prātiśākhya-s, rules of which account for

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rules: (13) **6**. 1. 102: *prathamayoḥ pūrvasavarṇaḥ* (*akaḥ dīrghaḥ* 101), (14) **6**. 1. 104: *nād ici*, (15) **6**. 1. 105: *dīgrhāj jasi ca*. (13) **6**. 1. 102 provides that two contiguous vowels V_1 and V_2 are both replaced by a single long vowel (*dīrgha*)[1] if V_1 is one of the sounds denoted by *a*K and V_2 is the vowel of an ending of the first or second triplets of nominal endings, that is, of a nominative or accusative ending; the single replacement is a long vowel homogenous with V_1; e.g., *agnī* (< *agni-au*) 'two fires (nom,-acc. du.),' *vāyū* (< *vāyu-au*) 'two winds,' *vṛkṣās* (< *vṛkṣa-Jas*) 'trees (nom. pl.).' (14) **6**. 1. 104 is an exception to (13) **6**. 1. 102: The long-vowel substitution stated therein does not apply if V_1 is an *a*-vowel and V_2 is one of the vowels denoted by *i*C; e.g., *vṛkṣa-au*→*vṛkṣau* 'two trees,' not *vṛkṣā*.[2] (15) **6**. 1. 105 is another exception to (13) **6**. 1. 102; If V_1 is a long vowel, the replacement in question does not apply both when V_2 is a vowel denoted by *i*C and when it is the vowel of the ending J*as* (nom. pl.); e.g., *kumāryau* (< *kumārī-au*) 'two girls,' *kumāryas* (< *kumārī*-J*as*). Now, assume that *a*K denoted only the short vowels *a i u ṛ ḷ*. Were this so, (13) **6**. 1. 102,

relations between a padapāṭha and a saṃhitāpāṭha. Such rules need not cover features found in the language of the prātiśākhya author but absent from the Vedic text for which he accounts.

[1] (13) **6**. 1. 102—(15) **6**. 1. 105 come under the heading of **6**. 1. 84: *ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ*. Rules of this section provide that one sound replaces two contiguous sounds.

[2] Dual forms of the type *vṛkṣā* are allowed, but only for Vedic, and Pāṇini accounts for them by a rule (**7**. 1. 39: *supāṃ suluk* . . .) specifically dealing with Vedic.

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would not provide for substitution where V_1 was a long vowel, so that *kumārī-au*, *kumārī-as* could not give **kumārī*, **kumārī-s* by this rule. Hence, there would be no need to exclude such a substitution, in (15) **6**. 1. 105. Yet Pāṇini does just this. Consequently, it must be that (13) **6**. 1. 102 does allow the single-vowel substitution in question when V_1 is a long vowel, so that *a*K must ultimately be considered to refer also to such long vowels. In the same way, *i*K of (10) **6**. 1. 77, which should apply to give *kumāryau*, *kumāryas*, also should refer to long *ī*, etc.

Of course, the above does not necessarily imply that Pāṇini's rules as stated properly provide for terms such as *a*K, *i*K to refer to long vowels. Indeed, the *Mahābhāṣya* claims they do not. Consider now the arguments involved. The term *a*K consists of the vowel *a*, the first sound of the first subgroup in Pāṇini's sound catalogue, and the marker *k* which closes the second subgroup of this catalogue. By (11) **1**. 1. 69, this *a* can designate the class of *a*-vowels. However, it is claimed, *i u ṛ ḷ* denoted by *a*K according to (9) **1**. 1. 71 cannot refer to homogeneous long vowels, since these are not overtly taught in the sound catalogue. Therefore, an abbreviatory term such as *a*K is considered to refer to short *i u ṛ* only.[1] Further, against the claim that these short vowels denote long ones, the following is pointed out: A speech element that is uttered conveys a meaning, not one which is itself conveyed; for example,

[1] Vārttika 2 on **1**. 1. 69 (*tatra pratyāhāragrahaṇe savarṇāgrahaṇam anupadeśāt*) with Patañjali's explanation (*Mahābhāṣya* I. 178. 14-17).

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the term *ṛk* (nom. sg.), when uttered, refers to a verse but not to what such a verse conveys.[1] The suggestion is then made that the sounds of the groups *a i u* Ṇ, etc. in the sound catalogue be considered to refer to sets of sounds, according to (11) **1**. 1. 69, within the sound catalogue itself, but this too meets with an objection. One must follow a sequence such that: Sounds are taught in the sound catalogue, then consonants closing subgroups are classed as markers,[2] after which one can provide for abbreviatory terms such as *a*K, by (9) **1**. 1. 71; only then is it possible, using the abbreviatory term *a*Ṇ, to provide, by (11) **1**. 1. 69, that certain sounds denote sets of sounds. Consequently, (11) **1**. 1. 69 cannot be used to let *a i u*, etc. denote sets of sounds within the sound catalogue itself.[3] One of two possible conclusions is drawn from the above. First, one may require that long vowels actually be taught in the sound catalogue: *a ā i ī u ū*, etc. instead of *a i u* Ṇ, etc.[18] Alternatively, one may take a step which allows doing away with having to state *a*Ṇ in (11) **1**. 1. 69: Let the sounds *a i u*, etc. of the sound catalogue be treated as uttered in order to convey generic properties

[1] *Mahābhāṣya* I. 178. 17: *nanu ca hrasvāḥ pratīyamānā dīrghān saṃpratyāyayiṣyanti*; **1**. 1. 68 vt. 3: *hrasvasaṃpratyayād iti ced uccāryamāṇasaṃpratyāyakatvāc chabdasyāvacanam*; *Mahābhāṣya* **1**. 178. 20: *ṛg ity ukte saṃpāṭhamātraṃ gamyate nāsyā artho gamyate.*

[2] Each final consonant of the groups *a i u ṇ, ṛ ḷ k*, etc. in Pāṇini's sound catalogue is a marker by **1**. 3. 3: *hal antyam.*

[3] **1**. 1. 69 vt. 4: *varṇapāṭha upadeśa iti ced avarakālatvāt paribhāṣāyā anupadeśaḥ* with Patañjali's explanation (*Mahābhāṣya*, I. 178. 23-179.2).

[4] **1**. 1. 69 vt. 5: *tasmād upadeśaḥ.*

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a-ness, etc. which characterize classes of sounds; such class properties are taught in order to refer to such classes.[1] Now, since Pāṇini formulates (11) **1**. 1. 69 in the manner shown, with *a*Ṇ, it is patent that his sound catalogue comprises individual sounds and is not intended as a type listing. Nor does Pāṇini follow the alternative of listing long vowels in his catalogue. Moreover, he does not need to adopt either of these alternatives, since the objections posed above are not cogent. To be sure, a term such as *ṛk*, when uttered, conveys its meaning, a verse, and not the meaning of any verse. It is also true that there is no general convention which would allow this. On the other hand, (11) **1**. 1. 69 establishes a convention whereby given sounds refer to sets of sounds. It is therefore perfectly proper to say that a term such as *a*K refers, indirectly, to long vowels: according to (9) **1**. 1. 71, *a*K denotes in the first instance *a i u ṛ ḷ*, and according to (11) **1**. 1. 69, these denote sets of vowels. This being accepted, the question arises whether a term such as *i*K in (10) **6**. 1. 77 should be considered to designate all the vowels *i ī u ū ṛ ṝ ḷ* immediately or whether, instead, one should proceed in the two steps shown, so that *i*K first designates *i u ṛ ḷ*. Consider the arguments of one Pāṇinīya, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in favour of the first alternative. (15) **6**. 1. 105 shows that abbreviatory terms such as *a*K, *i*K signify long vowels,

[1] **1**. 1. 69 vt. 7: *savarṇe'ṇgrahaṇam aparibhāṣyam ākṛtigrahaṇāt* with Patañjali's explanation (*Mahābhāṣya* I. 179. 14-16). I have omitted another argument leading to this suggestion.

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so that, as can be seen from (12) **8**. 2. 44, semivowel substitution by (10) **6**. 1. 77 applies to $\breve{i}$, $\breve{u}$, etc. The relation between a term like *i*K and the large set of vowels $\breve{i}$ $\breve{u}$, etc. is one of secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*), since the term bears a primary signifying relation (*śakti*) with *i u ṛ ḷ* alone. Still, it is not proper to begin with this primary signification, letting *i u ṛ ḷ* and *y v r l* be related in order according to (2) **1**. 3. 10, then having the former denote sets of sounds by (11) **1**. 1. 69. For, argues Bhaṭṭoji, this would allow *l* to substitute for *ṛ* and *r* to replace *ḷ*, since *ṛ* and *ḷ* are said to be homogeneous with each other so that *ṛ* denotes a set of sound including *ḷ* and vice versa.[1] Of course, this argument depends on having *ṛ* and *ḷ* be homogeneous sounds, and Kātyāyana would have this be.[2] However, Pāṇini makes no such provision, so that Bhaṭṭoji's argument fails with respect to Pāṇini's rules as stated. Consequently, it is best to consider that one should proceed in two steps, as shown. For, Pāṇini does have separate rules whereby a term like *i*K denotes first *i u ṛ ḷ*, and these in turn denote sets of vowels.

[1] *Prauḍhamanoramā* (ed. Gopāla Śāstrī Nene [KSS 125], Banaras, 1939) 124-33, *pratyāhāragrahaṇeṣu tadvācyavācye nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā dīrghāj jasi ca iti jñāpakāt lvādibhyaḥ iti nirdeśāc ca| tenekśabdena ṣaḷṣaṣṭir gṛhyante yaṇśabdena sapta . . . ato nāsti yathāsaṃkhyam| na ca lakṣyārthabodhāt pūrvabhāvinaṃ śakyārthabodham ādāya yathāsaṃkhyam| astv iti vācyam| evam api ṛtīyacaturthābhyām ṛkāraḷkārābhyām pratyekaṃ triṃśadupasthitau ḷvarṇānāṃ rephādeśasya ṛvarṇānāṃ lādeśasya ca prasaṅgāt| tasmād iha sthānentaratamasūtreṇaiveṣṭasiddhiḥ* . . . So also elsewhere.

[2] **1**. 1. 9 vt. 5: *ṛkāraḷkārayoḥ savarṇavidhiḥ.*

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It remains to be seen whether one is to go through both these steps before a metarule such as (1) **1**. 1. 50 or (2) **1**. 3. 10 comes into play. In this connection, consider again (8) **6**. 1. 68: *eco'yavāyāvaḥ*. Suppose one immediately lets *e o ai au*, denoted by *e*C according to (9) **1**. 1. 71, refer to sets of vowels by (11) **1**. 1. 69. It would then not be possible properly to apply (8) **6**. 1. 78. Not all the substituends are included in an ordered list, and the substituends and their possible replacements are not equal in number. Hence, they cannot be related in order according to (2) **1**. 3. 10. Nor could (1) **1**. 1. 50 determine which substitute should replace which particular substituend. For example, consider whether *ay* or *āy* should be allowed to occur for an *ai*. One cannot say that *āy* is selected because it has an open vowel and *ai* too has such a vowel.[1] For, in order to state phonologic rules, Pāṇini treats *a*- and *ā*-vowels as like in quality, both open.[2] Hence, *ay* too is treated as a complex with an open vowel, so that this also could substitute for an *ai*. Clearly, (8) **6**. 1. 78 cannot apply properly unless (2) **1**. 3. 10 serves to relate *e o ai au* denoted by *e*C with the replacement *ay av āy āv* in order. Moreover, this does not mean that (1) **1**. 1. 50 can no longer come into play with (8). **6**. 1. 78. As shown, vowels such as *e o ai au* are made class names designating sets of vowels, so that *e* represents

[1] This possibility is considered in the *Mahābhāṣya* on **1**. 3. 10 (1. 269. 7: *saṃvṛtāvarṇasya saṃvṛtāvarṇo vivṛtāvarṇasya vivṛtāvarṇo*).

[2] The final rule of the grammar (**8**. 4. 68 : *a a*) then reinstitutes phonetically close *a*.

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both high and low-pitched *e*-vowels. (8) **6**. 1. 78 should provide for a replacement *áy* or *ay*, depending on whether the substituend is *é* or *e:* the replacement should be the one most similar to the given substituend. So far as concerns (8) **6**. 1. 78, then, the following conclusions are warranted. Both the metarules (1) **1**. 1. 50 and (2) **1**. 3. 10 serve to let this substitution rule apply properly. (8) **6**. 1. 78 has the term *e*C, which, by (9) **1**. 1. 71, denotes the vowels *e o ai au*. (2) **1**. 3. 10 is a syntactic rule of interpretation whereby terms and their significants are related in a particular manner: the vowels denoted by *e*C and the substitutes *ay av āy āv*, being equal in number, are related in order. Though *e*C directly denotes only *e o ai au*, these are in turn class names which, by (11) **1**. 1. 69, designate sets of homogeneous vowels. Substitutes *áy*, *ay*, etc. replace given members of these sets in accordance with (1) **1**. 1. 50.

What has been shown to hold for (8) **6**. 1. 78 should hold also for other substitution rules where abbreviations interpreted by (9) **1**. 1. 71 are used. Accordingly, (10) **6**. 1. 77 should be interpreted as follows. The substituends *i u ṛ ḷ* and the replacements *y v r l*, denoted by *i*K and *y*AṆ according to (9) **1**. 1. 71, are related in order, by (2) **1**. 3. 10. In addition, *i*, *u*, etc. denote, by (11) **1**. 1. 69, sets of homogeneous sounds, so that *i̯ u̯ ṛ̯ ḷ̯* are replced by *y v r l* respectively.

Now suppose one had, instead of (10) **6**. 1. 77, a rule (16) *iuṛḷvarṇānāṃ yavaralā aci*. This would be comparable in its formulation to (7) **3**. 1. 134: *nandigrahipacādibhyo lyuṇinyacaḥ*. The latter has the term

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nandigrahipacādi (abl. pl. *-ādibhyaḥ*), a bahuvrīhi compound such that *ādi* 'first' is construed with each member of an included dvandva consisting of *nandi*, *grahi* and *pac*, so that term refers to three sets, the first members of which are *nandi*, *grah* and *pac*. The affixes L*yu*, Ṇ*in*I and *a*C are related in order with these sets. Similarly, (16) contains a dvandva compound such that *varṇa* 'sound set'[1] is construed with each of the terms *i u ṛ ḷ* so that the compound refers to *i*-, *u*-, *ṛ*- and *ḷ*-vowels. These sets are related in order to *y v r l*, which respectively replace *i*-, *u*-, *ṛ*- and *ḷ*-vowels. (16) and (10) **6**. 1. 77 both provide that *y v r l* occur instead of *i̯ u̯ ṛ̯ ḷ̯* before vowels. These are also equivalent in their manner of providing this, if (10) **6**. 1. 77 is given the interpretation shown, so that (2) **1**. 3. 10 serves to relate in order the vowels and semivowels which *i*K and *y*AṆ denote by (9) **1**. 1. 71. By (11) **1**. 1. 69, these vowels and semivowels are further terms that denote classes of sounds, so that terms such as *i* and *ivarṇa* are equivalent.

The point crucial to the above is that (2) **1**. 3. 10 relates sounds which abbreviations such as *i*K denote in accordance with (9) **1**. 1. 71. As shown, only in this way is it possible to have (8) **6**. 1. 78 apply properly. As further support for this procedure, consider now

[1] The *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya* (ed. K. Rangacharya, R. Shama Sastri, Mysore, 1906) has a rule (1. 20: *hrasvo varṇottaras trayāṇām*) according to which a term in which a short vowel is followed by *varṇa* denotes a set of short, long and extra-long vowels, e.g., *ivarṇa* denotes *i*, *ī* and tri-moric *i*3. This usage involving *varṇa* is widespread and well known.

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(17) **3**. 1. 33: *syatāsī lṛluṭoḥ*. This rule introduces the post-verbal affixes *sya* and *tāsi* to derive forms such as *dāsyāmi* 'I shall give,' *adāsyam* 'I would (have) give(n),' *dātāsmi* 'I shall give (sometime after today).' These are gotten from *dā-mi*, *dā-am*, *dā-mi*, which in turn derive from forms with three L-affixes: *dā-l*ṚṬ, *dā-l*ṚṆ, *dā-l*UṬ. According to (17) **3**. 1. 33, *sya* and *tāsi* occur if verbs are followed by endings which replace *l*Ṛ and *l*UṬ. Now, it is obvious that *luṭ* of *lṛluṭoḥ* refers to the L-affix *l*UṬ. On the other hand, *lṛ* here refers to the *l*Ṛ common to two L-affixes, *l*ṚṬ and *l*ṚṄ. If one considers the L-affixes ultimately at issue, there are three such affixes, to be associated with *sya* and *tāsi*. These five affixes could not be related in order by (2) **1**. 3. 10. However, the members of the pairs *l*Ṛ, *l*UṬ and *sya*, *tāsi* can be related in order by this metarule. Further, only thus can one have (17) **3**. 1. 33 account for proper forms. Moreover, it is clear that Pāṇini refers to such pairs in this rule, since he uses the dual forms *syatāsī* (nom. du.) and *lṛluṭoḥ* (loc. du.).

To summarize: Pāṇini adopts two conventions for referring to groups of elements. First, there is a convention whereby abbreviations are used to refer to elements of ordered sets. For example, *i*K denotes the vowels *i u ṛ ḷ*, *e*C denotes the vowels *e o ai au*, given in this order in Pāṇini's sound catalogue. In addition, there is a convention such that certain sounds in this catalogue are made terms which refer to sets of sounds. Thus, for example, *i* refers to all *i*-vowels. Pāṇini's grammar also has a metarule, **1**. 1. 50: *sthāne'ntaratamaḥ*,

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whereby, given a choice of possible replacements for a substituend, that one is selected which is most similar to the substituend, and another metarule, **1**. 3. 10: *yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām*, which serves to relate in order equal-numbered entities enumerated in rules. Some substitution rules in which abbreviations like *i*K are used can be applied using either of these two metarules. For example, **6**. 1. 77: *iko yaṇ aci* uses the terms *i*K, *y*AṆ and *a*C to provide for semivowel replacement: *ĭ ŭ ṝ ḷ* are replaced by *y v r l* before vowels. Since *i*K and *y*AṆ denote *i u ṛ ḷ* and *y v r l*, these can be related in order by **1**. 3. 10. Further, *i*, *u*, etc. denote sets of homogeneous sounds: *i*-vowels, *u*-vowels, etc. The sounds thus denoted by *i u ṛ ḷ* and *y v r l*, cannot be related in order by **1**. 3. 10: Still, the proper replacements can be gotten by **1**. 1. 50. However, there are other substitution rules in which abbreviations are used and which can apply properly only if the sounds denoted by these abbreviations are related in order with other sounds. For example, **6**. 1. 78: *eco'yavāyāvaḥ* can account for desired results only if *e o ai au* denoted by *e*C are related in order with *ay av āy āv*. From such decisive instances, it follows that rules such as **6**. 1. 77 should be applied in the same manner: the elements which such abbreviations immediately denote are related in order with members of another set of the same number. There is also other supporting evidence to show that this is the procedure intended by Pāṇini.

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SARVESWARA SHARMA PERI

CORRECTNESS OF THE VOCATIVE SINGULAR FORM *SUBHRU*

THE vocative singular form *subhru* has been widely used in Sanskrit literature from the *Mahābhārata* to the *Naiṣadhīyacarita*,[1] but the form is not correct according to the rules of Pāṇini. Grammarians from Vāmana onwards have discussed the question and tried to defend the popular usage, but it seems to be indefensible.

The word *subhrū* cannot come under the category of *nadī* by Pāṇini's rule *yū stryākhyau nadī* (**1.** 4. 3),

[1] *Subhru* has been found in the following works:
Mahābhārata: 1. 72. 12 (=1. 3267); 13. 41. 8 (=13. 2314); 13. 134. 1 (=13. 6748)
Kumārasaṃbhava: 5. 43
Vikramorvaśīya: 3. 22
Bhaṭṭikāvya: 6. 11
Mālatīmādhava 3. 8
Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra: p. 307. 65 (=Caurapañcāśikā); p. 307. 70
Otto Böhtlinck's Indische Sprüche: 241 (=*Vikramārkacarita*, 63 = *Siṃhāsanadvātriṃśikā*)
Śrutabodha
37 (=Knopp's Dissertation p. 101)
Bhāgavatapurāṇa 4. 3. 20; 4. 25. 27; 4. 26. 23; 9. 19. 12; 4. 25. 30; 9. 20. 15
Śukasaptati 2. 19
Brahmapurāṇa: 53. 10
Naiṣadhīyacarita 8. 99

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because of the negation *neyaṅuvaṅsthānāv astrī* (**1.** 4. 4) for the word *subhrū* takes the augment *uvaṅ*. Therefore the short form for the vocative ordained by the rule *ambārthanadyor hrasvaḥ* (**7.** 3. 107) is not possible in this case.

The discussions on this problem can be divided into two schools. In one no concrete solution is given, and even if one is given it is not satisfactory; in the other attempts have been made to defend the usage.

(1) Haradatta refers[1] to the *Kumārasambhava* (**5.** 43) usage of the term and says that it is a mistake. He then refers to a solution suggested by some scholars. This is based on the *Paribhāṣā: sakṛd baddham anityam, dvir baddhaṃ ca subaddham* ('what is once prescribed is not invariably valid, but what is twice prescribed is invariably valid). This *Paribhāṣā* is inferred from the sūtra *tado dā ca* (P. **5.** 3. 19) where the suffix *dā* is prescribed after *tad*, even though it is already prescribed in *sarvaikānyakiṃyattadaḥ kāle dā* (P. **5.** 3. 15). Hence *nadīsaṃjñā* by *neyaṅuvaṅsthānāv astrī* (P. **1.** 4. 4) taught only once need not be invariably valid; and the short form *subhru* by *ambārthanadyor hrasvaḥ* (P. **7.** 3. 107) is possible.

This Paribhāṣā cannot be accepted; otherwise, every rule of Pāṇini becomes optional, unless repeated. This is not found in the *Mahābhāṣya*. And Kātyāyana

[1] '*atha katham "vimānanā subhru kutaḥ pitur gṛhe" iti| pramāda evāyam| anye tv āhuḥ:- anityo 'yaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ, sakṛdbaddhatvāt| tathā ca paribhāṣā "sakṛdbaddham anityaṃ dvirbaddhaṃ ca subaddham" iti| atra ca jñāpakaṃ tado dāvacanam (tado dā ca P. **5.** 3. 19) ity āhuḥ|* (Haradatta on P. **1.** 4. 4).

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has rejected the rule *tado dā ca*, saying that it is already prescribed: *tado dāvacanam anarthakaṃ vihitatvāt.*

(2) Another solution suggested by Vāmana[1] and repeated by Mallinātha and many others is by assuming that another suffix *ūṅ* is added to the ū-ending word *subhrū* and thus have it under *Nadī* group and thereby have the short vocative form *subhru* by *ambārthanadyor hrasvaḥ.*

But though the term *subhrū* has not been used in any of its declensional form by Pāṇini, Katyāyana or Patañjali, Pāṇini mentions the word *bhrū* in the Sūtra: *aci śnudhātubhruvāṃ yvor iyaṅuvaṅau* (P. **6**. 4. 77). Hence the substitute *uvaṅ* comes always, whether the word *bhrū* comes alone, or compounded with any other word, because this rule is prescribed under the general rule *aṅgasya* (P. **6.** 4. 1). Hence the form *subhruvau* is acceptable to all; and it cannot come under *nadī-saṃjñā.*

(3) Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita does not refer to the possible adding of the suffix *ūṅ* in this case, since he knows it cannot be accepted in the face of Pāṇini's clear statement. He gives the correct form as *he subhrūḥ*, with a long ū and visarga.

He refers[2] to the futile attempt of some to make the

[1] *ūkārāntād apy ūṅpravṛtteḥ* (5. 2. 48) *uta ūṅ vihita ūkārāntād api kvacid bhavati/ kvāsau pravṛttiḥ/* "*aprāṇijāteś cārajjvādīnām*" (Vārttika on P. **4**. 1. 66) *iti/ alābūḥ, karkandhūḥ, ity udāharaṇam/ tena* "*subhru kiṃ saṃbhrameṇa*", *atra subhruśabda ūṅi siddho bhavati/ ūṅi tv asati subhrūr iti syāt /*' (Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*, **5.** 2. 48).

[2] *kecit tu* '*vāmi*' (P. **1.** 4. 5) *ity ato vāgrahaṇam ihāpakṛṣya vyavasthitavibhāṣāṃ cāśritya samādadhuḥ tan mandam/ tathā satīha naṅgrahaṇasya* '*vāmi*' *ity uttarasūtrasya ca vaiyarthyāpatteḥ/ anye tu* '*sāmānye napuṃ-*

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negation of *nadī saṃjñā* optional by bringing back the particle *vā* from the next rule *vāmi* (P. **1.** 4. 5) to *neyaṅuvaṅsthānāv astrī* (P. **1.** 4. 4), and rejects it saying that if that were the intention of Pāṇini he would have worded the sūtra '*veyaṅuvaṅ*—'

Bhaṭṭoji offers a solution to the problem on the basis of *Sāmānye napuṃsakam* (use of neuter gender in general); in that case the short form *subhru* is possible. His reference to this view as *kathaṃcit* shows that it is not acceptable to him.

Haridīkṣita, grandson of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and teacher of Nāgeśa, refers[1] to the usage of the term in *Bhaṭṭikāvya* and introduces two new ideas on the solution of the problem. He rejects the solution based on *Sāmānye napuṃsakam*, since in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* passage, Rāma is addressing Sītā, and the neuter gender is not appropriate there. He also criticises the solution on the basis of the *Paribhāṣā*, *nañghaṭitam anityam* ('a rule containing the negative *nañ* is not invariably valid); this *Paribhāṣā* is not found in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

Nāgeśa discusses the problem[2] and tries to solve the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* usage on the ground that Rāma suffering

sakam' iti kathaṃcit samādadhuḥ|" (Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita's *Prauḍhamanoramā* together with *Śabdaratna* by Haridīkṣita and *Bhairavī* by Bhairavamiśra, *Ajantastrīliṅgaprakaraṇa*, p. 314).

[1] *iti anena Sītāvirahiṇo Rāmasya vākye Sītāyā eva vivakṣitatvenedam apy aprayojakam iti sūcitam | 'nañghaṭitam anityam' (paribhāṣā) iti tu bhāṣyānuktatvān na lakṣyasaṃskāropayogi|*" (Haridīkṣita's *Śabdaratna* commentary on *Prauḍhamanoramā*, p. 315. 10ff)

[2] '*kvāsi he subhru' iti| Rāvaṇena Sītāpahārottaraṃ Rāmavilāpo 'yam vidhinā hāpitas tyājitaḥ sa 'he subhru kvāsi' iti evaṃ bahu*

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from the separation of Sītā makes the grammatical mistake, since he is not careful. He follows Haridīkṣita regarding the other two points. The argument based on absentmindedness cannot be accepted, since the usage is found in other cases also; absentmindedness cannot be taken as a criterion for grammatical mistakes.

Thus we come to the conclusion that the vocative singular form *subhru*, though used extensively by poets, is grammatically incorrect. The real problem is how to stop the negation of *nadīsaṃjñā* to *subhrū*. The solutions based on the *Paribhāṣā-s sakṛd baddham anityam* and *nañghaṭitam anityam* and the *vārttika sāmānye napuṃsakam* are shown to be unacceptable. The solution based on the mental condition of the speaker is also defective. The addition of *ūṅ* to the word *subhrū* cannot be accepted, since Pāṇini uses the word *bhrū* with *uvaṅ*, and thereby prevents *bhrū* as well as *subhrū* from being included under *nadī*. Hence the *hrasva* ordained for *nadī* cannot come for *subhrū*.

vilalāpety arthaḥ| ' neyaṅ. . .' ity anenāvayavasya samudāyasya ca naditva-niṣedhāt praśnaḥ| ' pramāda ' iti| virahapīḍitatvenānavadhānalakṣaṇo 'tra pramādaḥ| sa ca virahapoṣakatvāt kāvye guṇaḥ|" (Nāgeśa's *Laghu-śabdenduśekhara* together with Bhairava's *Candrakalā*, *Ajantastrīliṅga-prakaraṇam*, p. 383. 9ff.)

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SUSAN OLEKSIW

DICING IN THE MṚCCHAKAṬIKA

The *Mṛcchakaṭika*, attributed to King Śūdraka, has long been noted for its wealth of technical material on a variety of subjects, including several references to specific dicing games. The analysis and classification of different types of dicing games has been most extensively dealt with by Lüders in his monograph *Das Würfelspiel im alten Indien* (1907); the relevant material in the *Mṛcchakaṭika*, however, has received relatively little attention. It is proposed here to supply information on the three dicing games referred to in the play, which have been neglected or incorrectly perceived by Lüders and others; the games are referred to in Act **2**, during the so-called gamblers' scene.

In the *Mṛcchakaṭika* (*Mṛcch.*) the term for a die does not appear in the same passages with the terms from dicing games found in Act **2**; reference to dice is found in Act **4** in a description of one of Vasantasenā's apartments (**4.** 27. 37): the compound *pāsaapīṭha* (*pāśakapīṭha*) 'dicing board' contains the common term for a die, *pāśaka*, which has been well researched by Lüders (1907: 16-17). The *pīṭha* is one of several synonyms for the board on which the dice are thrown

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and may be marked or unmarked according to the particular game.

Pāśaka Game 1

The first reference to a dicing game in Act 2 is found in the *saṃvāhaka's* entrance speech:

ṇavabaudhaṇamukkāe via gaddahīe hā tāḍido mhi gaddahīe|

aṅgalāamukkāe via śattīe ghaḍukko via ghādido mhi śattīe|| (2. 1)

I was kicked by the *gaddahī* as though by a mule just released from its fetters; I was struck by the *śattī* like Ghaṭotkaca struck by the spear hurled by Karṇa.

The references to a specific game are to be found in the terms *gaddahī* (*gardabhī*) 'female donkey' and *śattī* (*śakti*) 'spear;' the strict definitions of both terms are incapable of conveying the meanings of the terms in dicing. The Sanskrit commentators, Pṛthvīdhara and Lalladīkṣita, interpret the terms as designations of cowrie shells; they tell us nothing about the game or the meanings of the terms in the game.

One of the terms is found in the Bower MS., which contains in part a text on reading oracles according to casts of the dice; the text is assigned to A.D. 350-500 by Hoernle (1892b: 37-38), which is the same period as the play. The Bower MS. lists casts of the dice and supplies for each a verse on its significance for the person requesting the oracle reading. The verses are

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not important for our purposes, but the designations of two of the dice throws and the manner of obtaining them are. The introduction to this part of the MS. states that three dice, each marked with a pot, discus, or elephant, are to be used (Hoernle 1892a: 135 line 3). The three dice are called *prāsaka-s*, which would certainly seem to be the correct Sanskrit term for a die rather than *pāśaka*, although Lüders feels that *prāsaka* and *pāśaka* are both Sanskritizations of a more authentic vernacular *pāsaka* (1907: 16). According to the Bower MS., the dice are tossed onto a board (*vṛti*) that is divided into squares; each square on the board is marked with the number 1, 2, 3, or 4, and, consequently, each number designates three squares, e.g., three squares would be marked with the number 4, and so forth (Hoernle 1892a: 132). Therefore, each tossing of the dice would produce three numbers by the dice falling on three specific squares; the sequential order of the numbers is determined by the figures on the dice of the pot, discus, and elephant, which determine first, second, and third place, respectively (134). Hoernle explains the numerical grouping that results from this procedure.

> Of such groups there would necessarily be three different classes, according as the same number occurred in the group thrice or twice or once; thus the group might be 444, or 443, or 432. It follows that there would be 20 possible groups, and that every throw of the dice would indicate one of these 20 groups. (1892a: 133)

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In other words, the three dice and twelve squares of the board can produce a total of 64 possible numerical combinations; these are ordered into 20 groups. The MS. is concerned with naming each group and then giving verses on each sequence within the group.

One of the twenty groups is termed *śakti*/*śaktī*, which designates the sequence 341 and any of its five variations (134, 413, 314, 143, 431) (Hoernle 1892a: 136). *Śakti* is also one of the terms used by the *saṃvāhaka*. The Bower MS. uses the term *kharī*, a synonym for *gardabhī*, the other term used by the *saṃvāhaka*, to designate the sequence 112 (the variations 211 and 121 are missing from the text; 1892a: 137 line 5); we shall return to this group.

A similar method for oracle reading is found in the *Pāśakakevalī*, an early astrological text. Weber describes the procedure according to this text:

> [The dice] must be considered three in number and four-sided (pyramid-shaped), respectively equilateral, and designated with 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . 64 possibilities are also therefore distinguished . . . (1859: 162)

Weber states that the sequential order of the numbers is determined by the order in which the dice are tossed (163). Although here the numbers are inscribed on the dice rather than on the playing board, the three dice produce the same twenty groups and the 64 numerical combinations found in the Bower MS.; the two texts know only minor variations in the procedure for producing the same numerical sequences.

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The Bower MS. is consistent in naming all the given numerical sequences in one group with the same term (e.g., the sequence 341 and its five variations are all termed *śakti*), but the *Pāśakakevalī* is not consistent, and occasionally names some sequences in a group by a different term. Nevertheless, in the *Pāśakakevalī*, the term *śakti* designates the tosses 314 and 143; in the Bower MS. the same designation is given for the entire group to which 314 and 143 belong. In the *Pāśakakevalī* two variations of this group are designated separately: 134 is termed *vijaya* and 431 *śakaṭa* (Weber 1859: 170 verse 36 and 179 verse 163); no designations are given for 341 and 413. The designation *śakaṭa* 'cart' may be a variant or a corruption of *śakti* (cf. Lüders 1907: 34).

The *Pāśakakevalī* also deals with the group of dice throws based on the sequence 112. The text designates the sequence 112 as *kartarī*, but leaves the variations 121 and 211 unnamed (Weber 1859: 168-80; dice throws are listed in numerical order). In the Bower MS. the sequence 112 is termed *kharī*, but the variations 121 and 211 are missing from the text. Weber does not interpret *kartarī* in the *Pāśakakevalī* as the term for a group of tosses but instead considers it a general indication of an unfortunate cast of the dice (164); this seems unjustified in view of the consistency of the text in giving specific names for dice throws. Lüders suggests that *kartarī* is corrupted from *kharī* (1907: 31); it is tempting to see in *kartarī* an erroneous effort to correct *gardabhī* to what might appear to be

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more correct Sanskrit form (with the exception, of course, of the final syllables in both words: -rī and -bhī), i.e. Pkt. garda- >Skt. karta-. Nevertheless, on the basis of how the terms are used in the text, *kharī*, *kartarī*, or *gardabhī* would be the name for the group containing the sequence 112 and its variations 121 and 211. This seems preferable to Weber's interpretation of *kharī* as simply a general term for a bad cast of the dice.

On the basis of the material in the Bower MS. and the *Pāśakakevalī*, it is clear that in the *Mṛcch.* the *saṃvāhaka* is referring to two specific groups of dice throws: *śakti* (134 and its variations) and *gardabhī* (*kharī* or *kartarī*) (112 and its variations). The mere use of the terms in the play, however, does not indicate which particular sequence among the possible variations resulted from the casting of the dice, nor if the dice throws belonged to the *saṃvāhaka* or to his opponent.

A description of this type of *pāśaka* game and its rules is found in the *Vidhurapaṇḍitajātaka* (545); in this text the general term for a group of sequences is *āya*.

> *. . . rajataphalake suvaṇṇapāsake ṭhapayiṁsu. Pu turito "Māhārājapāsakesu āyā nāma, mālikaṃ sāvaṭaṃ bahulaṃ, santi bhadrādayo catuvīsati. tesu tumhe attano ruccanakaṃ āyaṃ gaṇhathā" 'ti ā., rājā "sādhū" 'ti bahulaṃ gaṇhi Pu —sāvaṭaṃ, atha naṃ rājā ā.: tena hi tāta māṇava pāsake pājehīti," "Mahārāja paṭhamaṃ mama vāro na pāpuṇāti, tumhe pājethā" 'ti, rājā "sādhū" 'ti saṃpaṭicchi. . . . Rājā tatiyam pi pāsake khipitvā attano parājayāya bhassante ñatvāpi Puṇṇakassānubhāvena hatthaṃ pasāretvā gaṇhituṃ nāsakkhi, te rañño*

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parājayāya patiṃsu. Tato Pu- pāsake khipi, te attano jinantā patiṃsu, . . . (Fausboll 1964: 281-82) . . . They arranged the silver board and golden dice. Puṇṇaka quickly said, 'O King, among the *pāśakas* are the *āyas* called *mālika*, *sāvaṭa* and *bahula*; there are 24, beginning with *bhadra*; among those choose the *āya* that pleases you.' The king said, 'Good,' and chose *bahula*. Puṇṇaka chose *sāvaṭa*. Then the king said to him: 'Then, O venerable young man, throw the dice.' 'O King, I shouldn't take the first turn; you throw.' The king agreed, saying, 'Good.' . . . The king tossed the three dice, and knowing his dice were falling to defeat by the power of Puṇṇaka, stretched out his hand, but was unable to catch them; the losing *āya* fell to the king. Then Puṇṇaka threw the dice; his three fell in the winning cast.

The rules of the game are clear from the narrative. Each player chooses an *āya* or group of sequences (three specific numbers with variations allowed in the order) by name. The player tosses the dice; if the dice produce the *āya* chosen, the player wins. The game depends on the casting of a predeclared *āya*. It is not stated in the text if, in this game, the numbers are on the dice or on the playing board.

The *jātaka* refers to 24 *āya-s* or groups of dice throws, while the Bower MS. lists 20. Twenty-four groups are not mathematically possible on the basis of 2, 3, or even 4 dice and must be an error for twenty. The term *āya*, used in the *jātaka* as a general term for

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any group of dice throws or set of sequences, is also found, though rarely, in the *Pāśakakevalī* (Weber 1859: 170 verse 36, where sequence 134 is called an *aya* (not *āya*) and termed *vijaya*; 1859: 179 verse 163, where sequence 431 is called an *āya* and termed *śakaṭa*). Lüders interpreted the term as 'toss' (1907: 29-30), but as a general term for groups of dice throws, as in the *jātaka*, it more probably means a set of sequences. It is interesting also that three of the four groups of dice throws named in the *jātaka* are also found in both the Bower MS. and the *Pāśakakevalī*. *Bhadrā* is given for sequence 421 and four variations (sequence 124 is missing from the text) (Hoernle 1892a: 135-36). In the *Pāśakakevalī bhadra* is given for sequences 124 and 214; other sequences in the group are unnamed or given alternate names (Weber 1859: 170 verse 26, and 172 verse 60). In the Bower MS. *sāvaṭa* (Skt. *śāpaṭa*) is given for sequences 443, 434, and 344 (Hoernle 1892: 135); in the *Pāśakakevalī*, the sequences 344, 434, and 443 are named *śakaṭī*, *saphalā*, and *vāmā*, respectively (Weber 1859: 177 verse 138, 179 verse 171, and 180 verse 177). In the Bower MS. *bahula* (Skt. *vahula*) is given for sequences 324, 432, 243, 423, 342 (sequence 234 is missing from the text) (Hoernle 1892a: 135). In the *Pāśakakevalī bahulā* is given for 234, *saphalā* for 324 (243, 342, 423, and 432 are unnamed); *bahulā* is also given for 322 (Weber 1859: 173 verse 84, 176 verse 119, and 176 verse 113). In the Bower MS. *mālī* (obviously related to Pāli *mālika*) designates sequences 343, 334, and 433 (Hoernle 1892a: 135); in the

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Pāśakakevalī mālinī designates 334 (Weber 1859: 177 verse 129).

In the *Mṛcch.* the *saṃvāhaka* refers to two very specific casts of the dice, which are used in a particular *pāśaka* game. The play records the same *pāśaka* game based on *āya-s* or groups of dice throws that is found in the *Vidhurapaṇḍitajātaka* and which serves as the basis for the method of oracle reading described in the Bower MS. and the *Pāśakakevalī*.

Pāśaka Game 2

A second *pāśaka* game is referred to by Darduraka during his entrance speech:

tretāhṛtasarvasvaḥ pāvarapatanācca śoṣitaśarīraḥ|
narditadarśitamārgaḥ kaṭena vinipātito yāmi|| (2. 9)

The *tretā* took all my money; I withered at the fall of the *pāvara*; the *nardita* showed me to the road, and I was ruined by the *kaṭa*.

The four dicing terms, *kaṭa*, *tretā*, *pāvara*, and *nardita*, are related to known terms used in other games and can be traced in earlier sources. The value of *tretā* (three) is obvious. Pṛthvīdhara comments on the other terms: *pāvara* '*dūā*' '*pāvara*' = two; *nardito* '*nāndī*' '*narditā* = *nāndī*;' *kaṭena* '*pūrā*' '*kaṭa* = *pūrā*.' Pṛthvīdhara's comment on *pāvara* is clear, but he explains *nardita* and *kaṭa* by two unknown terms.

Kaṭa is found in Pāli sources as a dicing term; it is used consistently throughout, and a single example will suffice. In the *Majjhimanikāya* (129) occurs

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kaṭaggaha 'the *kaṭa* toss' (Chalmers 1899: 3: 178), which is explained in the *Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā* as *kaṭaggahenā ti jayaggāhena* 'by one having the *kaṭa* toss means by one having the winning toss' (Horner 1937: 230). The losing toss in these texts is consistently given as *kali* (Chalmers 1899: 3: 170) and explained as *kaliggahenā ti parājayena* 'by the *kali* toss means by the losing toss' (Horner 1937: 214). The Pāli term *kaṭa* is derived from Skt. *kṛta*, which appears in several Vedic texts as a gambling term where it has the same value given it in the Pāli sources. *Kali*, the term for a losing cast of the dice, is also found in Vedic sources with the same meaning. Pāli *gaha* is derived from Skt. *glaha*.

The terms *kṛta*, *kali* and *glaha* have been analyzed by De Vreese in his article on the *vibhītaka* game (1948), and a brief summary of his findings is given here. De Vreese focused on what he called the 'secular' *vibhītaka* game (1948: 362, 350), which is played with a large number of *vibhītaka* nuts, the whole being called the *durodara* (351). A player grasped a number of nuts and threw them down to be counted.

> . . . before playing the dicers mentioned what they thought that the result of their playing would be, expressed by the word *pūrvokta*. If the event agrees with the *pūrvokta*, it is said *kṛta*, i.e. the *pūrvokta* is realized, and the game is won; if otherwise, the game is said *kali* and lost. From this it follows that the terms *kṛta* and *kali* have not an absolute, but only a relative value. (354)

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De Vreese also concludes that this was a game of odd and even (354), each player declaring his intended toss, making a *glaha* ' grasp ' from the nuts (358), and throwing down the nuts to be counted and compared with his aforestated intent. This is the simple and basic *vibhītaka* game from which later, more elaborate games, which continued to use the original terms, developed. De Vreese notes at the end of his article that the terms *tretā* and *dvāpara* belong to another variety of *vibhītaka* game (362), which he has termed the ' ritual ' *vibhītaka* game (350).

Rudradatta, commenting on *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* **5.** 20. 1, describes a *vibhītaka* nut game which uses the terms *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali* for casts of the dice (these are also, of course, the names of the four *yuga-s*); each cast of the dice is called an *aya*.

> *kṛtatretādvāparakalināmāno dyūtaprakārā ye kṛtamayānāmiti śrutāvayā ityākhyāyante| nyupteṣvakṣeṣu catuṣkaśo vibhajyamāneṣu yatra sarve bhāgāḥ samā bhavanti tatkṛtaṃ nāma, atha yatrāntatastrayo' vaśisyante sā tretā yatra dvau sa dvāparaḥ, yatra ekaḥ sa kaliḥ| tathā ca śrutiḥ ye vai catvāra stomāḥ kṛtaṃ tat atha ye pañca kaliḥ sa iti|| tatrākṣāṇāṃ śatatvāt kṛtena prakāreṇa yajamāno vijināti vijayate||*
>
> The *kṛta* of the *ayas* = a manner of dicing with the terms *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali*; in *śruti* they are known as *aya-s*. When the dice cast are divisible by four and all parts are even (i.e. no remainder), that is called *kṛta*. When there is a remainder of three, that is called *tretā*; when the remainder is

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two, that is *dvāpara*; when the remainder is one, it is *kali*. Thus, according to *śruti*, the four *stoma-s* are *kṛta*; when there are five *stoma-s*, it is *kali*. Since there are a hundred dice, the sacrificer wins or loses by the *kṛta* mode.

In this game, a large number of nuts is also used, but the winning toss must be divisible by four with no remainder; the remaining tosses are those that are divisible by four with a remainder of one, two, or three. Again, as in the game described by De Vreese, the player grasps and throws down a number of nuts to be counted; if the *durodara* (total number of nuts) is divisible by four, the winning toss must also be divisible by four. (If the *durodara* were divisible by five, the winning cast would also have to be divisible by five.)

Rudradatta also supplies information on a variation of this game when he refers to *kali* as the fifth *stoma*. The meaning of *kali* in a game having four as its basic unit led to its adoption as the winning throw when the basic unit is five (i.e. *kṛta* + 1 = *kali*).

In the *vibhītaka* game, the terms have a relative rather than an absolute value. The *kṛta* must be divisible by four with no remainder, and its absolute value during any particular game will vary with each toss. That the most popular form of the game was one in which was used a quantity of nuts divisible by four is evident by the use of the term *kṛta* in inscriptions to represent the number four (Sircar 1965: 231).

Two of the terms found in the *Mṛcch.*, *kaṭa* and

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tretā, are now clear. *Pāvara*, defined as two by Pṛthvīdhara, is obviously related to the term *dvāpara* used by Rudradatta. The original form of the term for two can be reconstructed by *Pāṇini* **2.** 1. 10.

akṣaśalākāsaṃkhyāḥ pariṇā||

The calculations of *akṣa-s* and *śalākā-s* is done by *pari*.

[A *vārttika* further explains (*Mahābhāsya* on the above)]:

akṣādayastṛtīyāntāḥ pūrvoktasya yathā na tat|

Excluding the *kṛta*, the calculation of the dice, etc., up to the level of three is done by *pari*.

The *pūrvokta* is what has been agreed upon as the winning cast based on the total number of nuts used; that is the number by which the dice must be divisible with no remainder (cf. above and Keith 1908: 825). According to this rule, therefore, *kṛta* plus one die would be **ekapari*; *kṛta* plus two dice would be **dvāpari*, and *kṛta* plus three **tripari*. These forms, however, do not occur; instead, *dvāpara* occurs regularly (e.g., *Taitt. S.* **4.** 3. 3. 1-2 and *MBh.* **4.** 50. 24), and *ekapara* occurs in *RV* **10.** 34. 2. As can be seen from the occurrence of *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali* (for *ekapara*) the rule of Pāṇini was not followed, and other terms appeared in place of the correct terms for a specific die/dice calculation. The *Mṛcch.*, however, has *pāvara* instead of **dvāpari* or *dvāpara*. Lüders correctly found the origin of *pāvara* in **dvāpari*/*dvāpara* through **bāvara* (1907: 41).

Three of the terms for casts of the dice found in the play, therefore, are related to earlier, known dicing

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terms: *kaṭa*, *tretā*, and *pāvara*. Only the term *nardita* remains undefined. In a group of four casts of the dice in which *kaṭa* is the winning toss, the remaining term *nardita* must be synonymous with *kali*, the losing toss, as Lüders correctly concluded (1907: 41). The origin of *nardita*, from √*nard* 'to sound, roar, bellow,' as a gambling term is unknown, nor has it been found with this meaning in any other source.

The *Mṛcch.* contains terms that originally belonged to the *vibhītaka* game, and Lüders concluded from this that 'the game with *vibhītaka* nuts still was current at the time of *Mṛcch.*' (1907: 61) This conclusion assumes that the *vibhītaka* game underwent no further development up to the time of the play. Although De Vreese assigns these terms solely to the ritual game, he recognizes their later transfer to a *pāśaka* game (1948: 362).

Several later texts record games played with *pāśaka-s* which employ the four terms originally associated with the *vibhītaka* nut game. Nīlakaṇṭha, commenting on *MBh.* **4.** 50. 24, describes one *pāśaka* game that has adopted the four terms.

> *. . . krameṇa ekadvitricaturaṅkāṅkitaiḥ pradeśair aṅkacatuṣṭayavān pāśo bhavati| tatra ekāṅkaḥ kaliḥ| dvyaṅko dvāparaḥ tryaṅkas tretā caturaṅkaḥ kṛtam| tatra dyūte pañca svīyāḥ pañca parakīyāś ca dīnārādayaḥ sthāpyante tad itaḥ pāśaprakṣepe yady ekāṅka upary āyāti tarhi svīyeṣv eka eva jito bhavati| yadi dvau tadā parakīyaṃ dīnāradvayaṃ svīyaś ca eko jitaḥ yadi tryaṅka upari patet tadā parakīyaṃ trayaṃ svīyaṃ ca trayaṃ jitam|*

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caturaṅkasya upari patane sarve'pi svīyāḥ parakīyāś ca jitā bhavanti| tathā ca kalipāte jayo na asti dvāparādipāte uttarottaravṛddhyā jayo 'sti|

There is *pāśa* which is four-sided, with each side marked in order with 1, 2, 3, or 4 spots. There, one spot=*kali*. Two spots=*dvāpara*, three=*tretā*, four spots=*kṛta*. In this dicing game, each of two sides puts up five *dīnāra-s* or other money. So then, if in the cast of the dice the one turns up, then only one of one's own five *dīnāra-s* is won. If the two turns up, then two *dīnāra-s* of the other player and one of one's own is won; if the three turns up, then three of one's own and three of the opponent's are won. If the *kṛta* turns up, all one's own money and the opponent's is won. And so, if the *kali* is cast, no one wins; if the two and the others are cast, the win is by an ever higher increase.

This game is played with one die (*pāśa* or *pāśaka*) and a shared stake. The term *kṛta*, as in the *vibhītaka* game, continues to designate the winning toss. Nīlakaṇṭha obviously has a very specific game in mind in which the *kṛta* and associated terms are fully integrated.

With a change in the playing material, from nuts to dice, must come a corresponding change in the use of the terms. The spots on the dice have replaced the 1, 2, or 3 extra dice (or nuts) by which a player lost in the *vibhītaka* nut game; *kṛta* now represents the absolute value of four, whereas in the nut game it represented the most popular form of the game in which the winning cast was divisible by four. The terms now

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represent absolute rather than relative values. The *pāśaka*, therefore, does not simply replace the original large number of nuts or dice in the older game as De Vreese thinks (1948: 362); the *pāśaka* material replaces the *durodara* and is marked with the numbers by which one could lose a game (1, 2, or 3 dice over the agreed upon number, the *kṛta*), and with the number by which the nuts cast must be divisible, that is, four. There is evidence that the game could be played with a *kṛta* of five, but four was apparently sufficiently popular and common to survive into later games.

Darduraka uses four terms, *kaṭa*, *tretā*, *pāvara*, and *nardita*, for the absolute values of 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, each term referring to the marks on one side of a die. Although *kṛta*/*kaṭa* would appear by custom to be the winning cast, there is no way of knowing in the play if this is the case in the specific game Darduraka refers to.

Kattā Game

The third dicing game referred to in the *Mṛcch.* is much simpler than the two preceding *pāśaka* games. The *saṃvāhaka*, while fleeing from the king's games master and his assistant, hides in a temple by posing as the idol. The posture does not deceive his pursuers, who turn to gambling on the temple floor. The *saṃvāhaka* identifies the third game by the term *kattā*.

kattāśadde ṇiṇṇāṇaaśśa halaï haḍakaṃ manuśśaśśa/
ḍhakkāśadde vva ṇaḍādhivaśśa pabbhaṭṭalajaśśa// (2. 5)

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The sound of the *kattā* draws the heart of a poor man like the sound of a war drum draws the heart of a king dethroned.

The *kattā* game, as the impromptu game of Māthura and his companion illustrates, needs no special playing surface and is played with an unknown number of shells, which can be carried on one's person. The term *kattā* has been omitted by Lüders (1907) in his analysis of dicing games, although he does devote a brief section to *kapardaka-s* 'cowrie shells' used in ritual games (19).

Neither Pṛthvīdhara nor Lalladīkṣita defines *kattā* except as *dyūtakaraṇaṃ yayā sā kattā*, '*kattā* is that by which the game is played.' *Deśīnāmamālā* **2.** 1 defines *kattā* as *andhiakavaḍḍiāsuṃ kattāo*, which the commentary glosses as *andhikādyūtakapardikā* 'a cowrie used in gambling' (Pischel 1938: Glossary 22). While the cowrie shell may be used as a die, the very nature of the material will determine the type of game played; it is best, therefore, to translate *kattā* as cowrie shell rather than as die.

The commentators on *Mṛcch.* **2.** 5 give some additional information on the game; Lalladīkṣita's is the more complete. He states:

kāu iti prasiddhaḥ| nādi (nāndī) pūrvaḥ (pūrā) iti prasiddhe| dyūta ityanye|

The *kāu* is well known. The terms *nādi* (*nāndī*) and *pūrva* (*pūrā*) are well known. Some consider *kattā* to be the game itself (i.e. name of abstract game).

It is not clear what is meant by *kāu*, though this may be a corruption of *kaṭa* or the winning cast. Lalladīkṣita

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has used here, however, two terms that he used in explaining two terms of the second type of *pāśaka* game found in *Mṛcch.* **2.** 9. There, he explained *nardita*, the losing toss, as *nāndī nakkī* and *kaṭa*, the winning toss, as *pūrā*. Here, however, he only notes the two tosses to be found in the *kattā* game without any explanation. Lalladīkṣita's earlier comment on one of the *pāśaka* games establishes for the *kattā* game two kinds of tosses, probably corresponding to the two sides of the shell; the tosses are *nāndī* (or *nādi* or *nakkī*) and *pūrva* (or *pūrā*), the losing and winning tosses, respectively.

Cowrie shells are not unknown in other texts as material for gambling; several passages on the Rājasūya sacrifice include a game played with cowrie shells. Mahīdhara on *Vāj. S.* **10.** 28 describes the use of the shells and one method of playing this game.

> *yajamānahaste dyūtasādhanabhūtān pañcākṣān sauvarṇakapardān nidadhyāt|| . . . | caturṇām akṣāṇāṃ kṛtasaṃjñā pañcamasya kalir iti yadā pañca apy aksā ekarūpā patanti uttānā avāñco vā tadā deviturjayaḥ tatra kaliḥ sarvān akṣān abhibhavati . . .|*
>
> One should put into the hand of the sacrificer the five golden *kapardaka* (cowrie) shells which are used for gambling. . . . The term *kṛta* is used for four dice; *kali* is used for the fifth. When all five dice fall uniformly facing upwards or downwards, then the player wins; there the *kali* defeats all other dice.

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Mahīdhara has combined information on two different games; the explanation of the cowrie shell game, however, is clear. The game is played with five shells and the manner of play is simple, in conformity with the material used: when all five shells fall in the same direction, either facing upwards or downwards, the game is won; otherwise, it is lost. A similar game is described by Sāyaṇa in his comment on the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5. 4. 4. 6. The terms *kṛta* and *kali* are borrowed, as we have seen, from the earlier *vibhītaka* game, and Mahīdhara here calls the winning cast *kali* because five shells are used, not because the player casts a total of five dice from a stock of nuts or declares he will cast the five with dice; Mahīdhara has confused the terms and their application.

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T. BURROW

FIVE NOTES ON SANSKRIT ETYMOLOGY

1. *nema-* 'foundation'

AMONG the variety of meanings assigned by the lexicographers to Sanskrit *nema-*, but not otherwise recorded, we find *nema-* in the sense of 'foundation of a wall' (*prākāramūla-*) and also in the sense of 'root' or 'basis' (*mūla-*). This word being only lexical, and associated with a variety of other meanings of doubtful validity, has naturally not attracted much attention, and insofar as it has, it has been held to be connected with *nemí-* 'felly of wheel, rim'. There is in fact lexical authority also for *nemi-* in the sense of 'foundation of a wall' (Galanos), but the meanings are very different, and it is not easy to see how they can be connected.

The word, though attested in no Sanskrit texts, has a considerable history in Indo-Aryan stretching from Pali to the modern languages. The evidence

ABBREVIATIONS: AK=Amarakoṣa; AN=Anguttara-nikāya; BR=Sanskrit-Wörterbuch of Böhthlingk and Roth; CDIAL=Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages by R. L. Turner, Oxford, 1966; DED=Dravidian Etymological Dictionary (Burrow and Emeneau, 1961); IE=Indo-European; NIA=New Indo-Aryan; PTS=Pali Text Society; BHSD=Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (Edgerton, 1953); BSOAS=Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies; EWA=Etymologisiher Wörterbuch des Altindischen.

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from these latter has been collected by Professor Turner in CDIAL, no. 7592, from which it can be seen that this family of words is very widespread in the modern languages, whereas *nemi-* 'felly' is not much represented. Typical examples are Hi. *nīw*, *neu*, *nei* f., *nīwā* m. 'foundation', P. *nīu*, *nī* 'foundation', B. *neo*, Or. niă, 'foundation', Bi. *new* 'foundation of a house wall'. To these forms should be added Hi. *niwār* 'wooden ring or wheel at bottom of a well forming foundation of the superstructure of earth or masonry', which is given separately at CDIAL no. 7594. Professor Turner puts these under the heading *nemí-* 'rim, felly', but although the modern forms confirm the existence of the lexical Sanskrit *nemi-* beside *nema-* in the sense of 'foundation', it remains difficult to see what connection there is between the meanings 'rim, felly' and 'foundation'.

The widespread NIA family of words meaning 'foundation' gives reality to the Sanskrit lexical word, which otherwise could hardly be taken more seriously than *nema-* in all the other manifold senses given by the lexicographers, such as 'a hole', 'deceit', 'acting', 'food', etc. The modern languages do not provide evidence for the antiquity of the word in Indo-Aryan, but this is provided by Pali *nema-*, which, as a result of what has been so far established, can now be given its correct meaning. The meaning of this Pali word is given in the PTS dictionary as 'edge, point; root', with a reference to *nemi-*, and the compound *gambhīranema-* is translated 'with deeply rooted

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point, firmly established'. The meaning given is guessed from the context, and partly influenced by the comparison with *nemi-*, but now that we are in a position to compare Skt. *nema-* and its modern representatives, it becomes quite clear from the contexts that what we have here is this same word *nema-* 'foundation'. The contexts are all concerned with posts, pillars, etc. being firmly fixed in the ground. Thus AN 4.106 reads: *idha bhikkhave rañño paccantime nagare esikā hoti gambhīranemā sunikhātā acalā asaṃpavedhi*, "Here, O bhikkus, in a frontier town of a king there is a palisade with deep foundation, well dug in, immovable, not shaking". Likewise AN 4.404 reads: *seyyathā pi āvuso silāyūpo soḷasakukkuko tassa assu aṭṭha kukkū heṭṭhā nemassa* (v. l. nemaṃgamā) *aṭṭha kukkū upari nemassa . . .*", Just as, sir, there might be a stone pillar eight cubits in length, and of that eight cubits of the base part would be below, and eight parts above the base part . . ." The text goes on to say that such a firmly founded stone pillar could not be shaken by wind or rain, and gives the reason: *gambhīrattā āvuso nemassa sunikhātattā silayūpassa* 'through the depth of the base portion, because the stone pillar has been well dug in'. Similar statements occur in AN 5.444, in this case referring to *indakhīla-* and *ayokhīla-*. It is clear that in all cases the word *nema-* refers to that part of the pillar or post which is dug into the ground, i.e. its base or foundation, making certain the identification of this word with Skt. *nema-* 'foundation' and the NIA word derived from it.

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In Prakrit, Sheth's dictionary gives *ṇema-* in the sense of 'root' (*mūl, jaṛ*) quoting canonical texts. This corresponds to the meaning '*mūla*' given by the Sanskrit lexicographers. The Ardhamāgadhi Dictionary gives a rather peculiar meaning, 'region or portion protruding from ground level, divāl kā kinārā'. It is likely that the real meaning involved is the *prākāra-mūla-* of the Sanskrit lexicographers.

In view of this evidence from Pali and Prakrit there can be no doubt that *nema-* 'foundation' belongs to the ancient word-stock of Indo-Aryan, and consequently an IE etymology should be looked for. This is not difficult to find. The root syllable of this word contains the guṇa grade of that IE root which appears in the preverb *ni* 'down', and in the stem *nimna-* 'depth, low ground, depression; (adj.) deep, low, depressed, sunk'. The related IE material is to be found in J. Pokorny's *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, pp. 312-3, where forms with the guṇa grade, as in *nema-*, are quoted from Greek: *neiós* 'fallow land', *neíatos*, *néatos* 'lowest', *neíothen* 'from the bottom', *neíothi* 'at the bottom, under, beneath', *neíaira gastēr* 'lower part of the belly'.

2. Sanskrit *mārṣa-*, *māriṣa,-* Pali *mārisa*.

As a polite form of address the vocative *māriṣa* appears commonly in the Mahābhārata, e.g. **1**. 213. 8 *na ca paśyāmi yaḥ pārthaṃ vikrameṇa parājayet, api sarveṣu lokeṣu sendrarudreṣu māriṣa*, 'I do not see who could defeat Pārtha through military prowess, even in the three worlds including Indra and Rudra, O good sir.' It is also

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quoted (BR) from later literature, particularly drama. In the main it is used only in the vocative as a polite form of address, but examples of its use as a nominative are quoted from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The lexicographers (in *AK*, etc.) quote it with the meaning *ārya-* 'noble'. A corresponding *mārisa-* is found in Pali, used only in the vocative, 'worthy sir, good sir' both in prose and verse.

There is an alternative form of this honorific form of address, without the penultimate *i*-vowel namely *mārṣa-*. This form appears in Buddhist Sanskrit texts, where it is more frequent than the alternative *māriṣa-*. It also has lexical authority (Hemacandra). A much earlier occurrence of this form is found in *Kāṭhaka-gṛhyasūtra* 24.9: *naiva bho ity āha na mārṣeti*. 'He does not say either *bhoḥ* or *mārṣa*'. Here *mārṣa* as a polite term of address is used as more or less equivalent to *bhoḥ*.

In deciding on the etymology of this term with its two variant forms it is necessary in the first place to decide which is original and which is secondary. As a general rule it has been assumed that the form *māriṣa* is primary, and *mārṣa-* secondary, the latter being regarded as a hyper-Sanskritism (Edgerton, BHSD, p. 431, Mayrhofer, EWA, II, p. 626). On this basis Pali *mārisa-* is taken to be a middle Indian form of Sanskrit *mādṛśa-* 'like me' whence 'colleague'. This is unlikely from the point of view of meaning, since one would not expect a polite term of address to develop from a word meaning 'like me, resembling me.' The

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derivation is also impossible since although *mārisa-* 'like me' exists in Prakrit, along with similar forms, *tārisa-*, etc., derived from Skt. *mādṛśa-*, *tādṛśa*, etc. no such forms are found in Pali. In Pali the forms are *mādisa-*, *tādisa-*, etc. and no forms are found with *-r-* as in Prakrit. We cannot derive Pa. *mārisa-* from *mādṛśa-* when the latter word is invariably represented in Pali by *mādisa-*, and if the original meaning had been 'like me', how is it that *mādisa-* is not used in this sense?

An alternative suggestion by E. Leumann that this vocative is a development from the phrase *mā riṣat* 'let harm not come' is ingenious but fanciful. Since then no satisfactory etymology can be found on the basis of the form *māriṣa-*, it is worth while considering the other possibility, that the original form of this word is *mārṣa-* and that *māriṣa-* is a hybrid Sanskrit form based on Middle Indian *mārisa-*, in which an epenthetic vowel *-i-* has developed between the *-r-* and the *-ṣ-* as has happened in other cases (*varisa-*, *harisa-*, etc.). The fact that this form of the word (*mārṣa-*) occurs in a Vedic ritual text provides good evidence for its authenticity, since such texts were always carefully preserved and handed down. The authority of such texts in matters of language is much superior to that of the later epic language.

The long *-ā-* of this stem *mārṣa-* is capable of two explanations. It could be accounted for as an instance of derivational vṛddhi, or alternatively as a development of IE apophonic *-o-*, in which case the theoretical original form would be *morso-*. I have discussed this

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latter development in detail in an article entitled 'A new look at Brugmann's law' in BSOAS 38, pp. 55-80 (1975). It was there pointed out that the change of IE *-o-* to long *-ā-* in Sanskrit, which according to Brugmann took place only before single consonants is also found to occur before consonant groups, as in *mārga-*, etc. At the same time a process or levelling had obstructed this development in the majority of the derivatives in which this IE *-o-* had occurred, so that this *-ā-* is to be found only in such forms as had escaped this process of levelling. I take this *mārṣa-* to be one of these forms standing for IE *morso-*, a masculine *o*-stem of the usual type with *o*-grade of root, functioning as an agent noun. The root is IE *mers-* 'to forget, overlook' which in Sanskrit *mṛṣ-mṛṣyate* has developed the meaning of 'be patient, tolerate, forgive'. From this the meaning of this vocative 'gentle sir, kind sir', has naturally developed.

3 *raṅga-* 'stage'

Concerning the etymology of Sanskrit *raṅga-* 'stage' both Uhlenbeck and Mayrhofer accepted that it was in origin the same word as *raṅga-* 'colour, dye,' the latter, however, with query. Because make-up is used by actors on the stage a semantic development from the original meaning of *raṅga-*, namely 'colouring', to *raṅga-* 'stage' has seemed to be feasible. But *raṅga-* in the theatrical sense does not mean 'theatrical production', but purely and simply the actual stage on which the production takes place, and this makes

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such a meaning development exceedingly unlikely. The same objection applies to the suggestion put forward by Professor Turner in CDIAL, no. 10561. Taking the meaning to have been originally 'dancing' and the noun *raṅga-* to have been extracted from *raṅgabhūmi-* he derives it from the rare root *raṅg-* 'to move to and fro, rock'. This is not possible because evidence is lacking for the noun *raṅga-* being used in the sense of 'dancing'. It means 'stage, arena' only and in looking for an etymology we must start from this meaning only.

Since the art of drama developed at a certain stage in the history of Indo-Aryan, we must also bear in mind the question as to what this word may have meant before this specialized meaning could develop. The answer to this question, as well as a plausible etymology, may be got by comparing Khotan Saka *rraṃga-* 'bank, ridge, shore'. This comparison shows that the original meaning of the Sanskrit word must have been 'elevated piece of ground, raised terrace, or the like', from which the classical meaning 'stage' could easily develop. It also takes back the history of the word to the Indo-Iranian period, although no further IE connections have been noted.

This Sanskrit word has been borrowed into the South Dravidian languages. These words, which are given in DED, no. 166, with the suggestion that they are borrowed from Sanskrit, are as follows: Ta. *araṅku*, *araṅkam* 'stage, dancing hall, assembly hall, gambling house'; Ma. *araṅṅu* 'a stage, scene, place for

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public exhibition', Te. *arāgu* 'a pial', (B). *aruṅgu* 'id., terrace, raised a foot from the ground'. Here the Te. forms are particularly interesting, since they preserve a meaning which we have assumed to be the original Sanskrit meaning, and which is nowhere preserved in Indo-Aryan. As was to be expected, in Ka. and Te., for 'stage' the pure Sanskrit word has been introduced (Ka. *raṅga*, Te. *raṅgamu*).

4. *veṣṭa- veṣṭaka-* 'resin, gum'

These words are lexical only and have no related forms in Middle or New Indo-Aryan. They are listed by Mayrhofer (3. 263) under the root *veṣṭ-* 'to wind or twist round', which however does not provide a suitable development of meaning. In view of their slight attestation it might be considered hardly worth while to spend much effort on their etymology, but a fairly straightforward and simple derivation is available in the IE root *ueis-* given by J. Pokorny, IEW, p. 1134 with the meaning 'zerfliessen, fliessen'. From this IE rootare derived also Skt. *veṣ-*, *veṣati* 'flows' and English *ooze*. Further connections are Skt. *viṣa-* and related words for 'poison'.

5. *hīra-* 'diamond'

In his Dictionary of Khotan Saka H. W. Bailey assigns to the word *īra-* the meaning 'precious stone, probably jade'. There is some uncertainty about this rendering, since of the two corresponding Sanskrit words which are cited, the word *śilā* is ambiguous,

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whereas the other, *vajra*,- means ' diamond ', and on the strength of this one might conclude that this was the meaning of the Khotanese word. Further evidence in support of this view is provided by the late Sanskrit word *hīra*- ' diamond '. Although the Sanskrit word is infrequently used and mainly attested in lexica, its modern representatives are widespread (Hi. *hīrā*, etc., CDIAL, no. 14130). Given the fact that Skt. *vajra*- ' diamond ' corresponds to Khot. *īra*- in some passages, and in view of the similarity of Skt. *hīra*- and Khot. *īra*-, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the two words are to be identified, and that Skt. *hīra*- is a loan-word from a dialect of the Saka invaders of India. As those kings were like other kings the principal owners of these precious stones, it is not surprising that their word for ' diamond ' should gain some currency in the territories which they controlled. Probably because it was a foreign word, it was generally avoided in classical Sanskrit literature, but its currency in non-literary speech, is demonstrated by its widespread use in the NIA languages.

The initial *h*- of Sanskrit causes no difficulty. Prothetic *h*- is exceedingly common in Saka (*haṃguṣṭa*- ' finger', etc.), and although it does not occur in this word in Khotan Saka, it may well have occurred in other dialects of the Saka language.

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ARVIND SHARMA

A NOTE ON FRANKLIN EDGERTON'S INTERPRETATION OF *ĀHĀRA* IN *BHAGAVADGĪTĀ* 2.59

I

THE purpose of this note is to show that Franklin Edgerton's interpretation of the term *āhāra* in *Bhagavadgītā* 2. 59 may be technically correct but seems to be contextually incorrect.

II

Bhagavadgītā 2. 59 runs as follows:

viṣayā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehinaḥ/
rasavarjaṃ raso 'py asya paraṃ dṛṣṭvā nivartate[1]//

Franklin Edgerton translates the verse thus:

The objects of the sense turn away
From the embodied one that abstains from food,
Except flavour; flavour also from him

[1] Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavadgītā* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) p. 93. For another transliteration and translation, see R. C. Zaehner, *The Bhagavadgītā* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 151:

viṣayā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehinaḥ/
rasa-varjaṃ: raso'py asya paraṃ dṛṣṭvā nivartate//
For the embodied [self] who eats no more, objects of sense must disappear,—save only the [recollected] flavour,—and that too must vanish at the vision of the highest.

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Turns away when he has seen the highest.

Franklin Edgerton further comments on the verse thus:

> the fasting man, until he 'sees the highest', cannot help feeling longing for food, i.e., for 'flavor', the object of the sense of taste, though he feels no longing for the objects of the other senses. After a sufficiently long fast (interpreted as a sign that he 'sees the highest'), a man ceases even to feel hungry. Hindu commentators and modern interpreters have a different interpretation, abandoning the simple and familiar meaning of the word *rasa* (which can hardly mean anything but 'flavor' in the above sense, coming immediately after *viṣayāḥ* and clearly meant as one of the 'objects of sense'), for a more forced one.[1]

Franklin Edgerton stands almost alone in insisting that *āhāra* means—food here and has been criticized for taking such a position.[2] It will now be argued that in itself the Edgerton position can be sustained. Apart from the arguments he has adduced, it can be further argued that grammatically or etymologically, and not just metapsychologically, *rasa* and *āhāra* are closely connected. Thus according to the *Siddhānta-kaumudī*, *āhāra* means food because '*āharanti rasam asmād ity āhāraḥ*'.[3] It can be further maintained that all later uses of the word *āhāra* in the *Bhagavadgītā* are clearly in

[1] Franklin Edgerton, op. cit., p. 93, note 10.

[2] See R. C. Zaehner, op. cit., p. 152.

[3] See Vaman Shivram Apte, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965) p. 242.

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the sense of food. Thus *Bhagavadgītā* 6. 17 speaks of the *yogin* who is *yuktāhara* 'disciplined (moderate) in food'.[1] That the reference here is to physical eating and not symbolic becomes clear from a perusal of the previous verse which refers to the two extremes of 'he who eats too much' and 'he who eats not at all'. Finally, that the use of the word *āhāra* in Chapter 17 of the *Gītā* is clearly in the sense of food is hard to deny as various flavours are described.[2] Thus not only grammatical but internal evidence from the *Gītā* also seems to support the equation of *āhāra*=food. Not only that, metaphysical support comes from the Upaniṣad-s, especially from the experience, of Śvetaketu.

1. 'A person, my dear, consists of sixteen parts. For fifteen days do not eat; drink water at will. Breath, which consists of water, will not be cut off from one who drinks water.'

2. Then for fifteen days he did not eat. So then he approached him saying, 'What shall I say, sir?' 'The Rig verses, my dear, the Yajus formulas, the Sāman chants.'

Then he said: 'Verily, they do not come to me, sir.'

3. To him he then said: 'Just as, my dear, a single coal of the size of a fire-fly may be left over from a great kindled fire, but with it the fire would not thereafter burn much—so, my dear, of your sixteen parts a single sixteenth part may

[1] Franklin Edgerton, op. cit., p. 33.
[2] See *Bhagavadgītā*, 17. 7-10.

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be left over, but with it you do not now apprehend the Veda-s. (4) Eat; [4] then you will understand from me.'

(4) Then he ate. So then he approached him. Then whatsoever he asked him, he answered everything. (5) To him he then said:—

5. 'Just as, my dear, one may, by covering it with straw, make a single coal of the size of a fire-fly that has been left over from a great kindled fire blaze up, and with it the fire would thereafter burn much—[6] so, my dear, of your sixteen parts a single sixteenth part has been left over. After having been covered with food, it has blazed up. With it you now apprehend the Veda-s; for, my dear, the mind consists of food, the breath consists of water, the voice consists of heat.'

Then he understood from him—yea, he understood.[1]

III

It is clear, then, that Franklin Edgerton has a fairly strong case for taking the word *āhāra* in the sense of food and not sense-objects. Why, then, is his interpretation unacceptable?

It is important to realize in this connection that the pictures of the *sthitaprajña* and the *yogin*, which the *Gītā* draws, are similar—they are certainly not contradictory and may even be complementary. For instance,

[1] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6. 7; see Robert Ernest Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads* (Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 244.

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it is after Kṛṣṇa has said 'then you will attain *yoga*'[1] that Arjuna asks 'who is a *sthitaprajña*'.[2] It is true that in the description that follows the word *yoga* does not occur (though its grammatical variants do)[3] but if the description of the *sthitaprajña* in *Bhagavadgītā* **2.** 54-72 is compared with that of the Yogin in *Bhagavadgītā* **6.** 1-32 then the parallels are obvious.

With this fact in the background, it is obvious that if the *same ideal* is described in terms of *nirāhāra*[4] in Chapter **2** and in terms of *yuktāhāra*[5] in Chapter **6,** then a contradiction is involved unless the words are understood in different senses in the two contexts. And such indeed seems to be the case.

[1] *Bhagavadgītā* **2.** 53d.
[2] ibid., **2.** 54a.
[3] ibid., **2.** 61, 66.
[4] ibid., **2.** 59.
[5] ibid., **6.** 17.

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K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

SIDELIGHTS ON THE THEORY OF DHVANI

THE theory of *Dhvani* is universally regarded as the cream of Indian literary theory and as the most adequate philosophical explanation of the quintessence of poetry, not only by specialists in the past but also by scholars today. But its sweep is so vast and implications are so profound that many a problem remains unsolved even now, in spite of the vast literature on the subject. The present paper is intended to focus attention on some of these unsolved problems so that we might get nearer to their solution.

II

The Multiple Meanings of the Term 'Dhvani':

Dhvani is a technical term first introduced by Ānandavardhana and he has not left us in any doubt regarding the fact that its connotation is so wide as to include (1) *vyañjaka-śabda*, (2) *vyañjaka-artha* (3) *vyaṅgya-artha* (4) *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* and (5) *kāvya-viśeṣa* containing all these four. The *kārikā* is so laconic that all these are said to be included in the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of *dhvani*, namely *yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā* . . . (I. 13) itself as indicated

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in the *vṛtti* and as explicated in the *Locana*. If it be so, we land ourselves in difficulty even in understanding the first *kārikā* itself—'*kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti . . .*' What exactly is the subject of this statement—*ātman* or *dhvani*? If the subject is *ātman*, the predicate would be *dhvani*; if the subject is *dhvani*, the predicate would be *ātman*. In view of the next statement 'tasya abhāvaṃ jagaduḥ', one feels *dhvani* is the subject rather than *ātman* because none denies some *ātman* or the other in poetry, though a few might deny the new-fangled notion of *dhvani*. Mahimabhaṭṭa too understands only *dhvani* as the subject of the statement.

Granting it, we get entangled in the problem how to take that word *dhvani* in all the five senses to square it up with *ātman*. The later *kārikā-s* all appear to take it only in the sense of *vyaṅgya-artha*, also designated as *vastu*, *arthavastu*, *vastu-tattva*, etc. (*arthaḥ sahṛdaya-ślāghyaḥ*, **1.** 2; *pratīyamānaṃ vastu*, **1.** 3, *kāvyasyātmā sa evārthaḥ*, **1.** 5; *sarasvatī svādu tadarthavastu*, **1.** 6. *So' rthaḥ tadvyaktisāmarthyayogī śabdaḥ*, **1.** 8, etc.) True, *vyaṅgyārtha* logically cannot exist without the active participation of *vyañjaka-s* and *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* as they are inter-involved. But the question remains dubious whether *dhvani* which is said to be the *ātman* of poetry is primarily *vyañjaka-śabdārtha* or *vyaṅgyārtha* or *vyañjanā-vyāpāra*. Abhinavagupta too states openly that the meaning of *śabda* (i.e. *vyañjaka*) is not coherent here (*śabdapadārthakatve hi dhvanisaṃjñito' rthaḥ iti kā saṃgatiḥ*?). But when he declares under **1.** 4. . . . *pratipattṛpratibhāsahāya-arthadyotanaśaktiḥ dhvananavyāpāraḥ; sa ca prāgvṛttaṃ*

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vyāpāratrayaṃ nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtaḥ kāvyātmā, our doubt is not silenced. Again, when Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka observes—

> *dhvanirnāmāparo yo'sau vyāpāro vyañjanātmakaḥ|*
> *tasya siddhe'pi*, etc. (*Locana*, p. 78, KSRI Edn.),

we see that his *dhvani-dhvaṃsa* is concerned with *dhvani-vyāpāra* and not with *vyaṅgyārtha*. This is also equally true of Mahimabhaṭṭa who begins his polemics by stating

'*anumāne' antarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum.*'

They all take *dhvani* primarily to mean *vyāpāra*. Thus we come back to the point where we started, as in *ghaṭṭa-kuṭī-prabhātanyāya*. Is the *ātman* of poetry chiefly *vyañjanāvyāpāra* or *vyaṅgyārtha*? Ruyyaka, in the Kashmirian tradition, remarks pointedly that while *Dhvanikāra* is *vyaṅgyārtha-prādhānyavādin*, Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka and Kuntaka are *vyāpāra-prādhānya vādin-s*. Thus we cannot avoid a clear stand on this question while interpreting the *Dhvanyāloka*. To add to the difficulty, Vaiyākaraṇa-s tell us that not only the word 'Dhvani', but even the word *śabda* can etymologically denote all the five senses, (see LOCANA—*śabda iti pañcasvartheṣu yojyaṃ*, and '*śabdyate abhidhīyate iti vācyam, śabdyate aneneti vācakaḥ, śabdyate vyajyate iti vyaṅgyaḥ, śabdanamiti vyāpāraḥ, uktacatuṣṭayamayatvāt samudāyaścetyarthaḥ*'—*Kaumudī*, p. 268, KSRI Edn.). Is this not a farfetched and hairsplitting procedure throwing little light on the main problem at issue? That is why Viśvanātha, in his *Kāvyaprakāśadarpaṇa* unhesitatingly states—

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यद्यपि ध्वनिशब्दोऽनेकार्थः . . .तथापि
वाच्योपस्क्रियमाणव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जके एव काव्ये
ध्वनिपदं नियम्यते।

(Ed. Goparaju Rama, Allahabad, 1979, p. 7)

Imagine how we are further perplexed when we are called upon to fix the exact meaning of *dhvani* in the case of several varieties of *dhvani* proposed in the *Dhvanyāloka*. Beauty in poetry is as much effected by the variety of *vyañjaka-s* as by that of *vyangya-s*. In this context, Bhaṭṭa Gopāla, who is a very illuminating commentator of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, quotes three verses from a work called *Vārttika*, which is unknown to modern scholars. Here is the citation with its context —

यथा व्यञ्जकवैचित्र्याद् ध्वनिवैचित्र्यम्, एवं व्यङ्ग्यवैचित्र्यादपि।
उक्तं च वार्त्तिके—

ध्वननं ध्वन्यते तद्वद् व्युत्पत्त्या ध्वनतीत्यपि।
व्यञ्जनाख्या परा शक्तिः क्रमेणार्थो रसादिकः॥
वाच्यादिरर्थः शब्दश्च वाचकप्रभृतिर्ध्वनिः।
एषां चतुर्णां संसृष्टिः प्रबन्धोऽपि महाध्वनिः॥
स च त्रैविध्यमास्थाय काव्यालोकोक्तशिक्षया।
वस्तुमात्रमलङ्कारो रस इत्यपि भिद्यते॥

(—*Sāhityacūḍāmaṇi*, Trivandrum, 1926, p. 234)

We have indeed here a new thesis, namely *dhvani-vaicitrya* or beauty of *dhvani* which is as much a result of

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vyañjaka-vaicitrya as of *vyaṅgya-vaicitrya*. This thesis demands our close attention.

III

The Problem of Relative 'prādhānya' and 'aprādhānya' of the stated and suggested meanings

Only *pradhāna-vyaṅgya* poetry is declared, time and again, to merit the designation of *dhvani*, since *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* is distinguished from it. At the same time, the beauty of *vācya-śarīra* too is conceded as being born of *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, *saṃghaṭanā*, etc. But *dhvani* being *ātman* or the soul, the former beauties of the *vācyārtha* or body are required to serve as subordinate means to achieve the end-beauty or over-all beauty of *vyaṅgya* in what is called *Dhvani-kāvya*. So far so good. But when *vācya*-beauty overshadows the *vyaṅgya* as in *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya*, are we to say that the *ātman* is conspicuous or inconspicuous? If inconspicuous, would it be poetry worth attention? Will it not contradict the accepted dictum that beauty (*cārutva*) in poetry is to be judged only by the criterion of *vyaṅgya-prādhānya*? Another difficulty posed by this double categorization of poetry is the impossibility of their mutually exclusive status, as noted by Mammaṭa, and others. Mammaṭa says—

यद्यपि स नास्ति कश्चिद्विषयः यत्र ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्ययोः स्वप्रभेदादिभिः सह संकरः संसृष्टिर्वा नास्ति, तथापि प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति क्वचित् केनचिद् व्यवहारः। (ch. 5)

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Bhaṭṭa Gopāla is clearer in his position when he states

"योऽर्थः सहृदयश्लाघ्यः काव्यात्मेति व्यवस्थितः।
वाच्यप्रतीयमानाख्यौ तस्य भेदावुभौ स्मृतौ"॥ (Dhv. 1. 2)

इति ध्वनिदृशा वाच्यो व्यङ्ग्य इत्यर्थद्वयमन्योन्यव्यतिषिक्तमुपलभ्यते, कश्चिदखण्ड एवार्थो विवेकिभिर्विभागबुद्ध्या व्यवस्थाप्यत इति यावत्।

(*Sāhityacūḍāmaṇi*, Vol. 1, Trivandrum, 1926, p. 20).

This point is often forgotten even by scholars who talk of *vācya* and *vyaṅgya* in poetry as if they are separate entities like a cow and a horse. But the absolute truth is that they are aspects of an indivisible aesthetic unity. Caṇḍīdāsa, a forefather of Viśvanātha, reacts strongly against the *atyanta-bheda-vādin-s*:

न खलु ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यत्वे तद्विशेषे वा गोत्वाश्वत्वादिवत् वैयधिकरणनियता धर्माः स्वीक्रियन्ते, किं त्वौपाधिकाः। ततश्चोपाधिसमावेशात्तेषामपि समावेशो यदा यस्य प्रधानोपकारकत्वमुत्कृष्यते तदा तस्योपाधेर्मुख्यत्वेन व्यवहारः।

(*Kāvyaprakāśadīpikā*, Vol. 2, Calcutta, 1965, p. 205)

Only adventitious, functional and relative features associated with *akhaṇḍa-kāvyārtha's* indivisible two aspects (namely, *vācya* and *vyaṅgya*) mark them out as distinct for the time being; and that seems the best way out. Even KAUMUDĪ of Uttuṅgodaya confirms it:

न हि गवाश्वादिवदात्यन्तिको भेदो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः, धर्मधर्मिभावस्य समनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्, इति भावः। (KSRI edn., p. 87.)

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Such agreement between two writers—one from Orissa and another from Kerala—is indeed amazing.

Again, Bhaṭṭagopāla shows us the *raison d'etre* of this peculiar relation of *vācya* vis-a-vis *vyaṅgya*:

वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोरुपायोपेयभावः, अचारुत्वचारुत्वविभागः उपकारकोपकार्यभावश्चेति त्रैविध्यम्। तत्रोपेयस्य चारोरुपकार्यस्य च प्राधान्यम्। अप्राधान्यं पुनः उपायस्याचारोः उपकारकस्य इति स्थितौ आदिमयोः प्रतिक्षेपशङ्कायामन्तिमस्य उपकार्यत्वस्य स्वविश्रान्तिलक्षणस्य न काचित् प्रतिक्षेपार्हता। इतरथा गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्ये व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थो वाच्योपायभूतश्चारुरपि स्वविश्रान्तिशाली प्रसज्येत, प्रत्युत तस्य वाच्योपस्काराय प्रवृत्तत्वात्। (op. cit. p. 23).

Though a two-way relation is logically possible between *vācya* and *vyaṅgya* whether as means and end, or as beautiless and beautiful, or as embellisher and embellished, actually, it should be taken as one-way traffic only from *vācya* towards *vyaṅgya* and not *vice versa*. Otherwise, even in *Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*, the *vyaṅgya* would become the ultimate resting place in the mind of the reader, in spite of its being designed as an embellisher of the *vācya*.

It is very interesting to note in this connection how Abhinavagupta goes out of his way in interpreting the crystal-clear *kārikā* (**4.** 7) which has nothing to do with *vyaṅgyārtha*:

अवस्थादेशकालादिविशेषैरपि जायते।
आनन्त्यमेव वाच्यस्य शुद्धस्यापि स्वभावतः॥

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Abhinavagupta ingeniously tried hard to set it in relation with *vyaṅgyārtha* thus:

व्यङ्ग्यविषयो यो व्यापारः तत्स्पर्शं विनापि आनन्त्यं स्वरूपमात्रेणैव, पश्चात्तु तथा स्वरूपेणानन्तं सद् व्यङ्ग्यं व्यनक्तीति भावः। न तु सर्वथा तत्र व्यङ्ग्यं नास्तीति मन्तव्यम्, आत्मभूततद्रूपाभावे काव्यव्यवहारहानेः। तथा चोदाहरणेषु रसध्वनेः सद्भावोऽस्त्येव।

(*Bālapriyā* edn., Benares, 1940, p. 538).

That is indeed the last word on the subject. Can anyone think of any poem of some length—or even a *muktaka* for that matter—which is exclusively *vācya* or *vyaṅgya*? If, in practice, they run into each other, how is one to justify the theory that *Dhvani* is exclusively *kāvyātman*? Finally, can *rasādi*, which is by definition exclusively *vyaṅgya*, also have a reduced status like *rasavad-alaṃkāra*? Is it not a self-contradiction?

IV

The Precise Meaning of Artha

When we say that *rasādi* is *vyaṅgyārtha* or *vākyārtha* or *kāvyārtha*, it is equally intriguing if not embarrassing. In the *Abhinavabhāratī* written by Abhinavagupta after the *Locana*, it is stated twice that '*artha*' does not mean sense or meaning (*abhidheya*) as we are wont to take it, but only the end-value (*prayojana*). I shall quote here one passage:

कोः कवतेर्वा कवनीयं काव्यम्। तत्र च पदार्थवाक्यार्थौ रसेष्वेव

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पर्यवस्यत इत्यसाधारण्यात् प्राधान्याच्च काव्यस्यार्थाः रसाः। अर्थ्यन्ते प्राधान्येनेत्यर्थाः। **न त्वर्थशब्दोऽभिधेयवाची।**

This is also echoed by Uttuṅgodaya (*Kaumudī*, p. 172) in so many words.

स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वं हि रसादीनां ध्वनिकारादिभिर्दर्शितम्। तच्च मदीयादेव तद्विवरणात् सहृदयालोकलोचनादवधारणीयम्।
(*Nāṭyaśāstra*, Vol. I., GOS edn., Baroda, 1956, p. 343)

If this is accepted, how are we to accommodate it within a purview of *śabdavyāpāra* and also to distinguish it from *vyaṅgya-alaṃkāra* and *vastu*? Again, if *Rasa* is exclusively *rasika-pratīti*, in what sense can it be embodied in *kāvya* as Ānandavardhana states often? (Cf.

rasavanti hi vastūni sālaṃkārāṇi kānicit|
ekenaiva prayatnena nirvartyante mahākaveḥ||

(*Dhvanyāloka*, Dharwad edn., p. 60, etc.) In fact, Uttuṅgodya not only accepts it without any demur:

अर्थस्य = प्रयोजनात्मनः द्योतने शक्तिः ध्वननव्यापारः।

(*Kaumudī*, KSRI Edn. p. 116)

but also offers a lame explanation of the problem raised above—

स च यद्यपि मुख्यतया रसादिरेव, तथापीह वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वन्योरपि वाच्यापेक्षयोत्कर्षः कियान् भवतीत्यभिप्रायेणार्थत्वमुक्तम्।

Is this convincing? At the same time, we have numerous usages like विभावाद्यर्थ (ibid., p. 155; *Locana*,

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p. 193 *vibhāvādayo hi varṇanāgocaratayā kāvye mukhyo' rthaḥ* (ibid., p. 283) which equate *vibhāvādi-s* or content described by the poet as *artha*. Are the two identical? Our feeling is that while *vibhāvādi artha* is *laukika* or empirical, *rasādyartha* is *alaukika*; and hence the two can by no means be held as identical.

V

What is the precise meaning of 'śabda' in the definition—'*yatrārthaḥ śabdo vá* . . . .?' Does it mean word or 'language', divisible into such units as *varṇa*, *pada*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, and *prabandha*? If the latter, will not its participation in *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* relate it indivisibly with *vyaṅgyārtha*? If *vyañjaka-vācyārtha* has *vyaṅgya-mukha-prekṣitatva*, why should not *vyañjaka-śabda* also, to some extent at least, have a share in the same feature? Why does Abhinavagupta deny this and insist that *śabda* as *vyañjaka* is exclusive of *vyaṅgyārtha*? The relevant passage runs as follows:

वाच्योऽर्थो व्यङ्ग्यमुखेनैव भिद्यते। तथा हि—अविवक्षितवाच्यो व्यङ्ग्यो न्यग्भावितः विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्य इति व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रवण एवोच्यते। इत्येवं मूलभेदयोरेव यथास्वमवान्तरभेदसहितयोर्व्यञ्जकरूपोऽर्थः स व्यङ्ग्यमुखे प्रेक्षिताशरणतयैव भेदमासादयति। . . . शब्दस्तु न कदाचिद् व्यङ्ग्यः। अपि तु व्यञ्जक एवेति। . . .तथाहि **व्यङ्ग्यमुखप्रेक्षितया विना** पदं वाक्यं वर्णाः पदभागः संघटना महावाक्यमिति स्वरूपत एव व्यञ्जकानां भेदः। न चैषामर्थवत् कदाचिदपि व्यङ्ग्यता संभवति इति व्यञ्जकैकनियतं स्वरूपं यत्तन्मुखेन भेदः प्रकाश्यत इति तात्पर्यम्।

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The passage is very crucial because the earlier commentator Candrikākāra had proposed the simple alternate explanation of the expression व्यङ्ग्यमुखेन in the *vṛtti* by saying व्यङ्ग्यानां वस्त्वलंकाररसानां मुखेन which seems the best way of characterising the divisions of *dhvani* already completed in the second chapter. Is there much harm in accepting this straight *Uddyotasaṃgati*? Abinavagupta is against it only because the triple division occurs in the *vṛtti* portion of the II *Uddyota* and not in the *kārikā*, and he wants to follow scrupulously his self-assumed procedure of accuracy in keeping apart the functional difference of *kārikākāra* and *vṛttikāra*. Is it not somewhat scholastic and technical, missing the direct implication of the passage in question?

Further, is *śabda* as *vācaka* identical with *śabda* as *vyañjaka*? Does not Ānandavardhana openly admit an aesthetic use of *vyañjaka-s* also when he observes:

शब्दानां स्वरूपभेदस्तावदक्लिष्टत्वे सत्यप्रयुक्तयोगः। वाचकाश्रयस्तु प्रसादो व्यञ्जकत्वं चेति विशेषः। (under **3**. 48)

In *avivakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani*, don't we have *vyañjaka-śabda* in the role of *vyaṅgya-mukhaprekṣin*? How shall we reconcile these apparently contradictory remarks?

VI

Alaṃkāra-s are sometimes said to be *Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya;* and at other times *pada-s* are said to be *guṇī-bhūtavyaṅgya*. Can we say that *pada-s* and *alaṃkāra-s*

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enjoy the same status in poetry? (Cf. *vṛtti* on **3**. 36 and 40).

VII

Finally, the invocatory verse of the *Locana*—

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकलां
जगद् भावप्रख्यं निजरसभरात् सारयति च।
क्रमात् प्रख्योपाख्याप्रसरसुभगं भासयति त-
त्सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते॥

equates *kavi* and *sahṛdaya*, and identifies them as Sarasvatī to be extolled. All the adjectives given to '*kavi*' appear appropriate to the creative activity of the poet; but do they equally apply to the appreciative activity of the *sahṛdaya*? Both no doubt share in the quality of *pratibhā* or imagination and poetic sensibility. But while the creation of the poet takes verbal form (*vāgrūpa*), is it necessary that the *sahṛdaya's* appreciation also should be so? What exactly is the opinion of Abhinavagupta? Does he mean that the *sahṛdaya's* appreciation of *kavivāk* itself is a vital aspect of Sarasvatī eulogized? If *prakhyā* means intuition of poetic beauty, both may share it though from different poles. But what about *upākhyā*? Does it not mean only 'embodiment in language'? If creative criticism is implied, why did no Dhvani theorist attempt it, even of our top Mahākavi-s, up to date? How is it that Mammaṭa, Kuntaka, Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha, etc. only think of *kavi-vāk* in their invocations, and never allude to *sahṛdaya-vāk*, though they held Abhinavagupta in high esteem?

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N. P. UNNI

MŪṢIKAVAṂŚA AND THE CHANGE-OVER TO THE MATRILINEAL SYSTEM IN KERALA

THE *Mūṣikavaṃśa* of Atula,[1] a Sanskrit mahākāvya in fifteen cantos, containing 1057 stanzas as available in its incomplete form, has an important place in Indian historical literature as it gives us some hitherto unknown information on South Indian history in general and Kerala history in particular. T.A. Gopinatha Rao, who brought the work to the notice of scholars for the first time, observed that in the midst of a lot of legendary stories one finds a few grains of what appears to be real history.[2] As a historical poem this work is perhaps earlier than the great *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa, and can claim a unique place among the historical poems in Sanskrit. The date of the poem can be fixed as the first half of the 12th century A.D. since Atula the author was a court poet of the last two kings of the Mūṣika dynasty, namely Vaḷabha and Śrīkaṇṭha. Some scholars place the poem in the first

[1] Ed. Dr. K. Raghavan Pillai, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. 246, Trivandrum, 1977.

[2] Travancore Archaelogical Series, Trivandrum, Vol. II, p. 106.

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half of the 11th century, dating the last king around A.D. 1020.[1]

Altogether 118 kings, both legendary and historical, appear in the pages of the work. Conquests and chaos, deception and fraud, usurpation and ascendancy, fighting and killing, brother murdering brother for political power, foreign aggressions, annexations of territories and islands, suppression of revolts, marriage alliances, establishment and renovation of religious institutions and cities—all find a place in this remarkable account.

From the cultural point of view the work is a mine of information.[2] Hindu temples, Buddhist monasteries, capital cities, towns of mercantile importance, sea ports and fortifications, villages, rivers and mountains, etc. are vividly described in this poem. The work may be divided into three parts from the point of view of the arrangement of the theme.[3]

In the first part the early beginning of the dynasty is traced to the days of Paraśurāma, the sage who is said to have created the land of Kerala from the sea. A northern origin of the dynasty of Mūṣika-s is also

[1] Dr. M. G. S. Narayanan, 'Mūṣikavaṃśa as a source of Kerala history', *Pratibhānam* (a collection of Research Papers presented to Dr. P. K. Narayana Pillai), Trivandrum, 1970, p. 188.

[2] Dr. N. P. Unni, 'Mūṣikavaṃśa—a Cultural Study' *Journal of Kerala Studies*, Dept. of History, University of Kerala, Vol. VI, 1979, pp. 5-68.

[3] Dr. N. P. Unni, 'Studies in Mūṣikavaṃśa', *Journal of Kerala Studies*, Vol. V, 1978, pp. 133-220.

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suggested here. The first ten cantos deal with this aspect. It is here that the author fulfils the requirements of a mahākāvya like the description of seasons, marches for victory, etc. The section more or less forms an epic dealing with the legendary stories of kings.

The second part deals with the narration of a long line of kings. Here the names of 97 kings who followed Nandana, the son of the founder king Rāmaghaṭa-mūṣika, are given. Some of them are associated with the establishment of ancient temples located in the region. For instance, king Śatasoma is credited with the founding of the Cellūr (Perumcellūr) temple dedicated to Śiva. All this is described in the 11th canto of the poem.

The third part which consists of four cantos from 12 to 15 deals with historical rulers.[1] Altogether 19 kings are said to have ruled the Mūṣika country during a period of about 250 years from the second half of the ninth century upto the twelfth century A.D. Modern researches have provided corroboration by unearthing inscriptions recorded by some of the rulers of the period. These records throw light on the arrangements made by them for the preservation and protection of temple properties. An inscription in which Validhara Vikrama-rāma, a king of the dynasty, appears as the donor, refers to Mūḷikkuḷattu Vyavastai (*Mūḷikkuḷam kaccam*). This charter was framed in the ninth century A.D.

[1] Dr. N. P. Unni, 'Mūṣikavaṃśa—A Historical Study', *Journal of Kerala Studies*, Vol. V, 1978, pp. 315-398.

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by the rulers and representatives of temple committees who met at Mūḷikkuḷam and it became popular throughout the land.

Mode of Inheritance

The legendary account of the long line of Mūṣika kings starts from the founder king Rāmaghaṭamūṣika upto Īśānavarman, the father of Kuñcivarman. The names of 99 kings are supplied by the poet. During the whole period the mode of succession is patrilineal, the sons of the ruling kings succeeding to the throne. The poet, it seems, is particularly interested in showing that the elder son is to inherit the country after his father according to the patrilineal system. Hence a legendary king of the line who is the 49th ruler is depicted as an usurper. He is stated to have driven away the rightful heir Aśvasena who was his elder brother.[1] Both the usurper and the exiled were the sons of king Acala who established Acalapattana near mount Ēḷi. The kingdom thus seized by him was passed on to his son Vinayavarman, the 50th ruler, who was succeeded by his son Rājavarman. To set matters right, Jayamānī, the son of the ousted king Aśvasena, regained the country with the military assistance provided by the Pāṇḍya king.[2]

[1] *Mūṣikavaṃśa*, **11.** 81.
अश्वसेनं ततो राज्यादवरुध्य विशांपतिः ।
आसीद् विक्रमसेनाख्यः कनीयानस्य भूपतिः ॥

[2] ibid., **2.** 85
पुत्रस्ततोऽश्वसेनस्य दण्डमादाय पाण्डचतः ।
प्रत्यासीदत् स्वकं राज्यं जयमानी जगत्पतिः ॥

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Thus once again the country was ruled by the rightful heir. The only vacuum reported by the poet-historian is when Dvīpānīka, the 64th king died. At his death, his two sons Śaśidatta and Janavrata fought for ascendancy and killed each other.[1] The Magadha princess, wife of the elder brother Śaśidatta, was pregnant at the time and her son Vajrasāra came to the throne in due course. From then onwards again the patrilineal inheritance continued without any break.

It must be remembered that both these incidents are described in dealing with the legendary rulers. Here, in order to stress the patrilineal mode of inheritance the usurpation and restoration are created by the fancy of the poet. This is to establish that the kings of the Mūṣika dynasty who belonged to the lunar race followed the patrilineal system from a very early period without any change in its long history.

The Change-over

During the historical period a momentous change in the order of succession took place. When Īśānavarman reached the marriageable age, he married, as suggested by his minister, Nandinī, the daughter of the Cedi ruler who was living in exile near the Mūṣika country. Īśāna helped his father-in-law to regain the

[1] ibid., **2.** 94-95

द्वीपानीकस्य पुत्रौ द्वौ शशिदत्तजनव्रतौ ।
राज्यहेतोरुभौ संयत्यन्योन्यं तौ निजघ्नतुः ।।
अन्तर्वत्नी तदा पत्नी शशिदत्तस्य मागधी ।
प्रसूय पुत्रं (साराख्यं) सानाथ्यमकरोद् भुवः ।।

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Cedi kingdom. It seems that the new relationship of the Mūṣika ruler with the Cedi royal family infuriated the Kerala king Raghupati alias Jayarāga who was the brother-in-law of the Mūṣika. Raghupati was the husband of the elder sister of Īśānavarman. Since he did not approve of the alliance, he launched an attack on the Mūṣika territory before Īśānavarman could reach his capital after rendering assistance to his father-in-law. It is only the timely intervention of prince Goda, the son of Raghupati and the nephew of Īśānavarman that put a stop to the fight.[1] The young prince was successful in effecting peace.

Īśāna ruled over the kingdom in peace though he was worried since he could not beget a child in his wife Nandinī. With a view to having a scion he married again, this time the daughter of the king of Cola. The second marriage was successful and soon he begot a son called Nṛparāma.[2] Nandinī, the senior wife, was

[1] ibid., 12. 53

जृम्भिताम्बुनिधिविभ्रमभाजो-
र्मध्य एव पितृमातुलयोः सः।
सेतुबन्ध इव केरलकेतुः
प्रत्यदृश्यत तयोरथ गोदः।।

[2] ibid., 12. 62

प्रथममथ नरेन्द्रः पश्चिमायां महिष्या-
मलभत नृपरामं सूनुमानन्दहेतुम्।
निजविभवशिखायामुन्नतं कोमलायां
फलनिचयमिवोच्चैर्भूरुहः पारिजातः।।

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worried over this development and she began to do penance to beget an issue. Her prayer to Goddess Durgā was rewarded as the Goddess appeared in her dream. Nandinī with a view to ensuring the kingdom for the successors of her own line—the Cedi-s—requested for the boon that henceforth the sons of the ladies of the Mūśika royal house should become its rulers. The Goddess gave her the desired boons. In due course a son was born to her and later she gave birth to a daughter. Due to some peculiar circumstances, the boy who was called Pālaka was brought up by his maternal grandfather at Cedi.[1]

At the death of Īśānavarman the representatives of the people approached Pālaka, the younger son, to assume the reins in preference to Nṛparāma, the elder. But Pālaka refused to oblige them. This is an interesting development. Īśānavarman had two wives who gave birth to the sons Nṛparāma and Pālaka. The elder son Nṛparāma was born of the junior queen, the princess of Cola, while the younger Pālaka was the son of the senior queen, the Cedi princess. Against the natural circumstance that the senior son should assume the reins of the state, we find ministers and prominent citizens going to the assistance of Pālaka upto

[1] ibid., 12. 71

करिकलभविलासं पालकं बालमेव
प्रियतरमभिरामैः स्वैर्गुणैरप्यसुभ्यः ।
निकटमतिदिदृक्षोः प्रेषयामास धीर–
स्तनयमवनिपालस्तस्य मातामहस्य ॥

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Cedi and offering him their whole-hearted support.[1] This must have been without the knowledge of the elder son Niparāma who was in all probability attending his father on his death bed. The offer was very tempting and Pālaka somehow rejected it in favour of his elder brother despite the fact that he could overcome his brother since he had the support of a prominent section of the people.

It is apparent that the senior queen Nandinī was liked by the people at large in preference to the princess of Cola, for she belonged to the Hehaya stock and therefore to the original breed of the Mūṣika line. The minister who arranged the marriage of the king with his senior queen was naturally in support of her son becoming the next ruler. The very alliance of Īśāna with the Cola-s must have irritated the Cedi partisans. The circumstances that their queen was childless for a long time and her severe penance to get an issue must have won her many sympathisers. Sending Pālaka away to the side of his maternal grandfather also must have influenced the people in his favour. Perhaps the situation in the royal house was such that Pālaka was despatched to Cedi at a young age. The younger queen must have influenced this decision to

[1] ibid., 12. 75

पितरि दिवमुपेते पालकश्चेदिसंस्थः
प्रकृतिभिरथ सद्यः प्रापितां राजलक्ष्मीम् ।
विपुलबलभुजोऽपि ज्येष्ठभावानुवृत्या
कथमपि नृपरामं रुद्धबुद्धिर्विषेहे ।।

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some extent. All these factors prompted prominent citizens to offer the kingdom to Pālaka.

Nṛparāma did not live long and his baby son Candravarman succeeded him. The boy was unhealthy and he too died soon. Once again people approached Pālaka living at Cedi and he returned to claim the inheritance.

With the demise of Pālaka after a glorious reign, a new chapter in the history of the Mūṣika dynasty began. He was succeeded to the throne by Validhara, the son of his sister.[1] In the long history of the dynasty, it is for the first time that a nephew succeeds his uncle to the throne. What exactly was the reason behind the momentous change, we do not know. Perhaps there was something connected with the political situation or with the marriage of Pālaka. We know that there was an apparent dislike among the people in having an alien stock succeeding to the throne when Nṛparāma, the son of the Cola princess was to assume the kingdom after his father's death. He succeeded only because Pālaka refused to challenge him and to press his claim, which his supporters wanted him to do. This attitude of preserving the purity or monogenesis of the royal line must have stood in the way of Pālaka's son becoming the next ruler. By having Validhara as the claimant

[1] ibid., 12. 90.

कृतवति पदमस्मिन् राज्ञि मृत्योः कटाक्षे
स्वसुरथ पृथुकीर्तिस्तस्य राज्ञस्तनूजः ।।
अभवदभवहारी पूरिताशः प्रजानां
वलिधर इति तस्या वल्लभो राजलक्ष्म्याः।।

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after his uncle, the Cedi partisans found their interest preserved in tact.

Matrilineal System—a necessity of the time

This transition from the patrilineal to the matrilineal way of inheritance was thus the necessity of the time especially when the partisans of the one group gained predominance. As is to be gathered from the circumstances presented by the poet, the people were in favour of the transition. Several factors must have contributed to this opinion. The conflict between Nṛparāma and Pālaka or between the two queens must have been the root-cause of the change. Naturally Pālaka could not hand over the kingdom to his son, if any, since it would be against the tendency of the time.

This new situation is apparently explained by Atula, the author of the *Mūṣikavaṃśa*, in a novel way. Nandinī, the senior queen wanted her successors to rule the kingdom for ever. She was pained to note that her co-wife giving birth to the son Nṛparāma and thereby taking away the country from her family. In order to gain the country for her offspring and to perpetuate the line of succession to her own family she performed penance. By the blessing of the Goddess she secured a son and a daughter whose son was to be the next ruler.[1] She was particular in choosing the boon

[1] ibid., 12. 68-69.

प्रतिपदमियमस्मद्वंश्यनारीसुतानां
क्षितिरखनिपतीनामम्ब ! भूयात् स्वराज्यम् ।

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that after her son the sovereignty should pass on to the sons of the female members of her family. Thus the interest of monogenesis was preserved by having nephews to succeed their uncles. The sons of the kings who married from different regions had thus no place in this system.

Atula, the poet, wanted to give some kind of holy or divine sanction for the change-over of the system which was in fact purely a historical and political necessity. Here it is maintained that it was by the ordinance of fate that the change had taken place. The blessing of the Goddess was only a convenient explanation in appreciating the situation from the point of view of a resourceful poet.

From now on we find nephews succeeding to the throne of the Mūṣika kingdom. If the king dies at an early age his brother will naturally succeed. But after that it is invariably the son of the sister of the ruling prince that assumes the reins. After Validhara, the first nephew to rule over, his own nephew Ripurāma reigned. He was succeeded by his younger brother Vikramarāma since he died early and the nephew must have been quite young. An inscription of this last mentioned ruler suggests that the nephews

पुनरिति निगदन्ती सापतद् भक्तिपूर्वं
प्रणतजनशिवायाः पादमूलं शिवायाः ।।
प्रथितगुणमपत्यं संभविष्यत्यलं ते
क्षितिरपि च पुनस्त्री (वंश) कृत्वस्तथैव(?) ।
इति गिरमुपकर्ण्य प्रेयसीमम्बिकाऽसौ
कृतफल इव पुण्ये भोगसम्पत्तिरोऽभूत् ।।

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often assumed the name of their uncle as their surname. Vikramarāma is referred to as Validhara-Vikramarāma in one of his inscriptions[1] on a slab in the Narayan kaṇṇūr temple at the foot of Ēḷi hills, the region of the Mūṣika kings.

Since the date of Validhara, the first ever nephew to succeed to the throne, can be assigned to the first half of the 9th century A.D. we may assume that the change-over to the matrilineal system of inheritance took place at that period. The *Mūṣikavaṃśa* of Atula[2] thus gives definite information regarding this important transition in the social order of succession.

[1] No. 474 of 1916.

[2] For an account of the text and commentary see, M. G. S. Narayanan, *Mathrubhumi Weekly*, 23.8.1970; also, K. Maheswaran Nair, *Epigraphia Malabarica*, Trivandrum, 1972, pp. 93-94.

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HAJIME NAKAMURA

ŚAṂKARA'S VIVARAṆA ON THE YOGASŪTRA-BHĀṢYA

A work declared in the colophon to be by Śaṃkara, namely a gloss (*Vivaraṇa*) on the bhāṣya on the *Yogasūtra-s*,* has recently been discovered and published in Madras. Hitherto unknown to the academic world, it is an important basic text for the history of Indian thought. In my article in the *Okuda Festschrift* in 1976 I already pointed out a number of noteworthy words, citations, etc. which appear in it; I propose here to discuss some noteworthy ideas in the *yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* attributed to a Śaṃkara.

Vyāsa says simply (in his commentary on **1.** 1) 'What is called yoga is samādhi', but Vāsaspati-Miśra says: 'It is accepted generally in *śruti* and *smṛti*, histories, purāṇa-s and so on that *samādhi* is the cause of bliss (*niḥśreyasa* = liberation)'.[1] But Śaṃkara discusses in detail how it is knowledge attained

* Śaṅkarācārya's *Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*. Published as No. 94 in the Madras Government Oriental Series, Triplicane, Madras, 1952.

[1] *Tattvavaiśāradī*, p. 2 ĀnSS.

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by means of yoga that is the cause of liberation[1]. In explaining the structure of the *yogasūtra-s* he says:

> 'What is to be obtained is other than the result which is discarding (passions) on the basis of discriminative wisdom, and again the means to discarding is none other than discriminative wisdom. And thus the mutual relation of what is to be attained and the means to it is determined ... As an example, the relation is well known that the result of medical remedies is none other than attainment of health, and again the means to health are none other than medical remedies.' (*Viv.* **1.** 1, page 2, lines 18-23).

In other words the objective is to get rid of passions, etc. and discriminative wisdom is the means to it (*Viv.* p. 2, line 23). Here one can say that Śaṃkara lays the emphasis on knowledge. He presents an interpretation which appears markedly Advaitic.

Vyāsa says: 'Liberation (*apavarga*) is the experiencing subject's (*bhoktṛ*) knowing with certainty his self. There is no different (third) knowledge other than these two (experience of pain and pleasure, and liberation).'

Śaṃkara however says: 'As long as ignorance (avidyā) exists, what is unpleasant and what is pleasant exist. And therefore experience (of pain and pleasure) exists. But since puruṣa in its essence can

[1] *avidyāmūlatvād asmitādīnāṃ kleśānāṃ vidyāyāś cāvidyocchedarūpatvād vidyodaye cāvidyādi-klēśamucchedo* ... (Vācaspatimiśra ad *Vyāsabhāsya* **1.** 1. p. 3 ĀnSS.).

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neither accept nor reject aught, when puruṣa is accurately known, how could there be experience (of pain and pleasure)? Therefore the idea which subdues the ideas which are essentially ignorance and take the form of pain and pleasure, is the knowledge of puruṣa. For no third separate knowledge can be conceived apart from and different from these two. (*Viv.* p. 180, lines 19-23, on *sūtra* **2.** 18).

If in this passage *puruṣa* is taken in the sense of Ātman, it is an Advaitic position that is being put forward.

According to Śaṃkara's yoga commentary: 'Our bondage arises on the basis of ignorance' (*avidyānimitto hi bandhaḥ—Viv.* **1.** 1, page 4, line 2). 'By destroying ignorance by knowledge, liberation is attained' (*khyātir eva sādhanam avidyānivṛtti-dvṛāeṇa—Viv.* **1.** 1, page 4, line 2).

The yoga schocl traditionally have held that puruṣa is the experiencer, but Śaṃkara in commenting even on the yoga, abandons this traditional view and brings in the Vedānta Advaitic interpretation that Ātman is not an experiencer.

'Puruṣa takes a form identified with the various operations of the mind' (*Yogasūtra* **1.** 4)—to this *sūtra* Śaṃkara adds an Advaitic interpretation:

> 'The opponent says: If puruṣa takes a form identified with the various operations, then he undergoes a change of state and it entails puruṣa being something changing. Will it not thus entail many errors?'

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The reply is: It has been pointed out in the previous topic and already answered. The taking on of the various forms is a superimposition (*adhyāropa*) of the various operations of the mind on puruṣa. Puruṣa in its essence does not change.[1] It is as when something is placed against a crystal; its colour appears in it.' (*Viv.* p. 14, ll.15-17, *YS* **1**. 4).

This 'superimposition' (*adhyāropa*) concept and the example of the crystal are often employed in the Advaitic school.

Again, Vyāsa quotes Pañcaśikha: '*ekam eva darśanaṃ khyātir eva darśanam*'. Knowledge (khyāti)[2] in the yoga school is the discriminating knowledge that knows the difference between puruṣa and fundamental causal substance, and Pañcaśikha takes darśana and khyāti as identical, but Śaṃkara's view limits khyāti to an operation of buddhi, and the self-nature of puruṣa and buddhi are known by this knowledge.

Buddhivṛttir eva darśanam / khyāyate puruṣeṇeti-ca khyātiḥ, khyāyate anayā (*buddhyā*) *ca buddhipuruṣayoḥ svarūpam iti khyātiḥ.*

(*Viv.* ad **1**. 4, p. 14, ll. 22-23)

And in that case, the knowledge which discriminates has no connection with puruṣa. In fact a point which neither Pañcaśikha nor Vyāsa made clear, Śaṃkara makes clear-cut on the basis of his own ideas.

[1] That purusa does not change is argued in other places also (*Viv.* p. 190, l. 19f.; p. 191, l. 13; p. 349).

[2] *Yogasūtra* **1**. 16; **2**. 5, 26, 28; **3**. 49; **4**. 29.

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Again, Vyāsa says: 'Just as the victory and defeat existing in the army are finally attributed to the king, because the king is the one who experiences the results of the fighting, in the same way it is said that bondage and liberation exist only in the buddhi, but are attributed to puruṣa. Because puruṣa is one who experiences those results.' Commenting on this passage, Śaṃkara interprets: 'The one who experiences those results is the person who is aware of right idea and wrong idea.' (*Viv.* p. 181, 1.15—to *sūtra* 18). And again he says of the relation between bondage and liberation: 'In so far as buddhi thinks experience of pain and pleasure, which have something to be done, and liberation something already completed, buddhi is bound . . . Fulfilment of buddhi's goal is completion of what had to be done. Puruṣa when seeing that is not involved in bondage or liberation, which are things apart from itself, and thinking that there is nothing for puruṣa to do, that completion of what was to be done is the liberation of buddhi.' *Viv.* p. 181, lines 17-20.

Again after listing the various operations of the human mind, perception, memory, inference and so on, he says: 'Since these operations of the mind do not differ in so far as they are notions, the various attributes of buddhi exist only within buddhi, and are created by buddhi, and their existence in puruṣa is something super-imposed (*adhyāropita*). Puruṣa being aware of

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them, adopts them, and in this way they are superimposed on puruṣa (*adhyāropyante*)' (*Viv.* p. 181, 22-24).

When the essential nature of A does not really exist in a thing B, yet is mistakenly supposed to exist there, it is called 'superimposition' and in Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtra* commentary the word *adhyāsa* is used for it; here the word *adhyāropa*. The Vyāsa commentary (*Y. Bh.* p. 181, l.9) uses the word *adhyāropita-sadbhāva*. (The word *adhyāropa*, originally used in Vijñānavāda Buddhism, was adopted by the yoga and Vedānta. *adhyāsa* is purely Vedāntic and not used in Buddhism.) In any case it cannot be maintained that because the words for superimposition are different, the Śaṃkara who wrote the *Yogasūtra* commentary is other than the author of the *Brahmasūtra* commentary. (The words *adhyāropayati*, *adhyāropaṇā* are used freely in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, undoubtedly a genuine work of Śaṃkara.)[1]

According to this interpretation, it comes to saying that the conjunction between puruṣa and primary matter does not cause mundane existence (saṃsāra) but superimposition is the cause. This is absolutely Advaitic.

In some places even technical terms of Vedānta are used. For instance *sūtra* **4.** 4 is: 'When the yogin conjures up transformation bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) their minds are produced from the pure I-am notion (*asmitāmātra*).' Śaṃkara says: 'Produced from the sense-organs and the pure I-am notion alone' (*Viv.* **4.**

[1] Saṃkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* ed. by Sengaku Mayeda (Tokyo Hokuseido, 1973) p. 302.

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4, page 320, 1.22) This pure I-am notion he takes as ahaṃkāra (*Viv.* 320, line 20) and so far it is Sāṃkhyan. But Śaṃkara takes asmitā[1] as identical with the idea of 'I' (ahaṃpratyaya). (*so 'yam ahaṃpratyayo'smitākhyakleśa ucyate*, *Viv.* p. 138, lines 10-11; ad *YS* 2. 6)

Puruṣa has always the nature of awareness (*nityopalabdhisvarūpatva*—*Viv.* p. 191, line 27 ad *YS.* 2. 20). Puruṣa is what has awareness, and that is not experience (bhoga) of pleasure and pain (*Viv.* 191, 1.15).

According to Vyāsa, the operations of the mind (*cittavṛttayaḥ*) are already known by puruṣa, but according to Śaṃkara they are brought about in accordance with the nature of puruṣa as one eternally aware (*nityopalabdhṛ*) (*Viv.* p. 348, line 24 ad. *YS*, 4. 18).

Now Śaṃkara often uses of Brahman the expression 'having eternal awareness as its nature'.

Again, in the concluding verses of Śaṃkara's commentary:

The syllable *Om* is the expression of the Lord;

From the Lord the various results of all karman-s are manifested;

In him himself there are no passions, no karman-s, no fruition of their results;

He causes to appear all beings along with the results of their karman.

The Lord (Īśvara) who is ruler (īśa) of all, creator

[1] *asmibhāvo 'smitā asmīti pratyayaḥ* (*Viv.* p. 184, ll. 22-23 in 2. 19)

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who acts in the maintenance, creation and dissolution of the worlds;

May that Kṛṣṇa think of our white (=good karma) and remove our black[1] (=bad karma). Here the sound *Om* is taken as expressing the Lord. This is taught in *yogasūtra* **1**. 27 and is a teaching of the yoga school, and again is taught in the first chapter of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā-s* and is also a *Vedāntic* doctrine.

However, to call the Lord 'the creator who acts in maintenance, creation and dissolution of the worlds' is absolutely Vedāntic; no such idea is expressed in the *yogasūtra-s*. But again the concept of God which Śaṃkara gives in this commentary is in some cases clearly different from that of the Advaita school. For example there is the view that the Lord (Īśvara) is not omniscient (*Viv.* p. 64, line 154) but in the *Brahmasūtra* commentary he takes it that the Lord is omniscient —but the position about omniscience in the Yoga school is not at all clear and further reasearch is needed.

Again it is noteworthy that the Lord is called Kṛṣṇa. Śaṃkara in the *Brahmasūtra* Commentary refers to worship of Viṣṇu but does not refer to Kṛṣṇa. In the *yogasūtra* of course there is no such reference. Śaṃkara's *yogasūtra* commentary here takes a step in

[1] According to the dictionaries, śukliman (m.) for 'white' occurs in *Harṣacarita*, and it also appears in *Prakaraṇapañcikā* **4**. 49 (SDS **16**, lines 444). Again kṛṣṇiman (m.) for black comes, according to the dictionaries, in *Mudrārākṣasa*. But when in this commentary it is said *vyapanudatutarām kṛṣṇimānam sa kṛṣṇaḥ* it is a kind of play on words of a kind which is not seen in the Brahmasūtra commentary.

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the direction of the bhakti faith of Hinduism; in explaining yoga, Śaṃkara thought it was the purification of the mind.

'For taints (*kleśa*) are not operations of the mind. Really the various taints are not of the nature of (pure) ideas. But operations (of the mind) are of the nature of (pure) ideas. The various taints are impurities (dirt—*mala*) of the mind, just as cataract (*timira*) is an impurity of the eye. For when the mind is separated from the impurtiy of the passions, the fluctuations of (pure) ideas, and the opposing ideas, do not exist.' (*Viv.* ad 2. 3, p. 126, lines 6-8)

Here he speaks a doctrine recalling that of Mahāyāna of the essential purity of the essence of mind. In the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (4. 62, 64, 72) what is taught about 'mind' (citta) is close to Śaṃkara's understanding of the Ātman doctrine. In particular, 'kleśa' in the sense of 'passion' is peculiar to Buddhism, and it is the Śaṃkara of yoga who accepts it as having entered the thought of the yoga school. As against that, not merely in Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtra* commentary but in Indian philosophy generally, *kleśa* is used in the sense of suffering and pain. Here Śaṃkara is immersed in the spiritual atmosphere of the practising yogin-s who were influenced by Buddhism, and here too is the influence of the fact that the yoga school from ancient times was using Buddhist technical terms.

The standpoint of this Śaṃkara is realism and he rejects the Consciousness-only doctrine (on this point completely, the reverse of the Fourth Chapter of

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Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā). Introducing the doctrine of other schools he says:

'The mind itself is something which takes an appearance (*ābhāsa*) of itself and an appearance as an object. (According to him, svābhāsa=grāhaka, viṣayābhāsa=grāhya) For in the various operations (of the mind) their forms are attested spontaneously. For instance a light illumines jars, etc. (objects of the external world) and also itself. Is it necessary to suppose a puruṣa, who is supposed as a subject who knows the operations of the mind?'—this is said.

(*Viv.* page 344, line 14-17 ad **4.** 19)

To this the *Yoga Sūtra* replies in **4.** 19, as Śaṃkara explains it:

'Mind cannot illumine its own self, for mind is something seen.'

Then he says: 'nihilists (vaināśika-s) hold the mistaken view that the perceiving subject (grāhaka) and perceived object (grāhya) are nothing but mind itself' (*Viv.* 356 ad *YS* **4.** 23). (Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtra* commentary also calls Buddhist schools like the Vijñānavādin 'nihilist'—vaināśika)

Then he explains: 'No single thing, called the succession of knowledge, exists' (*Viv.* ad **4.** 24, p. 359, line 9). From this standpoint the Ālaya consciousness is naturally rejected. The point of rejecting Consciousness-only doctrine is the same in the *Brahmasūtra* commentary. Accordingly Śaṃkara, though adopting technical terms and so on from Vijñānavāda, yet rejects the doctrine itself.

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The realist position can be recognised in other points. Śaṃkara, expatiating on Vyāsa's teaching, says that the sense organs receiving operations of forms of sounds, etc. of the outer world, are the changing channels (*praṇāḍikā*) to the mind, namely portals (*dvāra*). (*Viv.* p. 19, lines 8-10). He says that direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) is established through them (*Viv.* p. 19, line 12).

Again looking at technical terms, in the same way there are expressions recalling those peculiar to Śaṃkara: 'All things from *mahat* to a post' (*mahadādistambaparyantā mūrtayaḥ*) (*Viv.* ad **2.** 18, p. 177, line 21). This recalls '*brahmādi stambaparyanta*' which appears in the *Brahmasūtra* commentary[1] (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, B. I. p. 604, l. 2; P. Deussen, *Das System des Vedānta*, S. 257).

There are also to be found special technical terms not used too much in Indian philosophy generally; for instance *upasthāpita* occurs in the sense of 'caused to manifest', 'caused to be manifested' (*Yogabhāṣya* **3.** 17, p. 266, line 10), which Śaṃkara glosses as *pratyupanīta* (*Viv.* p. 267, line 12). Incidentally he calls something which manifests a result *pratyupasthāpaka* (*Viv.* p. 22, line 12 in **1.** 6-7) and he seems to use the expression *avidyāpratyupasthāpita* 'manifested through ignorance' habitually in the *Brahmasūtra* commentary.

[1] *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* B.I. p. 604 12; P. Deussen: *Das System des Vedānta* S. 257.

N.B.: This article was translated from the Japanese into English by Mr. Trevor Leggett. I am very grateful to him.

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PARAMESWARA AITHAL

ON THE CĀTURMĀSYA-PRAYOGA OF ANANTADEVA

THE name of Anantadeva[1] is very well known in the *śrauta* and *dharmaśāstra* literature.[2] Among his several works, the *Smṛtikaustubha*, particularly the section dealing with *saṃskāra-s*, called *Saṃskārakaustubha* has been very popular and recognized as authoritative by the High Courts in India.[3] Although some of his works on *dharmaśāstra* have been published more than once, none of his *śrauta* works has been printed so far, nor has there been any effort by modern scholars to utilize the valuable material provided by him for the study of *śrauta*. The purpose of this short paper is to draw attention to one of his *śrauta* works.

With regard to the biographical details of Anantadeva some definite information is available. In the introductory verses of his *Smṛtikaustubha*,[4] a voluminous

[1] In order to distinguish him from his namesakes he is referred to as Anantadeva II as against his grandfather Anantadeva I in the *NCC*, vol. I, pp. 164-5. His literary activity is assigned to the third quarter of the seventeenth century. For detailed discussion see P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. I, pt. II, BORI, Poona, (rev. ed.) 1975, pp. 953-63.

[2] For an account of his contribution to *dharmaśāstra*, see Kane, op. cit.

[3] cf. Kane, op. cit. p. 954.

[4] Published in Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1909.

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digest on *dharmaśāstra*, composed at the instance of his patron, Baz Bahadur Candra of Almorah and Nainital (A. D. 1638-1678), the author records a pedigree of his patron's family and some details about himself.[1] He was a great-great-grandson of the famous Marāṭha saint Ekanātha; grandson of Anantadeva (I), the author of several works on *bhakti* (e.g. *Bhagavadbhakti-nirṇaya*);[2] his father, Āpadeva, was the author of, among many others, the well-known Mīmāṃsā work, *Mīmāṃsānyāya-prakāśa*, popularly known as *Āpadevīyam*, on which Anantadeva wrote a commentary called *Bhāṭṭālaṃkāra*.[3] His younger brother was Jīvadeva who wrote the *Āśaucanirṇaya*,[4] *Bhaṭṭabhāskara*,[5] etc. 'Mīmāṃsā lore seems to have been a hereditary endowment in the family [of Anantadeva] as in the case of the Bhaṭṭas of Benares. In all his works, particularly in the *Saṃskārakaustubha*,[6] Anantadeva applies at every step the maxims and doctrines of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* for the decision of doubtful points of Dharmaśāstra'.[7]

[1] cf. Kane, op. cit, pp. 960-3.

[2] There is considerable confusion in ascribing these works in manuscripts catalogues. Kane (op. cit. pp. 959, 963 and 1160) supposed that this work (i.e. *Bhagavadbhakti-nirṇaya*) as well as the *Kṛṣṇabhakticandrikā-nāṭaka* is by Anantadeva II. But they have been distinguished after verification and assigned to Anantadeva I in the *NCC*, vol. I, p. 165.

[3] Printed in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 53, Benares, 1921; see *NCC*, vol. I, p. 166.

[4] cf. *NCC*, vol. 2, p. 205.

[5] cf. *NCC*, vol. 7, p. 288.

[6] Printed in Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1913.

[7] Kane, op. cit., p. 961.

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Among the thirty-four works ascribed to Anantadeva in the *NCC*[1] not less than twenty-four belong to the subject of *śrauta*, mainly dealing with the functions of the *adhvaryu* priest according to the *sūtra-s* of Āpastamba or Baudhāyana. It may be that some of these works like *Kūṣmāṇḍagaṇahomaprayoga* are really parts of one or other of his larger works. One of the important works among them is the *Cāturmāsya-prayoga*. This is widely used and valued by the officiating priests in the *śrauta* ceremonies throughout India. This is evident from the existence of a large number of manuscripts distributed in various Libraries and also in private collections. On the basis of an original manuscript obtained from a priestly family in Gokarna[2] and collating it with four other manuscripts[3] an edition of the text has been prepared by the writer of this paper for publication. The text has an extent of about 1600 *grantha-s*.

As the author himself states in the introductory portion[4] of the text this work is intended for the

[1] See vol. I, pp. 165-67.

[2] Belonging to the Śrautin Subrāya Bhaṭṭa and Rāmachandra Bhaṭṭa, kindly lent to me for my work; dated *śake* 1734 (A.D. 1812).

[3] (i) Staatsbibliothek, München, No. 43, Skt. 79 (Haug 101), described by Aufrecht, Die Sanskrit-Handschriften der K. Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in München, 1909, pp. 19-20, 75 fo., dated 1787.
(ii) India Office Library, London, No. 4705.
(iii) BORI, No. 81 of 1891-1895, fo. 65, not dated.
(iv) BORI, No. 17 of 1899-1915 fo. 56, not dated.

[4] On fo. 1b. 1.2. āśvalāyanasya baudhāyanamatam avaṣṭhabhya cāturmāsyāni cikīrṣato yathāprayogapakṣam avalambya prayoga ucyate.

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Āśvalāyana school performing the *cāturmāsya* sacrifice according to the *Śrautasūtra-s* of Baudhāyana with regard to the functions of the *adhvaryu* priest. Anantadeva has also written another work on *cāturmāsya* according to the *Śrautasūtra-s* of Āpastamba.[1] Thus there are two different *Cāturmāsya-prayoga-s* by Anantadeva, namely one according to Baudhāyana and another according to Āpastamba, although manuscripts catalogues of Libraries, even the *NCC*, do not clearly distinguish the two works.[2]

A thorough study of the text in consideration (based on the *sūtra-s* of Baudhāyana-Āśvalāyana) reveals why so much of importance is attached to this work. This is not a mere *prayoga* in the usual sense of the term, i.e., a manual or guide-book of priests describing the course of ritual procedure. It has in fact the characteristics more of a *nibandha*. The author avails himself of every possible opportunity to present and discuss the divergent views of the various ritualistic authorities on the subject including those of the commentators on the *sūtra-s* of different Vedic schools.

[1] cf. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Sarasvatī Mahal Library, Tanjore, vol. **4**, no. 2267.

[2] cf. *NCC*, vol. I, p. 166, under Āpastambīyacāturmāsyapaddhati; most of these manuscripts are actually of the work according to Baudhāyana-Āśvalāyana; cf. also Cāturmāsya-prayoga on the same page; the manuscript no. 17 of 1899-1915 of BORI is according to Baudhāyana and utilized by me for the preparation of the edition. See also *NCC*, vol. **7**, p. 12: *Cāturmāsyaprayoga* by Anantadeva; under this entry could be found the manuscripts of both the works.

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The following illustration would show how the conflicting views of the various authorities are presented and solutions are arrived at:

In the *vaiśvadeva* sacrifice of the *cāturmāsya* an offering of *puroḍāśa* baked on seven potsherds (*kapāla-s*) is made to the Marut-s among the eight principal deities. According to Baudhāyana[1] it is the *mere* Marut-s, i.e. without any attributes. But in the *Āśvalāyana-śrautasūtra*[2] which prescribes the duties of the *hotṛ* priest the Marut-s are qualified with *svatavas*, i.e., *Marutaḥ svatavasaḥ* (self-strong).[3] Now when the *adhvaryu*, the chief priest, who performs his sacrificial functions according to the *sūtra-s* of Baudhāyana prepares the offering to the Marut-s, the *hotṛ* priest should follow the directions of the *adhvaryu* in reciting the verses for offerings. This stands in apparent contradiction to the prescription of Āśvalāyana. In a lengthy discussion on this topic Anantadeva quotes the views of several ritual authorities such as Devatrāta, *Tantraratna*, Vṛttikṛt, *Yajñatantra* (*-sudhānidhi*), Āṇḍapillai, Siddhāntin, etc. In order to solve the difference in prescriptions and to enable a co-ordinated ritual action he also refers to Mīmāṃsā maxims and concludes that, in general, *mere* Marut-s are to be taken as the deity and the *hotṛ* priest should follow the directions of the *adhvaryu*. But in the case of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) being a follower of Āśvalāyana the Marut-s

[1] *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra*, vol. I, p. 128.
[2] *Āśvalāyana-śrautasūtra*, 2. 16.10.
[3] cf. Kane, op. cit., vol. 2, pt. II, p. 1092.

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svatavas are to be offered. Then, even the *adhvaryu* priest also should follow the *sūtra-s* of Āśvalāyana irrespective of what is prescribed in the *sūtra-s* of the *Yajurveda* which he generally follows. Such conclusions are actually followed by the officiating priests in practice even today.

While elucidating the procedure of ritual acts, Anantadeva quotes from or refers to more than thirty-five authorities apart from those mentioned with words like *anye*, *apare*, *eke*, *kecit* and so on. Some of these works, though important, still remain unpublished. The following is a list, with brief notes, of the authors and works quoted or referred to by Anantadeva:

1. ANVIḶĀ: 4a.4,[1] 19a.11, 22b.3, 23b.8 (Anviḷā-kāraḥ), 36b.6, 38b.1.

   The work quoted by this name is by Āṇḍapillai alias Tālavṛntanivāsin who wrote commentaries on the *sūtra-s* of Āpastamba and Āśvalāyana, and also several *prayoga-s* pertaining to all the three Veda-s. This name is found in the works and manuscripts catalogues, particularly from northern India in a variety of ways: Āṇḍavila, Āḍabila, Anvilā, Āṇḍabilā and so on. Sometimes even texts or parts thereof by Tālavṛntanivāsin are given with this name as *Āṇḍapillai-prayoga* or *Āṇḍapillai-paddhati* or *Uttarāṇḍapillai*, etc. He is

[1] The numbers refer to the sides (a or b) of the folios and lines of the Gokarṇa MS. mentioned above. If the name of an author or a work occurs more than once in the same line it is indicated with a sign 'X', e.g. 19a. 10×2.

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quoted by several later writers. Āṇḍapillai is a South Indian Tamil name occurring in the inscriptions of the Coḷa period.[1]

2. APARĀRKA: 12a.11

Only one verse is quoted from Aparārka (*c.* A.D. 1115-1130), the well-known commentator[2] on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*.

Āgrayaṇayajñatantra: see Yajñatantra

Ādhānayajñatantra: see Yajñatantra

3. ĀPASTAMBA: 13b.6

Āpastamba is cited only once, that also in connection with the construction of the fire altar (*vedi*).[3] Anantadeva has written a separate work on *cāturmāsya* according to Āpastamba.[4]

4. ĀŚVALĀYANA: 2a.4, 3b.2, 3, 8, 11, 4a.4, 19b.2, 21b.11, 34b.11, 38a.10, 28b.9, 39b.2, 40b.8, 41a.1, 42b.6.

Āśvalāyana is quoted or referred to more than fifteen times. All these references could be traced in the *Āśvalāyana-śrautasūtra*. Since this *prayoga* is meant for the Āśvalāyana-s, the author tacitly reproduces the *sūtra-s* from Āśvalāyana pertaining to the respective ritual acts.

Āśvalāyana-hautrayajñatantra: see Yajñatantra.

5. KARKA: 18a.3, 19b.11

[1] cf. *NCC*, vol. 2, p. 42.

[2] cf. Kane, op. cit., pp. 713-23.

[3] From *Āpastamba-śulbasūtra*, 6.2.

[4] cf. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Sarasvatī Mahal Library, Tanjore, vol. 4, no. 2267.

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Karka or Karkopādhyāya is a well-known commentator on the *sūtra-s* and *pariśiṣṭa-s*, particularly those of Kātyāyana. About his date there are divergent views. While some have argued that he belonged to the fourth century A.D.[1] others have tried to place him in the fifteenth century. He is quoted by Hemādri, Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana, etc.[2]

6. KARMĀNTA: 14b.11, 15a.4, 18a.2, 18b.2, 20a.7, 27b.11, 30b.4.

Chapters 24-26 of the *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra* are known by this name. Since this portion of the *sūtra-s* provides clarifications,[3] supplements and even optional statements regarding the rites described in the main text of the *sūtra-s*, quotations thereof are brought in for discussion. All these quotations are identified in the printed *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra*.

7. KALPA(-SĀRA): 2b.1, 3a.4, 7, 3b.1, 4b.9, 5b.10, 6a.1, 5, 8, 12, 6b.3, 4, 7a.3, 7, 9, 9a.8, 9b.11, 10a.5, 10b.5, 11, 11b.2, 12a.7, 12b.2, 5, 7, 10, 13a.11, 14b.1, 5, 9, 16b.10, 17a.6, 17b.8, 10, 18a.4, 9; 18b.1, 11, 19a.6, 9, 10x2, 20a.4, 8, 10, 20b.2, 3, 6, 21a.1, 3, 11, 21b.2, 22a.2, 22b.10, 23b.2, 24a.5, 25a.3, 25b.6, 9, 26a.4, 5, 1, 26b.2, 3, 8, 27a.8, 27b.6, 7, 28a.4, 28b.2, 9, 29a.1, 5, 29b.3, 30a.8, 30b.1, 4, 31a.6, 9, 31b.2, 11, 32a.6, 10,

[1] cf. C.G. Kashikar, *A Survey of the Śrautasūtras*, University of Bombay, 1968, p. 126 and p. 80.
[2] cf. *NCC*, vol. **3**, pp. 181-2.
[3] cf. Kashikar, op. cit. p. 45.

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32b.3, 4, 9, 33a.1, 33b.4, 7, 34a.5, 34b.7, 35a.3, 35b.3, 5x2, 8, 37b.4, 38a.7, 38b.2, 8, 39b.2, 40a.6, 8, 41a.2, 41b.7, 41a.1, 11.

This *Kalpa* quoted over a hundred times, all the quotations being in verse form, is the same as the *Kalpasāra*, quotations of which are also in verse. The name *kalpasāra* is found only in the initial portions of the text. Even there the readings in the manuscripts are divergent, i.e. where one manuscript reads *Kalpa* another has *Kalpasāra* and *vice versa*. *Kalpasāra* is an unpublished text ascribed to Mayūravāhana and referred to by many medieval writers.[1] Altogether more than eighty-five verses from this text are quoted by Anantadeva.

8. KĀTYĀYANA: 3a.6 (Haradattīye), 12.6, 13b.5, 23b. 7, 24a.7, 41a.11.

Of these six quotations from Kātyāyana four are found in the *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra*. One verse on 'weights and measures' quoted as from *Haradattīye* (3a.6) and three verses (42a.11) on the values in coins for articles to be presented to the priests

[1] cf. *NCC*, vol. **3**, p. 239. Manuscripts of this work are also found under the title *Kalpa-kārikā-sāra* or *Kalpa-sāra-kārikā*; cf. Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts at the Oriental Institute, Baroda, vol. **2**, 1942, p. 181, ser. no. 223; see also Manuscripts Catalogue of Bharata Itihasa Samshodhana Mandala, Poona, 1960, p. 55. I have obtained a copy of an incomplete manuscript of this important work from the collection of a priestly family near Udipi (South Kanara). Collating it with other manuscripts from Baroda, etc. I am preparing an edition of the same.

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as *dakṣiṇā* are from the *Mūlyādhyāya-pariśiṣṭa* of Kātyāyana.[1]

9. KEŚAVA(-SVĀMIN): 1b.3, 4, 6, 2a.11, 3a.4, 9, 4b.3, 5b.1, 6a.12, 6b.6, 7a.1, 7, 8b.2, 9a.1x2, 2, 9b.6, 9, 10a.1, 8, 11x2, 11b.1, 12b.9, 11, 13a.10, 13b.2, 4, 11, 14a.5, 14b.9, 10, 15a.9, 15b.3, 10, 16a.1, 16b.7, 17a.1, 9, 17b.7, 10, 19a.6, 8; 20a.3, 20b.1, 3, 5, 21a.7, 9, 21b.2, 4, 11, 22a.10, 23a.11, 23b.1, 24a.6, 24b.6, 25b.4, 11, 26a.6, 11, 26b.5, 27a.8, 28b.2, 10, 29a.4, 29b.9, 30a.2, 9, 30b.2, 31a.9, 31b.3, 32a.7, 32b.2, 10, 33b.2, 34a.4, 35a.4, 7, 36b.5, 37b.4, 7, 38a.6, 8, 38b.7, 8, 39a. 10, 39b.2, 41a.6, 41b.9, 42b.5.

These quotations from or references to Keśava-svāmin (*c.* A.D. 1100) are from his famous work called *Prayogasāra* based on the *sūtra-s* of Baudhāyana. This important work, which Caland made use of for the edition of the *Baudhāyana-sūtra-s*, remains still unpublished.[2]

10. GOPĀLA: 2b.4, 14a.5, 16b.8, 17b.1, 19b.1, 20b.12, 22a.3, 22b.3, 23b.3, 29b.4, 37a.10, 38b.1.

Altogether nine verses cited as from Gopāla must be from his work *Baudhāyanakārikā* also known as *Gopālakārikā*. He is believed to have lived 'earlier than tenth century' A.D., since early writers like Bhavasvāmin, Keśavasvāmin, Nārāyaṇa, etc. refer to him.[3]

[1] cf. *NCC*, vol. **3**, pp. 323-4; see also Kashikar, op. cit., p. 113.

[2] cf. *NCC*, vol. **5**, p. 71, and also Kashikar, op. cit., p. 117.

[3] cf. *NCC*, vol. **6**, p. 132, 134-5.

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11. JAYANTA: 2a.3.

The only quotation from Jayanta[1] on the ceremonial invitation and veneration (*varaṇa-madhuparka*) of officiating priests is found in the *Vimalodayamālā*[2] of Jayantasvāmin. K. P. Jog, the editor of this text, proposes 'Jayantasvāmin's date as the 7th century A.D. or the beginning of the 8th century'.[3] Kane also places him in the 'end of eighth century'.[4] The fact that Jayanta quotes Devasvāmin[5] and the latter refers to Medhātithi who is supposed to have lived between A.D. 825-900[6] make the proposed date for Jayanta problematic.

Tantrakṛt: see Yajñatantra

12. TANTRARATNA: 3b.8.

This is a commentary[7] by Pārthasārathi Miśra on the *Ṭupṭīkā* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s* and *Śābarabhāṣya*.

[1] cf. *NCC*, vol. 7, p. 180, 181, and vol. 2, p. 218.

[2] Published from the University of Poona, 1974, p. 94: Yajamānavaśenaiva dānapratigrahau bhavataḥ. This passage is cited by Anantadeva.

[3] cf. op. cit., introduction, p. xxii.

[4] cf. op. cit. pp. 1180-1.

[5] In *Vimalodayamālā*, p. 26: 'ye 'nye śāstrāntaradṛṣṭā vidhayo-'virodhinas teṣām apīhecchātaḥ kriyā' ity asya *bhāṣyakāra*-vacanasyaivāyaṃ prapañcaḥ. This quotation is from the *bhāṣya* of Devasvāmin on *Āśvalāyana-gṛhyasūtra*, I.7.3; p. 17 of the new edition (1980) of the *bhāṣya* published by the Adyar Library.

[6] cf. Kane, op. cit., pp. 573-83.

[7] Published from Sarasvatī Bhavana, Benares, 1930, 1933.

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13. DEVA: 2a.3, 6b.6, 7a.2, 9a.3, 10a.2, 11x2, 11a.2, 12a.6x2, 12b.9, 10, 13a.8, 9, 13b.2, 15b.7, 10, 11, 16a.10, 16b.6, 17a.1, 17b.7, 8, 10; 19a.5, 7, 8, 20b.3, 22a.2, 26a.6, 11, 26b.5, 9, 27a.7, 28b.2, 29b.2, 29b.9, 31a.1, 32b.10, 35b.7, 38b.8, 11; 41b.2.
It is difficult to ascertain which author is referred to as Deva. The quotations are not from Yājñikadeva's *Paddhati* on the *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra*, whom Anantadeva mentions as Devayājñika.

14. DEVATRĀTA: 3b.6, 4a.1, 11a.6, 12a.10, 22a.8, 22b.1, 23b.4, 25b.8, 34a.11, 35a.6, 36b.7, 8; 38b.1, 40b.10.
These quotations are from the *bhāṣya* of Devatrāta on the *Āśvalāyana-śrautasūtra*.[1] He is also called Varāhadeva or Varāhakāya. He is an early writer referred to by many medieval authors, like Kamalākara in his *Nirṇayasindhu*.[2]

15. DEVAYĀJÑIKA: 20a.1.
He is also known as Yājñikadeva and the author of many works on *śrauta* and *gṛhya* including the *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtrapaddhati*.[3]

16. DEVASVĀMIN: 1b.3, 14b.8, 34b.5, 36b.6 (*bhāṣyakṛt*), 37a.9 (*bhāṣyakāra*).
These references could be identified in Devasvāmin's *bhāṣya* on the *Āśvalāyana-śrautasūtra*. He is well

[1] Being published by Vishveshvaranada Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur.

[2] cf. *NCC*, vol. **2**, p. 226 and vol. **9**, p. 106.

[3] Printed in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1933; cf. Kane, op. cit., p. 1207 and *NCC*, vol. **3**, pp. 327-8, and also vol. **9**, p. 117.

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known as *bhāṣyakāra* and is so referred to by Anantadeva twice. Kane surmised that 'Devasvāmin probably flourished about 1000-1050 A.D., if not earlier'.[1] He is later than Medhātithi whom he cites in his *bhāṣya* on the *Āśvalāyana-gṛhyasūtra* and is earlier than Jayanta who quotes his *bhāṣya* in the *Vimalodayamālā*.[2]

17. DVAIDHA: 2b.3, 3a.8, 4b.3, 8; 8b.3, 9b.1, 11b.6, 12a.9, 12b.9, 13b.6, 15a.7, 15b.8, 18a.5, 20a.7, 23a.4, 24a.7, 11, 25a.2, 25b.10, 26a.5, 8, 26b.6, 27a.8, 11, 27b.4, 28a.1, 29a.6, 30a.7, 31a.5, 9, 31b.1, 32a.5, 10, 32b.6, 7, 11, 33a.6, 33b.4, 6, 34a.2, 35a.2, 35b.6, 39a.6, 10, 39b.1, 40a.6, 41a.3, 42a.5, 9.

Chapters 20-23 of the *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra* which record the different opinions of various early teachers (*ācārya-s*) are known by this name. It is a useful source to quote from in order to develop a discussion presenting divergent views.

18. DHŪRTA: 3a.6, 9b.7, 20b.1, 22a.11.

Also known as Dhūrtasvāmin he is the oldest commentator on *sūtra-s* of Āpastamba and his *bhāṣya*[3] on the *Śrautasūtra* has a sub-commentary (called *Ṭīkā* or *Dīpikā*) by Kauśikarāma known as Rāmāṇḍār.[4]

[1] cf. Kane, op. cit., p. 593.

[2] cf. above, under Jayanta and fn. thereon.

[3] Printed in Mysore Govt. Oriental Library Series 87, Mysore, 1944; also in Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 142, Baroda, 1963.

[4] cf. *NCC*, vol. 2, pp. 137-8 and vol. 9, p. 303.

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19. NṚSIṂHA: 8a.6, 11a.8, 27a.2, 34b.4, 36b.4, 8.
Anantadeva quotes altogether nine verses from Nṛsiṃha-yajvan. All these verses are found in the work variously entitled as *Nṛsiṃhakārikā*, *Prayogaratna*, *Śrautaprayogaratna*, *Āśvalāyanaśrautaprayogaratna*[1] in manuscripts catalogues. He was a son of Nārāyaṇa, younger brother of Gopīnātha and disciple of Īśvarabhāratī-yati.[2]

20. PRAYOGAPĀRIJĀTA: 1b.10.
This voluminous work on *gṛhya* and *śrauta* rituals by Nṛsiṃha of Kauṇḍinya-gotra was composed between A.D. 1360-1435. The *gṛhya* portion is often printed and widely used in Karnataka by the priests. The *śrauta* portion of the work is available only in MSS. There is one in the Adyar Library dealing with *darśapūrṇamāsa*.[3]

Prayogasūtra: see Baudhāyana

21. PRĀYAŚCITTAPRADĪPA: 14a.5.

22. BAHVṚCA-BRĀHMAṆA: 3b.7.
This reference with regard to the *upāṃśuyāja* could be traced neither in the *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* nor in the *Śāṅkhāyana-brāhmaṇa*.

23. BAUDHĀYANA: 3b.2, 13b.9, 29b.1, 31a.11, 35a.1 (these 3 as *Prayogasūtra*), 40b.11.
As the author closely follows the *sūtra-s* of Baudhāyana with regard to the *prayoga* the mention of his

[1] An edition of this work based on four manuscripts prepared by me is in print.

[2] cf. *NCC*, vol. **2**, p. 223, vol. **9**, p. 363 and vol. **10**, p. 193.

[3] cf. Kane, op. cit., vol. **1**, p. 1070.

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name occurs only in connection with discussions on divergent views. To distinguish the *dvaidha* portion of the *sūtras* where the name Baudhāyana is often repeated the author quotes from the *cāturmāsya* section as *Prayogasūtra*. In a few cases the quotations are from the *Śulbasūtra*.

24. Bhava(-svāmin): 2a.2, 2b.3, 6a.12, 6b.5, 9a.1, 2x2, 9b.9, 10a.6, 15a.4, 15b.10, 18b.11, 19a.6, 19b.9, 11, 20a.8, 20b.2, 4, 9, 21a.7, 27b.5, 29a.4, 29b.3, 30b.7, 31a.9, 31b.3, 32a.11, 32b.3, 5, 10, 33b.2, 34a.5, 37b.4, 7, 38b.7, 41b.2.

Bhavasvāmin 'who lived in the eighth century A.D. or perhaps earlier'[1] is said to be the oldest commentator on the *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra* and is relied on by many later commentators and *prayoga-kāra-s*. His work, called *vivaraṇa*, used by Caland for editing the text of the *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra* still remains unpublished.

Bhāṣya(-kāra, -kṛt): see Devasvāmin

Mādhava: see Yajñatantra

25. Yajñatantra (Tantrakṛt): 1b.3, 7, 11 (Ādhānayajñatantre), 2a.3, 3b.1, 11, 4a.5,8 (Mādhava), 4b.4, 5a.7 (Vidyāraṇya), 6a.12, 6b.3 (Vidyāraṇyair Āgrayaṇe), 7a.7, 9a.6 (Āgrayaṇayajñatantre), 9b.8, 10a.1, 11a.9 (Āśvalāyanahautrayajñatantre), 11b.2, 6, 12a. 5, 12b.1, 4, 10, 13b.1, 3, 14b.5, 9, 15a.8, 15b.3, 10, 18a.3, 18b.10, 19a.7, 19b.9, 21a.4, 5, 7, 21b.11, 22a.10, 22b.10, 23a.7, 11,

[1] cf. Kashkr,ṭa op. cit., pp. 47, 49.

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24a.10, 25b.9, 26a.6, 10, 27a.7, 29a.4x2, 29b.3, 10, 30a.5, 31a.11, 32a.8, 32b.5, 10, 33b.2, 34a.5, 35a.5, 35b.7, 36a.4, 36b.2, 37b.4, 6, 38a.11, 38b.8, 39a.11, 41a.6, 41b.2, 4, 7, 9.

This is an extensive and learned work on *śrauta* by Sāyaṇācārya. The complete title of the work is *Yajñatantra-sudhānidhi*. Various portions of this work are available under different titles as *Ādhānayajñatantra*, *Āgrayaṇahautraprayoga*, etc. No complete manuscript is yet known to exist.[1] Anantadeva refers to this work as of Mādhava (once), of Vidyāraṇya (twice) and in the latter part mostly as Tantrakṛt.

26. YAJÑAPĀRŚVA: 42b.2.

Only three verses quoted under this name are from the 15th *pariśiṣṭa* of Kātyāyana.[2]

27. RĀMĀṆḌĀRA: 3b.2, 7a.9, 27a.2.

This is the popular name of Kauśikarāma or Rāmāgnicit, the author of the *vṛtti* on *bhāsya* of Dhūrtasvāmin on the *Āpastamba-śrautasūtra*.[3]

28. VIKALPASŪTRA: 1b.4.

Vidyāraṇya: see Yajñatantra

29. VṚTTIKṚT: 1b.5, 3b.8, 4a.1, 3, 8a.6, 11a.5, 9, 11b.5, 12a.1, 10, 14b.7, 19a.11, 20b.10, 22b.2,

[1] I have collected copies of the manuscripts of different sections of this large work and an edition is under preparation.

[2] Cf. Article by C. G. Kashikar on the Yajñapārśva-pariśiṣṭa in Marathi: *Yajña: Āśaya āni Aviṣkāra*, ed. by Ganesh Thite, Yajnavalkya Ashrama, Poona, 1979, pp. 9-22; especially p. 18, fn. 13 where three verses quoted by Anantadeva are found.

[3] cf. above, under Dhūrta.

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23b.8, 24a.2, 9, 25b.8, 27b.1, 34a.11, 34b.2, 9, 36b.3, 5, 37a.9, 38a.11, 38b.9, 40b.10.

Most of these references to or quotations from this author could be traced to the commentary, known as *vṛtti*, of Nārāyaṇa on the *sūtra-s* of Āśvalāyana.[1] Nārāyaṇa has based his *vṛtti* on the *bhāṣya* of Devasvāmin, as he himself states in the beginning. He is said to have lived *c.* A.D. 1100.[2] There are a few quotations pertaining to the ritual acts of the *adhvaryu*, ascribed to the Vṛttikṛt by Anantadeva which are not found in Nārāyaṇa's *vṛtti*. They must be from some other *vṛtti* belonging to the *Yajurveda*.

30. VṚDDHĀḤ: 13b.9 (Somaprayoge), 14a.6,38a. 11.
31. ŚULBASŪTRA: 13a.7, 13b.5, 29a.6.
32. ŚULBASŪTRABHĀṢYA: 13a.7, 11, 29a.11.
33. ŚAUNAKA: 2a.4.
34. SIDDHĀNTABHĀṢYAM(-KṚT): 1b.5, 4a.1, 8a.6, 1a.6, 12a.2,, 10, 19b.3, 20b.11, 22a.8, 22b.2, 23a.8, 34a.10, 34b.1, 38a.10.

Also known as Siddhāntin he is one of the early commentators on the *sūtra-s* of Āśvalāyana held authoritative and quoted by many later writers.[3]

Haradattīya: see Kātyāyana

35. HARISVĀMIN: 19b.11.

[1] cf. *NCC*, vol. 2, p. 225 and vol. **10**, p. 76.
[2] cf. Kane, op. cit., pp. 591, 593.
[3] Printed (two chapters) in the Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts 74, Benares; cf. *NCC*, vol. 2, pp. 219, 226; Kashikar, op. cit., p. 82.

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36. HEMĀDRI: 1b.8.

The following are abstracts from the beginning and end of the work in which it could also be seen how Anantadeva presents the different views of the various authorities:

Beginning:

navanītakaro bālo navanīradharaprabhaḥ/
kamanīyatamaḥ kuryāc chaṃ no viṣṇur
urukramaḥ/1/

āśvalāyanasya baudhāyanamatam avaṣṭabhya cāturmāsyāni cikīrṣato yathāprayogapakṣam avalambya prayoga ucyate/ udagayana āpūryamāṇapakṣe devanakṣatre prakramya āpūryamāṇapakṣa eva samāptir iti *keśava-devasvāminau*/ samāptir aparapakṣa iti kecid iti *yajñatantre*/ udagayana āpūryamāṇapakṣe puṇyanakṣatra ārambhasamāptī iṣyete, parvaṇi samāptim eke, yathāsaṃbhavam eka iti *vikalpasūtram*/ phālgunyāṃ caitryāṃ vā prakrama iti *keśavaḥ*/ tatra caturdaśyām anvārambhaṇīyāṃ kṛtvā paurṇamāsyāṃ sadyo dvyahaṃ vā vaiśvadevaparva/ dvyaham eveti *vṛttikṛt*/ paurṇamāsyāṃ vaiśvānarapārjanyāṃ kṛtvā pratipady eva vaiśvadevī kartavyā, na parvaṇīti *siddhāntabhāṣyakṛt*. . . .

End:

. . . iti śunāsīrīyaparva/ atha dakṣiṇā/ tatra *dvaidhasūtram*/ dakṣiṇānāṃ dāna iti sūtraṃ *śālīkeḥ*/ atro ha smāha *baudhāyano* hiraṇyaṃ vaiśvānare dadyād dhenuṃ pārjanye dvādaśa vaiśvadeve dvādaśa varuṇapraghāsahaviḥṣu tisra ānīkavate tisraḥ sāṃtapane catasro gṛhamedhīya ṛṣabhaṃ pūrṇadarve tisraḥ kraiḍine dvādaśa

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mahāhaviḥṣu tisra ādityе dvādaśa śunāsīrīyahaviḥṣv iti/ atro ha *māhaupamanyavaś* catuḥṣaṣṭiś cāturmāsyadakṣināḥ samāmnātā bhavanti tāś cen nādhigacched vāsāṃsy etāvanti dadyāt, manthān vodanān vaitāvantas teno haivaitaṃ kāmam avāpnotīti/ cāturmāsyānām anta iti/ somāntāni syur iti *baudhāyanaḥ*/ paśvantānīti *śālikiḥ*/ savaneṣṭyā yajetety *aupamanyava* iti/ vāsaḥprabhṛtidānapakṣe ' pi gośabdenaiva dānapratigrahau, pūtikāvat pratinidhitvād vāsaḥprabhṛtīnām iti *kecit*/

saktur dadhnārdito manthaḥ puruṣāśana odanaḥ/
ṣoḍaśa pratiparva syur mantho vā cennam(?)
ūhyatām//

iti *kalpaḥ*/ hiraṇyadhenvṛṣabhāṇāṃ tu mukhyānām asaṃbhave śāstrāntaraprasiddhaṃ mūlyaṃ deyam/ tatra *kātyāyanaḥ*:

dvātriṃśat paṇikā gāvaś catuḥkārṣāpaṇo varaḥ/
vṛṣe ṣaṭ kārṣāpaṇakā aṣṭāv anaḍuhi smṛtāḥ//
daśa kārṣāpaṇā dhenāv aśve pañcadaśaiva tu/
hiraṇye kārṣāpaṇakāḥ paṇā nava tathādhikāḥ//
vastre kārṣāpaṇāś chāge ' ṣṭau paṇā dvādaśāvike/

iti/ tataś catvāri śatāni brāhmaṇān bhojayet/ yathoktaṃ *yajñapārśve*:

garbhādhānādisaṃskāre brāhmaṇān bhojayed daśa/
śataṃ vivāhasaṃskāre pañcāśan mekhalāvidhau//
āvasathye trayastriṃśac chrautādhāne śatāt param/
aṣṭakaṃ bhojayed bhaktyā tattatsaṃskārasiddhaye//
sahasraṃ bhojayet some brāhmaṇānāṃ śataṃ paśau/
cāturmāsye tu catvāri śatāny atha surāgrahe//

iti/ somena samāptipakṣe 'gniṣṭomaḥ, paśupakṣe aindrāgnaḥ, iṣṭipakṣe āgneyam aṣṭākapālam, aindrāgnam

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ekādaśakapālaṃ vaiśvadevaṃ dvādaśakapālaṃ ca nirvaped iti *keśavaḥ/ āśvalāyanokte* cāturmāsyāni vā punaś cāturmāsyāni vā punar iti pakṣe tu naiṣām anyatarat kāryam/

iti śrīmad-anantadevasutāpadevatanay-*ānantadevena* racitaś cāturmāsyaprayogaḥ saṃpūrṇaḥ/*

* [Grateful acknowledgments are due to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for the travel grant which enabled me to visit various places in South India. Several ritual manuscripts mentioned in this paper were found out during this research trip.]

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LOKESH CHANDRA

NĪLAKAṆṬHA LOKEŚVARA AS THE BUDDHIST APOTHEOSIS OF HARI-HARA

HSÜAN-TSANG refers to Avalokiteśvara on the Potala in the following words (Beal 1884: 2. 233): 'To the east of the Malaya mountains is Mount Po-ta-lo-kia (Potalaka). The passes of this mountain are very dangerous; its sides are precipitous, and its valleys rugged. On the top of the mountain is a lake; its waters are clear as a mirror. From a hollow proceeds a great river which encircles the mountain as it flows down twenty times and then enters the southern sea. By the side of the lake is a rock-palace of the Deva-s. Here Avalokiteśvara in coming and going takes his abode. Those who strongly desire to see this Bodhisattva do not regard their lives, but, crossing the water (fording the streams), climb the mountain, forgetful of its difficulties and dangers; of those who make the attempt there are very few who reach the summit. But even of those who dwell below the mountain, if they earnestly pray and beg to behold the god, sometimes he appears as Tsz'-tsai-t'ien (Īśvara-deva), sometimes under the form of a yogī (a Pāṁśupata *sic*); he addresses them with benevolent words and then they obtain their wishes according to their desires'.

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Watters (1905: 2. 229) summarises the above passage as follows: 'In the south of the country near the sea was the Mo-lo-ya (Malaya) mountain, with lofty cliffs and ridges and deep valleys and gullies, on which were sandal, camphor and other trees. To the east of this was Pu-ta-lo-ka (Potalaka) mountain with steep narrow paths over its cliffs and gorges in irregular confusion; on the top was a lake of clear water, whence issued a river which, on its way to the sea, flowed twenty times round the mountain. By the side of the lake was a stone Deva-palace frequented by Kuan-tzŭ-tsai P'usa. Devotees, risking life, brave water and mountain to see the P'usa, but only a few succeed in reaching the shrine. To the people at the foot of the mountain who pray for a sight of the P'usa, he appears sometimes as Pāśupata Tīrthika, or as Maheśvara, and consoles the suppliant with this (*sic*) answer'.

Hsüan-tsang must have read in the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* about the earthly paradise of Avalokiteśvara: 'Potalaka is on the sea-side in the south, it has woods, and streams, and tanks, and is in fact a sort of earthly paradise'. Buddhabhadra (A.D. 420) calls Kuanyin's mountain Kuang-ming or 'Brilliance', which is usually given as the rendering for Malaya, but a later translator, Śikṣānanda, transcribes the name Potalaka' (Watters 1905: 2. 231). Buddhabhadra's rendering of Potala is 'Brilliance'. It refers to it, etymology: Tamil *pottu* (*potti-*) 'to light (as a fire)'s Kota *pot-* (*poty-*) id., Kannada *pottu* n. 'flaming', *pottige*

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'flaming, flame', Tulu *potta* 'hot, burning' (Burrow/Emeneau 1961: 298 no. 3691). In Kannada analogous words are: *pŏttige* 'flaming, flame', *pŏttisu* 'to cause to burn with flame, to kindle, to light', *pŏttu* 'to begin to burn with flame, to be kindled, to catch fire, to flame', *pŏttu* '1. flaming, 2. the sun, 3. time' (Kittel 1894: 1020). In ancient times the magnificence of the temple of Avalokiteśvara must have been resplendent and dazzling to the devotees who reached it after negotiating inaccessible cliffs and ravines: a transcendence beyond forbidding barriers.

In the above passage Avalokiteśvara at Potala sometimes takes the form of Īśvara (Śiva) and sometimes that of a Pāśupata yogin. In fact Śiva was metamorphosed into Avalokiteśvara. This is corroborated by the *Nīlakaṇṭhaka* and *Nīlakaṇṭha-dhāraṇī* where Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara is an apotheosis of Śiva and Viṣṇu (Hari-Hara). The *Nīlakaṇṭhaka* was translated into Chinese by three masters in the seventh and early eighth century: by Chih-t'ung twice during A.D. 627-649 (T[1]. 1057a and T. 1057b = [2]Nj. 318), by Bhagavad-dharma during A.D. 650-660 (T. 1059 and T. 1060 = Nj. 320), and by Bodhiruci in A.D. 709 (T. 1058 = Nj. 319).

The *Nīlakaṇṭha-dhāraṇī* was translated into Chinese by Vajrabodhi (worked A.D. 719-741, T. 1112), twice

[1] Taishō edition of the Chines Tripiṭakaka, ed. Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaigyoku, Tokyo, 1924-1929.

[2] Bunyiu Nanjio, *A Catlogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1883.

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by his disciple Amoghavajra (worked A.D. 723-774, T. 1111, 1113b), and in the fourteenth century by Dhyānabhadra (worked A.D. 1326-1363, T. 1113a).

Twelve scrolls of Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara texts in Chinese have been found at Tun-huang (Giles 1957: 105-106). Manuscript 3793 of the Stein Collection of Chinese scrolls from Tun-huang adds a note at the end: 'Translated at Khotan by the śramaṇa Bhagavaddharma of Western India'. Here West means 'South India' as we have already poined out in our article on Oḍḍiyāna (in print). It is notable that Bhagavaddharma accomplished the translation at Khotan. *Nīlakandi* for *Nīlakaṇṭha* in Amoghavajra's translation (T. 1113b) is a Central Asian form: Uigur nominative singular ending in *i*.

Amogha-vajra's Version

The version of Amoghavajra (T. 1113b) has been the most widespread ever since it was written in the eighth century. Its popularity has not waned to this day. Suzuki (1950: 22-23) includes its English rendering as an essential part of the Zen repertoire of sūtra-s, 'what the Zen monk reads before the Buddha in his daily service, where his thoughts move in his leisure hours' (ibid. 11):

Dhāraṇī of the Great Compassionate One

Adoration to the Triple Treasure!

Adoration to Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is the great compassionate one!

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Om, to the one who performs a leap beyond all fears!

Having adored him, may I enter into the heart of the blue-necked one known as the noble adorable Avalokiteśvara. It means the completing of all meaning, it is pure, it is that which makes all beings victorious and cleanses the path of existence.

Thus:

Om, the seer, the world-transcending one!
O Hari the Mahābodhisattva!
All, all!
Defilement, defilement!
The earth, the earth!
It is the heart!
Do, do the work!
Hold fast, hold fast!
O great victor!
Hold on, hold on!
I hold on!
To Indra the creator!
Move, move, my defilement-free seal!
Come, come!
Hear, hear!
A joy springs up in me!
Speak, speak! Directing!
Hulu, hulu, mala, hulu, hulu, hile!
Sara, sara! siri, siri! suru, suru!
Be awakened, be awakened!
Have awakened, have awakened!
O merciful one, blue-necked one!

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Of daring ones, to the joyous, hail!
To the successful one, hail!
To the great successful one, hail!
To the one who has attained mastery in the discipline, hail!
To the blue-necked one, hail!
To the boar-faced one, hail!
To the one with a lion's head and face, hail!
To the one who holds a weapon in his hand, hail!
To the one who holds a wheel in his hand, hail!
To the one who holds a lotus in his hand, hail!
To the blue-necked fear-causing one, hail!
To the beneficient one referred to in this Dhāraṇī beginning with 'Namaḥ', hail!
Adoration to the Triple Treasure!
Adoration to Avalokiteśvara!
Hail!
May these [prayers] be successful!
To this magical formula, hail!

Suzuki has used the Sanskrit text in Siddham script given along-side the Chinese transcription, as the basis for his translation. The Sanskrit is corrupt beyond recognition in certain cases: *dhava namo marakidhi herima*. Suzuki has taken 'O Hari' from another version. *sarva*[2] 'all, all', is in fact *sarpa*[2] 'descend'[2]. *Mala*[2] translated by Suzuki as 'defilement, defilement' should be *smara*[2] 'bear in mind'[2]. *dhiriṇi-rāya* is rendered as 'I hold on. To Indra the creator'. Its correct Sanskrit is *dhāriṇī-rāja* 'O Lord of the dhāraṇī (namely, Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara). *Vaṣa-vaṣaṃ praśaya* is

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done into English as 'Speak! speak! Directing'. Its Sanskrit reconstruction is *viṣaṃ*[2] *praṇāśaya* 'destroy every poison (of the senses)'. *dhaṣiṇina pasamana svāhā* is interpreted as 'of daring one, to the joyous, hail'. Its correct text would be [*dehi me*] *darśanaṃ/praharamāṇāya svāhā* 'appear [unto me]. To the overlooking Lord, hail'. Suzuki has missed not only the words of the dhāraṇī, but also its structure. The dhāraṇī can be divided into five parts: 1. initial salutation, 2. name of the Avalokiteśvara, 3. śloka enunciating merits of the hṛdaya-dhāraṇī, 4. dhāraṇī commencing with the classical phrase *tadyathā*, 5. final salutation. It escaped the attention of Suzuki that the third part is a śloka.

The text as written in Siddham script in the Chinese Tripiṭaka (T. 1113B, 20. 498-501) is transcribed below:

Namo Ratna-trayāya

1. Namo āryāvalokiteśvarāya, bodhisatvāya mahāsatvāya mahākāruṇikāya.
2. Oṃ sarva-rabhya-śudhana dasya namoskṛta imo aryāvarukitesivaraṃ dhava namo narakidhi.
3. Herima vadhaṣame[1] sarva athādu śubhaṃ/ ajeyaṃ sarva-bhūtanama va-gama-vadudu[2]//
4. Tadyathā/

[1] STP. *hridayam vartayiśami.*

[2] STP. has the correct text. *dudu* occurs elsewhere too as an expletive to slur over lacunae when words were forgotten.

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Oṃ/ Avaloka[1] lokatekarate/ chya mahābodhisatva sarva2/ mala2[2] mama hṛdayaṃ/ kuru2 karma/ dhuru2 vajayate mahavajayate/ dhara2 dhiriṇi-rāya[3]/ cala-cala mama vamara-muktele[4], che-ehe/ cinda2/ arṣaṃ pracali/ vaṣa-vaṣam[5] praśaya/ huru2 mara huru2/ sara2 siri2 suru2/ bodhiya2 bodhaya2/ maitriya Narakindi dhaṣiṇina[6] paṣamana svāhā/ siddhāya svāhā/ mahāsiddhāya svāhā/ siddhā-yogeśvakaraya svāhā/ Narakindi svāhā/ maranara[7] svāhā/ sirasaṃha-[8]mukhāya svāhā/ pamahāsiddhāya[9] svāhā/ cakrasiddhāya[10] svāhā/

[1] STP. *Āloka-adhipati*: this reminds us of Buddhabhadra (A.D. 420) who renders Potalaka the mountain of Avalokiteśvara as *Kuang-ming* 'Brilliance'. The Avalokiteśvara of Potalaka was Ālokādhipati or the Lord of Effulgence, and this phrase points to the fact that Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara and the Avalokiteśvara of Potala are identical.

[2] STP. 1294 line 1 *smrara hridayan.*

[3] STP. 1295 line 2 *dharenadriśvara.*

[4] STP. 1295 line 3 *vimalamūrte.*

[5] STP. 1298 line 1 *dveṣa-viṣa-vināśanam moha-viṣa-vināśanam.*

[6] STP. 1300 line 2 *daḍāhi me darṣana-kāmasa darśanāṃ/ praharāya-māna svāhā/*

[7] STP. 1300 line 4 *parāhamukhāya.*

[8] STP. 1301 line 1 *narasihamukhāya.*

[9] STP. 1301 line 2 *vajrahastāya.* In the Siddham of the Chinese text it is *pama* which can equally well be *gadā*. The dhāraṇī refers to Varāha and Narasiṃha, the two incarnations of Viṣṇu. The attributes that follow should also pertain to Viṣṇu: mace (*gadā*), discus (*cakra*), lotus (*padma*) and conch (*śaṅkha*). In this light *pama* has to be emended to *gadā* and not to vajra.

[10] STP. 1302 lines 3-4 *cakrāyudharāya svāhā/ śaṅkha-śabda-dnibohanāya svāhā.* The *śaṅkha* 'conch' is missing in our text.

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padma-kastaya svāhā/Narakindi vagaraya[1] svāhā/ mabari śaṅkaya svāhā.

5. Namo raratna-trayāya/ Namo āryāvarokiteśvaraya bodhi svāhā//

The above text can be corrected by a comparison with the version of Chih-t'ung (worked A.D. 627-649); which we find in the Ming edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. All the Sanskrit texts occurring in the Ming Tripiṭaka were collected together by Rol-paḥi-rdo-rje and his assistants in 8+2 volumes of the quadrilingual collection of dhāraṇīs which bears the Chinese title: *Yü chih man han mêng-ku hsi-fan ho-pi ta-tsang ch'üan chou* (edited by the author in 22 volumes under the title *Sanskrit Texts from the Imperial Palace at Peking*, abbreviated to STP). The prime objective of the redactors of the quadrilingual dhāraṇī-collection was to restore the Sanskrit text to its appropriate accuracy with the help of Tibetan texts. It proved to be a remarkable effort at textual reconstruction undertaken as early as the first half of the 18th century.

Herebelow is the reconstituted Sanskrit text with variant readings from STP. 5. 1290-6. 1304 which have been used for emendations:

/Namo Ratna-trayāya/

1. Nama āryāvalokiteśvarāya bodhisattvāya mahāsattvāya mahākāruṇikāya/

[1] Hsüan-tsang says that the Avalokiteśvara at Potalaka sometimes appears as a yogin smeared with ashes. The word *pāṇḍarāya* is an allusion to this attribute.

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2. Oṃ/ sarva-bhaya-śodhanāya tasya namaskṛtvā imu Āryāvalokiteśvara tava namo Nīlakaṇṭha/
3. hṛdayaṃ vartayiṣyāmi[1] sarvārtha-sādhanaṃ śubham/
ajeyaṃ sarva-bhūtānāṃ bhava-mārga-viśodhakam[2]/
4. Tadyathā/
Oṃ/ Ālokādhipati[3] lokātikrānta/ ehy-[ehi] mahābodhisattva sarpa-sarpa/ smara-smara[4] mama hṛdayaṃ/ kuru-kuru karma/ dhuru-dhuru vijayate mahāvijayate/ dhara-dhara dhāriṇī-rāja[5]/ cala-cala mama vimala-mūrtte[6], ehi-ehi/ chinda-chinda/ arṣa pracali/ viṣaṃ-viṣaṃ[7] praṇāśaya/ hulu-hulu smara hulu-hulu/ sara-sara siri-siri suru-suru/ bodhiya-bodhiya bodhaya-bodhaya/ maitriya Nīlakaṇṭha [8][dehi me] darśanam[8]/
praharāyamāṇāya svāhā/ siddhāya svāhā/ mahāsiddhāya svāhā/ siddhayogīśvarāya svāhā/ Nīlakaṇṭhāya svāhā/
varāha-mukhāya[9] svāhā/ narasiṃha-mukhāya[10] svāhā/
gadā-hastāya[11] svāhā/ cakra-hastāya[12] svāhā/ padma-hastāya svāhā/ Nīlakaṇṭha-pāṇḍarāya[13] svāhā/ Mahābali-Śaṃkarāya svāhā/
5. Namo ratna-trayāya/
Nama āryāvalokiteśvarāya bodhisattvāya svāhā/

TRANSLATION

Adoration To the Triple Gem

1. Adoration to the noble Avalokiteśvara, bodhisattva, mahāsattva, the Great Compassionate One.

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2. Om. Having paid adoration to One who Dispels all Fears, O noble Avalokiteśvara, to You adoration, O Nīlakaṇṭha.

3. I shall enunciate the 'heart' dhāraṇī which ensures all purposes, is pure and invincible for all beings, and which purifies the path of existence.

4. Thus:

Oṃ. Lord of Effulgence, the World-Transcending One. Come, come, great bodhisattva, descend, descend. Bear in mind my heart-dhāraṇī. Do, do the work. Hold fast, hold fast, oh Victor, oh Great Victor. Hold on, hold on, oh Lord of the Dhāraṇī. Move, move oh my immaculate image, come, come..... Destroy every poison. Quick, quick, bear in mind, quick, quick. Descend, descend, descend,[2] descend[2]. Being enlightened[2] enlighten me[2]. Oh merciful Nīlakaṇṭha appear unto me. To You who eye us, hail. To the Siddha hail. To the Great Siddha hail. To the Great Siddha in Yoga hail. To Nīlakaṇṭha hail. To the Boar-faced One hail. To One with the Face of Narasiṃha hail. To One who bears the mace in His hand, hail. To the Holder of cakra in His hand, hail. To one who Sports a Lotus in His hand, hail. To Nīlakaṇṭha smeared [with ashes], hail. To the mighty Śaṃkara hail.

5. Adoration to the Triple Gem. Adoration to the noble Avalokiteśvara bodhisattva, hail.

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Chih-T'ung's Version

Now we shall take up Rol-paḥi-rdo-rje's reconstruction (STP. 5. 1290-6. 1304) of the Nīlakaṇṭhaka as transcribed by Chih-t'ung during A.D. 627-649(Nj. 318, T. 1057b). This version is different and longer than that of Amoghavajra. The words *ehi hare* (*hare* is the vocative of Hari) and *ehi hara* are of crucial importance, as they are certain indications that the Potala image was a syncretic icon of Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva). Hari-hara Lokeśvara is one of the 108 forms of Avalokiteśvara in the Macchandar Vahal at Kathmandu in Nepal (Bhattacharyya 1958: 429 no. 84). The following characteristics allude to Hari: *padma-hasta*, *vajra-hasta*, *cakrāyudhadhara*, *śaṅkha-śabdanirghoṣaṇa*. These are the attributes held in the four hands of Viṣṇu, except *vajra* which replaces *gadā*. He has the faces of two incarnations of Viṣṇu: *Varāha-mukha*, *MahāVarāha-mukha*, *Narasiṃha-mukha*, *MahāNarasiṃha-mukha*. He has the prowess of Nārāyaṇa (*Nārāyaṇa-bala-rūpa*). He is Hara-Hari (*Hara-hare*, vocative) and Mahāpadmanābha which is an epithet of Viṣṇu and also one of his 24 aspects (*caturviṃśati-mūrti*, Liebert 1976: 204). He is standing on a lotus (*padma-sthita*).

The very title of the dhāraṇī refers to Nīlakaṇṭha, which is an epithet of Śiva. He is invoked as Hara (*ehi Hara*). His diadem is his black matted locks (*kṛṣṇa-jaṭā-mukuṭa*). He is dark blue in complexion (*kṛṣṇa-varṇa*). He is the Immutable Lord (*niścareśvara* = *Sthāṇu* or *Sthāṇvīśvara*, an epithet of Śiva). He wears a

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black serpent as the sacred thread (*kṛṣṇa-sarpa-kṛta-yajñopavīta*). He is the Destroyer of the three cities (*Tripuradahana*, an epithet of the violent manifestation of Śiva, Liebert 1976: 304). He holds the dreadful poison (*viṣadhara*) that he swallowed on its emergence from the churning of the ocean of milk, that threatened the world with destruction (*mahā-halāhala-viṣa*) and in consequence destroys the sinister poisons of passion (*rāga*), envy (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*). The *mahāṭṭahāsya* of the dhāraṇī refers to the fury of His laughter, which is unique to Him. Siddha-yogīśvara is again an epithet of Śiva.

The full text of Chih-t'ung reads:

नमो रत्नत्रयाय ।

नम आर्यावलोकितेश्वराय बोधिसत्त्वाय महासत्त्वाय महाकारुणिकाय ।

तद्यथा——

ॐ सर्व-बन्धन-च्छेदनकराय सर्व-भव-समुद्रोच्छोषणकराय सर्व-व्याधि-प्रशमनकराय सर्व-ईत्युपद्र[व]-विनाशनकराय सर्व-भयोत्तारणकराय तस्य नमस्कृत्वा इदों आर्यावलोकितेश्वराय तव नीलकण्ठ नाम वरम् ।

हृदयं वर्तयिष्यामि सर्वार्थ-साधनं शुभम् ।
अजेयं सर्व-भूतानां भव-मार्ग-विशोधकम् ।।

तद्यथा——

आलोकाधिपति लोकातिक्रान्त एहि(*xyl.* °क्रान्ते रा) हरे महाबोधिसत्त्व, हे महाबोधिसत्त्व, हे प्रिय बोधिसत्त्व, हे कारुणिक,

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स्मर हृदयम् । एहि हर आर्यावलोकितेश्वराय । परम-मैत्री-चित्त कारुणिक कुरु कुरु कर्म । साधय साधय विद्याम् । देहि देहि मे पअरम् । गमंगम विहंगम सिद्ध-योगीश्वर । धुरु धुरु । विजयन्ति महाविजयन्ति । धर धर धारणीन्द्रेश्वर (*xyl.* धरेनद्रिश्वर) । चल चल विमलमूर्त्ते आर्यावलोकितेश्वर जिन कृष्ण-जटा-मुकुट ए (*xyl.* °मुकुटे) । अलंकृतशरीर लम्ब प्रलम्ब विलम्ब महासिद्ध विद्याधर । बल बल महाबल । मल्ल (*xyl.* मल) मल्लमल्ल (*xyl.* मलमल) महामल्ल (*xyl.* °मल) । चल चल महाचल । कृष्ण-वर्ण कृष्ण-यक्ष कृष्ण-पाश । निर्गच्छन । हे पद्महस्त । चर चर निश्चरेश्वर । कृष्ण-स[र्प]-कृत-यज्ञोपवीत एहि हे । महा-वराहमुख त्रिपुर-दहनेश्वर नारायण-बल-रू[प] विषधर ए (*xyl.* °धरि) । हे नीलकण्ठ एह्येहि महा-हलाहल-विष-निर्जित लोकस्य राग - विष - विनाशन द्वेष - विष - विनाशन मोह - विष - विनाशन निमोक्षन हुलु हुलु । राहुला राहुला । हर-हरे (*xyl.* हलाहरे) महापद्मनाभ । सर सर सिरि सिरि सुरु सुरु । बुद्धय बुद्धय बोधय बोधय । बोधयामि ते नीलकण्ठ । एह्येहि पद्म-स्थित (*xyl.* पामं°) नरसिंहमुख (*xyl.* मचा°) । हसा हस । मुञ्च मुञ्च महाट्टहास्यम् । एह्येहि भो भो महासिद्धयोगीश्वर । भण भण वाच । साधय साधय सविद्यान् । स्मर स्मर तान् । भगवन्त लोक[ो]पलोका तान् तथागतानाम् । ददाहि मे दर्शनकामस[य] दर्शनम् । प्रहरायमाण स्वाहा । सिद्धाय स्वाहा । सिद्धयोगीश्वराय स्वाहा । नीलकण्ठाय स्वाहा । वराहमुखाय स्वाहा । महावरा-[ह]मुखाय स्वाहा । नरसिंहमुखाय स्वाहा । महानरसिंहमुखाय स्वाहा । वज्रहस्ताय स्वाहा । महावज्रहस्ताय स्वाहा । सिद्ध-

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विद्याधराय स्वाहा। महासिद्ध-विद्याधराय स्वाहा। पद्महस्ताय स्वाहा। महापद्महस्ताय स्वाहा। कृष्ण-सर्प-कृत-यज्ञोपवीताय स्वाहा। महामणि(*xyl.*°माल)मुकुटधराय स्वाहा। चक्रायुध-[ध]राय स्वाहा। शङ्खशब्द-निबोधनाय स्वाहा। वाम-[स]कन्ध-देश-स्थितकृष्णाजिनाय स्वाहा। वाम-हस्त-व्याघ्र-चर्म-निवासनाय स्वाहा। लोकेश्वराय स्वाहा। महालोकेश्वराय स्वाहा। सर्व-सिद्धेश्वराय स्वाहा। रक्ष रक्ष मां स्वाहा।

नमो भगवते आर्यावलोकितेश्वराय बोधिसत्त्वाय महा-सत्त्वाय महाकारुणिकाय। सिध्यन्तु मे मन्त्रपदानि स्वाहा।

CONCLUSIONS

1. Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara and Potalaka Avaloki-teśvara are both an epiphany of Hari-Hara. In all probability the two are identical.

2. The epithet *Ālokātikrānta* 'He who transcends Effulgence' supports the hypothesis that Nīlakaṇṭha is the Lokeśvara at Potalaka. Potalaka is rendered into Chinese by Buddhabhadra as "Brilliance" (*āloka*).

3. Nīlakaṇṭha Lokeśvara has the attributes of Śiva and at the end of the dhāraṇī he is lauded as one who holds the four implements carried by Viṣṇu in his four hands: *śaṅkha*, *cakra*, *gadā* and *padma*. It reminds one of the syncretism of Hari-Hara images.

4. The Dalai Lamas, the Rulers of Tibet, are reincarnations of the Avalokiteśvara who resides on the Potala. The palace of the Dalai Lamas at Lhasa is in fact designated Potala. The aspect of Avalokiteśvara

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as the Sovereign Head of State, stems from Viṣṇu. A King on earth is an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

5. The image at Potalaka symbolized the syncretism of Śiva and Viṣṇu, and in its later development when Buddhism became dominant it became Avalokiteśvara. An important fact for the convergence of Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism and Buddhism. A spot once sanctified remained sacrosanct, while externals underwent change.

6. The text of the dhāraṇī in Chih-t'ung's version is longer and has crucial details: *kṛṣṇa-sarpa-kṛta-yajñopavītāya svāhā/. . . vāma-skandha-deśa-sthita-kṛṣṇājināya svāhā/* (STP. 6. 1302-3). So also other versions preserve variations of consequence. A detailed study of all the Chinese translations of the dhāraṇī along with their descriptive text in Chinese giving directions for its use, is essential to trace the impregnation of Buddhism by Śaiva/Vaiṣṇava elements and the emergence of syncretic trends in the Tantra-s. The dates of the Chinese translations can help to define the chronology of philosophical development in India.

7. Nīlakandi in Amoghavajra's version is an Uigur form, which he must have employed by force of habit. This tiny but subtle and crucial nuance is decisive in confirming the view that he hailed from Samarkand.

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
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此是喚摩醯首羅天




俱嚧俱嚧羯蒙二十五

AMOGHAVAJRA'S TRANSLITERATION
from the Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka
(it excludes the Chinese text)


No. 1113 B (cf. Nos. 1111-1113A)

大慈大悲救苦觀㊁世音自在王
菩薩廣大圓滿無礙自在青頸
大悲心㊁陀羅尼


大廣智不空譯




南無喝羅怛那哆羅夜耶一




南無阿唎耶二



是如意輪菩薩本身到此誦在心




婆盧羯帝爍鉢囉耶三




菩提薩哆婆耶四

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
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




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
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




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
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阿羅參 佛羅 舍利三十六
訶沙訶參 佛羅舍耶三十七
呼嘘呼嘘麼 囉三十八
呼嘘 酤唎三十九同上
沙囉 沙囉四十
悉唎 悉唎四十一 蘇嘘 蘇嘘四十二
菩提唧 菩提唧四十三


菩提 耶 菩提耶四十四
彌 帝唎 耶四十五
那囉謹 墀四十六
他唎瑟尼 那波夜摩 那四十七
娑婆 訶四十八同上 悉陀夜四十九
娑婆 訶五十法語 摩訶悉陀夜 娑婆訶
悉陀 喻 藝五十二

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室睹伽羅耶娑婆訶五十三
那囉謹墀五十五同上娑婆訶五十六摩囉那囉五十七
娑婆訶五十八同上悉囉僧阿穆佉耶五十九
娑婆訶六十同上婆摩訶悉陀夜六十一同上
娑婆訶六十二同上者吉囉阿悉陀夜六十三
娑婆訶六十四同上
婆摩羯悉哆夜六十五
娑婆訶六十六同上
那羅謹墀睹迦羅夜六十七同上娑婆訶
摩婆唎勝羯夜六十九同上娑婆訶六十八同上
南無喝囉怛那多囉夜耶七十一
南無阿唎耶七十二婆嚕吉帝七十三燥睹囉耶七十四菩提娑婆呵
青頸觀音陀羅尼一卷
青頸大悲心印

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KATSUHIKO KAMIMURA

BHAṬṬA NARASIṂHA'S SARASVATĪKAṆṬHĀBHARAṆA-VYĀKHYĀ (PARICCHEDA III-1)

I HAVE already published the first Pariccheda of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa-Vyākhyā* (*Buddhist Studies*, Vol. **5**, Kamoe, Hamamatsu, 1976) and the first part of the second Pariccheda (**2**-1, *Studies in Buddhist Thought*, Osaka, 1976; **2**-2 & 3, *Journal of Indian Buddhist Studies*, Vol. **24**, No. 1, 1975; Vol. **25**, No. 1, 1976). This time I shall edit the third Pariccheda, in which Narasiṃha discusses Bhoja's conception of arthālaṃkāra. Principal Abbreviations—**A.B.**: Anundoram Barooah's ed. of the *S.K.Ā.*; **K.M.**: Ed. of the *S.K.Ā. Vyākhyā* in the Kāvyamālā, No. 94; **M**: Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library Transcript of the *S.K.Ā. Vyākhyā* (R. 2499); **T**: Kerala University MSS. Library Transcript of the *S.K.Ā. Vyākhyā* (T. 291). For other abbreviations and information, see my previous editions of the *S.K.Ā. Vyākhyā*.

TEXT

atha tṛtīyo'dhyāyaḥ.

(**3.1**) evaṃ bāhyālaṃkārān uktvā ye punar āntarāḥ[1] kāvyaśarīrasya kāminīśarīrasyeva kalābhiyogādayas

[1] **M** āntarā-; **T** āntaraḥ.

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tān[1] darśayati—alam iti. vyutpattiḥ[2] prakṛtipratyayādīnām arthaviśeṣajñānam. ādiśabdena vākyārthaviśeṣa[3]padārthasvabhāvatatsāmyavirodhaprabhṛtīnāṃ grahaṇam.[4] tatra prakṛtipratyayārthaviśeṣajñānaṃ hetvalaṃkārādiṣu. vākyārthajñānaṃ vibhāvanādiṣu. svabhāvajñānaṃ jātau. anyat sāmānya[5]virodhādiṣu. evam anyatrāpy ūhanīyam.

(3.4) svebhyaḥ[6]: svebhyo nisargebhyaḥ svasvakāraṇaśaktibhyaḥ naisargikaṃ rūpaṃ jātir ity arthaḥ.

(3.5) nanu vastuno naisargikaṃ rūpaṃ yady arthālaṃkāro jātiḥ, tarhi tat kathaṃ[7] vastuno'nupahita[8]rūpakathanātmano'rthavyaktiguṇān na bhidyate. tatrāha —arthavyakter iti.

(3.6) tadbhedahetavaḥ: tasyā[9] jāter bhedahetavaḥ. (v. 2) viśliṣṭeti:[10] viśliṣṭatvād yāḥ spaṣṭadṛṣṭās[11] tāś ca unnamanavaśena viralatvād valīnāṃ vyaktaṃ gauram[12] antarālaṃ yāsāṃ tāś ca viśliṣṭa[13]spaṣṭadṛṣṭonnata[14]-viralavalivyaktagaurāntarālāḥ, kramavaśavikasatkañ-

[1] **T** tāṃ.
[2] **M** vyutpattiṃ.
[3] **T** - viśeṣaḥ.
[4] **M** omits *grahaṇam*.
[5] **T** sāmya-.
[6] **M** svabhyaḥ.
[7] **M** taṃ kathanaṃ.
[8] **M** vastuno'pi hi tad-.
[9] **T** tasyāj.
[10] **M** viśliṣṭayati; **T** viśiṣṭeti.
[11] **M** viśliṣṭatvād yāḥ dṛṣṭās; **T** viśliṣṭatvād yāḥ spaṣṭadṛṣṭās.
[12] **M** ganaram.
[13] **M,T** viśliṣṭā.
[14] **M** -dṛṣṭonnati-; **T** -dṛṣṭānnati-.

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cukaprāntamuktāḥ pūrvaṃ parasparagranthitābhyāṃ saṃprati kramaṇasya vijṛmbhaṇasya vaśena vikasadbhyāṃ kañcukaprāntābhyāṃ muktāḥ. (v. 3) chaṇapiṭṭheti:[1] kṣaṇa utsavaḥ, tad anena[2] piṣṭena[3] dhūsarastani[4] madhumadatāmrākṣi kuvalayābharaṇe karṇakṛta[5]cūtamañjari putri[6], tvayā maṇḍito grāmaḥ. (v. 4) āpātyāḥ āpatantaḥ.[7] plutakṛtasvaraṃ plutasvaro yathā kṛto bhavati tathā. (v. 5) sahiāhi:[8] navanakhapadāni[9] nirdiśya tvatstane kusumāpacayasamaye[10] kusumbhapuṣpaṃ lagnam iti sakhībhir bhaṇyamānā mugdhavadhūs[11] tatheti taṃ prasphoṭayantī tābhir hāsyata iti. (v. 6) kālayati cālayati. kala calane. (v. 7) līḍhavyasteti:[12] yasmin parvate kuñjeṣu[13] sadyo vibhinnadvipaḥ, tadānīṃ madagandhavāsitasaṭaḥ[14], ata eva tasmin[15] lolupā madhupāḥ yena sāvajñatiryagvalatsṛkkāntāhatibhir

[1] **M** yan na viṃśati.
[2] **T** tadarthena.
[3] **M** niṣṭena.
[4] **M** susarastani; **T** dhūsarastanī.
[5] **M** karṇakṛtaḥ.
[6] **T** putrī.
[7] **M** āpatyāḥ āpatantaḥ; **T** āpātyāḥ āpātantaḥ. Cf. Mallinātha's comm. on *Śiśupālavadha*, V. 15; āpatantīty āpātyāḥ svayam ākramitum āgacchantaḥ ....
[8] **M** sahi abhi-.
[9] **T** navanakhāni.
[10] **T** kusumāpacaye.
[11] **T** mugshas.
[12] **M,T** ḍhavyasreti.
[13] **M** kukuja iṣu; **T** kukuñci.
[14] **T** -vīsanī takataḥ. *-saṭaḥ* is the same reading as **A.B.** (**K.M.:** *-vaṭaḥ*).
[15] **T** ata evāsmin.

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dhūtāḥ[1], sa sāvajñatiryagvalatsṛkkāntāhatidhūtalolamadhupaḥ[2], evaṃbhūto hariḥ; yayor līḍhatvād vyastāni[3], ata eva vipāṇḍurāṇy[4] agranakhāni nakhāgrāṇi, tayor agrimayoḥ pūrvayoś caraṇayor yuge[5] mukhaṃ vinyasya, ākarṇadīrṇaṃ dāritaṃ mukhaṃ[6] vinyasya śeta iti. (v. 10) gojāvikaṃ[7] gāvaś[8] cājāś cāvayaś[9] ca. cullī pākasthānam. (v. 12) upanihiteti: dvāropāntanihitasya halasyeṣādaṇḍena[10] sārgaladvāram.[11] praveśanavyagreṇokṣapālena yathā tadīṣayā[12] sārgalaṃ bhavaty agāradvāraṃ[13] tathopāntanihito[14] hala ity arthaḥ. ārāt paricakita[15]puraṃdhrīsāritābhyarṇabhāṇḍaṃ dūrād[16] eva paricakitābhiḥ puraṃdhrībhiḥ pāmarībhir apasāritābhyarṇavartibhāṇḍam.[17] (Prose after v. 12) karmakartṛsādhanayor iti

[1] **M** sāvajratiryacaratsṛkvāntāvitibhiddhṛtāṃ; **T** sāvajñātiyagvalasṛkvāntāhatibhir dhutāḥ.

[2] **M** sa sāvajñatiryavarakvasṛkvāntvāhakridhūrtalolamadhupaḥ; **T** sa sāvajñatiryagvalatsṛkvāntāharidhūtalolamadhupāḥ.

[3] **M** yayor llīḍhato'py astrāṇi; **T** yayollīḍhatvād vayatrāṇi.

[4] **M** picaṇḍarāṇy.

[5] **M** dhvage; **T** yoge.

[6] **M** dāritaṃ; **T** dāruṇaṃ ritaṃ.

[7] **M** gojāyikaṃ.

[8] **T** goś.

[9] **T** capayaś.

[10] **M** halasyaiṣāṇḍeṇa; **T** halasyaiṣādaṇḍena.

[11] **M** sārgalaṃ dvāram.

[12] **M** diṣāyā.

[13] **T** āgāradvāraṃ.

[14] **T** tatopāntanihito.

[15] **T** āgat paricakīta-.

[16] **T** ārāt.

[17] **T** abhisāritā bhyarṇabhāṇḍaṃ.

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karmarūpam āgāraṃ[1] kartṛrūpā[2] ukṣā[3] ca praveśa-kriyāyāḥ sādhane tayoḥ.

(3.9) vibhāvanāśabdaniruktyā[4] tallakṣaṇam āha —prasiddheti. kāryasya[5] lokaprasiddhaṃ hetuṃ vyā-vartya tasya kiṃcit kāraṇāntaraṃ tajjananaṃ prati svābhāvikatvaṃ[6] vā yatra vibhāvyaṃ vyañjanīyaṃ sā vibhāvaneti.

(3.11) tāṃ prati tayānayā vā gīrbhaṅgyeti:[7] tāṃ vibhāvanāṃ prati tayā[8] vibhāvanārūpayā[9] tadanyayā avibhāvanārūpayā vā vacanavyaktyeti(?)[10]. (v. 13) kṣībatvādeḥ kāryasya. (v. 17) vaktreti:[10] tasyā[11] vaktraṃ vapuś ca na me prasiddhena kāraṇena ripuḥ kiṃ tu viraheṇa[12], na[13] ca prasiddhena nimittena suhṛt kiṃ tu samāgamenety[14] anayoḥ kāraṇāntaravibhāvanayoḥ; na tatsurabhidravyasaṃkrāntyā surabhiḥ[15] kiṃ tu svabhā-vataḥ[16], na taddravyajenābharaṇādinā[17] sundaraṃ

[1] **M** karmarūpa āhāraṃ; **T** karmarūpābhahāraṃ.
[2] **M,T** kartṛrūpam.
[3] **M** utkarṣā.
[4] **M** vibhāvanāśabdaśaktyoḥ.
[5] **M** krauryasya.
[6] **T** svabhāvikatvaṃ.
[7] **M** vāgibhaṅgeti.
[8] **M** prakṛtayā.
[9] **M** nativācanavyakteti; **T** tadanyayā apibhāvanārūpayā vā vacanavyakteti.
[10] **M,T** atreti.
[11] **M,T** tasya.
[12] **T** viharaṇena.
[13] **M,T** omit *na*.
[14] **M** samāganety.
[15] **M** surabhīti.
[16] **M** svāhavataḥ.
[17] **M** tadvyājenābharaṇādinā.

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kiṃ tu svabhāvata[1] ity ābhyāṃ svābhāvikatvavibhāvanābhyāṃ vaktragato vapurgataś ca viśeṣo yathākramam[2] uktaḥ. athavā kramaṃ[3] ca svabhāvata[4] ity asyāṃ svābhāvikatvavibhāvanāyāṃ. . . . (v. 18) darīgṛhotsaṅganiṣaktabhāsa ityādibhir avibhāvanārūpair eva śeṣa [padārthair viśeṣa] oṣadhigataḥ kaścid ukta iti.

(3.12) kriyāyāḥ kāraṇam iti: kriyotpādako hetuḥ. sa ca niṣpattikriyotpādakaḥ kārakaḥ[5], jñaptikriyotpādako jñāpakaḥ, niṣedhātmako'bhāvaḥ, prasiddhahetumaryādātipāti[6] citra iti.

(3.13) teṣu[7] kārakahetuṃ kriyābhedād bhinatti[8] —yaḥ pravṛttim iti. utpattiḥ pravṛttiḥ,[9] tadabhāvo nivṛttiḥ, utpattyādinirvāhakas tatsamarthācaraṇalakṣaṇo[10] vyāpāraḥ prayuktir[11] iti. tam imaṃ trividham api hetum āviṣṭakriyatvānāviṣṭakriyatvābhyāṃ punar bhinatti—antarāviśann udāsīno'pi veti. (Prose after v.19) prītyutpādana[12] kriyāsamāveśād iti: āndolita-

[1] **T** omits *svabhāvata*.
[2] **M** ayathākramaḥ.
[3] **M** omits *uktaḥ athavā kramam*.
[4] **T** svabhāva.
[5] **T** -kāḥ kārakāḥ.
[6] **M** -medhyātipāti.
[7] **T** keṣu.
[8] **M** kriyābhedābhinnakri.
[9] **M** utpattipravṛttiḥ; **T** utpattivipattiḥ.
[10] **T** tatsamārthāccaralakṣīṇo.
[11] **M** prakṛtir; **T** prayuktar.
[12] **M** pratyutpādana-.

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[1]prauḍhacandanadrumapallava ity anena mārutasya prītyutpādanakriyāyāṃ samāveśo darśitaḥ. (Prose after v. 20) atra prabhāva iti: suradrumāspada[2]jananakriyāyāṃ[3] tadaupāyikavyāpāre[4] prabhāvo na niviśate.[5] ata eva prabhāveneti hetau tṛtīyā na kartari. kartari ced āviṣṭakriyatvaṃ[6] syād iti. (v. 21) pathikapramāthas[7] tajjīvitanivartanaṃ[8] tatrāviṣṭatvaṃ pavanasya candanāraṇyā[9]dhūnanamalayanirjharasparśaḥ. (Prose after v. 22) tṛtīyārthe[10] hetau 'vibhāṣā guṇe striyāṃ' (*Pāṇ.* 2. 3.25) iti vaikalpikī pañcamī vihitā, tāṃ prayojayati. bāṣpas tv āviṣṭo'pi[11] dānakriyāyāṃ darśānakriyāyāṃ nāviṣṭaḥ(?)[12]. tasyā darśanakriyāyāḥ karmakārakatayā saṃbandhād apradhānabhāveneti. (Prose after v. 23) balapratyujjīvanādikaṃ prati nimittatvena yo'dhikaraṇabhāvas teneti. atra prayuktyaupayikaṃ[13] tatsamarthācaraṇaṃ[14] hanūmato[15] jīvanādikam iti. (Prose after v. 24) ātmany eveti: mānābhyāsasya prakāro

[1] **M** āndolitā-; **T** andolitā-.
[2] **M,T** -āspanda-.
[3] **M** -kriyāyāḥ.
[4] **M** skandena vaikalyāvāre.
[5] **T** prabhāvena niviśate.
[6] **M** āviṣṭakriyātvaṃ.
[7] **M,T** pathakapramādas.
[8] **M** -nivartinaṃ.
[9] **T** cananāraṇyād.
[10] **T** tṛtīye tṛtīyārthe.
[11] **M** bāṣpatv āviṣṭo'pi; **T** bāṣpatvaviṣṭo'pi.
[12] **M,T** tān tu sa.
[13] **M** pravṛtyaupayikaṃ.
[14] **T** tatsamarthyācaraṇāṃ.
[15] **M** hastamato.

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bhrūbhaṅgajihmākṣiprekṣaṇādiḥ,[1] sa ca tadātmaiva na ca svātmani yasya niveśaḥ. sa ca mānābhyāsa[2] īdṛśaprekṣaṇāder uddeśyatāyā[3] hetuḥ prayojakaḥ. tatsaṃpattyarthaṃ[4] hi sā sakhīm itthaṃ[5] prekṣate. kutas tasya hetutvam atrābhihitam[6] iti cet, tatrāha—iti śabdābhidheya iti.

(3.14) nanu na[7] kācid vibhaktir[8] jñāpakahetum ācakṣāṇā[9] śāstre dṛṣṭā, kathaṃ[10] jñāpakahetur uddiṣṭa iti śaṅkāṃ śamayann āha—dvitīyā ca tṛtīyā ceti. lakṣaṇaṃ tāvad dvitīyādir[11] ācaṣṭe jñāpakaś ca sa evety arthaḥ. atra pūrvavan[12] na dvaividhyaṃ kiṃ tv anāviṣṭatvam evety uktaṃ[13]—kriyānāviṣṭam ācaṣṭa[14] iti. (v. 25) praṇayāgradūtyaḥ snehasya prathamadūtyaḥ. (Prose after v. 25) so'yam iti: indumatyākhyo lakṣaṇahetuḥ[15] 'lakṣaṇetthaṃbhūtākhyānabhāgavīpsāsu pratiparyanavaḥ' (*Pāṇ.* 1. 4. 90) ity evaṃ vihita[tām] 'karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyā' (*Pāṇ.* 2. 3. 8) iti

[1] **M,T** -jihvākṣiprekṣaṇādiḥ.
[2] **T** samānābhyāsa.
[3] **T** uddeśyatayā.
[4] **M** tattsampattyarthaṃ; **T** tat saṃpaty-(paraṃ)rthaṃ.
[5] **M** ity arthaḥ.
[6] **M** atrābhinitam.
[7] **T** omits *na*.
[8] **M** vibhakti-; **T** vibhaktika-.
[9] **T** ācakṣaṇā.
[10] **T** taṃ kathaṃ.
[11] **T** tāvadvitīyādir.
[12] **M** pūrvam.
[13] **M** uktam iti.
[14] **M** ācakarṣa.
[15] **T** omits *lakṣaṇahetuḥ*.

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vihitāṃ dvitīyāṃ[1] svasminn utpādayati. yathā 'vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyud '[2] ity atra vṛkṣa iti. (Prose after v. 26) kaṇṭhekāla ityādīni:[3] kaṇṭhekālatvasya jaṭādivallakṣaṇatve'py[4] asminn aluksamāse bahuvrīhāv anyapadārthaṃ[5] prati guṇabhūtatvāt tadvācini tṛtīyā tatra notpadyate.[6] yathā kamaṇḍalupāṇicchātra[7](?) ity atra lakṣaṇatve'pīti. (Prose after v. 27) tejasā ravir ity atrāpi[8] tejas tejasvino'ṅgam iti. vikṛto'ṅgas(?)[9] tasyāsty[10] evāṅgino vikṛtaṃ prati lakṣaṇabhāvaḥ. tato yenāṅgavikārair[11] iti tṛtīyā bhavaty eveti[12]. (v. 28) gonāsāya maṇḍalākhyasarpāya[13] niyojitāgadarajāḥ[14], niyojitam agadakāraṇaṃ rajo yasyāḥ sā prītā[15] bhītā ca. bhartṛsannidhau prītā[16] gonāsādidarśanād bhītā ca. (Prose after v. 28) gauryā vivāhamaṅgalānaucityeneti: prakṛter anyatvam

[1] **T** vihitā dvitīyāyāṃ.
[2] *Kāśika* on *Pāṇ.* **1**. 4. 90.
[3] **M** ity ādini.
[4] **M** jaṭhādivallakṣaṇatve'pi; **T** jaṭādilakṣaṇatvenāpi.
[5] **M** anyatvapadāntāḥ; **T** iti vanyapadārthaṃ.
[6] **T** tatrotpadyate.
[7] **M** kamaṇḍaluvān icchati.
[8] **M** atrāha.
[9] **M,T** vikṛtasya.
[10] **M** tasyāstv.
[11] **M,T** yenāṅgavikāra.
[12] **T** eti.
[13] **M** niyojitā gāvo (. . . .) vivāhamukhasya prakṛtiḥ.
[14] **T** niyojāgadarajāḥ.
[15] **T** hrītā.
[16] **T** hrītā.

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utpātaḥ(?)[1] ucitacandanādyanulepo vivāhamaṅgalasya prakṛtiḥ.[2] anucitas tv agadarajoniyogādir vikṛtiḥ, tata utpātaḥ, tenotpātenāśubharūpāḥ pariṇetṛgatāḥ gonāsādayo jñāpyante[3], yato'gadarajoniyogādayas tan nūnam atra gonāsādayaḥ[4] santīti. yathā 'vātāya kapilā vidyud'[5] ity atra vikṛtavidyutā [vāto] jñāpyata iti. nanv atra lakṣaṇavācī vidyul lakṣya[6]vācinaś caturthī tat katham asyā iti tatrāha—tataś ceti. yato jñāpyajñāpakabhāvaḥ siddhaḥ, tataś ca 'utpātena jñāpyamāne caturthī vaktavyā'[7] iti *Vārttika*vihitaṃ jñāpyajñāpakabhāvaṃ saṃbandham upādhīkṛtya pravṛttā caturthī saṃbandhasyobhaya[8]niṣṭhatvena lakṣyagatatve'pi tallābhāt tatraiva bhavati. yathā tādarthye caturthī yūpādāv eva[9] na tadarthī dārvādyaḥ[10]. nanu[11] saṃbandhadyotanaṃ[12] cec caturthī, sā lakṣaṇavācina eva kiṃ na bhavati. tatrāha—na[13]lakṣaṇavācina iti. hetum āha—tṛtīyeti. 'itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇe'

[1] **T** utpādayataḥ.
[2] **M.** niyojitā gāvo (. . . .) vivāhamukhasya prakṛtiḥ.
[3] **T** jñāpyata.
[4] **M** tat sūcanamātragonasādayaḥ.
[5] *M. Bh.* on *Pāṇ.* **2.** 3.13.
[6] **M,T** lakṣaṇa-.
[7] *Vārt.* on *Pāṇ.* **2**.3.13.
[8] **T** saṃbandhatvenobhaya-.
[9] **M** apādānād eva; **T** yūpādāv epa.
[10] **M** tadartho dārvidyo. Cf. *Vārt.* & *M.Bh.* on *Pāṇ.* **2**.3.13. caturthī vidhāne tādarthya upasaṃkhyānam; yūpāya dāru, etc.
[11] **M** na.
[12] **T** saṃbandhanadyotanaṃ.
[13] **T** omits *na*.

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(*Pāṇ.* 2. 3. 21) ity evaṃ saṃbandhopādhau lakṣaṇam evopādāya tṛtīyā vihitā. ato[1] balavatyā tayāpahṛta-viṣayatvān na lakṣaṇavācinaś caturthī bhavitavyam iti. tarhi[2] lakṣyavācinaś caturthī bhavatu, lakṣaṇa-vācinas tṛtīyāpi[3] bhavatu. tatrāha—ekayaiveti. saṃ-bandhoktir hi[4] vibhakteḥ phalam. ekayaiva ca[5] tayo-bhayaniṣṭhe'pi tasmin sūcyamāne[6] tadarthena kiṃ vibhaktyantareṇa[7]. yathā 'rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ'[8] ity atrobhayagate'pi svasvāmisaṃbandhe rājagatayā[9] ṣaṣṭhyaivokte sati puruṣe tadarthaṃ na vibhakty-antaram[10] utpadyata iti. (v. 29) iti śāsatīti: anekadhā gacchatas tān gaṇān senānyām evaṃ[11] śāsati sati, tān niṣidhya kiṃcid dhasatā'ndhakāriṇā[12] tatra tastha[13] iti. (Prose after v. 29) 'prakāśa-nastheyākhyayoś ca' (*Pāṇ.* 1. 3. 23) ity ātmanepadavi-dhānād ātmanāṃ prakāśitavān ity arthaḥ. atrāndha-kāreḥ svaprakāśanaṃ[14] kadeti bubhutsayā, 'yasya ca

[1] **T** omits *ato*.
[2] **M** omits *tarhi*.
[3] **M** lakṣaṇāvacanīyāpi.
[4] **M** iti hi.
[5] **M** ekayeva ca; **T** eka eva.
[6] **T** tasminn ucyamāne.
[7] **T** vibhaktyāntareṇa.
[8] *Kāśika* on *Pāṇ.* II.3.50.
[9] **M** *rājagatā-*; **T** *rājagatāyā*.
[10] **T** vibhaktyāntaram.
[11] **M** eva.
[12] **M** dhasatāhāsakāriṇā; **T** bhāsatāndhakāriṇā.
[13] **M** tatrastha; **T** tatstha.
[14] **M** atrāsakāre sveprakāśanaṃ.

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bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam' (*Pāṇ.* 2. 3. 37) ity evaṃ[1] siddhayā śāsatīti[2] saptamyā gaṇānuśāsanakāla[3] iti jñāpyate.[4] yathā godohanagamanam iti.[5] upalakṣaṇam caitad iti[4]: dvitīyā ca tṛtīyā cety[6] anuktānām apy upalakṣaṇam. ato 'lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ' (*Pāṇ.* 3. 2. 126) ityādivihitaśāstrādy[7] abhidheyaṃ bhāvalakṣaṇam apy anena saṃgṛhītam,[8] yathātraivodāharaṇe śatṛpratyayapratipādita[9]lakṣaṇabhāvena[10] hāsenāndhakāreḥ[11] svaprakāśanaṃ lakṣyate—hasatā tastha iti. 'tiṣṭhānto'nuśāsati gaṇakāḥ'[12] ity atra sthityānuśāsanavad iti. (Prose after v. 30) anādarādhika iti:[13] bhāvalakṣaṇamātre saptamī bhavati[14]. [15]tasmin miṣato'smān anādṛtyācchinattīty evam anādarādhike sāpi bhavati,[15] ṣaṣṭhy api[16] bhavati[17]. yathā 'vikrośatāṃ janānāṃ[18] gataḥ sa coraḥ', 'vikrośatsu janeṣu[19] gataḥ sa coraḥ' iti.

[1] **M** eva tvam. [2] **M** śāsasīti.
[3] **M** gaṇanāśāsanakāla. [4] Omitted in **T**.
[5] Cf. *Kāśikā* on *Pāṇ.* 2.3.37; goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ.
[6] **M** vety. [7] **T** -rātrādy-.
[8] **T** saṃgrahītam. [9] **T** śatṛpradipādita-.
[10] **M** -bhāgena. [11] **M** haṃsenāndhakāre.
[12] *Kāśikā* on *Pāṇ.* 3.2.126.
[13] **K.M., A.B.:** anādaropādhike. But see *Kāśikā* on *Pāṇ.* 2.3.38: anādarādhike bhāvalakṣaṇe bhāvavataḥ ṣaṣṭhīsaptamyau vibhaktī bhavataḥ.
[14] Cf. *Pāṇ.* 2.3.37.
[15] Omitted in **M**.
[16] **T** ṣaṣṭhyāpi.
[17] Cf. *Pāṇ.* 2.3.38.
[18] **M** 'pi krośatārjanāṃ.
[19] **M** vikrośatsu janatana; **T** vikrośātsvajaneṣu.

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(3.15) abhāvaḥ prāgabhāvād iti: abhāvaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, itaretarābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāva ity evam upādhibhedena nirūpyamāṇo bhavati caturvidhaḥ. tannirūpaṇaṃ cottarakālamātrasaṃsargipratiyogikaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ. pūrvakālamātrasaṃsargipratiyogikaḥ pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ. tādātmyapratiyogī itaretarābhāvaḥ. atyantāsaṃsargipratiyogiko'tyantābhāvaḥ. yadā tu ghaṭapaṭādinā pratiyogimātreṇa nirūpyate tadā tasyāsaṃkhyatvād asyāpy asaṃkhyatvam eveti. (Prose after v. 35) atra vastuna utpāda iti: udyānasahakāra mañjaryutpattir yadā vidhimukhena nirūpyate tadānīm abhāva iti, yadā tūdbhedaprāgabhāvo nāstīti prāgabhāvaniṣedhamukhena nirūpyate tadā tadabhāva iti vyapadiśyate; evam uttaratrāpīti. (Prose after v. 36) atra yathokteneti: upaghātasya pradhvaṃsasya hetau gāḍhāliṅgane saty api lakṣmīvapurgatayoḥ śroṇibhārastanayoḥ pīnatvabhṛśoccatvān nābhimadhyayor gabhīratvakṛśatvābhyām

[1] T -saṃsargika-.
[2] M -saṃyogi-.
[3] T -pratiyogika.
[4] T pratiyoga-.
[5] M saṃkhyatvāt.
[6] M atra vastuna iti yadā.
[7] M udyānasakhī-.
[8] T tadā tadabhāva iti (vyapadiśyate).
[9] M bhedaprāgabhāvo.
[10] T tadābhāva.
[11] M atha yathokteneti; T atha yathokteneti atra yathoktene (yoḥ pīnatvaṃ) iti.
[12] M gabhīratvākṛśatvābhyāṃ; T gabhīrakṛśatvābhyāṃ.

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ca vidhinivāsasya harināhhikamalasya yas tadabhāvaḥ[1] sa iha kamalākhyasya vastunaḥ sthitir eva. sā ca vidhimanonivṛttihetur[2] iti. evam itaretarātyantābhāvayor apy udāhāryam.

(3. 17) nanv eteṣāṃ hetutve vāstave vidūrakāryatādi[3] vāstavaṃ syāt. tatrāha—te'mī prayogeti[4]. vidūratvasahajatvābhimatanighnatvādi[5]guṇayogān nirvoḍhavyam iti(?). (Prose before v. 42) evaṃ śabdasyeti: evaṃ śabdasya yukto na yukta ity atra prakāravācitvād anuktāpi citraprakārāḥ parigṛhyanta iti.

(3. 18) vyāhatas tu ya[6] iti: svabhāvena[7] śaktihānyā vā vyāhatakāryo'py ahetur iti.

(3. 19) [8]pṛthakpṛthagasāmarthyād iti: anyonyāsahāyānām avāntarakriyāsu sāmarthye'pi pradhānakriyāyām asāmarthyād iti. (Prose before v. 47) tayor iti: sa dvividhaḥ, tayor dvividhayor iti neyam. (v. 48) pīṇattaṇeti: [9] (chāyā) ' pīnatvadurgrāhyaṃ[10] yasya bhujāyantraniṣṭhuraparigṛhītam[11]; ariṣṭasya[12] viṣamavalitaṃ kaṇṭhaṃ duḥkhena jīvitam apakrāntam.[13] '

[1] **T** tadā vaḥ. [2] **M** -vismṛtihetur.
[3] **T** vāstave'pi dūrakāryatādi.
[4] **M** nemi prayogeti; **T** te'bhiprayogeti.
[5] vidūratvasahajatvakāryānantarajatvādi-(?) **T** -ābhimataśīghratvādi-.
[6] **M,T** vyāhataś ca sa.
[7] **T** svābhena.
[8] **M** pṛthagasāmarthyādi; **T** pṛthagasāmarthyād.
[9] The same reading as **A.B.**; cf. **K.M.:** pīṇattuṇa.
[10] **M** pīnatvadurgrahaṃ; **T** pīnatvadurgrahaṃ.
[11] The same as the chāyā in **A.B.** & R. Basak's ed. of *Rāvaṇavaha* (I.4); cf. **K.M.:** bhujayor antarniṣṭhuraparigṛhītam.
[12] The Skt. rendering in **K.M.** & **A.B.** (:riṣṭasya) is not correct. Cf. Basak's ed.: riṭṭhassa=ariṣṭasya.
[13] **K.M., A.B.:** atikrāntam; Basak: vyatikrāntam.

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(3. 21) iṅgitākāreti:[1] iṅgitaṃ bahiraṅgaceṣṭādiḥ, ākāras tv antaraṅgo[2] romāñcādiḥ, tābhyāṃ tarhi sūkṣmanāmny arthaguṇe'tra[3] vyāptiḥ. uktaṃ hi 'sūkṣmam ity ucyate tat tu yat sūkṣmārthasya darśanam.'[4] iti. tatrāha—sūkṣmaguṇāt tv[5] iti. sa tu sūkṣmaguṇād bhidyate kutaḥ? pratyakṣasūkṣmam avekṣya[6], apratyakṣo'rthaḥ sūkṣmo bhavatīti[7] yataḥ. sa tu pratyakṣaviṣayaḥ, ayaṃ tūnneyaviṣaya[8] ity arthaḥ. (v. 51) vāhitteti:[9] (chāyā) 'vyāhṛtā prativacanaṃ na dadāti ruṣyaty ekasmai;[10] vadhūḥ kāryeṇa vinā pradīpyamāne[11] nadīkacche.' saṃketasthāne nadīkacche pradahyamāne nimittād ṛte ruṣyatity arthaḥ. (v. 52) sāmāityādi:[12] (chāyā) 'śyāmāyāḥ śyāmalatayā[13] ardhākṣipralokinyā mukhaśobhā; jambūdalakarṇāvataṃse[14] bhramaṇaśīle halikaputre.'[15] saṃketagamanalāñcchanajambūdalakarṇāvataṃse[16] halikaputre bhramatīti.

(to be continued)

[1] **M** iṅginā karoti.
[2] **T** āntataṅgo.
[3] **T** antaṃ guṇeti.
[4] *S.K.A*, I. 84: saukṣmyam ity ucyate tat tu yat sūkṣmārthābhidhānam.
[5] **M,T** sūkṣmaguṇātv.
[6] **T** -sūkṣmavekṣya.
[7] **M** bhavati.
[8] **M** ayantrāṇeyaviṣaya.
[9] **M** vyāhṛteti, **T** vāhiteti.
[10] **K.M., A.B.**: ekaikasmin. R. Basak's ed. of *Gāthāsaptaśatī*, V. 17: ekkamekassa=ekaikasya.
[11] **M** pradīpyamānena.
[12] **M, T** sāmā ity ādi.
[13] **M** śyāmāyate śyāmāyā; **T** śyāmāyāte śyāmalayā. Cf. Basak (II. 8): sāmāi sāmalijjaï=śyāmāyāḥ śyāmalāyate.
[14] **M** -karṇāvataṃsaṃ; **T** -karṇāvataṃsa-.
[15] **M,T** harmyakaputra.
[16] **M** -karṇārpitaṃse.

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M. D. BALASUBRAHMANYAM

ACCENT IT-s IN THE KṚT SUFFIXES

[An attempt is made in this paper to make a brief structural study of the accent *IT*-s which Pāṇini distributes in 128 *kṛt* suffixes, enumerated in the Third Book (Adhyāya) of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.]

1.1 The significant indicatory symbol or exponent may, structurally speaking, be designated an *IT*[1] (or *anubandha*) in Pāṇini's system. Pāṇini (=P) teaches the scope of application of exponents in the metarules

[1] For clarity I have inserted the exponents *C*, *N* and other *IT*-s in Capitals. I render the term *IT* by 'exponent' in this paper. RENOU [(*Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit*: 93, Paris, 1952)] and ROSANE ROCHER, [(Review of R. BIRWE's *Studien zu Adhyāya* III *der Aṣṭādhyāyī Pāṇinis* (1966) in *JAOS* 87: 582-88 (1967))] too render it as 'exposant' and 'exponent' respectively. Other scholars render it differently: 'mute or dummy sound' (stummer Laut) by BÖHTLINGK, *Pāṇinis Grammatik*, (*s.v. A* **1.** 3. 2); 'classifier' (V. N. MISRA, *The Descriptive Technique of Pāṇini*: 28, The Hague/Paris, 1966); 'determinative' (H. SCHARFE. *Pāṇini's metalanguage:* 20, Philadelphia: APS, 1971); 'marker' (G. CARDONA, *Pāṇini—A Survey of Research*: 199; 335, Mouton, The Hague-Paris, 1976); 'sigla' (S. M. KATRE Private Communication) and 'servile or indicatory letter' (V. C. VASU, *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini* I: 118). According to TRAGER, *The Theory of Accentual Systems:* 132, the entities of the type of stress, pitch . . . will be termed on the phonetic level *exponential sounds*.

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A **1.** 3. 2 to 8 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (=*A*). The *IT*-s being his favourite cliché, P coins such metaterms as *CIT*, *ÑIT*, *ṆIT*, *PIT* and others, whose grammatical operations are studied in P's metalanguage.

1.2 The exponents—*K*, *KH*, *G*, *GH*, *Ṅ*, *C*, *Ñ*, *Ṭ*, *Ṇ*, *T*, *N*, *P*, *R*, *L*—are added to roots, affixes, and certain grammatical units.[1] These are significant, since they carry distinct structural functions such as accentuation, vowel-gradation, substitution, velarisation, morphophonemic alternations and gender.

1.3 For the purpose of this paper, I shall concentrate my attention only on the accent exponents: *C*, *Ñ*, *T* (= T_1, T_2), *N*, *P*, *R*, and *L*, which are distributed, according to my count, in Book III (*Pāda-s* 1 to 4) of the *A*, taught in 431 rules against a total of 631 rules.[2]

2. The *kṛt* suffixes, numbering 128 occurring in Book III of the *A*, are alphabetically arranged in the Table 1 that follows.

[1] A general treatment of *IT*-s appears in several papers. Read G. V. DEVASTHALI, *Anubandhas of Pāṇini*, Poona, 1967. Also read my paper in the *Journal of the University of Poona* (Hum. Section) 25: 77-82 (1966) for the pre-Pāṇinian anubandha-s *Ṅ* and *C*.

[2] The root-forming suffixes, infixes, alternant forms of the present stem morphemes and other suffixes—causatives, desideratives, frequentatives and denominatives—are omitted in Table 1, although P teaches these suffixes in the first four *Pāda-s* of the Third Book of the *A*.

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1	a	aÑ aC	aṆ	atṚN	athuC	adhyai
8	adhyaiN	ani	anīyaR	aP	ase	aseN
14	āru	āluC	iÑ	itra	iN	inI
20	inUṆ	iṣṇuC	* iṣyai	u	ukaÑ	uṆ
26	ūka	* eŚ	Ka	KaÑ	Kadhyai	KadhyaiN
32	KaP	KamUL	KasUN	KaseN	KānaC	Ki
38	KiN	KuraC	* Ke	KeN	Kenya	* Kai
44	Kta	KtavatU	KtiC	KtiN	Ktri	Ktvā
50	Knu	KmaraC	KyaP	Kru	KlukaN	KvanIP
56	KvaraP	KvasU	KvIN	KvIP	Kse	K(G)snu
62	KHaC	KHamUÑ	KHaL	KHaŚ	KHiṣṇuC	KHukaÑ
68	KHyuN	GHa	GHaÑ	GHinUṆ	GHuraC	ṄvanIP
74	CānaŚ	ÑyuṬ	Ṭa	Ṭak	Ḍa	Ḍu
80	Ṇa	ṆaC	ṆamUL	ṆinI	ṆyaT	ṆyuṬ
86	ṆvI	ṆvIN	ṆvuC	ṆvuL	taveÑ	taveN
92	tavai	tavya	tavyaT	tumUN	tṛC	tṛN
98	tosUN	tvaN	thakaN	naÑ	najIÑ	naN
104	manIN	yaT	yuC	ra	ru	LyaP
110	Lyu	LyuṬ	vanIP	varaC	vIC	vIṬ
116	vuÑ	vuN	Śa	ŚatṚ	Śadhyai	ŚadhyaiN
122	ŚānaC	ŚānaN	ṢākaN	ṢṭraN	ṢvuN se	seN

TABLE—1

3. By removing the exponents which are linked to the actual forms used in the object language (*-a-*, *-adhyai-*, *-ura-*, *-ta-*, and other primary suffixes) from the 128 *kṛt-pratyaya-s* listed above, we arrive at 56 bound morphemes which are alphabetically arranged and shown in Table 2 as under:

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1	ϕ-a-	-aka-	-at-	-athu-	-adhyai (*Ch*)[1]	-ana-		
8	-ani-	-anīya-	-am	-as-(*Ch*)	-ase (*Ch*)	-āka-	-āna-	
15	-āru-	-ālu-	-i-	-itra-	-in-	-iṣṇu-	-iṣyai (*Ch*)	
22	-u-	-uka-	-ura-	-ūka-	-e (*Ch*)	-enya- (*Ch*)		
28	* ai (*Ch*)	-ta-	-tavat-	-tave (*Ch*)	-tavai (*Ch*)			
33	-tavya-	-ti-	-tum-	-tṛ-	-tos- (*Ch*)	-tra-		
39	-tri-	-tva- (*Ch*)	-tvā	-thaka-	-na-	-naj-		
45	-nu-	-man-	-mara-	-ya-	-ra-	-ru-	-luka-	
52	-van-	-vara-	-vas-	-se (*Ch*)	-snu-			

TABLE—2

4. P has specifically designed the accent exponents to mark the pitch (prosodic or suprasegmental) features, and he enumerates them in 75 primary suffixes (*kṛt-pratyaya-s*). Among these, *T*, *Ñ*, *P* and *R* always occur in the final position of the bound form to which each one of the symbols is attached. /*C*/ appears once in the initial position (*CāṇaŚ*), but it is seen in the final position 18 times. /*Ñ*/ is placed in the initial position once and in the final position seven times. /*L*/ occurs thrice initially and four times finally. The frequency of accent exponents in the final and initial positions is shown in Table 3.

[1] *Chandas*—inserted in brackets—is abbreviated to *Ch.* in Table 2, and the suffix marked in the Table with (*Ch*) is a Vedic peculiarity.

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accent exponent	initial position	final position	frequency of occurrence of *IT*-s in 75 suffixes
C	1	18	19
Ñ	1	7	8
T (*T*¹ *T*²)	—	3	3
N	—	29	29
P	—	8	8
R	—	1	1
L	3	4	7
8	5	70	75

TABLE—3

5. The distribution of the accent exponents in 75 primary suffixes is listed in the following Table (4), in which the *IT*-s are enclosed between diagonals to distinguish these from the *kṛt-pratyaya-s*.

accent exponent	kṛt suffixes containing accent IT-s	
/*C*/	aC, athuC, āluC, iṣṇuC, KānaC, KuraC, KtiC, KmaraC, KHaC, KHiṣṇuC, GHuraC, ṆaC, ṆvuC, CānaŚ, tṛC, yuC, ŚānaC varaC & vIC ...	19
/*Ñ*/	iÑ, ukaÑ, KaÑ, KHamUÑ, KHukaÑ, GHaÑ, ÑyuṬ, & vuÑ ...	8
/*T*/	ṆyaT, tavyaT & yaT ...	3
/*N*/	atṚN, adhyaiN, aseN, iN, KadhyaiN, KasUN, KaseN, KiN, KeN, KHyuN, KtiN, KlukaN, KvīN, ṆvIN, taveN, tumUN, tṛN, tosUN, tvaN, thakaN, naN, manIN, vuN, ŚadhyaiN, ŚānaN, ṢākaN, ṢvuN, ṢṭraN & seN ...	29
/*P*/	aP, KaP, KyaP, KvanIP, KvaraP, KvIP, ÑvanIP & vanIP ...	8
/*R*/	anīyaR ...	1
/*L*/	KamUL, KHaL, ṆamUL, ṆvuL,[1] (LyaP), Lyu[1] & LyuṬ ...	7
	Total suffixes ...	75

TABLE—4

[1] The substitution of the bound form *-ana-* and *-aka-* for the prototypes *yu* and *vu* respectively takes place through the orce f the metarule: *yu.vor ana.akau* (*A* **7.** 1. 1).

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6. The accent exponents indicating the three pitch accents: *anudātta* (grave), *udātta* (acute) and *svarita* (circumflex), are shown in Table 5, in which the second column marks the accent position and the last the accent rules cited from the *A*.

accent exponent		accent position	accent rule no.
1.	*C*	end-acute	6. 1. 163
2.	$\tilde{N}$	initial-acute	6. 1. 197
3.	T_1	circumflex	6. 1. 185
4.	T_2	initial-acute	6. 1. 213
5.	*N*	,, ,,	6. 1. 197
6.	*P*	grave tone	3. 1. 4
7.	*R*	penult-acute	6. 1. 217
8.	*L*	acute on the syllable before the suffix	6. 1. 193

TABLE — 5

7.1 The author of the *A* lays down some special rules of accentuation to indicate the *ādyudātta* (initial acute) by the exponents /$\tilde{N}$, *N*/ and /T_2/, the *madhyodātta* (penult accent or middle acute) by /*R*/, and /*L*/ (that is to say, the syllable before the suffix receives the acute), the *antodātta* (end-acute) by /*C*/, the *svarita* (circumflex intonation) by /T_1/ and the *anudātta* (grave tone) by the exponent /*P*/.

7.2 The acute accent falls regularly on the initial syllable of the (derived word) which consists of an affix

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with the exponent /$\tilde{N}$/ or /N/ as has been stated in the rule: *ñ.n.ity ādir nityam*, *A* 6. 1. 197. The *udātta* is placed on the end-syllable of a base (formed by a suffix, augment or substitute) which has /C/ as its exponent, which is shown in the rule: *citaḥ*, *A* 6. 1. 163. The derived word which contains the suffix *ya*T (symbolized as T_2) has, when it (the word) is disyllabic, the acute on the initial vowel, with the exception of *nāvyâḥ* from: *nau: yato'nāvaḥ A* 6. 1. 213. When the deverbative consists of more than two syllables, and if it is formed with an affix having the exponent /R/, the penult of the word is acutely accented through the force of the rule: *upottamam riti*, *A* 6. 1. 217. The vowel, immediately preceding the affix to which is appended the exponent /L/, will be actuely accented in a word in accordance with the rule: *liti*, *A* 6. 1. 193. The circumflex intonation falls on the affix that has the exponent /T_1/, as has been taught by the rule: *tit svaritam* (or *svaritaḥ*), *A* 6. 1. 185. As a general principle, the case endings (*sUP*) and the affixes carrying the exponent /P/ will be unaccented or grave-toned by the rule: *anudāttau sup.pitau*, *A* 3. 1. 4, which is, of course, an exception (*apavāda*) to the general rule: *ādy udāttaś ca*, *A* 3. 1. 3; accordingly, an affix (is what follows: *pratyayaḥ*, *A* 3. 1. 1 and *paraś ca A* 3. 1. 2 and) has the *udātta* accent on the initial syllable.

8. We have shown the actual distribution of eight accent exponents in 75 *kṛt-pratyaya-s* listed in Table 4. The accentuation of the derivatives formed with primary suffixes carrying accent exponents—and becoming

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barytonic, oxytonic, paroxytonic or perispomena—could be precisely determined by the specific accentual rules formulated by P and listed in the third column of Table 5. But we are left over with 53 *kṛt* suffixes which do not contain accent exponents such as *-a-*, *-adhyai-*, *-ani-*, *-ase*, *-āru-*, *-itra-*, *-iṣyai*, *-u-*, *-ūka-*, *-tavai*, *-tavya-*, *-ra-*, *-ru-*, *-se* and others. At this juncture, a legitimate question would arise: how can we account for the accentuation of the deverbatives made by means of the suffixes which do *not* carry accent exponents? P, a shrewd judge of linguistic facts, solves the problem with remarkable acuteness by postulating the rule, *ādy udāttaś ca*, *A* 3. 1. 3—a rule which teaches the initial accentuation of words made by means of suffixes which are not sealed with accent exponents.

9.1 P prescribes the general principle to be observed in suffixal accentuation that the initial vowel of the suffix is marked with the high pitch, the *udātta* accent by the *adhikāra* rule, *A* 3. 1. 3. This rule has been the subject of a lengthy but systematic discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya* (*s.v. A* 3. 1. 3: *VMB* II. 6. 3-14).

9.2 Patañjali begins his argument to discuss the purpose of the rule, *A* 3. 1. 3 thus:

'(The purport of the rule is that) the initial vowel should be acutely accented, (since) the *udātta* should not fall on the final vowel (of the suffix). The rule is not directed to the purpose (mentioned above). (Because we find that) when P desires the end-acute, he adds (to the suffix) the exponent */C/*. So he ordains: *cito'nta udāttaḥ* (: A derivative, made by means of an

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affix, or augment or substitute, carrying the exponent /*C*/ gets the acute accent on the final syllable; *A* 6. 1. 163). In that case (the rule 3. 1. 3 conveys the idea that the *udātta* accent falls on the initial syllable of the suffix, but) not on the middle vowel. (It follows of necessity that) if P intends middle-acute, he appends (to the suffix) the exponent /*R*/. Hence he formulates: *upottamaṃ riti* (*A* 6. 1. 217): The acute accent falls on the penultimate syllable of a derivative, consisting of more than two syllables, which is formed with the exponent /*R*/). Then the (significance of the *sūtra* 3. 1. 3 lies in the fact that the initial vowel of the suffix alone is acute, and the) grave tone should not be marked. (And) if P wishes for the grave tone, he designs the exponent /*P*/. Consequently he formulates the rule: *anudāttau sup.pit.au* (*A* 3. 1. 4: The case-endings and the affixes having the exponent /*P*/ are gravely toned). If such were the case, (the rule 3. 1. 3 is enjoined for suggesting only the initial high-pitched vowel, and) not the circumflex intonation. (It follows that) when P wants to have the circumflex intonation, he designates the exponent /*T*/. He, therefore, teaches the rule: *tit svaritam* (*A* 6. 1. 185: A derivative made by means of an affix carrying the exponent /*T*/ is perispomenon, that is to say, the end syllable of the word bears the circumflex intonation).'

9.31 In conformance with the above discussion, it is to be noted that in the case of the remaining suffixes which are destitute of accent exponents, the general principle which fixes the barytone (*ādyudātta*) for the

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initial suffixal vowel, will be applicable. Therefore, the *sūtra* 3. 1. 3 is *not necessary*.

9.32 Patañjali meets the above objection raised by the *pūrvapakṣin* with a cogent reply, and his *siddhānta* runs as follows:

एवमपि येषामेव प्रत्ययानां स्वरो नियम्यते त एव नियतस्वराः स्युः, य इदानीमनियतस्वरः स कदाचिदाद्युदात्तः, कदाचिदन्तोदात्तः, कदाचिन्मध्योदात्तः, कदाचिदनुदात्तः, कदाचित्स्वरितः स्यात्। आद्युदात्त एव यथा स्यादित्येवमर्थमिदमुच्यते ॥

Concomitantly Patañjali, on the one hand, points out that the *niyata-svara-s* belong to the *fixed* accentual features pertaining to the suffixes which contain accent exponents. On the other hand, the *aniyata-svara-s* represent the general accentual features of those suffixes which are read by P without accent exponents and which, under different circumstances, indicate the accentual classes—barytone (*ādyudātta*), oxytone (*antodātta*), paroxytone (*madhyodātta*), the grave tone (*anudātta*) and the circumflex intonation (*svarita*)—as the situation or context would demand. Consequently, the *Mahābhāṣyakāra* concludes that the purpose of the rule 3. 1. 3 is the fixation of the accent of the *initial suffixal vowel alone*, and the barytonisation is, in fact, predilected to oxytonisation, paroxytonisation and other accentual categories.

9.4 It should be observed here that Patañjali distinguishes *niyata-svara-s* (fixed accentual type) from

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aniyata-svara-s (nonfixed accentual type). The former represents those suffixes whose accentual features are predictable, that is to say, when the authenticated accent exponents *C*, *T*, *P* or *R* are linked to the suffixes in question, the accents are definitely fixed (see Para 6, Table 5). The latter belongs to the suffixes whose accentual features are nonpredictable, because, these suffixes are destitute of accent exponents. Since accent symbols are not attached to the second type of suffixes, the tonal features of these *IT*-less *pratyaya-s* will have to be decided by the logical application of the general rules ordained by P in his system of accentuation.

9.5 The relevant principle that emerges from Patañjali's discussion is that in a total of 128 *kṛt* suffixes enunciated by P, 75 suffixes which are sealed with accent exponents belong to the *niyata-svara* (predictable accent) type, while 53 *pratyaya-s* which are devoid of accent *IT*-s are consigned to the *aniyatasvara* (nonpredictable accent) type. For instance the *niyata-svara* of the suffix *aC* (=bound morpheme *-á-*) is that a word derived from this suffix will be acutely accented on the final vowel through the force of the rule *A* 6. 1. 163, whereas the *aniyata-svara-* of a suffix like *ṆyuṬ* (=bound form *-ána-*) will suggest that in a word, derived from this suffix, the acute accent will fall on the suffix-initial according to the general rule, *A* **3**. 1. 3.

9.61 A few illustrations may be cited here in support of P's formulation of the general accent rules (*A* **3**. 1. 3; **6**. 1. 162) and the accent exponents (Table 6).

(i) Root-accent: *sútvan-:* grammatical steps:

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√su + ṄvanIP .. *ṄvanIP* by *A* **3**. 2. 103
,, + -van- .. *Ṅ*, *I*, *P* = *ϕ* by **1**. 3. 8; 2; 3; & 9
,, + t(UK) + van .. *tUK* by **6**. 1. 71; U, K = *ϕ*
,, + t+vàn .. *anudātta* of *-vàn-* by *A* **3**. 1. 4
= *sútvan-* .. Root-accent by *A* **6**. 1. 162

(ii) Suffix-accent: *uktá-*: grammatical steps:

√vac + K-ta .. *Kta* by *A* **3**. 2. 102
,, + -ta .. *K* = *ϕ* by *A* **1**. 3. 8 & 9
uc + ta .. *saṃprasāraṇa* by *A* **6**. 1. 15
uk + ta .. *k* for *c* by *A* **8**. 2. 30
uk + tá .. suffix accent by *A* **3**. 1. 3
= *uktá-*.

9.62 We list below an example each for illustrating the accent exponents in the accompanying Table 6.

accent exponent	suffix	example	suffix rule	accent rule
C	aC	*mod-á-*	**3**. 1. 4	**6**. 1. 163
Ñ	GHaÑ	*véś-a*	**3**. 3. 16	**6**. 1. 197
*T*₁	tavyaT	*kar-tavyâ-*	**3**. 1. 96	**6**. 1. 185
,,	ṆyaT	*vāk-yâ-*	**3**. 1. 124	,,
*T*₂	yaT	*géya-*	**3**. 1. 97	**6**. 1. 213
N	ṢvuN	*nárt-aka-*	**3**. 1. 145	**6**. 1. 197
P	KvaraP	*jít-vàrà-*	**3**. 2. 163	**3**. 1. 4
R	anīyaR	*kar-aṇíya-*	**3**. 1. 96	(**6**. 1. 162) **6**. 1. 217
L	LyuṬ	*hás-ana-m*	**3**. 3. 115	**6**. 1. 193

TABLE — 6

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10. From a brief study of the accent exponents structured by P in the Third Book of the *A*, I resume the following considerations:

(i) The exponents are significant indicatory symbols.

(ii) These are added to roots, suffixes and other grammatical units.

(iii) P has structured eight metalinguistic accent exponents in the third Book of the *A*, which play the role of indicating prosodic features—grave, acute and circumflex intonations.

(iv) By structuring the exponents which serve the significant purpose of indicating the accents (besides several morphophonemic functions[1]) in his metalanguage, P has achieved a remarkable sense of economy in his descriptive analysis of the Sanskrit language.

[1] The special purpose served by the exponents *C*, *Ñ* and *Ṅ* is discussed on pages 42 to 55 in my book, *The System of kṛt Accentuation in Pāṇini and the Veda*, Tirupati, 1981 (in Press).

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K. M. PRABHAKARA VARIAR

SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF INTERJECTIONS

0. Introduction

In the course of the last couple of decades studies on syntax and semantics have made enormous strides. In the early days of 'Modern Linguistics' syntax received very little attention, and the semantic level was conceived as 'extralinguistic', being not worthy of serious investigation within the structuralistic framework of linguistic analysis. The transformational theory of grammar brought syntax to the central area of linguistic studies. The early version of the transformational model, however, relegated phonology and semantics to a sphere outside grammar proper. The modified model of transformational grammar (generative semantics), on the other hand, considers meaning as an integral component of grammar; in fact, all decisions of form are based on the meaning structure, according to this recent theory of language. Despite the renewed interest shown towards the problem of meaning, it should be admitted that we are nowhere near a well-defined 'theory of meaning'.

In the following sections it is proposed to examine certain aspects of the syntax and semantics of interjections, with special reference to Malayalam language.

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Here, a pertinent distinction is to be made at first. In grammar, syntax means the rules of the combination of constituents. Since interjections do not have constituent structures, we cannot apply syntax (as it is conceived generally) to the analysis of interjections. Therefore, the syntax of interjections has to be taken in an altogether different sense. Most of the interjections can co-occur with sentences.[1] These occurrences are constrained by both semantic and syntactic considerations. In this sense, the syntax of interjections deals with inter-sentential rather than intra-sentential rules. This is different from rules governing the formation of larger texts, in that an interjection-sentence complex constitutes a single functional unit within a text, whereas individual sentences in a text are functionally separate elements. We are, therefore, concerned with inter-sentential constraints only in the sense of functional unitariness.

1. Syntactic Constraints:

Before explicating the issue, it is necessary to broadly classify Malayalam interjections as those which are essentially part of the lexical stock of the language and those which appear only as interjections. For instance, lexical items like *enna:l*, *pinne*, *appo:l* can

[1] Co-occurrence can be in pre-sentential, post-sentential or intra-sentential positions. Even when an interjection appears in intra-sentential position, it should be remembered that it does not assume the status of a constituent of sentence. It can only show the function of a paratactic construction.

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behave like interjections in certain discourse contexts, whereas sound sequences like *cchi*, *o*: and *a*? are inherently interjectional expressions, having no other function elsewhere. It is only the former class which is usually governed by syntactic constraints. The inherent interjections cannot appear intra-sententially. Their favourite position of occurrence is sentence-initial, although post-sentential occurrences are not ruled out. In James (1972: 162-163), intra-sentential occurrences of certain items, which she names as interjections, are exemplified. What she has described are 'hesitation phenomena' and not interjections. The items, which are basically lexical units and which are appearing as interjections, allow themselves to take intra-sentential positions. Some instances of such occurrences are shown below:

(1.a) *appo:(l)*, ni: enṯeku:ṯe varilla, alle.

(1.b) ni:, *appo*:(*l*), enṯeku:ṯe varilla alle
'So, you won't come with me?'

(2.a) *enta:*, ña:n paṟaññapo:le ceyyumo:

(2.b) ña:n paṟaññpo:le, *enta:*, ceyyumo:
'Well, will you act as I told you?'

(3.a) piṉṉe:y, ni: avaṉṯe ka:ryattil iṭapeṭaṇṭa

(3.b) ni: avaṉṯe ka:ryattil, piṉṉe:y iṭapeṭaṇṭa
'Look here, you need not interfere in his affair'.

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In the above, *appo:ḷ* and *pinne*[1], are temporal adverbs, and *enta:* an interrogative noun when they appear as parts of speech in sentences. Here, however, they are manifested at the expressive level as isolate which do not function as constituent elements of a sentential structure.[2]

Non-lexical interjections do not show this privilege of occurrence within sentences. Thus, the (b)—sentences below are not possible.

(4.a) *o:*, ña:n akka: ryam maṛannu

(4.b) *ña:n akka:ryam, o:, maṛannu.

'Oh, I forgot that matter.'

[1] *pinne:y* includes the basic form *pinne* and a particle —*e:y* which functions as an attention caller. It is interesting to note that the particle—*e:y* can appear as an isolate in the pre-sentential position as

e:y, ni: iviṭe va:
'Hallo, you come here',

and also can be stringed to many other constituents within a sentence as,

avaṉe:y ña:n paṛaññaːl ke:ḷkkilla
'He will not obey me'
innale avan vannappoḷe:y ña:n
vi:ṭṭil uṇṭa:yirunnilla.
'When he came yesterday, I was not at home',

etc.. Although in the pre-sentential position it behaves like an interjection, the possibility of its appearance within a sentence stringed to various other words, makes it impossible to group this along with interjections.

[2] James shows that the appearance of interjections is odd before some negative polarity items (but not others) and cites the following examples to prove her case:

(a) *Samson hasn't come, well, yet.
(b) Samson didn't come, why, until Tuesday.

She has no idea why these should be as they are (James, 1972: 165). In Malayalam such a constraint applies only to non-lexical items.

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(5.a) *ayyo:* eṉṉo:ṭə co:dikkaṇṭa

(5.b) *eṉṉo:ṭə, *ayyo:*, co-dikkaṇṭa
'Goodness! don't ask me!'

The presence of an interjection can serve to disambiguate an otherwise ambiguous sentence, according to the author referred to above. James, for instance, gives the following sentence,

(6.a) John kicked the bucket

and claims that if an interjection is inserted within the verb phrase, the sentence can have only the literal meaning and not the idiomatic sense. Thus,

(6.b) John kicked. . . . oh. . . . the bucket

can mean only that John literally kicked the bucket and not that John died. This behaviour, as far as we could see, is not peculiar to interjections. In fact, an idiomatic phrase will not allow any element coming within its structure; if insertion is made it automatically loses its idiomatic sense.[1]

[1] Strictly speaking, non-insertability is not a phenomenon which is exclusively applicable to idiomatic phrases. There are quite a number of closely bound structures which disallow insertion of extraneous elements. Take, for instance, the Malayalam verbal phrase, '*ma:ppə koṭukkuka*' which literally means 'to give pardon'. This phrasal unit, although it resembles an object-verb composite like *paṇam koṭukkuka*, 'give money', is not to be analyzed as an object-verb construction. See how the possibility of insertion of an adverb in the latter phrase and the oddness of the same in the former keep them apart:

(1.a) niṅṅaḷ avaṉə ti:rccaya:yum paṇam koṭukkaṇam
(1.b) niṅṅaḷ avaṉə paṇam ti:rccaya:yum koṭukkaṇam
'You should certainly give him money'.
(2.a) niṅṅaḷ avaṉə ti:rccaya:yum ma:ppə koṭukkaṇam
(2.b) niṅṅaḷ avaṉə ma:ppə ti:rccaya:yum koṭukkaṇam
'You should certainly pardon him.'

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The constraints, that control the combinatory possibilities of lexical as well as non-lexical interjections with sentences, are based purely on semantic considerations. That is, the symptomatic function of the interjection should not clash with the actual communicative function of the accompanying sentence. Thus, an interjection, having the function of exclamation cannot be combined with a sentence intended to show only a symbolic function. Likewise, the pre-sentential isolate which implies an emphatic denial should necessarily be followed by a negative sentence. The following pair exemplifies the above:

(7.a) *e:y*, ni: ippo:(l) po:(ka)ṇṭa
'(denial), you need not go now.'

(7.b) **e:y*, ni: ippo:(l) po:(ka)ṇam
(denial), you should go now.

Since the interjection *e:y*[1] contains a sense of emphatic denial, what follows it should implicate a negative proposition either overtly (as in the above) or covertly (as in the sentence below):

(8) *e:y*, avan aṅṅane ceyyumo:
'(denial), will he do like that?'

In the above, unless the interrogative sentence is interpreted as a notionally negative proposition, the whole

[1] The form *e:y* cited above and explained in footnote no. 2 is different from the homonym *e:y* being referred to here. The first is an 'attention caller' and more or less functions as a non-specific vocative while the second is an interjection which expresses notional negation.

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utterance cannot be considered well-formed.[1] The above utterance, therefore, is, conceptually identical with

(9) *e:y*, avan aṅṅaṉe ceyyilla
'(denial), he won't do like that'[2]

In the same manner, the interjection *cchi*, which contains the sense of 'disapproval' should co-occur only with a sentence exhibiting the speaker's attitude of displeasure or intolerance. It is true that on many occasions, this agreement is deliberately broken for revealing idyosyncratic or metaphorical meanings.

2. Reduplication:

One of the universal grammatical processes is what is called 'reduplication'.[3] If some meaningful unit of a language is repeated in a construction, the process is called reduplication. Not all elements of

[1] That verbal functions and grammatical functions do not show one-to-one correspondence has already been pointed out by psycholinguists. Normally, one could say that interrogative sentences elicit explicit responses from the addressees. But in certain contexts question-structures can have the effect of imperative. For instance, under certain conditions, the sentence 'would you close the door?' would have to be understood as a request to close the door. For further details, see Sadock, 1970 and 1971.

[2] Contextually, even affirmative sentence-structures can be interpreted as contradictions to stimulus-sentences. In such cases also the responses are notional negations to the stimuli.

[3] "If some element of a form is repeated, being. . . . infixed before (or after) itself, the process is called reduplication" (Hall, 1969: 135). Hall's definition, apparently, raises a question. If a particular form appears in reduplication, how can one decide whether the form follows or precedes itself? Presumably, Hall's contention refers to the fact whether one of the reduplicated stems appears in full or in truncated shape. Sometimes the preceding element in a reduplicated structure has a reduced syllabic structure.

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language, however, can be reduplicated. In Malayalam, generally, qualificatory terms and verbs often appear in reduplication. Reduplication, generally speaking, gives the meanings of 'prolongation', 'intensity', and 'frequency'.

One of the noteworthy characteristics of interjections is that almost any one of them,[1] irrespective of their other differences, can be reduplicated:

(10) *ayyayyo*: enikkə annə vara:n paṭṭillallo:
'(disappointment'), I cannot come on that day'.

(11) *cchicchi*, aññane onnum paṛayarutə
'(disapproval), don't say like that'

(12) *e:y e:y*, atonnum śariya:villa
'(denial), that won't be all right.'

Interjections share this phenomenon not only with qualificatory terms but with certain other types of minor sentences also. Among minor sentences one-word responses usually are reduplicated if the respondent intends to provide extra emphasis to the communicative content. Thus, in everyday conversations we often

Examples are not rare in Malayalam: *pappa:ti* (*pa:ti—pa:ti*), *mummu:nnə* (*mu:nnə—mu:nnə*), *vevve:ṛe* (*ve:ṛe—ve:ṛe*), etc. Obviously, the second element in reduplicated forms in certain languages must be appearing with reduced syllables.

[1] This statement is a gross generalization. Mostly those items which have attitudinal overtones more often appear in reduplication than others which are less expressive and more neutral in communicative functions. Yet, even in latter cases, the process of reduplication is not entirely ruled out. One could probably say that the grammatical process of reduplication usually has the same function of 'intensifiers'. Intensifiers refer to any device 'that scales a quality, whether up or down or somewhere between the two' (Bolinger, 1972: 17).

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hear utterances like *uṇṭə—uṇṭə* 'there is—there is', *ale-ale* 'yes-yes', etc. In ellipsis, along with reduplication, an emphatic particle can also be added: *uṇṭe*: *—uṇṭə*, *alle*: *—alla*, *ille*: *—illa*, etc. As pointed out already, interjections can never be subjected to any kind of morphological modifications.

3. Meanings Of Interjections:

The term 'meaning' ordinarily has a tremendous variety of senses. Hence, before determining the nature of meaning that interjections reveal, it becomes necessary to explicate the exact sense of the term 'meaning' that can be applied to the analysis of interjections. Age-long discussions on the phenomenon of meaning have probably taught us that a direct frontal attack on the problem is doomed to failure. Furthermore, it is also not possible within the scope of this paper to deal with the 'theory of meaning' in great detail. We shall, therefore, employ a 'limited method of indirection' in order to approach the specific issue at hand, i.e., the meaning of interjections.

When we attempt to examine any chunk of language it becomes immediately clear that 'meaning' and reference refer to two distinct relationships, the border of which can be marked distinctly.[1] Reference deals

[1] Frege, the philosopher, draws a fundamental distinction between the problem of reference and the problem of meaning in his discussion of statements of equivalence. According to him, the theory of reference deals with such concepts as reference, naming, truth, extension, etc. The theory of meaning deals with such concepts as significance, intention, synonymity, analysyticity, etc. Frege's 1892 article is reprinted in Feigl and Sellars, 1949.

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with the relationship between the linguistic elements, words, sentences, etc. and the non-linguistic world of experience. Meaning, on the other hand, does not refer to an experience *per se* but only to a relationship arbitrarily established between a 'concept' and a 'symbol'. The meaning-relationship is a pre-requisite for the reference relationship to exist. In other words, it is only the meaning-relationship that functions as a link between a linguistic unit and its reference. Yet it is not always the case that, once we have a symbol-concept relationship (the meaning of the symbol), it should necessarily result in a symbol-reference link. Some linguistic units have only the former. Consequently, we have two types of meaning relationship, one, that ends with concepts and the other that proceeds to establish a connection with a reference.

It follows that the linguistic sign's relationship with extra-linguistic phenomenon takes two directions: one, through the language user's concept to significate that can be objectively identified, and the other to the language user's concept only.[1] The reality of the sign-concept relationship can be established by the fact

[1] It is significant to note that in language acquisition process, the child always starts with units which have specific references and only later he produces utterances which contain items having only symbol-concept relationship. McNeill's pivot-grammar implies the above as is seen in his statement: 'Typically one or two Pivot (P) classes are combined with an Open (O) class... words from P-class rarely stand alone in a child's speech but words from the O-class often do so' (McNeill, 1971: 24).

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that there are a number of language signs which do not have corresponding significates in the external world. Meaningfulness, therefore, is not a unilevel relationship like syntactic, morphological, and phonological inter-relations. Perhaps, it is this peculiarity that has escaped many of the theorists who have laboured to explain 'meaning'. Even in post-Chomskyan generative grammar, the protagonists admit that the deep logical structure, from which utterances are generated, is not a well-defined content-structure.[1]

When we take up the issue of the meaning of interjections, it becomes evident that interjections, being paralinguistic signs, can never have a referential denotation with 'objects' or 'states' belonging to the external world. The denial of the existence of denotation for interjectional utterances does not automatically lead to the establishment of a 'meaning relationship' akin to the non-denotational linguistic signs, for them. To make this point clear, we have to bring another phenomenon into focus. The 'speech-act' theorists have eloquently argued that sentences contain both a 'propositional content' and an 'illocutionary force'.[2] The psycholinguistic correlates corresponding to the

[1] '... like all trees drawn in discussions of syntax, our logical structures are fudges, the best we can do at present, but certainly subject to change. And like all rules of grammar mentioned in discussions of syntax, our proposed postulates are approximations at best' (Gordon & Lakoff, 1975: 105).

[2] In a narrower sense this division refers to the age-old dichotomy represented by 'content' vs. 'function'.

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above are 'concept' and 'predication'.[1] In ordinary discourse this 'deep' concept-predicate structure is transformed into a syntactic subject-predicate construction at the surface level in a variety of ways. Even at the conceptual level, the concept-structure can be isolated and can be shown to be distinct from the predicate structure. Consider, for example, the classic instance of the sentence: 'The door is open'. It is not difficult to demonstrate that the above sentence, depending on the context and depending on the intention of the locutor, can be interpreted as a declarative statement as well as a request to shut the door (or even as a warning). Here it is evident that the conceptual structure corresponding to the sign-structure is same but the predicative function differs in each case.[2]

[1] The term 'predication' is being used for quite unrelated concepts by scholars of different persuasions. For instance, logicians consider predicability as a function of argumentation. Grammatical predication, on the other hand, is a phenomenon related to the syntactic structure. In our account, 'predication' refers to a psychological mechanism which gives a concept-structure a communicative function. More explicitly, without the predicative mechanism,concept-structures cannot be symbolized overtly; nor can they exist as overt verbal behaviour or silent language. Miller states that 'a psycholinguistic account of speech acts must, therefore, include some description of the psychological process of predication and intention. At present, however, our understanding of these psychological processes, is, to say the least, fragmentary and unsatisfactory' (Miller, 1970: 190).

[2] That all speech events are interpretable only by taking into account the situational settings and the frame of reference of the speakers, amounts to asserting that sentences, phrases, and words have no meaning taken out of their communicative context. The above supposition, Antal opines, leads to an 'acknowledgment of the existence of speech without language' (Antal, 1963: 20).

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In the case of interjections, the two realms—the conceptual structure and the psychological process of predication—cannot be split up. At the pre-articulatory stage, there is only one cognitive event, namely, the 'predication'. Thus, the linguistic and paralinguistic behavioural schemes differ in a manner as shown below:

Linguistic : concept (predication) → utterance.
Paralinguistic: (predication) → —vocal segregate[1].

Even in the case of lexemes (like *kaṣṭam*, *pa:vam*, etc.) which function as interjections, the cognitive content and the predicative function exist in unison. Therefore, it will not be appropriate for us to ask the question: 'what is the meaning of an interjection?'. Instead, a more reasonable inquiry would be something like: 'what is the specific predicative function of such and such interjection?'[2]

4. Interjections And Emotive Meanings:

The earlier definitions of interjections were based upon the assumption that this class of units expresses emotive meanings only. This assumption is not true as there are number of interjections which are symptomatically neutral. The predicative function, discussed

[1] 'Vocal segregate' is the paralinguistic term which approximates the linguistic term 'interjection'.

[2] This is one of the characteristics by which interjections differ from 'vocative' and 'elliptical' minor sentences. Both the latter have 'meanings' in the traditional sense.

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in the previous section, therefore, subsumes both the symbolic and expressive functions of interjections. In this respect, interjections exhibit similar semblance with the kinesic elements. Body movements can be used to convey emotionally neutral ideas (like calling the attention of the addressees) as well as idyosyncratically expressive functions (like 'disgust' by twisting the lips in a particular manner).

Another feature which is normally attributed to the actual realization of interjections, and one which is closely connected with the expression of emotions, is the 'spontaneity' of the act. Presumably, this refers to the automacity of stimuli triggering a verbal response. Non-intentional automatic acts, psychologically speaking, are to be considered as 'reflexes'. If interjections are to be identified as reflex responses, they cannot be brought within the sphere of 'symbolic behaviour'.[1] In other words, one cannot assume that interjections simultaneously behave as reflex responses as well as verbal or quasi-verbal responses. Therefore, once a particular behaviour is qualified as spontaneous, the same is to be relegated to a realm

[1] Recall the distinction between 'signal process' and 'symbol process'. Where an organism provides itself with a sign which is a substitute in the control of its behaviour for another sign, signifying what the sign, for which it is a substitute, signifies, then this sign is a symbol, and the sign-process is a 'symbol process'. When this is not the case the sign is a signal and the sign-process is a 'signal process'. More succinctly, a symbol is a sign produced by its interpreter which acts as a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous. See further: Morris, 1971: 100.

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other than communicative behaviour. Thus, it is argued here that both the attributes, 'expressiveness' and 'spontaneity' as found in earlier definitions of interjections, are not identifying characteristics of the class of these paralinguistic units.

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N. V. P. UNITHIRI

COMMENTARIAL LITERATURE IN SANSKRIT

COMMENTARIES on Kāvya-s and Nāṭaka-s have not so far received serious attention from scholars.[1] Many of these commentaries are important not only because they analyze, interpret and evaluate the original works on the basis of human experience and aesthetic values, but also because they can stand as pure literature. An attempt is made here to make a brief survey of the commentarial literature in Sanskrit.

The origin of commentarial literature may be traced to the oral method of Vedic instruction prevalent in ancient days. The prose portions of the *Yajurveda* show an early undeveloped stage of the later *Brāhmaṇa-s*. The *Ṛkprātiśākhya* (**15.** 9) refers to the method of teaching Veda-s:

> guruḥ śiṣyasya padam āha mukhyaṃ
> samāsaś ced asamāso yadi dve,
> etena kalpena samāpya praśnaṃ
> pratyāmnāyus tat punar eva sarve.

The *Nighaṇṭu* and the various *Brāhmaṇa-s* may be considered as the detailed 'teaching notes' that were

[1] One good study is T. G. Mainkar, *Studies in Sanskrit Dramatic Criticism.*

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used in ancient Vedic Guru-kula-s. It may be mentioned that Śaṃkarācārya calls one of the eight divisions of the Brāhmaṇa as Vyākhyāna, i.e. the interpretation of the hymns (*mantravivaraṇāni vyākhyānāni*, *Bṛhadāraṇyabhāṣya* under 2. 4. 10).

The two Mīmāṃsā systems of philosophy arose from these *Brāhmaṇa-s*. That is to say, the elaborate discussions on the sacrifices and other rituals which formed the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the *Brāhmaṇa-s* were the basis of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Similarly the discussions on the supreme Soul which formed the Upaniṣad-s or the Jñānakāṇḍa portion of the *Brāhmaṇa-s* became the basis of the Uttaramīmāṃsā or the Vedānta philosophy. In both these we can see the descriptions of profound subjects using the method of question and answer and other devices like showing familiar objects as examples, telling the stories of Purāṇa-s and Itihāsa-s and presenting typical similes. In these discussions a popular method by name Ākāṅkṣā (Utthāpyākāṅkṣā and Utthitākāṅkṣā) was very much prevalent. This method of Ākāṅkṣā has a prominent place in the later commentaries on Kāvya-s and Nāṭaka-s. The method of question and answer is followed by Yāska in his *Nirukta*. So also by Durgācārya in his commentary thereon.

As time went on, the Vedic literature became more extensive, the six Vedāṅga-s developed through oral teaching and written works, and the learning of these by heart became much more difficult. A more convenient vehicle of knowledge became necessary. This

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was how the Sūtra literature came into existence. Subsequently all the systems of philosophy came to be recorded in the Sūtra form. As the Sūtra literature came into vogue, the method of oral teaching through question and answer and subsequent discussions was revived. In course of time, this oral tradition had also to be put in writing. Thus came into existence the different types of commentaries such as Vṛtti, Vārttika and Bhāṣya. In the beginning, it can be presumed that these kinds of commentaries were confined to the field of Śāstra-s only. Gradually the scope of these became widened to include general literature as well. Consequently types like Vṛtti, Vārttika and Bhāṣya became less prevalent and others like Ṭīkā, Vivṛti and Vyākhyāna came into being.

According to ancient Indian scholars, commentary could be manifold. In general it is called Ṭīkā. Vivṛti, Vivaraṇa, Vyākhyā and Vyākhyāna are considered synonymous. In *Nyāyakośa*, Ṭīkā is defined as follows: 'Mūlagranthasya apratipattivipratipattyanyathāpratipattinivāraṇena tatkartur abhipretasya śabdāntareṇa vivaraṇaṃ ṭīkā. Yathā Śrīmad Bhāgavatasya ṭīkā vijayadhvajī' (p. 306). This word can be derived from the root *ṭīk* meaning to move, to go, etc. *Ṭīkyate gamyate granthārtho'nayā iti ṭīkā*. Rājaśekhara's definition is based on this derivation. He writes: 'Yathāsaṃbhavam arthasya ṭīkanaṃ ṭīkā' (*Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 27). Vṛtti and Vivaraṇa are derived from the root 'vi + vṛ' meaning to reveal, to unfold, etc. *Yo'rthaṃ vivṛṇoti vyanakti prakāśayati sphoṭayati sā vivṛtir vivaraṇaṃ vā*. Vyākhyā

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and Vyākhyānam may be derived from the root '*vi* + *ā* + *khyā*' meaning to tell, to explain, to narrate, etc. '*Apratipatyādinivāraṇaprayojanakaṃ tatsamānārthakapadāntareṇa vistareṇa tadarthakathanaṃ vyākhyānam*' (*Nyāyakośa*, p. 828). Kauṭilya defines this in a different way: 'Atiśayavarṇanā vyākhyānam' (*Arthaśāstra*, **15.** 150). In the *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali explains what is meant by the word vyākhyāna: '*Na kevalaṃ carcāpadāni vyākhyānaṃ vṛddhihāt-aic iti. Kiṃ tarhi? Udāharaṇam pratyudāharaṇaṃ vākhyādhyāhāra ityetatsamuditaṃ vyākhyānaṃ bhavati*' (Paspaśāhnika, p. 77).

There is a definition of Vyākhyāna in *Parāśarapurāṇa*, according to which a commentary has five characteristics, namely, splitting of words, explanation of meanings, dissolution of compound words, presentation of prose-order and raising of doubt followed by the answers. The verse is as follows:

'*Padacchedaḥ padārthoktir vigraho vākyayojanā/*
Ākṣepo'tha samādhānaṃ vyākhyānaṃ pañcalakṣaṇam//'[1]

As pointed out above, these are all synonyms of the word *Ṭīkā* or commentary in its general sense. *Ṭīkā* is divided into many kinds: *Vṛtti*, *Paddhati*, *Bhāṣya*, *Samīkṣā*, *Pañcikā*, *Kārikā*, *Vārttika*, *Saṃgraha* and the like. Rājaśekhara defines all these terms in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*. According to him, *Vṛtti* is called a complete description of the idea of the Sūtra-s: *Sūtrāṇām sakalasāravivaraṇaṃ vṛttiḥ*' (p. 21). The clarificatory discussion of *Sūtra* and *vṛtti* is called Paddhati: '*Sūtravṛttivivecanaṃ paddhatiḥ*.

[1] Quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, p. 828.

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Bhāṣya is that kind of commentary in which new rules are introduced keeping in view the examples and refuting contradictory points. *Ākṣipya bhāṣaṇād bhāṣyam* (ibid.)[1]. In a *Bhāṣya*, Siddhānta-s are to be established by refuting all the *pūrvapakṣa-s*. A slightly different definition of *Bhāṣya* can be seen in the oft-quoted verse:

> '*Sūtrārtho varṇyate yena padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ|*
> *Svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṃ bhāṣyavido viduḥ*'||

The discussion in the middle of a *Bhāṣya* eliminating irrelevant matter is called *Samīkṣā*. *Antarbhāṣyaṃ samīkṣā*. *Avāntarārthavicchedaśca sā* (*Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 27). The commentary which explains the difficult words is called *Pañcikā*. '*Viṣamapadabhañjikā pañcikā*' (ibid. p. 27). *Kārikā* is that which describes all the meanings in verse: '*arthapradarśanakārikā kārikā*' (ibid.). *Vārttika* consists of critical views on what is said, what is not said and what is wrongly said, '*uktānuktaduruktacintā vārttikam*' (ibid.). The same is revealed in the following verse:

> '*Uktānuktaduruktānāṃ cintā yatra pravartate|*
> *Taṃ granthaṃ vārttikaṃ prāhur vārttikajñā manīṣiṇaḥ||*'[2]

Saṃgraha means a summary of many things: '*anekeṣām ekatra sthāpanaṃ saṃgraha iti kāvyajñā vadanti*'

[1] Also see the *Madhusūdanavṛtti* on this:

'*Lakṣyānurodhānnavaniyamanirmāṇam anyathā sthitasya khaṇḍanaṃ vyākhyānāntaraṃ cākṣepaḥ, taṃ kṛtvā*' (p. 27).

[2] Quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, p. 541.

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(*Nyāyakośa*, p. 908). A popular saying defines *Saṃgraha* as follows:

'*Vistareṇopadiṣṭānām arthānāṃ sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ|*
Nibandho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidur budhāḥ'||

ibid.

A Summary of all things that are described in detail in Sūtra and Bhāṣya is called *Saṃgraha*.

In this connection mention may be made of the views of the Dravidian scholars regarding commentarial literature. Tolkāppiyar makes some observations on this in the last pages of his *Tolkkāppiyam*. He refers to two kinds of commentaries, namely, *Kāṇṭikai urai* and *Virutti urai*. *Kāṇṭikai urai* is that which explains sūtra not losing even a bit of its meaning. Without deviating from the sūtra, arguments and illustrations are properly quoted therein[1]. Tolkkāppiyar explains *Virutti Urai* in the next two sūtra-s. In *Virutti urai*, additional matters are also given appropriately. Pūrvapakṣa-s and Uttara-pakṣa-s, as well as additional evidences from the same works or from others are quoted in a commentary to eliminate all doubts and misunderstandings and thus the main point is established. Things that should be avoided in such a work, for example, repetition, contradiction, etc., are also pointed out by Tolkkāppiyar[2].

Bhavanandi also gives certain definitions and explanations of commentaries in general in his *Nannūl*. According to him there should be fourteen parts in a commentary. The original, the summarized sense of

[1] *Tolkkāppiyam*, Puralatikāram, 647, 648.
[2] ibid., 649, 650.

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the Sūtra, words, word meaning, summary of the meaning, examples, questions, answers, additional matters if any, explanation of what is implicitly stated in the Sūtra, mention of Adhikāra, presentation of the substance in unequivocal terms, dwelling on values and quotations of the author's words—these are the fourteen factors listed by him[1]. He also explains the two kinds of commentaries, namely, *Kāṇṭikai urai* and *Virutti urai*[2].

In essence these observations do not substantially differ from those of the Sanskrit scholars.

As a vehicle for the continuation of knowledge handed down from the successive teachers, the Ṭīkā has a noble purpose. The commentators as a whole have helped to preserve many a work from total extinction or oblivion. But for their attempts to explain the works they would have hardly survived. We have so many works which live merely through the quotations in the commentaries. The commentators have preserved the literary and social traditions, the customs, manners and idioms of their age through their commentarial works. This explains why the commentarial literature flourished in the course of centuries catering to changing tastes. When the *Ṭīkā-s* became more difficult than even the originals, they naturally required further *Ṭīkā-s*. The *Ṭīkā* on *Ṭīkā* is called *Ṭippaṇī* or *Ṭippaṇa*. '*Ṭīkāyāṣṭīkā ṭippaṇī*' (*Nyāyakośa*, p. 305). A short commentary also is called *Ṭippaṇī*.

[1] *Nannūl*, Pāyiram, 21.
[2] ibid., 22, 23.

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Although different terms like Ṭīkā, Vṛtti, etc. and their definitions indicate their separate individual existence, it does not appear that in actual practice, in later times, much difference existed among them. Moreover, *Vṛtti*, *Vārttika*, *Bhāṣya* and *Kārikā* are seen only in the field of Śāstra literature. As far as general literature is concerned *Ṭīkā* or *Vyākhyāna* and *Ṭippaṇī* are the only relevant forms of commentaries.

We would do well to refer in this connection to the two methods of commentaries on Kāvya-s and Nāṭaka-s, namely Khaṇḍānvaya and Daṇḍānvaya. The Khaṇḍānvaya method follows the way of the Mimāṃsaka-s. In this method, the explanation of the original work is achieved through questions and answers. According to this, the verb is taken first. Then, in respect of cases, questions are asked and thus through the *ākāṅkṣā* the prose-order of the words is drawn which is followed by the explanation of words and the like. This method might have been actually employed in oral teaching in ancient times. The commentary by Nārāyaṇa on *Naiṣadhīyacarita* may be poined out as an example for Khaṇḍānvaya method.

Daṇḍānvaya method follows more or less the way of the Naiyāyika-s. In this method, we take the subject first and then draw the prose-order of the words in the verse which is followed by the explanation of words and the like. This method also might have existed actually in oral teaching in ancient times as is evident from the reference to the method of teaching similar to this in *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (p. 14). This method became prevalent

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later in the commentarial literature. It was Mallinātha who gave wide popularity to the Daṇḍānvaya method through his several commentaries on the famous Kāvya-s.

Commentarial literature forms an integral part of Sanskrit literature, both Śāstraic and general. The valuable commentaries on different systems of philosophy by Patañjali, Śabara, Śaṃkara, Praśastapāda, Vācaspatimiśra, Madhusūdanasarasvatī, Appayadīkṣita and others have greatly enriched our Śāstra literature. The high position enjoyed by the *Locana* and *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavagupta on *Dhvanyāloka* and *Nāṭyaśāstra* respectively and *Kāvyapradīpa* by Govindaṭhakkura on *Kāvyaprakāśa* reveals that the contribution of commentarial literature to literary criticism is very substantial. Likewise Mallinātha, Rāghavabhaṭṭa, Aruṇagirinātha, Pūrṇasarasvatī, Abhirāma, Jagaddhara, Tripurāri, Ghanaśyāma, Vidyāmādhava, Śrīdharasvāmin, Kāṭayavema, Vīrarāghava and several other commentators have made laudable contributions to enhance the appreciation of literary works of our first-rate Sanskrit writers through their commentaries.

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ASHOK AKLUJKAR

INTERPRETING VĀKYAPADĪYA 2.486 HISTORICALLY (PART 1)*

1.1 The verse I propose to discuss (*parvatād āgamaṃ labdhvā bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ| sa nīto bahu-śākhatvaṃ candrācāryādibhiḥ punaḥ||*) is a part of the ten epilogue type verses found at the end of the Vākya-kāṇḍa or second book of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* or *Trikāṇḍī*.[1]

* (a) A part of this article was presented as a paper at the 188th meeting of the American Oriental Society held in Toronto in April 1978. The financial support necessary for gathering the relevant textual materials was given at various stages by the University of British Columbia, the Canada Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute.

(b) In referring to the *Vākyapadīya*/*Trikāṇḍī* verses I have followed the enumeration in Rau 1977.

[1] Eight of these verses are directly or indirectly relevant to the following discussion. They are given below for easy reference:

prāyeṇa saṃkṣepa-rucīn alpa-vidyā-parigrahān|
saṃprāpya vaiyākaraṇān saṃgrahe 'stam upāgate||481||
kṛte 'tha patañjalinā guruṇā tīrtha-darśinā|
sarveṣāṃ nyāya-bījānāṃ mahābhāṣye nibandhane||482||
alabdha-gādhe gāmbhīryād uttāna iva sauṣṭhavāt|
tasminn akṛta-buddhīnāṃ naivāvāsthita niścayaḥ||483||
vaiji-saubhava-haryakṣaiḥ śuṣka-tarkānusāribhiḥ|
ārṣe viplāvite granthe saṃgraha-pratikañcuke||484||
yaḥ patañjali-śiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamaḥ|
kāle sa dākṣiṇātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ||485||
parvatād āgamaṃ labdhvā bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ|
sa nīto bahu-śākhatvaṃ candrācāryādibhiḥ punaḥ||486||
nyāya-prasthāna-mārgāṃs tān abhyasya svaṃ ca darśanam|
praṇīto guruṇāsmākam ayam āgama-saṃgrahaḥ||487||
vartmanām atra keṣāṃcid vastumātram udāhṛtam|
kāṇḍe tṛtīye nyakṣeṇa bhaviṣyati vicāraṇā||488||

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I have argued elsewhere (Aklujkar 1978:9-26) that the ten verses were not written by Bhartṛhari but by a student of his. However, this does not diminish the historical importance of the verses, for they remain almost as ancient as they have been thought to be. Secondly, acceptance of my view on the authorship of the verses is not a presupposition underlying the points I wish to make in this article. As far as I can see, the observations I offer below are logically independent of the problem of authorship.

1.2 I should also clarify what I mean by a historical interpretation of 2.486. Such an interpretation is primarily an attempt to dissociate the verse from the interpretation, mythological and based on superstition, assigned to it in the *Ṭīkā* and echoed elsewhere.[2] It is an exploration of the possibility of attributing a commonsensical and contextually defensible meaning to 2.486. Secondly, I do not wish to claim that such a meaning reflects historical events—that it informs us regarding what *actually* took place. Although I shall write a portion of this article as if in my view the verse

[2] (a) The *Vākya-kāṇḍa-Ṭīkā* published in the Benares Sanskrit Series (nos. 11, 19, 24 in 1887) is usually ascribed to Puṇya-rāja. However, as is argued in Aklujkar 1974, it could be from the pen of Helā-rāja.

(b) As far as I am aware, it has not as yet been demonstrated that the Ṭīkā comment on 2.486 is largely mythical in nature. I intend to analyze the comment as a myth in part 2 of this aticle (see fn. 5 below).

(c) Even those scholars working on Bhartṛhari who have referred to or reproduced the Ṭīkā comment on 2.486 have not noted that similar accounts are found in the Tibetan tradition and in the late Sanskrit epic poem *Patañjali-carita*.

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contains unquestionable history, this is not a matter of conviction to me. The value of 2.486 and the group to which it belongs lies primarily in informing us about what was viewed as history by a learned individual fifteen hundred years ago. It is as an ancient historical statement that the verses are important. Although because of their age they are likely to be closer to historical reality than our more recent sources and guesses, it is not imperative that we view them as giving us *the* historical truth. In other words, there is a need to separate our perspective from that of the author of the verses.[3]

1.3 A comprehensive historical interpretation of 2.486 should attempt to answer the following questions: (a) What was the nature of the activity referred to by *āgamaṃ labdhvā*? In other words, what was the manner of the acquisition of *āgama*? (b) What was the source or location of the acquisition of *āgama*? How does one identify *parvata*? (c) What is meant by *bhāṣya-bīja-s* and how were they utilized? (d) What is the precise meaning of *bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*? How exactly did Candrācārya and others make the *āgama* many-branched?[4] (e) Who are Candrācāryādi? Can we

[3] Regrettably, such a separation is missing in the discussions of 481-90 that have so far appeared in print. Scholars have written as if an unalloyed piece of historical information regarding the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition is to be found in these verses.

[4] In a literal interpretation of 486 the component *ādi* in *candrācāryādibhiḥ* must be connected with *āgamaṃ labh* as well as *bahu-śākhatvaṃ nī*; that is, the associates or followers of Candrācārya must be understood as agents in the act of acquisition and the act of making the *vyākaraṇāgama* many-branched. However, it is

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assign a personality to the designation Candrācārya? My intention in the present article is to answer only the first question. The remaining questions must be left out for treatment in separate publications.[5]

2.1 Prior to addressing myself directly to question (a), I should draw attention to a grammatical-textual problem I have pointed out without offering a solution in Aklujkar 1978:23-4. How we answer question (a) will depend on our resolution of that problem. The construction *āgamaṃ labdhvā sa bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ* in **2.**486 seems as strange to me as *maṇiṃ labdhvā sa bahu-bhedatvaṃ nītaḥ* or *viṣavṛkṣaṃ saṃvardhya sa bahu-khaṇḍatvaṃ nītaḥ*. Normally, the demonstrative pronoun *saḥ* should not be necessary, and there should be nominative forms in the place of *maṇim* and *viṣa-vṛkṣam*;

possible that the author did not want us to interpret his remark with such grammatical exactitude; in his view Candrācārya could have been the lone agent of the act of acquiring and others could have joined or followed Candrācārya only in furthering the *āgama*. The same can be said about the parallel statement in *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* **1.**176. In the Tibetan tradition Candra-gomin, who is a functional equivalent of Candrācārya, is not accompanied by anyone when he comes across the *Mahābhāṣya* exposition.

[5] See 'Interpreting *Vākyapadīya* **2.**486 historically (part 2)' to be published in *Indological and Buddhist Studies in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong* and 'Interpreting *Vākyapadīya* **2.**486 historically (part 3)' forthcoming. The former will constitute a negative sequel to the present article in that it will demonstrate that the *Ṭīkā* answer to question (a) is not historical and has features typical of myths. The latter will seek to answer question (b). My thoughts on questions (c)-(e) are far from reaching a publishable form.

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that is, the sentences should be: *maṇir labdhvā bahu-bhedatvaṃ nītaḥ, viṣa-vṛkṣaḥ saṃvardhya bahu-khaṇḍatvaṃ nītaḥ*, and *āgamo labdhvā bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*.[6]

2.2 Now, there is no easy textual way of reducing *āgamaṃ labdhvā sa bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ* to *āgamo labdhvā bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*. All known manuscripts, especially those which are most reliable in instances of divergence in reading, agree in reading *āgamam* and in containing *saḥ*. Besides, *saḥ* is needed to refer to *vyākaraṇāgama* mentioned in verse 485. This leaves only one textual solution available to us: emendation of the reading *āgamam* or *parvatād āgamam*. Such a course of action is especially inviting if one notes that the word *āgamam* is not really necessary; *vyākaraṇāgama* has been referred to unambiguously in 485. Use of an unwarranted substantive hardly agrees with the meticulousness of expression evident in 2.481-90. Secondly, if the substantive *āgama* were to be repeated at all, it would have been repeated most probably after employing an appropriate form of the demonstrative pronoun; that is, *āgamo vyavasthitaḥ/ tam āgamaṃ labdhvā* . . . does not seem strange, but *āgamo vyavasthitaḥ/ āgamaṃ labdhvā*

[6] Cf. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkāra-sūtra-vṛtti* 5.2.21 (p. 77-8 of the Nirṇaya Sāgara edition of 1953): *anabhihite* [Pāṇini 2.3.1] *ity atra sūtre tiṅ-kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiḥ* [Vārttika 5] *iti parigaṇanaṃ kṛtam. tasya prāyikatvān nipātenāpy abhihite karmaṇi na karma-vibhaktir bhavati, yathā viṣa-vṛkṣo 'pi saṃvardhya svayaṃ chettum asāṃpratam* [*Kumāra-saṃbhava* 2.55] *iti*. Also, *Siddhāntakaumudī* on 2.3.1-2 in Kāraka-prakaraṇa 537. Note the construction *rājñā sa mahīpatiḥ nigṛhya tulyāvasthaḥ vyadhīyata* in *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī*, 4.305.

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. . . does seem strange; the two sentences do not join smoothly in the latter case.[7]

2.3 The above considerations, however, do not seem so strong to me as to force an emendation on us; their strength extends only to making a *prima facie* case that the wording available to us may not be the original one. The argument they build up is essentially stylistic. That words are used in a measured, considered manner in verses 2.481-90 does not necessarily mean that their author will not repeat a substantive for the sake of the metre or for the sake of emphasizing some aspect.[8] Similarly, the absence of a *tam* is a matter of stylistic sensitivity; it is an expression that would have made the reference of *āgama* more pointed, but it is not absolutely required by the context. Being aware of these counter-arguments and of at least one other plausible way of explaining the construction *āgamaṃ labdhvā sa bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*, I do not wish to propose that the text of 486a be emended.

2.4 If it is decided that the text as handed down in manuscripts should not be tampered with, then the grammatical problem seen in *āgamaṃ labdhvā sa*

[7] One would get a similar feeling if someone decided to avoid using pronouns in constructing English sentences and repeated the related nouns whenever necessary. Why this happens is an interesting question, but it need not be answered here.

[8] For example, the intention could be to say: 'one does not expect that a culturally less active area like a mountain would preserve knowledge that is lost elsewhere, but it is at a mountain that Candrācārya acquired the *āgama* which the successors of Patañjali had lost.'

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bahuśākhatvaṃ nītaḥ must be solved by probing deeper into syntax. Two syntactic solutions are possible:

(a) One could assume that the author of 486 feels like referring to the *vyākaraṇāgama* by *saḥ* once again after he has referred to it by *āgamam* because an expression like *bhāṣyabījānusāribhiḥ* actually intervenes and an expression like *bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ candrācāryādibhiḥ* mentally intervenes. A sentence like *mārgaṃ labdhvā śrāntais tṛṣitaiḥ kṣudhitai rāja-putraiḥ sa punar hāpitaḥ* ('After having found the path, the exhausted, thirsty, and hungry princes lost it again') does not seem strange. Only when the expressions between *mārgaṃ labdhvā* and *saḥ* are removed and the sentence is shortened to *mārgaṃ labdhvā sa hāpitaḥ* do we get the feeling that some deviation from standard Sanskrit has taken place; we feel like asking, 'If this is what the author has in mind, why did he not write *labdho mārgaḥ punar hāpitaḥ* or *mārgaṃ labdhvā te taṃ punar hāpitavantaḥ*?'

(b) If one assumes that the reference of *āgamaṃ* and *saḥ* is to different entities then *āgamaṃ labdhvā sa bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ* is not a strange or ungrammatical construction. For example, *vajraṃ labdhvā maṇir bahu-bhedatvaṃ nītaḥ* and *viṣavṛkṣaṃ saṃvardhya āmra-vṛkṣo bahu-khaṇḍatvaṃ nītaḥ* are acceptable sentences.

2.5 The *Ṭīkā* ascribed to Puṇya-rāja or Helā-rāja (see fn. 2 above) accepts the second possibility and does not seem to be aware of the first.[9] It understands

[9] The *Ṭīkā* introduces and explains 486 as follows: *atha kālāntareṇa candrācāryādibhir āgamaṃ labdhvā tena copāya-bhūtena sakalāni bhāṣyāvasthitāni yāni nyāya-bījāni tāny anusṛtya vyākaraṇāgamaḥ punar api sphītatāṃ nīta ity abhidhātum āha . . . parvatāt tri-kūṭaika-deśa-varti-*

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āgamaṃ as referring to a *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* and *saḥ* as referring to the *vyākaraṇāgama* that the students of Patañjali lost. According to it, what happened in the history of Pāṇinian grammar was essentially this: Because of the peculiar style of the *Mahābhāṣya* and because of the insensitive interpretations advanced by Vaiji and others, the successors of Patañjali lost the knowledge of what Patañjali actually wished to say and what Patañjali accepted as *siddhānta*. This knowledge was no longer a part of their living tradition of study and was preserved only in manuscripts among the Southerners. Candrācārya and others again gave it currency in a much developed form, once they came in possession of the *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama*. In other words, although the Ṭīkā seems hesitant and hazy,[10]

tiliṅgaika-deśad iti. tatra hy upala-tale rāvaṇa-viracito mūla-bhūta-vyākaraṇāgamas tiṣṭhati. kenacic ca brahma-rakṣasānīya [sa?] candrācārya-vasurāta-guru-prabhṛtīnāṃ datta iti. taiḥ khalu yathāvad vyākaraṇasya sva-rūpaṃ tata upalabhya, satataṃ ca śiṣyāṇāṃ vyākhyāya [vyākaraṇāgamo?] bahu-śākhitvaṃ nīto vistāraṃ prāpita ity anuśrūyate.

[10] Note that in the *Ṭīkā* comment *āgama*/ *mūla-bhūta-vyākaraṇāgama* and *vyākaraṇāgama* are nowhere placed near each other in such a manner as to make their distinction readily intelligible. In the passage introducing 486, one cannot immediately determine whether the *āgama* referred to by *āgamaṃ labdhvā tena copāya-bhūtena* is the same as the *vyākaraṇāgama* referred to by *vyākaraṇāgamaḥ punar api sphītatāṃ nītaḥ*, and thus identical with the *vyākaraṇāgama* spoken of in verse 485. It is also not clear if that *āgama* is a means (*upāya*) with respect to following the intimations in the *Mahābhāṣya* (*bhāṣyāvasthitāni yāni nyāya-bījāni tāny anusṛtya*) or with respect to making the obscure *vyākaraṇāgama* easily noticeable (*vyākaraṇāgamaḥ punar api sphītatāṃ nītaḥ*). As for the passage following the text of 486 in the *Ṭīkā*, there seems to have been a studied effort not to state explicitly the object of *satataṃ ca śiṣyāṇāṃ vyākhyāya bahu-śākhitvaṃ nītaḥ* and thus to play down the presence of *vyākaraṇāgamaḥ* and *saḥ* in verses 485 and 486.

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it probably visualizes the relevant happenings as follows: Candrācārya and others got hold of the essential, most fundamental, body of Vaiyākaraṇa doctrines. They studied the intimations in the *Mahābhāṣya* on the background of these doctrines; they used the principles implicit in Patañjali's statements to provide flesh to the skeleton they had received. This activity enabled them to make current once again a multi-faceted, robust tradition of Vaiyākaraṇa views.

2.6 There are several problems associated with the reconstruction of events given in the *Ṭīkā*. First of all, no author is likely to use a very general word like *āgama* for a very specific *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* without adding the necessary qualifications. Such an unqualified use is especially unlikely when the word *āgama* could be mistaken as referring to the general *vyākaraṇāgama* or the *Mahābhāṣya*-related *vyākaraṇāgama* (see fn. 18 below) mentioned in the immediately preceding verse. Besides, the verses 481-90 have been written with such a clear awareness of sequence that it seems highly improbable that their author would suddenly switch the reference of *āgama* from *vyākaraṇāgama* to *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama*. If he had such a switch in mind he would have in all likelihood written a verse between present 485 and 486 making the transition possible. As matters stand, even the *Ṭīkā* does not give any hint of a verse missing in between. Moreover, nowhere else in Sanskrit literature, as far as I am aware, is the notion of an eternal but ordinarily inaccessible *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* corroborated. To be noted

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in this connection is also the fact that the *Ṭīkā* explanation does not clarify what the relation of the activities of Candrācārya and others was to the *vyākaraṇāgama-grantha*[11] preserved among the Southerners. Did Candrācārya and others get hold of this *grantha* or was the furthering of *vyākaraṇāgama* achieved by them independently of the *grantha*—achieved only through the *mūla-bhūta vyukaraṇāgama* and study of the *Mahābhāṣya*? It is obviously the first alternative that is more likely to have been intended by the author of 486, for if Candrācārya and others are not said to have known the *grantha*, the mention of *grantha* in verse 485 becomes vacuous, and Candrācārya and others cannot be said to have made the *vyākaraṇāgama* many-branched; they cannot make many-branched something they do not possess, and verse 485 tells us that *vyākaraṇāgama* was preserved only in *grantha* form (note *grantha-mātre*). But if Candrācārya and others did get hold of the *grantha* and the *vyākaraṇāgama* contained in it, how do we get a statement to that effect from 486a, should we decide to follow the *Ṭīkā* explanation? Under that explanation, once 486a is made to state that Candrācārya and others got hold of the *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* we have no space to accommodate a statement to the effect that Candrācārya and others got hold of the *vyākaraṇāgama*

[11] I retain the expression *grantha* in order to be able to preserve the ambiguity of the original; verse 485 does not specify whether the *vyākaraṇāgama* was preserved in one *grantha* (manuscript, composition, written form of a work, manuscript bundle) or several *grantha-s*.

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that the successors of Patañjali had lost.[12] Thus, the Ṭīkā explanation is untenable for more than one reason.[13]

2.7 The outcome of the discussion so far is that, in the present state of our resources, alternative (a) mentioned in 2.4 above is the best solution available. True, it implies acceptance of a certain laxity in the composition of 486, with part of that laxity attributable to intervening expressions. However, it does not at

[12] It may be said by way of objection that I am putting too specific an interpretation on the word *mūla-bhūta*—that what the author of the *Ṭīkā* means is nothing more than *vyākaraṇāgama*; he characterizes it as *mūla-bhūta* because it was vital to the understanding of the *Mahābhāṣya* and the doctrines of the Vaiyākaraṇa-s; his intention is not to set *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* apart from *vyākaraṇāgama* (see fn. 10 above). In other words, *mūla-bhūta* is an adjective that describes, not one that distinguishes. However, it seems extremely unlikely to me that *mūla-bhūta* is intended as a simple descriptive, emphatic, adjective. The author of the summary verses appearing at the end of the *Ṭīkā* manuscripts, who was most probably a junior contemporary of, if not identical with, the author of the *Ṭīkā* (Aklujkar 1974:181-4), certainly did not take it that way. The relevant verse in his composition is: *bhraṣṭasyāmnāya-sārasya vaiyākaraṇa-gāminaḥ/ mūla-bhūtam avāpyātha parvatād āgamaṃ svayaṃ//*. Here the *vaiyākaraṇa-gāmin āmnāyasāra* (that is, the *vyākaraṇāgama*) is clearly distinguished from the *mūla-bhūta āgama*. Thus, the *Ṭīkā* words have been understood as I understand them almost from the time of its author. Secondly, if *vyākaraṇāgama* and *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama* are deemed identical, the *Ṭīkā* must be understood as implying that the successors of Patañjali mentioned in 485 were initially in possession of a *rāvaṇa-viracita āgama* and that *grantha* in 485 means 'inscribed on stone (*upala-tala*)'. However, these implications are not at all supported by the *Ṭīkā* comment on 485.

[13] Note also that there is no suggestion of two *āgama-s* in the *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* (1.176) passage reminiscent of 486: *candrācāryādibhir labdhvādeśaṃ* [v. l. *labdhvā deśāt*] *tasmāt tadāgamam* [read *sahāgamam*?]/ *pravartitaṃ mahā-bhāṣyaṃ svaṃ ca vyākaraṇaṃ kṛtam//*.

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least force us into any intellectual acrobatics or assumption of unexpressed distinctions. Besides, although I have so far been able to find only one,[14] many sentences showing the influence of intervening expressions on constructions of the type *āgamo labdhvā bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ* may be found in Sanskrit literature. If they are found, then the only problem with the wording of 486 will be the use of the word *āgama* when it could have been contextually understood. As pointed out in **2.3** above, this is hardly a serious problem. The greatest merit of solution (a), however, is that it leaves room for answering question (a) in **1.2** above in a commonsensical way.

3.1 Given the background that verses 481-485 provide and the result (*bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*) that 486 speaks of, what could Candrācārya and others be understood as having done or gone through? It is quite clear that in their days the *Mahābhāṣya*-related *vyākaraṇāgama* had ceased to be a true *āgama* and was, at least according to the text we have, preserved only in a remote

[14] This is Śaṃkara, *Tattvopadeśa* verse 66 (*Minor Works of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya*, Poona Oriental Series No. 8, ed. H.R. Bhagavat, 2nd edn., 1952, p. 24): *advayānanda-rūpāt tvāṃ pracyāvyātīva dhūrtakaiḥ/ dūra-nīto 'si deheṣu saṃsārāraṇya-bhūmiṣu//* 'Having dislodged you thoroughly (*atīva*) from a form consisting of bliss of non-duality, the rogues have led you far in [the region of] bodies, the jungle land of transmigration.' Here the construction *dhūrtakais tvāṃ pracyāvya* [tvaṃ] *dūra-nīto 'si* is similar to *candrācāryādibhir āgamaṃ labdhvā sa bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ*, unless, of course, the reading *tvām* can be proved to be a corruption of *tvam*. As an instance of the need felt that a pronoun be used to refer to an intervened subject or object, note Patañjali on *Pratyāhāra-sūtra* 1 (Kielhorn's edn., vol. I, p. 18): *loka ṛṣi-sahasram ekāṃ kapilām ekaikaśaḥ sahasrakṛtvo dattvā* **tayā sarve te** *sahasra-dakṣiṇāḥ saṃpannāḥ.*

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or relatively remote written source or body of sources. Therefore, the first possibility is that Candrācārya and others would try to make the source or sources not so remote, that is, to make the Southern *grantha* available in the North. The second possibility is that they would try to collect the scattered written record; a reconstruction of the *āgama* would have been impossible without a systematic exploration of the sources in which it was preserved. The third possibility is that Candrācārya and others would try to interpret what they found in the South.[15]

3.2 Of these three possibilities—reintroduction of manuscripts in the North, piecing together of the *āgama* preserved in the Southern sources, and making sense of the relevant enlightening works in the South, the first possibility is not likely to have been intended for expression in 486a. The words *bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ* and *bahu-śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ* indicate that the initial achivement registered by Candrācārya and others is likely to be intellectual and unlikely to be a simple transcription of manuscripts. Besides, if Candrācārya and others had been responsible for giving wider currency to a work or body of works, details such as title, etc. of that work

[15] Theoretically, this interpretation could have been two-fold: (a) reading the Southern record by mastering its script, and (b) making sense of the sentences or remarks seen in the record. The first type of interpretation, however, is not likely to be meant here. Since Sanskrit manuscripts were commonly written in the local scripts, decipherment was probably not considered to be such a rare achievement as to deserve a special mention. Secondly, the accompanying qualification *bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ* indicates that the achievement of Candrācārya and others was interpretative in the sense of understanding, comprehension, or making sense.

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or body of works would probably have been provided. Nor does the first possibility agree with the general and primary sense of *āgama* ('traditionally handed down knowledge' as explained in Aklujkar 1971:169-70).

3.3 Thus, if we are to follow the indications that 485 and 486 give, the initial achievement of Candrācārya and others can be narrowed down to (a) culling of the *vyākaraṇāgama* bearing on the *Mahābhāṣya* from various works preserved in the South and (b) interpretation of the works surviving in the South that contained information crucial to a proper understanding of the Mahābhāṣya which had ceased to be properly studied. Now, these two activities are mutually complementary in practice. Mere collection of relevant passages or works is useless without interpretation, and no satisfactory interpretation of texts which have gone out of currency is possible unless passages of similar or related import are put near each other. Therefore, what Candrācārya and his associates or successors did was probably both collation and exegesis.

3.4 I thus understand recovery of as much *vyākaraṇāgama* as was available in a book-bound, moribund form to be the nature of the activity referred to by *āgamaṃ labdhvā*. I do not think that the *āgama* referred to in this phrase is different from the *vyākaraṇāgama* mentioned in 485 or is one, specific, work. I view Candrācārya and others as having in their possession the *Mahābhāṣya*[16] and some other texts of the Pāṇinian

[16] Attempts have been made, most notably by Albrecht Weber and S. D. Joshi, to infer from verses 481-90 that the text of

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system (including the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*[17] and *vārttika*) but no reliable interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya*[18] and no precise knowledge of what the *Mahābhāṣya* had implicitly taken from the *Saṃgraha* and related works. Generally, it was the pre-Patañjali scholarship in theories about language, grammar, and related topics and the knowledge of the influence of that scholarship on Patañjali's own thinking that had become elusive by the time of Candrācārya and his associates. The inability of their predecessors to cope with a work that demanded knowledge of several branches of learning and the prevalence of *Mahābhāṣya* interpretations based on uninformed guess-work (*śuṣka tarka*; see Aklujkar 1978: 18; Cardona 1978: 95-6) authored by Vaiji, Saubhava,

the *Mahābhāṣya* survived precariously before Candrācārya established it again. Kielhorn (1876) and Cardona (1978) have pointed out that the verses do not support any such inference.

[17] Remarks by Thieme (1956: 19 fn. 45-6) and Cardona (1978: 97, lines 6-10) leave the impression that in their view the understanding and use of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* had suffered a decline before Candrācārya recovered the *āgama*. As indicated in Aklujkar 1978:16-9, the evidence before us does not warrant this conclusion. Although a *Mahābhāṣya*-related *āgama* would include at least some knowledge contained in or inspired by the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and although improper understanding of the *Mahābhāṣya* may in some cases result in an improper understanding of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we have no indications in the available evidence that the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as such was eclipsed—either as a body of knowledge or as a generally accessible text.

[18] It should be borne in mind that *bhraṣṭaḥ* in 485b is an attributive (qualifying or delimiting) adjective, not a predicate adjective. The author's intention is not to assert loss of the entire *vyākaraṇāgama* or the entire Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, but to speak of the lost portion of the *vyākaraṇāgama*. That this *vyākaraṇāgama* is one which has a bearing on the *Mahābhāṣya* is something we know from the context (*patañjalinā*, *mahābhāṣye*, *patañjali-śiṣyebhyaḥ*).

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and Haryakṣa had deprived them of information necessary for a proper understanding of the *Mahābhāṣya* (not necessarily of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*; see Aklujkar 1978: 18-9). It is this information they must have tried to get, and their success in getting it or a significant part of it must constitute the *āgama-lābha*. Since they could not have got the information unless they searched for pre-Patañjali works, works incorporating contents of pre-Patañjali works, and works directly (as commentaries) or indirectly relevant in the study of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and studied whatever materials became available to them, *āgama-lābha* amounts to search and understanding of nearly-lost relevant works and fragments thereof.[19]

[19] (a) If *mūla-bhūta* in the *Ṭīkā* explanation (fn. 9) is taken as a simple descriptive or emphatic adjective (fns. 10, 12 and 13), my interpretation may be said to agree with the *Ṭīkā* interpretation in spirit, although certainly not in details. Both the interpretations would then converge to the extent of describing the recovered *āgama* as fundamental, as basic, to the understanding of the Pāṇinian tradition in general and of the *Mahābhāṣya* in particular, as one having general relevance as well as immediate specific application. The details of the *Ṭīkā* explanation I would eschew would then be *upala-tale*, *rāvaṇa-viracitaḥ*, and *brahma-rakṣasānīya dattaḥ*.

(b) My interpretation agrees with Kielhorn's (1876:245) in that he too attempts (although implicitly) to divest verse 486 of the supernatural elements associated with it. We differ in our understanding of what Candrācārya and others discovered in the South. According to Kielhorn, the discovered matter was 'written ... commentaries which gave the traditional interpretation [of the *Mahābhāṣya*]'. I find this interpretation too specific to be reconciled with the primary sense of *āgama* and the drift of 481-7. The author of 481-7 is evidently concerned with some knowledge which was common to the *Saṃgraha* and the *Mahābhāṣya*, which could be used for understanding (or in conjunction with) the principles implicit in the *Mahābhāṣya* (note *bhāṣya-bījānusāribhiḥ*), and

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3.5 Since I was so far concerned with discussing the most probable interpretation of only *āgamaṃ labdhvā*, I have ignored the presence of the word *parvatāt* and have used expressions that leave room for the inference that Candrācārya and others acquired the *āgama* portions at a number of distant places in the South. Hence it needs to be clarified that this inference is not an unavoidable aspect of my exposition of *āgamaṃ labdhvā*. What is necessary if my interpretation is to stand is that Candrācārya and his associates be thought of as having visited a number of places in the South and as having made as thorough an effort as was possible in the then prevailing conditions; it is not necessary that they be thought of as having *acquired* the *āgama* at a number of places removed from each other. Therefore, the word *parvatāt* which indicates that the acquisition of *āgama* took place in one region or took place mostly in one region does not conflict with my interpretation. It merely implies that even the written sources for the *āgama* had become scarce and were not found, as far as the search by Candrācārya and others was concerned, outside a region identifiable as *parvata*.

which had the potential for development into a variety of views or principles (note *bahu-Śākhatvaṃ nītaḥ ... nyāya-prasthāna-mārgāṃs tān*). Such knowledge could be gathered from the commentaries on the *Mahābhāṣya*, but it need not be viewed as exclusively available in them. Besides, if the uncertainty of interpretation evident in Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā* is any indication, a definite or mostly definite traditional interpretation such as the one commentaries would provide does not seem to have been available in Bhartṛhari's time. It is, therefore, unlikely to have been acquired by Candrācārya who does not seem to be far removed from Bhartṛhari in time.

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3.6 I prefer the interpretation given in the last five paragraphs to the one found in the *Ṭīkā* for a number of reasons:

(a) It arises out of and agrees with the context of 486. According to it, Candrācārya and his followers carry out what we would expect them to carry out in the situation described in 481-5.

(b) It appeals to no supernatural event or person.

(c) It does not necessitate the assumption of an unsubstantiated, permanent but almost inaccessible, *āgama*.

(d) We are not required to admit a sudden shift in the use of the word *āgama*—from *vyākaraṇāgama* to *mūlabhūta vyākaraṇāgama* or from 'knowledge handed down in a tradition' to 'a specific text'.

(e) Conflict with the *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* passage echoing 486 (see fn. 13 above) is avoided. That passage seems to speak of an *āgama* whose immediate usefulness was in bringing the *Mahābhāṣya* into academic currency, in making the *Mahābhāṣya* a respectable and hence attractive text for serious students. My interpretation presupposes precisely such an *āgama*.

(f) The nature of the *āgama* that Candrācārya and others managed to salvage should be reflected in the *Vākyapadīya/Trikāṇḍī*, for as verse 487 tells us, the *Vākyapadīya/Trikāṇḍī* is based on Bhartṛhari's[20] own view as well as the many-branched *āgama* or *nyāya-prasthāna-mārga-s* that Candrācārya and others succeeded in developing after they got the *āgama*. Now, even a rapid reading of Bhartṛhari's

[20] Or Vasurāta's, if the *Ṭīkā* explanation is followed.

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work will bring home the fact that the *āgama* it contains is almost always related to the *Mahābhāṣya*. More often than not the pattern is one of stating some theses in the area of language and grammar and then mentioning or discussing some *Mahābhāṣya* statements that could be associated with those theses. This pattern is particularly obvious in the third *Kāṇḍa* but is not missing in the first two *kāṇḍa-s* particularly in the Vṛtti portion.[21] Traditional scholars have not been oblivious to it.[22] Thus, there can be no doubt that *āgama* as it related to the *Mahābhāṣya* was something that Bhartṛhari valued greatly. The interpretation I have proposed agrees with this observation, as it does not rest on the notion of an *āgama* distantly or indirectly related to the *Mahābhāṣya*.

(g) We know it as a fact, especially after the discovery of Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* and the Bhāsa plays, that many Sanskrit works which would throw a flood of light on dark periods and serve to link later works to earlier works survived in manuscript form in the South long after they ceased to be available in the North. This was but natural in view of the relatively

[21] Bhartṛhari's commentary to the *Mahābhāṣya* retains the thrust of this pattern, but naturally, since it must follow the order of *Mahābhāṣya* statements, reverses the sequence of the constituents of the pattern; wherever the *Mahābhāṣya* statements can be related to the general theses of the Vaiyākaraṇa-s it cites or utilizes those general theses.

[22] In concluding the *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa*, Helā-rāja observes: *sūkti-śriyaḥ . . . etāḥ . . . harer bhāṣyābdhi-pīyūṣa-cchaṭācchurita-vigrahāḥ*. One of the introductory verses of Tārānātha Tarka-vācaspati's *Śabdārtha-ratna* is as follows: *mahābhāṣyārtha-tātparya-jñāpikāḥ kārikāḥ svayam| kṛtvā vākyapadīyākhyaṃ nibandhaṃ kṛtavān hariḥ||*.

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greater freedom the South enjoyed from agression, the more durable writing material it abundantly had, the financial support its scholars received, and the tradition it created of bestowing filial care on manuscripts. Distant regions tend to preserve older language forms as well as works. Hence an interpretation of 486a which mainly argues that the situation concerning Sanskrit works was essentially the same in the days of Candrācārya as we have witnessed it to be in the twentieth century should not come as a surprise.

3.7 To sum up, just as we need to distinguish our perspective from that of the author of 486 (**1.2** above), we should distinguish the *Ṭīkā* author's perspective from that of the author of 486. The *Ṭīkā* interpretation, particularly because of its twofold understanding of *āgama*, is not the one we should view as intended in *parvatād āgamaṃ labdhvā*. The supernatural element in it *may* go back to the author of 481-90, for the possibility of that author having believed that Candrācārya and others were guided to the lost *vyākaraṇāgama* through some extraordinary encounter cannot be logically ruled out. However, we can be certain that the possibility is not *expressed* in 486 and that, for this reason, it should be treated as non-existent. It seems more than likely that in the days of Bhartṛhari and his disciples the story of Candrācārya's acquisition of the *āgama* was a simple tale of intelligent guesses and determined search, in which the only miracle was that Candrācārya succeeded in the face of overwhelming odds. The simple tale seems to have been gradually mythologized

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in the Vaiyākaraṇa tradition in the following period of five or more centuries.

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M. SRIMANNARAYANA MURTI

BHARTṚHARI ON SVAṂ RŪPAṂ ŚABDASYĀŚABDASAṂJÑĀ

THE rules of Pāṇini are interpreted by Bhartṛhari mainly from the semantic point of view while his predecessors like Kātyāyana and Patañjali focus their attention more on the morphological or formal analysis of the language. Some of the interpretations of Bhartṛhari are very significant as they throw considerable light on the fundamental linguistic problems pertaining not only to Sanskrit but to all languages in general. Bhartṛhari might not be the first linguist to formulate such semantic theories; for, he himself acknowledges two prominent thinkers, namely, Vyāḍi and his own teacher Vasurāta, besides several other unindentified linguists. But in view of the nonavailability of the works of his forerunners, we are to depend upon Bhartṛhari's extant works to understand the mind of the Indian semanticists. In this paper an attempt is made to show how Bhartṛhari interprets the rule *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā* (**1.** 1. 68) against the linguistic theories obtaining in his time. He discusses the rule in the first Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya* while describing the nature and function of the linguistic symbol called *sphoṭa*.

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I

Bhartṛhari interprets the rule on the following semantic presuppositions:

1. In communication a word has two distinct referents: the linguistic *form* comprising the various phonemes constituting the word and the *content* or the meaning intended to be conveyed.

The cognition of the linguistic form follows the accurate comprehension of the phonemes that constitute the word. As to how the linguistic form as well as the content is conveyed by the word, Bhartṛhatri gives his explanation with the analogy of knowledge. Knowledge reveals its own form simultaneously with the object of knowledge.[1] Knowledge cannot be cognized independent of its object. Even though knowledge illuminates the object, its cognition depends upon the object. So in every cognition, the object as well as the knowledge of it are cognized. Similarly, in a verbal cognition the word refers to both the referents, the linguistic form and its content.

2. As a word can communicate these two referents, the form and the content, it can be assumed that it possesses two distinct powers called *grāhyatva*, the

[1] *ātmarūpaṃ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṃ ca dṛśyate /*
artharūpaṃ tathā śabde svarūpaṃ ca prakāśate //

Vākyapadīya (*VP*), 50 of Bhartṛhari with the *Vṛtti* (*Vṛ*) and the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966.

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power of the word to be the object of apprehension and *grāhakatva*, the power to convey the meaning.[1]

3. So in a verbal cognition there are two stages, namely, the comprehension of the linguistic form of the word and that of the meaning or the content of the word.[2]

Without cognizing the linguistic form one cannot cognize the meaning of the word. Expressed otherwise the primary referent of a word is its linguistic form and the meaning constitutes its secondary referent. In the former case the word makes the cognition of its form possible by virtue of its power of 'being apprehended' and in the latter the cognition of the meaning is due to the power of the word to reveal.

This double function of words conforms to our experience. The speaker desiring to communicate, first conceives the correct form of the word; similarly the listener also comprehends the linguistic form of the word before understanding the meaning.[3] By comprehending the mere existence of the word its meaning is not cognized, unless the linguistic form is cognized primarily.[4] Therefore the listener fails to comprehend the meaning when the linguistic form is not apprehended

[1] *grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā /*
tathaiva sarvaśabdānām ete pṛthag avasthite // ibid., 55.

[2] Ibid., 50.

[3] *yathā prayoktuḥ prāg buddhiḥ śabdeṣv eva pravartate /*
vyavasāyo grahītṝṇām evaṃ teṣv eva jāyate // ibid., 53.

[4] *viṣayatvam anāpannaiḥ śabdair nārthaḥ prakāśyate /*
na sattayaiva te 'rthānām agṛhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ // ibid., 56.

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and asks the speaker as to what he has uttered.[1] Thus the form of the word is the principal (*śeṣin*) when it is comprehended and the same becomes subordinate (*śeṣa*) when the content or meaning is conveyed.[2]

4. The word thus becomes the object of cognition (*grāhya*) and also the means of cognition (*grāhaka*); whereas in other instances of cognition, like the sensory perceptions, the sense organs are only the instruments which are never cognized and the objects of perception are never the instruments.

With the analogy of light Bhartṛhari elucidates how two contradictory powers can reside in one substratum. The light illuminates itself and also the objects in its range.[3] It may be noted that many systems of Indian philosophy, including Buddhism, have admitted that the word, light and knowledge are cognized both as objects and as means of cognition.

5. In common parlance we do not differentiate the first stage of cognizing the linguistic form from that of cognizing the meaning because of two reasons. Firstly, the linguistic form does not have any relation with the activity expressed by the verb in the sentence.[4] It is just like the adjectival words expressing quality like *śukla* and *nīla* which do not have any direct

[1] *ato 'nirjñātarūpatvāt kim āhety abhidhīyate |*
nendriyāṇāṃ prakāśye 'rthe svarūpaṃ gṛhyate tathā || ibid., 57.

[2] *tasmāc cheṣibhāvakāṣṭhām anubhūya sarvārthayonayaḥ sarve śabdāḥ śeṣabhāvam artheṣu pratipadyante*, ibid., *Vṛ.* 53.

[3] *VP*, 55.

[4] *sā tu saṃnihitapratyavabhāsāpi loke bhujyādikriyāsaṃbandhaviro-dhān nāśrīyate*, ibid., *Vṛ.* 50.

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connection with the verb as in *śuklaṃ vastram ānaya* (bring a white piece of cloth). Secondly the linguistic form of the word is subordinate to the meaning of the word and the listener who wants to understand only the intention of the speaker never pays attention to it.[1] So in using the language for communication, the linguistic form is not thought of as separate from the comprehension of the meaning.[2]

6. In formulating and communicating the grammatical rules the situation is different. The words in the rules refer only to the linguistic forms as primary referents and these are connected with the grammatical modifications enjoined in the rules; for, the grammatical modifications enjoined cannot be associated with the meanings of the words.[3] Thus in social communication the meaning of the word is predominant (*pradhāna*) while in grammar it is the linguistic form.

7. There is a distinction between the words used in the grammatical rules and the words used for social communication. The relationship of 'the name and the named' (*saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandha*) is between the word and its meaning in ordinary communication, whereas in the case of grammatical rules, the linguistic

[1] *arthopasarjanībhūtān abhidheyeṣu keṣucit /*
caritārthān parārthatvān na lokaḥ pratipadyate // VP, 54.

[2] *arthapratipattibhāvanābhyāsāt tu sā śabdarūpaparicchedāvasthā na citrīkriyate. tasmāc cheṣibhāvakāṣṭhām anubhūya sarvārthayonayaḥ sarve śabdāḥ śeṣabhāvam artheṣu pratipadyante*, ibid., *Vṛ*. 53.

[3] *vyākaraṇe tv arthasya kāryavirodhitvāt tasyāś cābhidheyarūpeṇa vyavasthānād aviruddhaḥ kāryair yogaḥ*, ibid., 50.

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form is the name and the word which conveys the meaning is the named.

Just as the names like *rāma* and *ghaṭa* are to refer to certain individuals, the linguistic form in the rules being names have words as their referents. The words in the rules being names fulfil their purpose by referring to the words in usage, and the grammatical operations are applied to the words in the social communication.

II

Bhartṛhari substantiates this principle on the basis of interpreting the rule *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya*. According to him the purpose of this rule is to name (*saṃjñāvidhi*). This means the words in grammatical rules are names. Like the words in communication, the words in the rules have also two powers that of the revealed (*grāhya*) and that of the revealer (*grāhaka*) as explained above. In the capacity of the revealed the word in the rule conveys only its form and in its capacity of the revealer it denotes the word of communication. Bhartṛhari illustrates this theory with two rules *vṛddhir ādaic* (**1.** 1. 1) and *agner ḍhak* (**4.** 2. 33).

In the rule *vṛddhir ādaic*, *vṛddhi* is a word of name or the motif (*pravṛttinimitta*) of the word *vṛddhi* is only its linguistic form consisting of five phonemes. Hence without referring to the etymological meaning the word denotes only the linguistic form which is the name.[1]

[1] *vṛddhyādayo yathā śabdāḥ svarūpopanibandhanāḥ |*
ādaicpratyāyitaiḥ śabdaiḥ saṃbandhaṃ yānti saṃjñibhiḥ || VP, 59.

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In its capacity of the revealer, the word *vṛddhi* denotes the named, namely the *ād* and *aic* which are again in their turn names for the phonemes *ā*, *ai* and *au*.[1]

Similarly in the rule *agner ḍhak*, the word *agni* denotes in its capacity of the revealed (*grāhya*) the linguistic form and in its capacity of the revealer (*grāhaka*) the word *agni* used in communication. So the grammatical operations like the addition of the affix *ḍhak* shall take place to the word used in communication.[2] In this instance the same word functions as the name and the named, but belonging to two different situations, while the name and the named are different in the rule *vṛddhir ādaic*.

III

Now Bhartṛhari proceeds to resolve the possible doubts and objections against this interpretation. The first doubt is regarding the purpose served by this interpretation. As the logic behind the interpretation is that the words referred to in the rules are different from the words in communication, the latter alone should get the grammatical operations. For example the rule *agner ḍhak* purports that the *ḍhak* is added to the word *agni* found in the communication.

Now a pertinent question arises as to why we should

[1] *tatra vṛddhyādayaḥ śabdāḥ svarūpādhiṣṭhānāḥ svenārthenārthavantaḥ svarūpeṇa śabdāntarasvarūpāṇy upajighṛkṣantaḥ svarānunāsikyabhinnair ākārādibhir ādaicchabdādibhiḥ pratyāyitaiḥ saṃbandhaṃ yena prakāreṇa pratipadyante, tenaiva prakāreṇa duravadhāratve 'pi bhedasya,* ibid., *Vṛ*. 59.

[2] *agniśabdas tathaivāyam agniśabdanibandhanaḥ /*
agniśrutyaiti saṃbandham agniśabdābhidheyayā // VP, 60.

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presume another word which is found in social communication as the recipient of the grammatical operations enjoined by the rules leaving out the words readily found in the rules. Bhartṛhari answers that this is only logical on the basis of the social communication. In communication the words are subordinate (*apradhāna*) to their meanings because they are used to serve the purpose of conveying the meanings; hence the words themselves are not connected with the action. In the same way the words read in the rules signifying the words in usage are therefore subordinate to the latter and are not fit to receive the grammatical operations. As a rule every word that is uttered to communicate something becomes subordinate to its meaning and forsakes any association with action.[1]

Here we have to keep one point in mind that the Indian grammarians have evolved their method of analyzing the rules on the basis of the syntactical principles already accepted in the sentences of the communicative language.[2] If the words in the rule get the grammatical operations, it would go against logic; for, there would not be any utility for the meaning conveyed by the word in its capacity of the revealer (*grāhaka*). Further when once the grammatical operations are applied to the referent conveyed by the word in its capacity of the revealed (*grāhya*), there shall not be any

[1] *uccaran paratantratvād guṇaḥ kāryair na yujyate |*
tasmāt tadarthaiḥ kāryāṇāṃ saṃbandhaḥ parikalpyate || ibid., 62.

[2] *yathaiva gām ānaya dadhy aśānety arthatantrā śrutiḥ kriyāsu sādhanatvaṃ na pratilabhate tathā śabdāntaratantrāpi. pārārthyasyāviśiṣṭatvāt,* ibid., *Vṛ.* 62.

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expectancy for the referent conveyed by the word in the capacity of the revealed (*grāhya*) to complete the meaning of the rule. Therefore we have to recognize the words in the social communication as the recipient of the grammatical operations. And the power of the word to signify another word is not curtailed because the sense of the rule shall be complete only when the verb is connected with the referent conveyed in the capacity of the revealer (*grāhya*).[1]

Another pertinent question arises as to how the words functioning as names are found sometimes in the nominative case as in *vṛddhir ādaic* and sometimes in the genitive case as in *agner ḍhak*. How can two types of syntactical structures be possible when the semantic relation is the same. The answer of Bhartṛhari is that this is possible because of the difference in viewing the referent of the words in the rule. Before connecting itself with the named, the name signifies its own form as the referent and this referent can have syntactic connection in some way and can be a cause for the genitive or nominative case.[2] There is another reason why we should accept the linguistic form as its denotative sense. Unless the name and the named are related to each other the name cannot signify the named through its capacity of the revealer (*grāhaka*). Before the relation, which is an external one connecting two different

[1] *yo ya uccāryate śabdo niyataṃ na sa kāryabhāk /*
anyapratyāyane śaktir na tasya pratibadhyate // VP, 61.

[2] *prāk saṃjñinābhisaṃbandhāt saṃjñā rūpapadārthikā /*
ṣaṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimittatvāya kalpate // ibid., 66.

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referents, is effected it should be bereft of any sense. But this is an impossible situation because the relation between the word and meaning is eternal according to the tradition of the grammarians. When the linguistic form is the meaning, there shall be no anomaly; for, the word becomes a stem (*prātipadika*) technically by the rule *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam* (**1.** 2. 45) and fit to receive the case affixes.[1]

When the referent of the word is viewed as the linguistic form, the word receives the nominative case affix.[2] Being declined in the nominative case, the name is associated with the named by the principle of super-imposition as in *so 'yaṃ devadattaḥ* (this is that Devaddata), by which two referents are identified.[3] Because of this identity, the name and the named are in collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) and are in the same case as in *vṛddhir ādaic* and *adeṅ guṇaḥ*. On the other hand when the word is viewed as denoting the named, it receives the genitive case in relation with the grammatical operation enjoined. For example in *agner ḍhak*, the word *agni* denotes not only its linguistic form but also the word *agni* found in social communication; thus it is related to the affix *ḍhak* which is ordained.

The above discussion may be summarized as follows:

[1] *yāvat saṃjñinā tu saṃjñā na saṃbaddhā tāvan na saṃjñāpadārthikety arthāntarābhāve tasyāḥ prātipadikasaṃjñābhāvād vibhaktiyogo na syāt*, ibid., *Vṛ.*

[2] *tatrārthavattvāt prathamā saṃjñāśabdād vidhīyate*, ibid., 67.

[3] *so 'yam iti ca saṃjñinā śaktyavacchedalakṣaṇaḥ saṃbandho niyamyate*, ibid.

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1. In the rule *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā*, the injunctive part *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* is enjoining the position of name (*saṃjñā*) to the words in the rules. The name in grammar refers to the linguistic form of the word.

2. In grammatical rules all the words with reference to which some grammatical operations are enjoined, are only names. They refer, being names, to the named, namely the words which are found in the social communication to which grammatical operations are to be applied.

3. The prohibitive part *aśabdasaṃjñā* is meant to ward off taking the linguistic form as the referent in those cases where the name, once enjoined, is repeated in the rules of application. For example in *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* (**7**. 2. 114), the word *vṛddhi* shall not refer to the linguistic form, but only the phonemes *ā*, *ai* and *au*.

4. The chief contribution of Bhartṛhari lies in presenting two very significant semantic concepts.

(a) The denotation of the two referents, namely the linguistic form and the meaning to be conveyed has been suggested by Patañjali.[1] Bhartṛhari's contribution lies in the elaboration as to how these two referents are conveyed in two different stages by two distinct powers: to be revealed (*grāhyatva*) and to reveal (*grāhakatva*).

[1] *rūpagrahaṇaṃ kimartham. na svaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā bhavatīty evaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya saṃjñā bhaviṣyati; na hy anyat svaṃ śabdasyāsty anyad ato rūpāt. evaṃ tarhi siddhe sati yad rūpagrahaṇaṃ karoti taj jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ — asty anyad rūpāt svaṃ śabdasyeti. kiṃ punas tat. arthaḥ, Mahābhāṣya,* **1**.1.68.

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(b) The differentiation of the words in the rules and the words in social communication on the one hand and the building up a relation of the name and the named on the other are ideas not found in any of the extant works before Bhartṛhari. On the basis of the two distinctive powers, to be revealed (*grāhyatva*) and to reveal (*grāhakatva*), the distinction of the name and the named is evolved.

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A. K. WARDER

THE ORIGINS OF THE TECHNICAL SENSES OF THE WORD *RASA*

In *Indian Kāvya Literature* (Vol. 1 pp. 21-2) the technical sense of *rasa* in aesthetics has been explained as a direct application of the meaning 'taste' (object), by metaphor, to the aesthetic experience of enjoying a play. A play is of course seen and heard, so that to say one has had a sight or a sound of a play means no more than that one has attended a performance; it does not indicate whether one has enjoyed it. To say one has 'tasted' it, however, must imply more than simply to have seen and heard it. It cannot be understood literally; therefore, if it means anything at all, it must refer to something other than the simple sensation of a performance. That other should be, not the audible or visible speeches, gestures, costumes, etc., but something further represented by them which, though not sensed by the five senses, is perceived by the mind as being in the performance. That something further is the emotional content of the play. Its aesthetic perception in the mind is identifiable as *rasa*. This use of *rasa* in a transferred (*upacāra*) sense seems simple enough as an explanation of how the

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word became a technical term in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* or perhaps already in the *Naṭasūtras* which preceded it and may have been in part incorporated in it.

However, the history of the term *rasa* may not be quite so simple, for we find it used in a technical sense, though a different one, in the ancient Pali texts of Sthaviravāda Buddhism. In that tradition it is most familiar in the commentaries, which we read in the +5 versions of Buddhaghosa. There it is used in a fourfold system of definition of elements or 'principles' (*dhamma-s*, Sanskrit *dharma-s*), giving their 'characteristics' (*lakkhaṇa*, i.e. *lakṣaṇa*) and so on. *Rasa* has the surprising sense of the 'function' (this is the usual translation of the word *kicca*, i.e. *kṛtya*, which the commentaries themselves use to explain it) or the 'accomplishment' (*sampatti*, defined as the 'complete function', e.g. *Paṭisambhidāmagga Gaṇṭhipada* p. 26). This refers to what the principle in question does in action, acting as a cause or condition, what it accomplishes (see Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, p. 63). The connection of this with the original senses of 'taste' or of 'juice' is much less obvious, though one might think of the latter with its secondary meanings of 'essence' and 'strength' already in the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā* (see Grassmann *s.v.*).

Buddhaghosa was in fact translating older versions of these commentaries written in Old Sinhalese in the – 1 and + 1, so this usage appeared much earlier than the Pali versions now available; nevertheless it might still seem that it was remote

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from the locus in which the *Nāṭyaśāstra* was developing, in Northern India, though closer chronologically (cf. *Indian Kāvya Literature* 1 p. 21). In the canonical *Tipiṭaka* (*Tripiṭaka*) texts, composed in India between the time of the Buddha and *c.* –100, *rasa* is very familiar as one of the sense objects. It is also encountered, very rarely, in a few figurative expressions such as the 'taste of freedom' (*vimutti-rasa*, *Aṅguttara* 4 p. 203). This is the 'taste' of the Buddha's teaching, which is compared in its uniformity with the literal 'taste of salt' of the ocean. But this figure does not seem to offer much of a bridge to the technical sense of 'function'.

It is only in one of the latest additions to this *Tipiṭaka* that we suddenly come upon a usage of *rasa* which does offer some kind of transition. This addition is the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* which, though probably earlier in part, seems to have been composed mainly in the –2 (see our Introduction to Ñāṇamoli's English translation, PTS 1982). It speaks in many contexts of a 'single-*rasa*' (*eka-rasa*) of two or more principles, especially of 'calming' and 'insight' (which work together to produce enlightenment; see e.g. Vol. 1 pp. 16, 28-31, 33-4, etc.). In these contexts 'single-taste' does not yield a satisfactory meaning, since the principles thus combined do not merge completely. They simply work together to produce a single result, thus 'single-function' or 'single-accomplishment' makes good sense.

The commentator Mahānāma (+6, Buddhaghosa

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did not comment on this text) sometimes explains the compound as meaning 'having the same function' (*samānakicca*, pp. 131, 134). But sometimes he explains it as '*rasa* of freedom' (*vimutti-rasa*, pp. 94, 131, 134), where, however, he says *rasa* means 'accomplishment' (*sampatti*) and thus understands the compound as 'accomplishment of freedom' (p. 134). Thus he holds that *rasa* here means 'function' or 'accomplishment' as it does in the system of definitions followed by Buddhaghosa and *eka-rasa* means 'single-function' or 'single-accomplishment (of freedom)'.

Later in his Commentary, however, Mahānāma has occasion to explain *vimutti-rasa* itself in the text (Vol. 2 p. 88). But instead of speaking of the 'taste' here, which of course cannot be understood literally, he maintains that *rasa* has a double meaning. First it means the 'accomplishment' (*sampatti*) of freedom (as we have already seen). But alternatively it means the 'love' (*rati*) or the 'joy' (*pīti*, i. e. *prīti*) of freedom (p. 582). This seems to connect with the later Sanskrit sense of 'love' or 'passion' (e.g. *Kumārasaṃbhava* 3 37), with 'joy' as a synonym no doubt more appropriate for the context of attaining *nirvāṇa*. Perhaps, however, this alternative sense is old and belongs genuinely to the *Tipiṭaka* expression. If it does, then it connects directly with the aesthetic sense of *rasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and, bearing in mind the double meaning, may illuminate that sense as it was developing as early as the –2. If *vimutti-rasa* has this sense already in the *Aṅguttara*, then the date is carried back to the –4,

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since this is a text elaborated mostly before the schisms in Buddhism and common to all schools (unlike the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*). Thus the *Pahārāda Suttanta* to which we referred above (Vol. 4 pp. 197-204) is found in Chinese versions in the corresponding *Ekottara* (No. 42.4 of Taishō 125) and also in the *Madhyama* (No. 35 of Taishō 26), belonging to two different schools of Buddhism which seceded from the Sthaviravāda in the −3. Unfortunately Buddhaghosa in his Commentary on the *Aṅguttara* does not comment on *vimutti-rasa* here (see his Vol. 4 p. 111). Where *vimutti-rasa* occurs earlier (text Vol. 1 p. 36) he says (Vol. 2 p. 39) simply that it means *nibbāna* (*nirvāṇa*). This is not inconsistent with Mahānāma's explanation as 'the accomplishment of freedom' or 'the joy of freedom', but simply leaves it to be inferred that the 'taste' of freedom is the (actual) experience of *nirvāṇa*, which pushes us towards the aesthetic understanding of the term.

Thus in the Sthaviravāda tradition we find that *rasa* developed the sense of 'accomplishment' apparently as early as the −4, with, according to Mahānāma, a second sense of 'joy'. It was then not yet a technical term in philosophy but instead a poetic expression in connection with the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. When it became a technical term later, in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (−2) and then in the commentaries (−1), it had the sense of 'accomplishment' or 'function', the actual performance of the action of some principle. But what catches our attention here, if we are interested

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in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and aesthetics, is that in that transitional period from the poetic use in the *Aṅguttara* to the philosophical use in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* the 'accomplishment' of something apparently signified also the 'joy' of it, these both being expressed by the word *rasa*. If these senses of *rasa* were in circulation in India (in North India certainly in the case of the *Aṅguttara* and probably in the case of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*) from the −4 onwards, they constitute a significant part of the background to the development of the technical sense of *rasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

In *Indian Kāvya Literature* (**1** pp. 20-1) we have a 'very speculative' chronology for the development of the text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which has come down to us, based on the composite nature of that text and on such outside indications as its techniques being largely in use in the theatre by the +1 (Aśvaghoṣa). There it is suggested that the verse *kārikā-s* may have existed in some form in the −1 and the prose 'commentary' on the earlier prose *sūtra-s* in the −2. As to the *sūtra-s* themselves, it is so far pure conjecture to what extent those we now find in the text, and particularly those relating to *rasa*, may have overlapped with the *Naṭasūtra-s* known to Pāṇini (**4**. 3.110) in the −4. In any case it is probable that there were different recensions of *naṭasūtra-s*, of different schools of actors, in Pāṇini's time, so that we can hardly look for a definite text. What we can do is to attempt to trace the ideas that may have been present in the *naṭasūtra-s* of that period. Let us then consider the senses of *rasa* we have just

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traced to that period in the context of the *Nāṭyasāstra* doctrine, which outlines a method of performance rather than a philosophical theory of aesthetics and is as practical in its own field as the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* in its way to enlightenment through the 'single-function' of calming and insight.

The central, all-pervading and therefore probably most original principle in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* system is the arising or 'being accomplished' (*niṣpatti*, which sometimes has the sense of 'perfection', cf. also in Pali *nipphanna* and *nipphāda*) of a specific *rasa* from the conjunction of (specific) causes and effects of emotion (*bhāva*) and 'transients' (subsidiary emotions dependent on and therefore helping to indicate the main one). The formulation of this principle is known as the *rasa sūtra* (*Nāṭyaśāstra* Kāśī p. 71). Practically everything which follows in the remainder of the text bears on this, since it is the acting of the causes and effects of emotion (the transients likewise appear usually as their immediate effects), including occasional musical accompaniment appropriate for the *rasa* and other subordinate matters. The names of the eight specific *rasa-s* being adjectives, we have eight varieties of *rasa*, such as comic, compassionate and heroic.

If we take *rasa* in the sense of 'accomplishment' it will be readily intelligible that we have these eight varieties of accomplishment. If instead we take 'joy' as the sense, we have eight varieties of joy, which seems to come closer to what is usually understood by *rasa*

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here. Bhāmaha (**1.** 2) uses the very same word 'joy' (*prīti*) as Mahānāma for that which is produced by literature, whilst the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself uses the synonym 'delight' (*harṣa*) for the enjoyment by the audience of the emotions presented, at the end of the prose passage containing the *rasa sūtra*. Here 'delight' seems to be used in place of *rasa*, either as its synonym or to indicate its nature (the text actually reads 'delight, etc.', where it is a puzzle to know what 'etc.' could be, Abhinavagupta in his Commentary objecting to it; perhaps there are simply varieties of delight as there are varieties of *rasa*, i.e., the comic delight and so on). This seems decisive: supported by Mahānāma we can read *harṣa* here in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as a gloss on *rasa*, 'taste means delight'. On the other hand the overlapping here of 'being accomplished' (*niṣpatti*) with the alternative meaning 'accomplishment' (*sampatti*) for *rasa* seems to be more than a coincidence and therefore difficult to ignore. The 'being accomplished of an accomplishment (of one of the eight kinds)' from certain conditions may appear superfluous, but it may in fact draw our attention to the fact that *rasa* is something to be accomplished, the result of a process or the actual process with its result. In any case we can compare 'the taste is accomplished' with 'the taste of freedom means the accomplishment of freedom'. 'Delight' seems most convincing as the main (transferred) sense of 'taste' here, but 'accomplishment' can very well be felt as a subordinate sense. But let us turn now from the audience to the actors, to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*

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as setting out a practical method of producing delight in the audience.

The Nāṭyaśāstra, as we have noted, is essentially a practical handbook, with only occasional suggestions of any theoretical background or any interest in possible theoretical conclusions (see *Indian Kāvya Literature* 1 p. 26). *Rasa* is treated as a practical matter and not only as the aim of delighting an audience but also as something linking together all the ingredients to accomplish that aim. Of course, the nature of the delight in an audience is something which can be studied philosophically, to determine its nature, to compare it with other kinds of pleasure, to contrast it with actual emotion, which has a special relation to it, and so forth. Such investigations were made in due course, culminating as far as we know in those of Abhinavagupta, a critic and philosopher. But the actors were not primarily philosophers; they were gaining a livelihood in the theatre by being entertaining: theories would be of minor interest to them and their attention was focussed on the practical technique of their profession. In fact this situation of opposition between actors and critics continues throughout the history of Indian theatre and we see it clearly reflected, for example, in the *Naṭāṅkuśa* (+15), where the anonymous critic rebukes the actors of his day for tampering with texts, displaying their virtuosity at the expense of realism, absurd breakings of the dramatic structure and reversing the development of the action and even, as culminating aberration, spoiling the *rasa* by not using the appropriate dress

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and with digressions brought in from the *Purāṇa-s* (see *Indian Kāvya Literature* Vol. **5**, §§2765, 2768, 2793-9, etc.). Such a separation of *rasa*, at least as perceived by a critic, from virtuosity in performance seems inconceivable in the time of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, unless the actors had their own ideas about *rasa* which were purely practical, not related to any philosophical context of what was appropriate but perhaps attuned to the response of a certain type of audience (thus the *Vyaṅgyavyākhyā* on *Tapatīsaṃvaraṇa* distinguishes the 'ordinary people', who like to see something quite external such as miming a creeper, from the real 'spectators' who enjoy the play itself, see *Indiam Kāvya Literature* Vol. **5** §3433).

The technique of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, then, is based on *rasa* not merely as an aim but as a kind of organizing principle in performance: no subject matter at all can be presented without it (*na hi rasād ṛte kaścid apy arthaḥ pravartate*, same prose passage on p. 71, introducing the *rasa sūtra*). After this, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* goes on to enumerate the causes and effects of emotion for each of the eight *rasa-s* and the appropriate transients for them, all of which are to be presented on the stage by the actors in the rôles of characters experiencing the corresponding emotions. All the details on acting (speech, gesture, etc.) in the chapters which follow are subordinated to the same unifying principle of a specific *rasa*. Without losing sight of the *rasa* as ultimate aim, as delight of one of these specific kinds in the audience, which naturally captured the attention of critics and

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philosophers, we must consider whether the sense of 'accomplishment' might suit this unifying principle of the stage performance and perhaps be what the actors had immediately in mind in their practice.

If the 'being accomplished (*nispatti*) of an accomplishment (*rasa*, as a process, or a 'function' being completed when separate elements combine into one effect) from the conjunction of causes of emotion, effects of emotion and transients' is a possible translation of the *rasa sūtra*, we may then ask what exactly is this 'accomplishment'. It is, in the first place, one of the eight qualities specified, namely the comic, compassionate, heroic and the others, for *rasa* pure and simple is not being accomplished. *Rasa* as such is not accomplished or enjoyed; there is always the specific quality or content, such as the comic, which might be understood as the effect of the *rasa* as function and accomplishment, though as adjective and noun they are not separable. The comic is accomplished, not some general *rasa*, not 'accomplishment' in the abstract, which would be meaningless. It follows from this that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* simply describes the 'accomplishment' of each of the eight specifics, the comic and so on. We should glance at some of the details in order to see what this 'comic-accomplishment', 'compassionate-accomplishment', 'heroic-accomplishment', etc. means.

In the case of the comic (*Nāṭyaśāstra* p. 74 Kāśī, we confine ourselves to the prose), whose 'essence' (*ātman*) is stated to be the emotion 'mirth' (*hāsa*), the

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'causes of the emotion' are seeing extraordinary dress and ornaments, impudence, greed, quarrelling, false speech, deformities, the extolling of faults, etc. It is quite obvious how the actors will accomplish such things, the emotion of mirth being presented as in one character who sees and hears another acting in the ways described. The effects of the emotion are listed as the quivering of the lips, teeth, nose and cheeks, either opening wide or contracting the eyes, sweating, colouring of the face, holding the sides, etc. Obviously this is the acting of amusement and laughter when filled with mirth. The transients are lassitude, dissimulation, bewilderment, drowsiness, sleeping, awaking, envy, etc. These also should occur in the character amused. A note is added to the effect that the comic has two forms, according as one simply laughs oneself or makes another (character) laugh. Thus the amused and laughing character will act the effects and sometimes a transient and in the second case will make another character laugh at the causes of the emotion. It seems clear also that the character in whom the causes of the emotion are displayed can himself be amused and laugh. Such are the details which the actors have to work on in the 'comic-accomplishment'. Of course the audience will laugh if they are successful, but the point suggested here is that the actors have the 'accomplishment' (*rasa*) in mind as their guide: they are acting with an eye to the comic in everything they do, because some of the things mentioned need not necessarily be comic but must here be presented in relation to that only.

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The other 'accomplishments' need not be exactly parallel to this. Thus the 'compassionate-accomplishment' is said (p. 75) to have its 'source' (*prabhava*) in the emotion 'grief'. The 'sensitive' (*śṛṅgāra*) with its source in 'love' is the only other *rasa* which similarly has a 'source' instead of an 'essence', except that the 'furious' has both but with its emotion as essence. The causes of the emotion in the case of the compassionate are such things as separation from the 'desired' person (it has been anticipated on p. 73 that it is 'compassionate' when there is no expectation of reunion), loss of wealth, union with various disasters such as death and so on. The effects of the emotion are weeping, etc. and there is a long list of transients such as 'indifference' (disgust with the world), depression, anxiety and so on. All these have to be acted by the character experiencing grief, but in such a way as to excite the compassionate, the latter being the guiding principle in the performance.

The essence of the heroic is 'courage' (*utsāha*, 'energy') in the 'highest' (*uttama*) kind of character (p. 77). The causes of the emotion are the absence of delusion, resolution, (good) policy, discipline and abundant valour, power, glory (or 'courage', *pratāpa*) and majesty. The effects of the emotion are constancy, bravery, firmness, generosity, confidence, etc. The transients are contentment, reflection, pride, agitation, ferocity, indignation, remembrance, horripilation (thrilling), etc. All this is very straightforward. The character having courage or energy possesses the causes

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and shows also the effects of this emotion and the transients according to circumstances.

The 'horrific' (*bībhatsa*), whose essence is the emotion 'disgust' (p. 78), is a somewhat strange 'accomplishment' to feature prominently with these others. One might suspect that in origin it owed much to Buddhism as revulsion against the disgusting world and was prominent in Buddhist plays of the earliest period of the classical theatre; in extant plays it is rarely prominent. Be this as it may, the causes of the emotion are listed as hearing or seeing or narrating, etc., what is repulsive, unloved, impure (correcting from Abhinavagupta), undesired. Its effects are 'rolling' in all gestures and of the face and eyes, anxiety ('searing the heart'), spitting, alarm, etc. The transients are forgetfulness, agitation, bewilderment, sickness, dying, etc.

The essence of the apprehensive is the emotion fear (p. 77), the causes of which are distorted cries, seeing apparitions, etc., entering a forest, dying and seeing, hearing, narration, etc., of the death or imprisonment of one's relatives. Its effects are trembling of the hands and legs and so on and the transients are paralysis and many others. The marvellous is equally straightforward with its essence the emotion astonishment (p. 78), whose causes are seeing the divine, obtaining desired wishes and so on, effects expanding of the eyes, etc. and transients tears and so on.

The account of the furious (*raudra*) is more complicated (p. 76). Its essence is the emotion anger. But

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then it is said to have a 'source' (*prabhava*), which is in demons (*rakṣas-es*), demons (*dānava-s*) and haughty humans. Further, its cause is war (*saṃgrāmahetukaḥ* might equally mean it causes war). The causes of the emotion are anger (it seems strange that anger should be the cause of anger, but Abhinavagupta, Vol. 1 p. 320, says it means another's anger, the previous statement referring to those who are angry by their own nature), outrage, insult, disrespect, untrue speech, harsh words, malice, selfishness, etc. Then it has some special business, namely striking, cleaving, crushing, cutting, breaking, attacking, robbing, attacking with weapons, fighting, blood, drawing a bow, etc. After this the effects of the emotion are listed as red eyes, sweating, frowning, compressing the hands, teeth and lips, quivering of the cheeks, rubbing the hands together, etc. The transients are bewilderment, courage (*utsāha*, or 'energy'), agitation, indignation, rashness, ferocity, sweating, trembling, horripilation, stammering, etc. Then it is added that demons, etc., are by their own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) furious, because they have many arms, many faces, hair which is shaking, scattered and red, red and prominent eyes and terrible black bodies. This makes them models of the furious. Also it is because all their speech and gestures are acted as naturally furious from beginning to end. And men who follow them, fighting, should have the furious *rasa* in agreement with them. It is not immediately clear why this 'furious-accomplishment' should have these additional topics not found in the others, with the

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demons brought in as a special set of characters peculiar to it. Then it seems to be of two kinds, innate (by own nature) and imposed by provocation (anger causing anger, etc.). Unlike the other accomplishments it has some special stage business, namely the miming of fighting. Otherwise, however, it seems a simple enough account of what the actors do, with more direct representation in being dressed as demons and fighting than for the other 'accomplishments'. Such an account of a *rasa* which again is of minor importance in the extant repertory may be in part a legacy from a period before the full elaboration of the doctrine of acting simply causes and effects of emotion and transients, in which one would expect everything described here to be included under those heads. The unifying principle, however, is as always the 'accomplishment' (*rasa*), namely the furious.

We have kept till last the *rasa* which stands first in the enumeration and in popularity, because it too presents peculiar difficulties. In the first place *śṛṅgāra* is hardly translatable. Etymologically it would mean 'pointed' (like an arrow) or 'peaked' (like a mountain). This might refer to heightened sensibility or sensitivity. But it relates specifically to the emotion 'love' (*rati*), not to any of the others. As noted above, like the compassionate it has a 'source' (love, as the compassionate has grief) instead of an 'essence'. This at least stresses that it is something quite different in nature from its corresponding emotion. That should indeed be obvious: considered as a 'taste' or 'joy' to

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be produced in the audience, the *śṛṅgāra* must be a contemplation or enjoyment of the spectacle of characters in love and this cannot itself contain the essence of love. It is the experience of a story about love brought to the stage, or of witnessing the happiness of lovers, and sometimes their unhappiness. There seems to be no word in English for this. But the *Nāṭyaśāstra* immediately (p. 73) assigns it an 'essence' quite different from its emotion, namely 'brilliant dress'. This may remind us of the demons in relation to the furious, but the positions are reversed because there the demons are the 'source' and anger is the 'essence'. This is then explained as because whatever in the world (not in the theatre) is pure, fresh or beautiful is compared (reading *upamīyate*, the other reading being inferred', *anumīyate*) with *śṛṅgāra*. A person wearing brilliant dress is said to be 'possessing *śṛṅgāra*'. The text goes on to insist on attractive and brilliant dress being established as the essence of *śṛṅgāra*, in the usage of the teachers, as one of the terms used in drama. That would suggest something like 'brilliance' as the original meaning of *śṛṅgāra*. We use 'sensitive' as a mere stopgap (having in mind 'tender' as well as 'pointed' and 'brilliant').

The text continues, to state that the sensitive has women and men as 'cause' (again only the furious has such a special 'cause'). Its characters are at the height of youth. After mentioning that it has two states, 'union' and 'frustration', the text lists the causes and effects of emotion and the transients for

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the first of these. The causes are the season, etc., the desired person and all kinds of social pleasures; the effects are movements of the eyes and so on and playful and sweet gestures and speech, etc.; the transients are nearly all (only terror, lassitude, ferocity and disgust are excluded as obviously contradictory to it). In the case of frustration only the effects of the emotion are listed and it is strange that they are all taken from the transients. Certainly these may appear as effects of love when frustrated, nevertheless it seems to deviate from the usual system. The causes of the emotion are presumably the same as in 'union'. After this the text raises the question of how emotions (transients apparently) related to the compassionate can occur here, when the sensitive has its source in love. The answer to this is complex. First it has already been stated that the sensitive consists of both union and frustration. Ten stages have been described in the *vaiśikaśāstra-s* (the treatises on harlotry, predecessors of the extant *Kāmasūtra* or of part of it). These will be described under 'universal acting' (*Nāṭya-śāstra* Chapter 24 Kāśī). Most of them in fact belong to the situations of frustration. If there is expectation of union, despite obstacles separating the lovers, we have 'frustration'. If there is no such expectation, it is the compassionate *rasa*. Thus the sensitive is connected with all the emotions.

We may try to clarify the nature of the 'sensitive' by considering it as an 'accomplishment'. In the case of 'union', at any rate, the actors may keep

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something resembling 'brilliance' in mind as unifying principle. Their dress will be beautiful and so on and the atmosphere might be called festive. In the case of frustration, however, all that lies for the time being in the past, as something to remember whilst emotions more akin to the compassionate are represented. The 'brilliance' is obviously dimmed, but not completely extinguished unless the 'accomplishment' actually changes to the compassionate. What may be decisive here is that 'brilliance' suits an 'accomplishment' (or perhaps a 'function') much better than a 'taste', an 'aesthetic experience' or a 'joy' produced in the audience. If we understand both Mahānāma's senses of *rasa* here (disregarding 'taste' in its literal sense), we have a 'brilliant-accomplishment' by the actors producing a 'brilliant-joy' in the audience, bearing in mind that 'brilliant' (*ujjvala*) here glosses 'pointed' (*śṛṅgāra*) and is associated with youth, beauty, purity, freshness and lovers. Let us add here the full list of 'causes of the emotion' which we omitted above: the season, flowers, cosmetics, jewellery, the desired person, objects of pleasure (of the senses, music, etc.), enjoying excellent buildings, experiencing going to a park, hearing and seeing amusements and play etc. All this is to be accomplished with reference to the 'pointed' unifying principle as we have just tried to contextualize it.

Thus if we read the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in the light of Mahānāma's explanation of *rasa* in the *Paṭisambhidā-magga*, where the latter is actually borrowing from the

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Aṅguttara, we seem to find the term richer in meaning for the actors than if we just take it as 'taste' and 'aesthetic experience' according to the etymology and Abhinavagupta's much later commentary. According to Mahānāma *rasa* means 'accomplishment' (and is associated with a unifying function), which relates to the practice of meditation or of acting; or 'joy', which is the successful result and the delight of the audience as well as the satisfaction of the actors. It may be noted finally that Mahānāma and the *Nāṭyaśāstra* are complementary: the Sthaviravāda tradition clearly establishes 'accomplishment' as an early meaning of *rasa* (the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* itself does that), with 'joy' as a second sense according to Mahānāma but not clearly confirmed in earlier texts; in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* on the other hand 'delight' is clearly used for the enjoyment of the audience, apparently in place of *rasa* and as a synonym for it, whilst it is only our conjecture that *rasa* has the sense of 'accomplishment' as well, when taken as the unifying element in the method of the actors. Putting these two pieces of evidence together, we find both senses, 'accomplishment' and 'joy', current in an ancient period when the text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (or of *Naṭasūtra-s* and *Bhāṣya*) was just beginning to be developed. The actors could hardly have been unaware of these two senses in current speech and it seems probable that they chose the term *rasa* because it offered this valuable ambiguity. Theoretical writers on *nāṭya*, critics and philosophers, may have lost sight of the practical sense of 'accomplishment'

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which the term had for actors and concentrated on 'joy' and aesthetic experience. In Sthaviravāda the opposite development took place, for 'accomplishment' and 'function' became the regular senses of *rasa* in the commentarial tradition (from the –1 onwards), 'joy' being remembered only as a second sense in archaic contexts, in the *Tipiṭaka*.

For the ancient actors of India, *rasa*, like many other key terms in the history of ideas, may have been creatively ambiguous and given them a supporting principle throughout their performances as well as a single aim and fulfilment for each occasion.

(+ and – = centuries 'A.D.' and 'B.C.')

(Pali texts are referred to in the editions of the Pali Text Society, except for the *Paṭisambhidāmagga Gaṇṭhipada*, Colombo, 1967.)

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ALAKA HEJIB & ARAVIND SHARMA

A NOTE ON PĀṆINI 6. 1. 87

I

PĀṆINI 6. 1. 87 contains the rule for the combination of a final ă with a dissimilar vowel which is known as *guṇa* Saṃdhi. The standard illustrations of this Saṃdhi are: UPA + INDRA = UPENDRA; RAMĀ + ĪŚA = RAMEŚA; GAṄGĀ + UDAKAṂ = GAṄGODAKAM; and KṚṢṆA + ṚDDHI = KṚṢṆARDDHI.[1] It will be clear from an examination of these and other examples[2] that the short or long nature of the final *a* has no bearing on the Saṃdhic outcome. This paper is an attempt to examine why it should be so.

One may begin by making the observation that Pāṇini's rule may be split into two parts. The first part deals with the combination of the final ă with all vowels except ṛ and ḷ. The second part deals with the combination of the final ă with ṛ and ḷ. For carrying out the second operation another rule of Pāṇini (I. 1. 51) has to be invoked. This creates the

[1] See Rāmacandra Paṇasīkara Śāstrī, ed., *Bhattojidīkṣitaviracitā Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*, Benaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1948. p. 55.

[2] See William Dwight Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, Harvard Univerity Press, 1971, p. 43, para. 127.

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possibility that separate explanations may be required for each of these two parts.

II

The case of a final *a* combining with vowels other than ṛ and ḷ is, it seems, easier to explain than the case of its combination with them. The explanation of the fact that, for example, both UPA + INDRA and RAMĀ = ĪSA result in an *e*—even though in the first example both a and ī are short and in the second example long—seems to lie in the diphthongal nature of *e* and the composite nature of the dipthong. Thus the dipthong *e* covers by itself the following four vowelic combinations: short a + short i; short a + long i; long a + short i and long a + long i. Hence, since by Pāṇini's rules the dipthongs *e* and *o* take over in combinations of final ā with ī and ū respectively, sufficient accommodation is provided for the short or long nature of the combining vowels. The explanation for the first part of Pāṇini's rule is hence dipthongal.

III

Next let us take up the case of ṛ and ḷ. For the sake of brevity and clarity let the case of ṛ alone be examined in detail as it is also representative of ḷ.[1] The point at issue is this: why should MAHĀ + ṚṢIḤ, for instance, yield the combination MAHARṢIḤ when DEVA + ṚṢIḤ also yields the form DEVARṢIḤ? In

[1] Vārttika 150.

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other words, the length of the final *a* seems to make no difference. Why not? Pāṇini's rule makes no distinction between these two cases in their Saṃdhic outcome, but since the nature of the final combination is not diphthongal in the second case, it may be argued, hypothetically, that MAHĀ + ṚṢI could as well be MAHĀRṢIḤ, especially when there are Vedic precedents of this kind of combination.[1]

If the explanation for the first part of Pāṇini's rule is phonetical, the explanation for the second part seems to be historical. It is well known that 'in Vedic texts, the vowel ṛ is ordinarily written unchanged after the a-vowel, which if long, is shortened: thus, MAHAṚṢIḤ instead of MAHĀṚṢIḤ. The two vowels, however, are usually pronounced as one syllable.'[2] Thus if *a* is shortened and the two vowels are pronounced as one syllable, one will get the combination AR, through the following steps: MAHĀ + ṚṢIḤ ⟶ MAHA + ṚṢIḤ ⟶ (pronounced as) MAHARṢIḤ — (combined as) MAHARṢIḤ. This last stage in the process has become, it seems, the standardized Saṃdhic outcome in classical Sanskrit. Thus the explanation for the second part of Pāṇini's rule seems to go back to Vedic linguistic usage—a usage whose end product, stripped of its historical background, seems to have been incorporated in the Pāṇinian system.

It is interesting to note that the Vedic tradition

[1] See Arthur Anthony Macdonell, *A Vedic Grammar for Students*, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 24, para. 23.

[2] William Dwight Whitney, *op. cit.*, p. 73, para. 127a.

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of shortening the *a* before *ṛ* in external Saṃdhi is retained in classical Sanskrit optionally. Thus, for example, BRAHMA + ṚṢIḤ can yield two forms: (1) BRAHMA ṚṢIḤ and (2) BRAHMARṢIḤ.[1] This option, however, exists only in cases of external Saṃdhi. It may be suggested now that what are offered to us here as two simultaneous options could in reality represent two successive stages in the evolution of the language. This would mean that first the long *a* is shortened, and next this shortened *a* is combined with *ṛ*. The first stage is clearly an example of external Saṃdhi in the Vedas[2] and continues as an option in classical Sanskrit. The second stage is taken up as internal Saṃdhi in classical Sanskrit—which really turns out to be a case then of double Saṃdhi: MAHĀ + ṚṢIḤ ⟶ MAHA ṚṢIḤ ⟶ MAHARṢIḤ. The Pāṇinian system, however, does not recognize the intermediate stage, and thus one moves from MAHĀ + ṚṢIḤ to MAHARṢIḤ directly by the device of substituting AR in cases of both long and short *a*. Historically the long *a* was shortened; grammatically long and short *a* cease to be distinguished in the Pāṇinian system.

[1] Rāmacandra Paṇasīkara Śāstrī, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

[2] See Ṛgveda **10.** 18.5 (YÁTHA ṚTÁVAḤ); **1.** 162.19 (TÁTHA ṚTÚḤ); **2.** 24.13 (Váśa Ṛṇám); etc.

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MUSASHI TACHIKAWA

'*PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA*' IN THE DEDICATION OF THE *MŪLAMADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀ*

NĀGĀRJUNA's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*) begins with the following dedication:

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam|
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam||
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam|
deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam||

Of these four lines, the first two consist of eight terms, each of which modifies the term '*pratītyasamutpāda*' (*ps*) found in the third line. Each of these eight terms contains the negative particle '*a-* (or *an-*)'. The *ps* qualified by the eight negative modifications has been considered to be the theme of *MMK*. The author of this work, however, does not explain clearly the relation between *ps* and each of the eight modifications. Here I shall attempt to clarify the relation by examining the arguments given in *MMK* as well as in its commentaries.

The dedication of *MMK* has been translated a number of times by modern scholars into European

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languages. Th. Stcherbatsky's translation, for instance,[1] reads as follows: 'The Perfect Buddha,/ The foremost of all Teachers I salute./ He has proclaimed/ The Principle of (Universal) Relativity,/ 'Tis like blissful (*Nirvāṇa*),/ Quiescence of Plurality./ There nothing disappears,/ Nor anything appears,/ Nothing has an end,/ Nor is there anything eternal,/ Nothing is identical (with itself), Nor is there anything differentiated,/ Nothing moves,/ Neither hither nor thither./[2]' Here he takes the term '*pratītyasamutpāda*' (*ps*) as meaning the principle of Universal Relativity. Generally speaking, *ps* is interpreted as a relation, or a principle, according to which things that come into existence are dependent upon one another. However, if *ps* is a relation or a doctrine concerning the relation, it would be absurd to talk about its disappearance (or perishing, *nirodha*), or appearance (or arising, *utpāda*). It is only in the dedication that *MMK* states that *ps* neither perishes nor arises. Insofar as the arguments given in *MMK* are concerned, it is always things or objects, not the principle of *ps*, that are said neither to perish nor to arise. In *MMK*, Nāgārjuna proves that there is neither perishing nor arising of any objects that have the possibility of coming into existence, such as plants or animals. Of course, a principle or doctrine

[1] *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Cammentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. by L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bibliotheca Buddhica* **4**, St. Petersbourg, 1913, p. 11.

[2] Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Leningrad, 1927, p. 69.

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can be said to arise or perish in the sense that it is newly formulated or abolished. Such an interpretation of arising or perishing is, however, irrelevant here. In order to state clearly the agent of such action as an object, not as a principle or a doctrine, Stcherbatsky has supplied the word 'anything' (or 'nothing') in his translation, where each of the eight modifications does not directly qualify the term '*ps*' (the Principle of Universal Relativity).[1] He has further supplied the word 'there', referring to the principle of *ps*. Stcherbatsky thus holds that *ps* is the principle according to which anything is considered neither to perish nor to arise.

Yet, if this is so, why has Nāgārjuna not employed the word 'object' (or 'thing,' *bhāva*) in the dedication just as Stcherbatsky has supplied it in his translation? If the author of *MMK* has intended to refer to the arising or the perishing of objects (*bhāvānām*), he could have easily used such a word as 'object' (*bhāva*) somewhere in the dedication. He might not have used such a word on purpose, or there might have been no need to employ such a word at all.

[1] It is helpful to supply the term *bhāvānām* (of objects) to each of these modifiers except *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham* but it makes little sense to supply the term *bhāvānām* to *an-eka-artham* or to *a-nānā-..rtham*. At least, we cannot supply the term *bhāvānām* to *an-eka-artham* or to *a-nānā-artham* in the same way as we do to the other six modifiers. The relation between the action of arising (or perishing) and *bhāva* is a sort of relation between a quality and its locus. On the other hand, the relation between one object (*eka-artha* and *bhāva* (objects) is of a different type. Here it should be noted that *artha* and *bhāva* in *MMK* have the same meaning.

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At this point, we might examine R. Robinson's translation, in which neither the word 'object' nor the word 'thing' is employed: 'I offer salutation to the best of preachers, the Buddha, who has taught that dependent co-arising has no ceasing, no arising, no nullification, no eternity, no plurality, no arriving, and no departing, that it is quiescent of all fictions, that it is blissful.'[1] Here the eight modifications have been translated as directly modifying the term '*ps*,' which is indeed more literal. E. Frauwallner has translated the dedication in a similar manner: 'Den Buddha, der das abhängige Entstehen verkündet hat als ohne Vernichtung und ohne Entstehen, ohne Aufhören und nicht ewig, ohne Einheit und ohne Mannigfaltigkeit, ohne Kommen und ohne Gehen, . . ., verehre ich.'[2] One can readily notice that Frauwallner also regards *ps* itself as possessing no arising, no one-ness, no manifoldness, no action of coming, etc. According to these two scholars, it is *ps* itself that neither arises nor perishes, and is neither one nor manifold.

But what does it signify that *ps* (dependent co-arising) has no arising, no ceasing, no unity (one-ness), no plurality (manifoldness), and so on? As mentioned above, it is nonsensical to assert or negate the existence of the action of arising (or ceasing) in a principle. In order for it to be meaningful to represent *ps* as having no arising, no ceasing, there must be the presupposition

[1] R. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1976, p. 83.

[2] E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1956, p. 178.

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that it is meaningful to respresent *ps* at the locus of such action. Robinson thus considers *ps* to be substantial in such a way that one can assert or negate the existence of the action of arising, or ceasing (perishing), within it. Some modern scholars, however, seem to have understood *ps* as the rule or fact that things come into being by depending upon other things. Therefore, Robinson's view might seem difficult to accept, but some passages in the Sūtra-s and in the commentaries on *MMK* support the views of Robinson and Frauwallner. The Chinese version of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, for instance, states: 'Since things do not move, one should realize that the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) does not move, either.... Since things do not arise, one should realize that the perfection of wisdom does not arise, either. Since things do not perish, one should realize that the perfection of wisdom does not perish, either.[1] Here one can see that the perfection of wisdom is considered to be that which neither arises nor perishes. In other words, there is the presupposition that it is meaningful to impose the existence of the action of arising (or of perishing) upon the perfection of wisdom. Dependent co-arising (*ps*) and the perfection of wisdom share important characteristics in that both of them are considered to embody absolute truth. Hence, it would be possible to infer that the author of *MMK* also considered *ps* to be that which neither arises nor perishes.

[1] *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*, ed. by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, Vol. 8, p. 423b.

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The *Prajñāpradīpa*, which is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on *MMK*, quotes the following objection: 'If [it is] dependent co-arising, how is it possible to be that which does not arise? It is a sort of self-contradiction.[1] Granting that it is meaningful to discuss the arising or perishing of *ps*, Bhāvaviveka replies: 'We are not saying that all *ps* does not arise.[2] If he had understood *ps* only as a principle or theory concerning dependent co-arising, he would not have given such a reply. His answer clearly shows that he also used the term *ps* in the sense of that in which the existence of the arising or perishing can be asserted or negated.

Let us now examine the meaning of the dedication of *MMK*. First, one should realize that the meanings of terms *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham* are at best problematic. The former appears twice in *MMK*: the dedication, and 18. 11 which reads:

anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvatam|
etat tallokanāthānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtam||[3]

Although the term '*artha*' may be used as a neuter in Vedic or Hybrid Sanskrit, it is used in a masculine sense in classical Sanskrit. In *MMK*, the term is used as masculine (see 11. 7). In 18. 11, however, '*artha*,' which qualifies the neuter word *śāsanāmṛta* (teaching-ambrosia),

[1] Cf. *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Peking Edition, Reprint ed., D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1957, Vol. 95, p. 154, f. 4, l. 7.
[2] Cf. ibid., Vol. 95, p. 154, f. 5, l. 1.
[3] *Prasannapadā*, ed. by Poussin, p. 377.

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takes the neuter ending. Therefore, '*an-eka-artham*' and '*a-nānā-artham*' found in 18. 11 are possessive compounds (*bahuvrīhi*). Hence, the verse reads as follows: [It is] without one object, without manifold objects, without nullification, and without eternity. This is the teaching-ambrosia of Buddha-s, lords of the world.' In addition to the dedication and 18. 11, the term *a-nānā-artham* also appears in 18. 9:

aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam/
nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam//[1]

Here also '*a-nānā-artham*' is a possessive compound, because the masculine noun '*artha*' takes the neuter ending. The verse means: [It is] not dependent upon other things, tranquil, not expressed by *prapañca*, free from mental constructs, and has not manifold objects. This is the characteristic of truth.'

Both '*an-eka-artham*' and '*a-nānā-artham*' in the dedication of *MMK*, qualifying the masculine word '*ps*,' have the endings of the accusative case. Since the masculine and the neuter endings of the word '*artha*' are the same in the accusative one cannot decide definitively from the form whether these two compounds are possessive or not. As we have already seen above, in *MMK*, however, these two terms are used as possessive compounds in other references, where the term qualify 'the characteristic of truth' or 'teaching-ambrosia,' which, after all, signify the same thing as *ps*. Hence, one can

[1] ibid., p. 372.

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construe the two compounds in the dedication to be possessive.[1] Accordingly, one must concede the implication that it is both tenable and meaningful to regard *ps* as possessing 'one object' (*eka-artha*) or manifold objects (*nānā-artha*). The assumption of the possibility of *ps*' possessing one object or manifold objects leads to the negation of such a possibility. As a result, there arises the question: In what kind of relation does *ps* stand to one object (*eka-artha*) or to manifold objects (*nānā-artha*)?

Stcherbatsky has translated the expression *an-eka-artham . . . pratītyasamutpādam* as 'there . . . nothing is identical (with itself).' However, in no chapter of *MMK* is Nāgārjuna concerned with the identification of a thing with itself, but in *MMK* he often asserts that two inseparably connected entities—such as cause and effect, the seer and the action of seeing, the goer and the action of going, being and non-being—are not 'one object' (*eka-artha*). It is impossible to discuss identity or difference with regard to one object. In order to discuss identity or difference between and among objects, one needs, at least, *two* objects. Of course, one can say that an object is identical with itself, but the author of *MMK* is not concerned with this kind of identity.

[1] Cf. *Akutobhaya* (Tibetan translation), *The Tibetan Tripitaka* Peking Edition. Vol. 95, p. 16, f. 1, l. 5: *ḥgag pa med pa shes bya ba ni rten ciṅ ḥbrel bar ḥbyuṅ ba ḥdi la ḥgag pa yod pa ma yin pa ste; Prajñāpradīpa* (Tibetan translation), *The Tibetan Tripitaka*, Peking Edition, Vol. 95, p. 154, f. 3, l. 7: *don gcig min shes bya baḥi bar du yaṅ don gcig pa yod pa ma yin paḥo; Prasannapadā*, p. 40, l. 7: *nirodhādayaḥ pratītyasamutpādasyopalabhyante.*

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On the other hand, it is possible to recognize the existence of the action of arising (or perishing) in *one object*; the action of arising (or perishing) may inhere in an individual object. We need only one object in order to perceive the action of going or coming; that is, we can see *one* object going or coming. However, it makes little sense to assert that *eka-artha* (one object) resides in an individual object, for *eka-artha* and *nānā-artha* are objects or loci in which identity or difference resides. It is 'one-object-ness' or unity (*eka-artha-tva*) which resides in 'one-object'. Thus *an-eka-artham* and '*a-nānā-artham*' qualify the word *ps* in a manner different from the way *a-nirodham* (that which has no perishing) and *an-utpādam* (that which has no arising) qualify the word *ps*. In other words, the relation between the action of arising (or perishing) and *ps* is of a type that is distinct from that between one objct (or manifold objects) and *ps*.

Robinson renders *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham*, respectively, as . . . has . . . no unity and . . . [has] . . . no plurality. But the term *eka-artha*, when used as a possessive compound, does not mean 'that which has unity'; neither does the term *nānā-artha*, when used as a possessive compound, mean 'that which has plurality'. The literal meanings of these two compounds are 'that which has one object [for its content]' and 'that which has manifold objects [for its content]'. Here one should not forget that *artha* in *MMK* means not only a property or attribute but also the possessor of a property or attribute. If the expression *an-eka-artha-tvam*

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('one-object-ness') had been used in *MMK* in place of the expression *an-eka-artham* the expression *pratītyasamutpādam* (acc.) . . . *an-eka-artha-tvam* would have meant 'the dependent co-arising [theory] that [two different objects (*x* and *y*) are not one and the same'. Neither *an-eka-artha-tva* nor *a-nānā-artha-tva* is, however, used in *MMK*.

It is informative to note that none of the existent Chinese translations has taken *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham* as possessive compounds.[1] The translators of the Chinese versions of *MMK* and its commentaries have considered *ps* to be neither one object nor manifold objects. That is to say, in Chinese translations, the existence of one object (or of manifold objects) in *ps* is not negated, but the identity of *ps* with one object (or manifold objects) is.

Similarly, as far as the existent Tibetan translations of the dedication of *MMK* and its Indian commentaries are concerned, *an-eka-artha* and *a-nānā-artha* are not translated as possessive compounds. The Tibetan translation of the dedication reads as follows: *gaṅ gis rten ciṅ ḥbrel par ḥbyuṅ| ḥgag pa med pa skye med pa| chad pa med pa rtag med pa| ḥon ba med pa ḥgro med pa|| tha dad don min don cig min| spros pa ñer shi shi bstan pa| rdzogs paḥi saṅs rgyas smra rnams gyi| dam pa de la phyag htshal lo||*[2] Here the expression *rten ciṅ ḥbrel par ḥbyuṅ ba* in the first line stands for *pratītyasamutpāda*. The eight negative

[1] Cf. *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*, Vol. 30, 1b, 39c, 51c, and 130a.

[2] *The Tibetan Tripitaka*, Peking Edition, Reprint, Vol. 95, p. 2, f. 1, l.4.

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modifications are rendered respectively as *ḥgag med pa* (*anirodham*), *skye med pa* (*anutpādam*), *chad pa med pa* (*anucchedam*), *rtag med pa* (*aśāśvatam*), *ḥon ba med pa* (*anāgamanam*), *ḥgro med pa* (*anirgamanam*), *tha dad don min* (*anānārtham*), and *don cig min* (*anekārtham*). The order of the last four modifiers in the Sanskrit text has been changed in the Tibetan translation into the following order: the seventh, the eighth, the sixth, and the fifth. In the Tibetan translation, the negative particle *min*, which means the negation of identity, has been employed in the last two modifiers; whereas the negative particle *med*, which means the negation of the existence of an entity in its locus, has been employed in the first six modifiers. This suggests that the Tibetan translator(s) interpreted *an-eka-artham . . . ps* as '*ps* that is neither one object nor manifold objects'. It is unlikely that the Tibetan or the Chinese translator(s) were unaware of the fact that *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham* are used as possessive compounds. If so, why did they then not translate those terms in the sense of possessive compounds? Did they hold that those Sanskrit terms were able to convey their meanings more accurately when the terms were translated as descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) compounds, although the terms were used as possessive compounds?

In this context, the interpretation of Candrakīrti (7th cent.), a commentator on *MMK*, is revealing. In the *Prasannapadā*, his commentary on *MMK*, he has replaced the possessive compound *a-nānā-artham* found in 18. 9 by *a-nānā-artha-tā* ('non-manifold-object-

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ness'),[1] which means either (a) the principle that [*ps*] does not possess manifold objects [for its content], or (b) the state of *ps*' not being manifold objects. The former (a) is the sense in which the part *a-nānā-artha* is understood as a possessive compound, and the latter (b) is that in which the part is understood as a descriptive compound. It would be difficult to decide definitely which case Candrakīrti meant. But no matter which he did in fact mean, what is relevant to our problem is that he has interpreted the compound *a-nānā-artham* with some degree of laxity. The following passage in the *Prasannapadā* shows more clearly Candrakīrti's understanding. He rewrote the expression *an-eka-artham a-nānā-artham* found in 18. 11 by *eka-tva-anya-tva-rahita*, which means that which lacks (*rahita*) 'one-ness' (*eka-tva*) and 'other-ness' (*anya-tva*). Here again Candrakīrti interprets the possessive compounds *an-eka-artham* and *a-nānā-artham* somewhat loosely. This construction is the same as that in the Chinese and Tibetan translations; *ps* is considered to be that which is neither one nor manifold.

If we follow Candrakīrti, we obtain the following relation:

an-eka-artham	=	*eka-tva-rahitam*
(possessing no *eka-artha*)		(lacking one-ness)
a-nānā-artham	=	*anya-tva-rahitam*
(possessing no *nānā-artha*)		(lacking other-ness)

[1] *Prasannnapadā*, ed., by Poussin, p. 375, l. 7.

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Here one can see that the negative particle '*a-* (or *an-*)' has been replaced by the term *-rahita* (lacking). The term *eka-tva* (one-ness) means nothing but *eka-artha-tva* ('one-thing-ness'). Similarly, *anya-tva* ('other-ness') means the same thing as *anya-artha-tva* (the property of being another thing). Hence, we can derive the additional relation:

eka-artha	=	*eka-artha-tva*
(one object)		(one-object-ness)
anya-artha	=	*anya-artha-tva*
(other or different objects)		(the property of being different objects)

This kind of relation cannot find acceptance among Indian realists, such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, who hold that there must be a clear distinction between *dharma* (property) and *dharmin* (property-possessor). To assert that 'one-object' (*eka-artha*) is identical with 'one-object-ness' (*eka-artha-tva*) is to identify one object (*x* or *y*) with the relation that two factors (*x* and *y*) are one and the same. Here Candrakīrti identifies *dharma* (the relation between *x* and *y*) with *dharmin* (*x* or *y*). If it is possible to identify 'one-object' with 'one-object-ness', one can more easily understand why the term *an-eka-artham* is regarded as indicating 'that which is not one object' in traditional Chinese and Tibetan translations and some modern translations as well.[1]

[1] It should be added that *an-eka-artham a-nānā-artham* found in *MMK*, 18. 9 and 18. 11 are not construed as possessive compounds in Chinese and Tibetan translations.

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The identification of a factor (*x* or *y*) with the relation between the factors (*x* and *y*) is possible only if the borderline between *dharma* and *dharmin* is obscured. Usually in such an identification, relation comes to be considered as substantial. We cannot say that Nāgārjuna considered *ps* exactly in the same way as Candrakīrti, but we can safely assert that Candrakīrti was working in the same direction as Nāgārjuna. In the dedication of *MMK* appears also the identification of a factor with the relation between factors. The term *pratītyasamutpāda* appears to mean not only (a) factors (*x*, *y*, and other members) that are found in the relation of *ps*, but also (b) the relation of *ps*, according to which *x* (or *y*) comes into existence by depending upon *y* (or *x*). If the term *pratītyasamutpāda* may also refer to the factors of *ps*, then one must infer that Nāgārjuna has stated that *ps* neither arises nor perishes, not that *ps* is the absence of the arising (or of the perishing) of objects. Similarly, one could take the expression *anutpādaṃ pratītyasamutpādam*, found in the dedication, as meaning not only (a) objects (*x*, *y*, etc.,) which are members of the *ps* relation, and which do not arise, but also as (b) the principle according to which objects (*x*, *y*, etc.,) do not arise. The expression *aneka-arthaṃ pratītyasamutpādam* would, then, indicate not only (a) objects (*x*, *y*, etc.,) which are found in the *ps* relation, and which are not one and the same, but also (b) the *ps* relation that *x* and *y* are not one and the same. In the former case, i.e., (a), the relation of *ps* is considered to be something substantial, and is identified

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with objects (x and y) which are not one and the same. This is the way the Chinese and Tibetan translators have understood the compound *an-eka-artham*. Such a flexible interpretation does not, however, oblige us to hold that Nāgārjuna and his followers had no correct knowledge of Sanskrit. Rather, this kind of ambiguity is fundamental to the characteristics of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

I express my deepest gratitude to Prof. K. Heller (Sugiyama Jogakuen University, Nagoya), who rendered great help in improving my style.

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MARIA CHRISTOPHER BYRSKI

IS MANU'S VARṆADHARMA AN OBSOLETE SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT?

It is rather risky now to talk about the *varṇa* system of Manu in India. This much talked, much analyzed and even much more censored system hardly yields itself to a totally novel interpretation. It is the recent socio-economic development in Poland that has induced us to examine the *Varṇa-dharma* of Manu again.

We begin our argument *ab ovo*, i.e., from the Puruṣasūkta of the *Ṛgveda* to draw attention to the functional aspect of the myth of creation of the four *varṇa-s*. For, contrary to the point of view more commonly accepted that this myth gives divine justification to what was to become the hereditary and unequal division of the society, we believe that much more important is the fact of mythical incarnation of divine thought and speech in the form of a brāhmaṇa; power and authority in the form of a kṣatriya; productivity and wealth in the form of a vaiśya and, last but not least, exertion and toil symbolized by the divine feet, in the form of a śūdra. The functional and active aspect of this image as well as the mutual, functional interdependence of all the four faculties of the Primeval Man-God,

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putting them in a way on equal footing cannot be underestimated. Some of these ideas find support in Manu. For instance in **2.** 155 he states that the importance of each *varṇa* stems from knowledge (jñāna) in the case of a brāhmaṇa; from power and manliness (vīrya) in the case of a kṣatriya and from wealth (dhana) in the case of a vaiśya. Unhappily Manu already shows a deprecating attitude towards the śūdra mentioning as the source of his comparative importance just birth (janman) and not the skill and experience in his work. Yet this wasn't always so and elsewhere it is stated that śūdra is toil.[1] Thus as it was usual with the ancients of this country the theoretical principle of functional differentiation of society was expressed in mythological terms. We shall try to substantiate our conviction that this is a perfect basis also from the point of view of science for not so much the stratification of the society but rather its compartmentalization. And contrary to the later social practice in India, it does not have to involve glaring inequality, discrimination and degradation of one section of society. As it is usual, prolonged socio-political stability, in India of the past, as well, changed this system into mechanism of hereditary priviledge with little or no reference to actual

[1] M. V. Patwardhan, *The ideal democratic republic of Manu*, Delhi 1968, p. 24. The book contains many intersting formulations often quite in line with our argument. But due to what Albiruni would call 'mixing scientific theorems up with the silly superstitions of the crowd' his book leaves an impression of rather 'frenetic' approach, if we may use the word.

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qualifications of men belonging to these groups. Caste (jāti) actually embodies this principle of heredity. Yet, justice demands that we mention also quite a few, though often self-contradictory, protestations directed against automatic application of this principle. Manu himself is the best example here, once asserting that an ignorant brāhmaṇa is like a stuffed antilope but elsewhere insisting that even such a brāhmaṇa has to be treated like a god. Thus finally the *karmapradhāna* system* changed into the *dharmapradhāna* one and acquired the shape of a fossil giving security but hampering change, accommodation and growth even, or rather above all, within itself. The factor that facilitated this process was the mode of transferring knowledge and skills from generation to generation. Oral transmission of knowledge and teaching skills through direct demonstration by the elder, usually father, made impossible the mobility of talent, which can be safeguarded only through the system of universal, basic, and, to certain extent, indirect, education, i.e., not so much oral and demonstrative as transferred mainly by means of the written word.

Here, for the time being we want to abandon the Indian side of the problem and outline briefly these aspects of the present day socio-economic situation in Poland which have induced us to discuss the problem of the *varṇadharma* again. One of the leading

* As the *Gītā* says: cāturvarṇyaṃ mayā sṛṣṭaṃ guṇakarmavibhāgaśaḥ/ **4.** 13.

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economic experts of the Solidarity trade union, professor Stefan Kurowski in an essay published a few months back but written already ten years ago[1] analysing the social situation in Poland begins with the assertion that Poland, like so many other countries, found herself on the threshold of scientific and informatic revolution. This revolution differs from the industrial revolution in as much as the machines constructed now (computers, etc.) do not process any more matter but they process information. At the same time technological progress involves much more of scientific programming than before. Thus the role of scientists and the role of skilled workers rapidly grow. This is roughly speaking the background on which one has to see all conflicts which rocked the Polish society during the last twenty-five years. The Marxist theory of class struggle is of no use since it applies to capitalist society and its very basic premise is the private ownership of the means of production. Practically speaking the entire wealth in Poland has been nationalized. Thus the Marxist theory from a demaskating one changed into an apologetic one. There is no doubt that Polish is the class-less society in the strict Marxist meaning of the term. Wherefrom then come these violent conflicts that periodically affect our life? Before we attempt to give an answer to this question we have

[1] S. Kurowski, *Struktura społeczna a rewolucja naukowo-informatyczna* (*teoria kratyzmu*) Social structure and the scientific and informatic revolution (The theory of Cratism), Wydawnictwo im. Kostytucji 3 Maja, Warszawa 1981.

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to find out what is the structure of our class-less society? Here Stefan Kurowski proposes to ponder for a while upon the very original and basic causes, not so much of stratification of societies, but of their compartmentalization. He lists four such differentiating factors giving to them in accordance with the European scientific tradition Greek names. The first is power and authority—*cratos*, the second is wealth—*pleutes*, the third is work—*ergon* and last but not least the fourth is knowledge—*episteme*. Some men aspire to outstanding positions in the society by wielding power and controlling the means of coercion, others do it by either possessing or at least administering wealth, yet some other people achieve it by attaining skill in the work that they do (artisans and technicians) and last but not least a group of people does it by acquiring knowledge (scientists and scholars). The next very weighty indeed observation of Kurowski concerns a broad division of these four groups into two. He insists that while power and wealth tend to be more and more centralized and concentrated, knowledge and work, on the contrary, have a tendency to diffuse and the more they are spread the better results they give. Thus the conflict between the two is imminent, if a delicate balance is not struck at. Kurowski believes that in Poland an unprecedented concentration of power has taken place. Cratoses (the kṣatriyas of Manu) as he calls them—the wielders of power, are not separate individuals but a group of party functionaries occupying key positions in the other spheres.

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In the sphere of wealth they become administrators (for they do not own the means of production). They also tried to administer the sphere of knowledge which was made dangerously impotent by their incompetence. They made subservient the sphere of work, by putting on it the straight jacket of centrally controlled trade unions. The first to revolt against this state of affairs was the sphere of work. The representatives of the sphere of knowledge followed. Then again three times labour unrest took place. The last one in 1980 differed, for the intellectuals came forward with a massive and substantial support. The last action of both workers and intellectuals proved successful and it has begun the slow peaceful process of recovering the balance between all the four components of our society.

Now, if we remember what has been said right at the start of this paper, the most striking analogy of the above argument with the *varṇadharma* of Manu cannot be overlooked. The nature of conflict in the Polish class-less society can be thus described as a conflict of rather overgrown and too much centralized kṣatriya power aided by the totally subservient vaiśya-administrators with the śūdra-s representing the working class backed in close alliance by the brahmins, i.e., intellectuals. The first group represents centrifugal tendency, the second—centripetal one. The first is rather conservative in its character while the second has a revolutionary character and tries to bring in the scientific-informatic revolution.

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We present these views here not only because of their explanatory value so far as the Polish situation is concerned but also since we believe that they may have some bearing upon the role that a Sanskritist and an expert in the dharmaśāstra may play in shaping contemporary Indian sociology. Remembering that the views of Professor Kurowski are absolutely independent of any Indian influence (he does not seem to be aware of the *varṇadharma* concept considered from this particular point of view) but firmly rooted in the European tradition, we cannot underestimate their value as confirming the theory formulated millenia ago in India in its very substantial portion. It seems to us tempting to look at the ancient brahmin-kṣatriya conflict in the light of what has been presented above. It is equally tempting to ascribe the later difficulties and disabilities of the Indian social organization to the highly deprecatory attitude towards labour, i.e., towards śūdra. It is also unavoidable to feel that the hereditary custodianship of the tasks of the four varṇa-s should be assessed rather critically. In Poland of today the śūdra—a worker is even prouder than the brahmin—an intellectual and receives greater respect of the society at large. He owes it as well to himself as to the positive attitude of European intellectuals (brahmins) towards labour (the best example might be Carl Marx himself). This attitude finally prevailed and brought about the socialist revolution in many countries of Europe.

Ending these remarks we would like to raise one

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more issue; namely the question why this type of social organization developed in India so long ago and why it seems to be only the future perspective in Europe? We doubt whether it is possible at the moment to give a wholly convincing answer. Undoubtedly the particular genius of the peoples involved is mainly responsible for it. Still one cannot help pointing out the environmental or ecological cause. The benevolent climate of the Indian peninsula, the fertility of its land and the abundance of produce that it normally yielded permitted the Indian society to divide social duties on a scientific principle. This fact cannot be obliterated by later non-scientific distortions of the system. The same conditions could have been created in Europe only comparatively recently due to both technological progress and the change of social attitudes brought about by powerful socialistic trends. At the very beginning of our civilization almost every man had to attend to all his needs himself. Then slowly the societies of Europe embarked upon their way of development. And apparently it is only now that similar patterns of social structure emerge.

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।। न्यायदर्शने सुखचर्चा आनन्दमोक्षवादश्च ।।

आक्षपादसूत्रेषु षोडशपदार्थानामुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षणविधौ सुखदुःखयोश्चर्चा बहुधा समुपलभ्यते। बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् (न्या. सू. १. १. २१) इत्यत्र दुःखलक्षणं समायाति। तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः (१. १. २२) इत्यत्र तच्छब्देन प्रक्रान्तस्य दुःखस्यैव समुद्देशः। आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेय (१. १. ६) मित्यत्रोभयोः प्रमेयत्वेन परिगणनम्। इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् (१. १. १०) इत्यत्रात्मलिङ्गत्वेनोभयोः सुखदुःखयोर्गणनम्। दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः (१. १. २) इत्यत्रापवर्गप्राप्तिविधौ दुःखापायादपवर्गः दुखापायो वेति प्रदर्शितम्। प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासादिसूत्रे (३. १. ४१) सुखदुःखयोः स्मृतेरुत्पादो व्यवस्थितः। विविधबाधनायोगाद् दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः (४. १. ५४), न सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः (४. १. ५५), दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च (४. १. ५७), इत्येतेषु दुःखपरीक्षासूत्रेषु दुःखस्य सुखस्य च नामग्राहं ग्रहणं दृश्यते।

स्वीये प्रस्थानेऽक्षपादेन सुखचर्चात आधिक्येन दुःखचर्चा कृतेत्यत्र बीजमनुसंधेयम्।

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न्यायसूत्रव्याख्यातृषु पक्षिलस्वामिना वात्स्यायनेनापि न्यायभाष्ये सुखवद्दुःखस्यापि गणना कृता। तथाहि अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुश्च दुःखं दुःखहेतुश्च (१. १. १) इत्यत्र सममेव द्वयोरुल्लेखः। जन्मनि सति दुःखम्। तत्पुनः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयम्। बाधना पीडा ताप (१. १. २) इत्यत्र दुःखस्य लक्षणं प्रदत्तम्। दुःखे सुखमिति मिथ्याज्ञानम् (१. १. २)। आत्मादिषु सुखादिषु च प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं वक्तव्यम् (१. १. ४) इत्यत्र सुखादिप्रत्यक्षं स्वीकृतम्। तथैव सुखादिप्रत्यक्षं मनसो लिङ्गमिति युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति (१. १. १६) सूत्रपातनिकायाम्। दुःखमिति नेदमनुकूलवेदनीयस्य सुखस्य प्रतीतेः प्रत्याख्यानम्। किं तर्हि? जन्मन एवेदं ससुखसाधनस्य दुःखानुषङ्गाद् दुःखेनाविप्रयोगाद् विविधबाधनायोगाद् दुःखमिति समाधिभावनमुपदिश्यते (१. १. ६)। आत्मलिङ्गसूत्रभाष्ये पुनः अनेकार्थदर्शिनो दर्शनप्रतिसंधानाद् दुःखहेतौ द्वेषः। यज्जातीयोऽस्यार्थः सुखहेतुः प्रसिद्धः, तज्जातीयमर्थं पश्यन्नादातुं प्रयतते। एतेन दुःखहेतौ प्रयत्नो व्याख्यातः। सुखदुःखस्मृत्या चायं तत्साधनमाददानः सुखमुपलभते, दुःखमुपलभते। सुखदुःखे वेदयते (१. १. १०) इति भाष्योक्तिः। अपवर्गसूत्र (१. १. २२) व्याख्याने पुनः तेन दुःखेन जन्मना अत्यन्तं विमुक्तिरपवर्गः। कथम्? उपात्तस्य जन्मनो हानम्, अन्यस्य चानुपादानम्। एतामवस्थामपर्यन्तामपवर्गं वेदयन्तेऽपवर्गविदः। तदभयमजरममृत्युपदं ब्रह्म क्षेमप्राप्तिरिति बृहदारण्यकश्रुतिसंवादि भाष्यवचनम्। अत्र सुखस्य नित्यत्वम्, संजाते च मोक्षे तस्य व्यक्तिर्भवतीति मतं प्रतिक्षिप्तम्। मोक्षे

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सुखाभिव्यक्तिरविच्छिन्ना चेत् तस्य नित्यत्वं वा कारणजन्यत्वं वा मन्तव्यम्। स्वीकृते नित्यत्वे संसारदशायामपि तस्या अभिव्यक्त्यापत्तिः। तथा च मुक्तसंसारावस्थयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गः। अनित्यायां नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्तौ तस्या उत्पत्तिकारणं निर्णयमर्हति। आत्ममनःसंयोगो निमित्तान्तरसहितः कारणमिति चेत्? किं तावत् तन्निमित्तान्तरम्? धर्म एव तदिति पक्षे अनित्य उत्पत्तिमति धर्मे सति सुखसंवेदनम्। असति च तदभाव आपद्येत। असति संवेदने सुखस्थितौ न प्रमाणम्। अप्रक्षयी योगसमाधिजो धर्म इत्यप्यनुपपन्नम्। जातश्च भावपदार्थोऽविनाशी चेति विप्रतिषिद्धमेतत्।

नित्यसुखसंवेदने शरीरादिसंबन्धो बाधक इति न कथनीयम्। शरीरादयो भोगप्रसाधकाः। ते भोगप्रतिबन्धं करिष्यन्तीति व्याहतम्।

अथ नित्यस्य सुखस्य वेदनं न स्वीक्रियेत, मोक्षाधिगमे प्रवृत्तिरेव न स्यात्। अतो मोक्षचेष्टायां नित्यसुखानुभवस्वीकार इति वक्तव्ये नेयं प्रवृत्तिरिष्टाधिगमार्था, परमनिष्टोपरमार्थेति भाष्यमतम्। नेष्टमनिष्टेनाननुबद्धं संभवतीति अनिष्टानुबन्धादिष्टमप्यनिष्टं संपद्यते। अनिष्टहानाय च घटमान इष्टमपि जहाति, विवेकहानस्याशक्यत्वादिति।

नित्यसुखसंवेदनाय नित्यं देहादिकमपवर्गे कल्पनीयमिति चेत्? तर्हि मुक्तस्य कैवल्यहानिः। यथा देहादीनां नित्यत्वं प्रमाणविरुद्धम्, तथैव सुखस्यापि नित्यत्वं प्रमाणविरुद्धमेव स्वीकर्तव्यम्।

तर्हि नित्यसुखार्थकानामागमवचनानां का गतिरिति प्रश्ने

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तत्र सुखशब्द आत्यन्तिके दुःखाभावे प्रयुक्त इत्युपचारकल्पनैव भाष्यकारस्य समाधानम् ।

सति नित्यसुखरागे तत एव मोक्षाय प्रवृत्तिः, तदभावे च सा नैव घटते । दृश्यते च तत्र जनानां प्रवर्तना । अत्राह भाष्यकारः, रागस्तु बन्धनमेव । सति रागात्मके बन्धने मुक्त इति व्यपदेशो न घटते । तत्र तथैव दुःखद्वेषात्प्रवृत्तिरिति भाष्यसंमतपक्षेऽपि समानो दोषः । द्वेषोऽपि बन्धनमेव ।

अतः सुखदुःखयो रागद्वेषवियुक्तस्य मोक्षाधिगमस्वीकारे न दोष इति भाष्यनिष्कर्षः ।

भाष्यकारमतेन अनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखम्, प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं च दुःखम् । उभयोः सत्तायामनुभवगम्यायाम्, स्वल्पत्वात् क्षयित्वात् दुःखानुषक्तत्वाच्च सुखस्य दुःखपक्ष एव निक्षेपः । अकिंचित्करत्वात् विवेकहानस्याशक्यत्वाच्च तदवाप्तिचेष्टा वृथैवेति सूत्रकृता सुखस्य परीक्षादिकं न कृतमिति भाष्यसिद्धान्तः । प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयत्वात् तस्यापलापोऽपि न कृतः[1] ।

अर्थोऽयं दुःखपरीक्षाप्रकरणे (४. १.५४–५७) स्पष्टीकृतः । सुखस्य वस्तुसत्तायां न विमतिः । दुःखबाहुल्यं, दुःखदृढता, दुःखसातत्यं च दुःखपरीक्षायाः कारणम् । अत्र दुःखसातत्यव्याख्याविधौ

कामं कामयमानस्य यदा कामः समृद्धयति ।
अथैनमपरः कामः क्षिप्रमेव प्रबाधते ।।

[1] न्यायोपार्जितेष्वेव विषयेषु कियती सुखद्योतिका, कियन्ति चार्जनरक्षणादिभिर्दुःखदुर्दिननि । अन्यायोपार्जितेषु यद्भवति तन्मनसाऽपि चिन्तयितुमशक्यम् । (आत्मतत्त्वविवेकः पृः ४४०-१)

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इति महाभारतवचनं (१३. ४. ३०) समुपोद्बलकत्वेनोद्धृतं भाष्यकारेण। भाष्यानुसारिणोद्द्योतकरेण न्यायवार्त्तिके शरीरं षडिन्द्रियाणि, षड्विषयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेत्येकविंशति-प्रभेदभिन्नं दुखमुक्तम्। वाचस्पतिमिश्रेणोदयनाचार्येण च तदेव समर्थितम्। अनूक्तं च नव्यैर्न्यायविद्भिः।

तथापि न्यायनये सुखदुःखविषयिण्येकैव सिद्धान्तकथेति न मन्तव्यम्; बहुत्र विरुद्धवादस्योल्लेखदर्शनात्। न्यायतन्त्राणां चानेकत्वं समुल्लिखितम्[1]।

वात्स्यायनदृष्ट्या मोक्ष आनन्दानुभवो नास्तीत्युक्तचरम्। तत्र तस्य आत्मनो विशेषगुणोच्छेद एव मोक्ष इति वैशेषिकसिद्धान्ते पक्षपात इति स्पष्टमाभाति। दृष्टं च न्यायभाष्यकारस्य वैशेषिकानुसरणं प्रमेयगणनावसरे, अनुमानत्रैविध्यवैकल्पिकव्याख्याविधौ, न्यायसूत्रव्याख्याने च वैशेषिकसूत्राणां तत्सिद्धान्तानां च भूयसा समुपयोगेषु च। आनन्दमोक्षवादः प्राचीनस्वीकृत इत्यत्र वात्स्यायनेन तत्प्रत्याख्यानमेव प्रमाणम्, दृश्यते च परवर्तिनि भासर्वज्ञसंप्रदाये आनन्दमोक्षवादस्योररीकरणम्।

तथाहि न्यायसारे भासर्वज्ञः— कः पुनरयं मोक्ष इति? एके तावद् वर्णयन्ति, समस्तात्मविशेषगुणोच्छेदे संहारावस्थायामाकाशवदात्मनोऽत्यन्तावस्थानं मोक्ष इति, सुखदुःखयोरविनाभावित्वाद् विवेकहानानुपपत्तेः। न च सुखार्थैव प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिः कण्टकादिदुःखपरिहारार्थत्वेनापि प्रवृत्तेरुपलम्भादिति। मोहाद्यवस्थात्वात् मूर्च्छाद्यवस्थावदत्र विवेकिनां प्रवृत्तिर्न

[1] न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः॥
(महाभारत १२. २१०. २२)

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युक्ता इत्याहुरन्ये। दुःखे सति सुखस्यासंभवात् कण्टकादि-परिहारोऽपि सुखोपभोगार्थ एवेत्यसमो दृष्टान्तः।

कुतो मुक्तस्य सुखोपभोगसिद्धिरिति चेत्? आगमात्। उक्तं हि

सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम्।
तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाद् दुष्प्रापमकृतात्मभिः।। इति।

तथा [ ]

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति। [तै. उ. २-४]
आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यते। [ ]
विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म। [बृह. उ. ३. ५. ३४] इति च।

मुख्यार्थे बाधकाभावान्नोपचारप्रकल्पना। किं च भाराक्रान्तस्य तदपाये वाय्वादिसंपर्कवशात् सुखोत्पादे सत्येव सुखशब्दप्रयोगः, न दुःखाभावे।

सुखसंवेदनयोर्नित्यत्वात् मुक्तसंसारावस्थयोरविशेषप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्, न, चक्षुर्घटयोः कुड्यादेरिव सुखसंवेदनयोः विषय-विषयिभावसंबन्धप्रत्यनीकस्य दुःखादेः संसारावस्थायां सद्भावात् तन्नाशे मुक्तावस्थायां भवति सुखसंवेदनयोः संवन्ध इत्यतो नाविशेषः; तस्य संबन्धस्य कृतकत्वेन कदाचिन्नाशप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्? न, प्रध्वंसेनानैकान्त्यात्। वस्तुत्वे सतीति चेत्? न, द्रव्यादिष्वनन्तर्भावेन तदसिद्धत्वात्। अन्तर्भावे वा समवायादिभिः सह तत्संवेदनस्य संबन्धो न स्यात्। अदृष्टादिवशात् कर्मकारकं विषयः। तज्जनितज्ञानं विषयीति चेत्? न, ईश्वरज्ञानस्य

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नित्यस्यार्थैः सह संबन्धाभावप्रसङ्गादिति । तस्मात् कृतकत्वेऽपि नित्यसुखसंवेदनसंबन्धस्य विनाशकारणाभावात् नित्यत्वं स्थितम् ।

तत् सिद्धमेतत् नित्यसंवेद्यमानेन सुखेन विशिष्टा आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्ष इति ।।

[न्यायसारः पृः ५९-४-८]

इयं भासर्वज्ञीया युक्तिरर्वाक्तनव्यख्यासंबलितस्य न्यायभाष्यस्य मतखण्डनाय प्रेरितेति प्रतीयते ।

संक्षेपशंकरजये कस्यचिन्नैयायिकस्याचार्यशंकरं प्रति प्रश्नः, आचार्यकृतं तदुत्तरं चात्र स्मरणीये । तथा हि

तत्रापि नैयायिक आत्तगर्वः
कणादपक्षाच्चरणाक्षपक्षे ।
मुक्तेर्विशेषं वद सर्वविच्चेत्
नोचेत् प्रतिज्ञां त्यज सर्ववित्त्वे ।।
अत्यन्तनाशे गुणसंगतेर्या
स्थितिर्नभोवत् कणभक्षपक्षे ।
मुक्तिस्त्वदीये चरणाक्षपक्षे
सानन्दसंवित् सहिता विमुक्तिः ।।

[सं. श. ज. १६. ६८–९]

अत्र मुक्तिविषये न्यायवैशेषिकयोर्मतभेद उट्टङ्कितः । सच भासर्वज्ञानुसारीति प्रतियते ।

कुमारिलस्वामिपादविरचिता नचिरात् प्रकाशिता सौगतसूत्रव्याख्यानकारिकापि आनन्दमोक्षवाद एव गौतममतमित्याह,

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दुःखात्यन्तविमोक्षः स्यादपवर्ग इति ब्रुवन्।
सूक्ष्मधीगम्यमानन्दमुपेक्ष्यमाह गौतमः ।। ३-१३
आत्ममोक्षावनानन्दौ प्रयत्नाद् येन वर्णितौ।
स्वमौढ्यं दर्शितं तेन तद्वचो न ज्ञसंमतम् ।। ३-१५

आद्यादिमे श्लोके गौतममतेनानन्दमोक्षवादस्य स्वीकारो, द्वितीये च वात्स्यायननिन्देति प्रतिभाति। एतावता न्यायशास्त्रे आनन्द-मोक्षवादस्य संप्रदायो निरानन्दमोक्षवादस्येव सुदीर्घात् कालात् लब्धप्रसर आसीदिति संभाव्यते।

अन्यत्रापि भारतीयदर्शन आनन्दमोक्षवाद उररीकृतो दृश्यते। मीमांसाप्रस्थाने कुमारिल आनन्दमोक्षवादीति सुचरितो नारायणः खण्डदेवश्च। निरानन्दमोक्षवादीति पार्थसारथि-मिश्रः। तत्र पार्थसारथिमिश्रस्य वात्स्यायनस्येव वैशेषिकसंमते आत्मविशेषगुणोच्छेदरूपे मोक्षे पक्षपात इति ज्ञेयम्।

मोक्षे सुखसत्त्वासूचकेषु श्रुतिवचनेषु सत्स्वपि तत्र वात्स्यायनस्य लक्षणास्वीकाररहस्यं तात्पर्यटीकायां वाचस्पति-मिश्रेण मनाक् प्रदर्शितम्। मोक्षे नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्तिर्भविष्यतीति अवधारणे जाते नित्यसुखावधारणजन्या सुखतृष्णापिशाची मुमुक्षुहृदये लब्धप्रसरा भविष्यतीति समुपस्थितविषयसुखेष्वपि तस्य प्रवृत्तिसंभावना। तेन पुनर्मुमुक्षोर्मोक्षलाभः सुदूरपराहतो मा भूदिति। [ता. टी. १-१-२२]। आत्मतत्त्वविवेके उदयनस्ता-त्पर्योक्तिं विस्पष्टयन्निवोवाच, नित्यसुखकामना दुरवसाना। नित्यसुखाभिलाषिणश्च नितरां दुर्गतिः संभाव्यते। तस्य मोक्षविरोधिनि वैषयिकेऽपि सुखेऽपि कदाचित् रतिः स्यात्,

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अलाभे मत्तकाशिन्या दृष्टा तिर्यक्षु कामितेति न्यायात् [आ. त. वि. पृ. ४४५] ।

अमूलिकेयं नैयायिकभीतिरिति प्राच्यमीमांसकस्योक्ति-र्वात्स्यायनमतसमालोचनपरा मन्ये वाचस्पतिनोदयनेन च न विवेचिता । तथा हि ब्रह्मसिद्धौ मण्डनः । न च रागनिबन्धना तत्र प्रवृत्तिः, नहीच्छामात्रं रागः । अविद्याक्षिप्तमभूतगुणाभि-निवेशं रागमाचक्षते । तत्त्वदर्शनवैमल्यात्तु तत्वे चेतसः प्रसादो-ऽभिरुचिरिच्छा न रागपक्षे व्यवस्थाप्यते यथा संसारासारता-तत्त्वदर्शननिष्पन्नो नोद्वेगस्ततो द्वेषपक्षे । अन्यथा सर्वदुःखातिगेऽपि तत्त्वे तद्द्वेषनिबन्धना प्रवृत्तिरिति संसारानुबन्धः स्यात् । अपि च दृष्टपरोत्कर्षे रागिभ्योऽपि इन्द्रियजय उपदिश्यते[1], साधनत्वेन कामादित्यागात्मकः । तथेहापि भविष्यतीति । (ब्रह्मसिद्धौ पृ-३) ।

प्रागुद्दिष्टां नैयायिकशङ्कामपनयन् प्रमाणमालायामानन्द-बोधभट्टारकोऽप्याह—ब्रह्मात्मभावरूपे मोक्षे तदानन्दरागात् प्रवर्तमानस्य संसारप्रसङ्गो बाधकः स्यात् । रागादिनिबन्धना च प्रवृत्तिः संसारबीजमिति हि शास्त्रस्थितिरिति चेत् ? मैवम्, अस्य परमानन्दगोचरत्वे तत्प्रवृत्तिविरोधित्वात् । परमो हि ब्रह्मानन्दः । सोऽस्य परम आनन्दः । एतस्यैवानन्दस्य अन्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति इति श्रुतेः । तथा च तद्गोचरो रागः कथमल्पीयसि अनेकदुःखसंभिन्ने सांसारिके सुखे प्रवर्तयेत् ? यदि तदलाभे काचिदन्यत्र प्रवृत्तिर्भवेत् अलाभे मत्तकाशिन्या दृष्टा

[1] आर्थशास्त्र १. ६.

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तिर्यक्षु कामितेति न्यायादिति चेत्, भवत्वेवं कस्यचित् न तु सर्वस्य, महारम्भस्य व्यग्रमनसो वशीकृतेन्द्रियग्रामस्य प्रकृत एवार्थे प्रवृत्तिसंभवात्। तादृश एवाधिकारी मोक्षशास्त्रे विवक्षितः न च सर्वाधिकारं किमपि शास्त्रं संभवतीति। यस्त्वेवमपि दर्शनकथन्तासंबोधरहितो यथादर्शनपूजकः प्राह, रागनिबन्धत्वादियं प्रवृत्तिः संसारबीजत्वाद् इतरप्रवृत्तिवदिति, तस्य दुःखोच्छेदमात्रे मोक्षे दुःखद्वेषनिबन्धना प्रवृत्तिः द्वेषनिबन्धना इति कथं न संसारबीजं भवेत्? तथाभूतेतरप्रवृत्तिवत् यदि न तत्र द्वेषनिबन्धना इति कथं न संसारबीजं भवेत्? तथाभूतेतरप्रवृत्तिवत्। यदि न तत्र द्वेषात् प्रवृत्तिः, किं तु संसारासारतातत्त्वदर्शननिष्पन्नोद्वेगात्, मिथ्याज्ञाननिदानं हि दोषः इति चेत् ? अत्रापि तर्हि रागान्न प्रवृत्तिः, अपि तु परमार्थदर्शननिदानायाः परमानन्दश्रद्धाया एव, न हीच्छामात्रं रागः। किं तर्हि? मिथ्याज्ञाननिदानैव सा। तस्मात् मुख्यार्थे बाधकाभावात् ब्रह्मणि आनन्दश्रुतिर्न दुःखाभावपरतयोपचरणीयेति सिद्धम्॥

[प्रमाणमाला पृ- १-२]।

एतावता आनन्दमोक्षवादस्य खण्डनमण्डनविधौ दर्शनप्रस्थानेषु तत्त्वविदां निरन्तरा प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा। वस्तुतः सुखस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वस्वीकारो न्यायभाष्यकारादीनाम्, तस्य दौर्लभ्यात्। कदाचिल्लाभेऽपि क्षयित्वात्, तारतम्यवत्त्वाद, विवेकहानस्याशक्यत्वाच्चेति द्रष्टव्यम्। आगमप्राप्तसुखशब्दस्य मुख्यार्थत्यागेन दुःखाभावे लक्षणापरिग्रहस्तेषामेतदर्थं एव। न्यायवैशेषिकयोः समानं भरं न्यस्यतां तेषामात्मविशेषगुणोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति वैशेषिकराद्धान्तविरोधोऽपि मोक्षे सुखस्वीकारविधावन्तरायः।

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इति न्यायविदां नीतौ प्रत्नानां युक्तिलेशतः।
सुखास्तित्वे मते प्रोक्ते राजानेन प्रसीदतु ॥

श्रीअनन्तलालठाकुरो
वर्धमानविश्वविद्यालयीयसंस्कृतविभागस्थः ॥

[1] द्रः न्यायभूषण पृ १६३.

आलम्बनानि

[1] न्यायदर्शनम् भाष्य-वार्त्तिक-टीकावृत्तिसहितम्-कलिकाता संस्कृत ग्रन्थमाला १९३६

[2] न्यायसारः सभूषणः, वाराणसी, १९६८

[3] आत्मातत्त्वविवेकः' चौखम्बा१९४०

[4] भारतीयदर्शनशास्त्रेर समन्वय, कलिकाताविश्वविद्यालय १९५८

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MIRON WINSLOW

Tamil-English Dictionary

Reprint edited by KLAUS LUDWIG JANERT

1978. XIV, 976 Seiten (3spaltig), 21 x 28 cm. Ln. DM 148,–.

Wenn das in Madras 1862 erschienene und seit etwa hundert Jahren vergriffene und folglich auch dem Antiquariatsmarkt ganz unzugängliche Wörterbuch der großen dravidischen Tamilsprache aus dem Süden Indiens nun endlich im unveränderten Nachdruck vorgelegt wird, so geschieht das, weil es bis heute kein anderes Tamil-Englisches Wörterbuch gibt, das sowohl handlich als auch wirklich umfassend ist (ca. 120.000 Ausdrücke in feinstem Druck und dreispaltiger Anordnung): niemand kann es entbehren, der sich sprachlich mit dem Dravidischen und Südindien oder der dortigen sehr bedeutenden Tamilliteratur beschäftigt. Das Erscheinen des Nachdrucks fällt in eine Zeit, in der dem Tamil und den Tamils weltweit ein völlig neues und ungeahnt großes Interesse entgegengebracht wird.

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Herausgegeben von M. SRIMANNARAYANA MURTI unter der Mitarbeit von KLAUS L. JANERT

1980. XXV, 268 Seiten. Ln. ~~Efmn~~ DM 82,–.

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
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